B.1.1Widespread, pervasive impacts to ecosystems, people, settlements, and infrastructure have resulted from observed increases in the frequency and intensity of climate and weather extremes, including hot extremes on land and in the ocean, heavy precipitation events, drought and fire weather (high confidence). Increasingly since AR5, these observed impacts have been attributed28 to human-induced climate change particularly through increased frequency and severity of extreme events. These include increased heat-related human mortality (medium confidence), warm-water coral bleaching and mortality (high confidence), and increased drought-related tree mortality (high confidence). Observed increases in areas burned by wildfires have been attributed to human-induced climate change in some regions (medium to high confidence). Adverse impacts from tropical cyclones, with related losses and damages19, have increased due to sea level rise and the increase in heavy precipitation (medium confidence). Impacts in natural and human systems from slow-onset processes29 such as ocean acidification, sea level rise or regional decreases in precipitation have also been attributed to human induced climate change (high confidence). {1.3, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 4.2, 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, 5.12, 7.2, 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, 9.11, 11.3, Box 11.1, Box 11.2, Table 11.9, 12.3, 12.4, 13.3, 13.5, 13.10, 14.2, 14.5, 15.7, 15.8, 16.2, CCP1.2, CCP2.2, Box CCP5.1, CCP7.3, CCB DISASTER, CCB EXTREME, CCB ILLNESS, WGI AR6 SPM.3, WGI AR6 9, WGI AR6 11.3–11.8, SROCC Chapter 4}

B.1.2Climate change has caused substantial damages, and increasingly irreversible losses, in terrestrial, freshwater and coastal and open ocean marine ecosystems (high confidence). The extent and magnitude of climate change impacts are larger than estimated in previous assessments (high confidence). Widespread deterioration of ecosystem structure and function, resilience and natural adaptive capacity, as well as shifts in seasonal timing have occurred due to climate change (high confidence), with adverse socioeconomic consequences (high confidence). Approximately half of the species assessed globally have shifted polewards or, on land, also to higher elevations (very high confidence). Hundreds of local losses of species have been driven by increases in the magnitude of heat extremes (high confidence), as well as mass mortality events on land and in the ocean (very high confidence) and loss of kelp forests (high confidence). Some losses are already irreversible, such as the first species extinctions driven by climate change (medium confidence). Other impacts are approaching irreversibility such as the impacts of hydrological changes resulting from the retreat of glaciers, or the changes in some mountain (medium confidence) and Arctic ecosystems driven by permafrost thaw (high confidence). (Figure SPM.2a). { TS B.1, Figure TS.5, 2.3, 2.4, 3.4, 3.5, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 9.6, 10.4, 11.3, 12.3, 12.8, 13.3, 13.4, 13.10, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6, 15.3, 16.2, CCP1.2, CCP3.2, CCP4.1, CCP5.2, Figure CCP5.4, CCP6.1, CCP6.2, CCP7.2, CCP7.3, CCB EXTREMES, CCB ILLNESS, CCB MOVING PLATE, CCB NATURAL, CCB PALEO, CCB SLR, SROCC 2.3}

B.1.3Climate change including increases in frequency and intensity of extremes have reduced food and water security, hindering efforts to meet Sustainable Development Goals (high confidence). Although overall agricultural productivity has increased, climate change has slowed this growth over the past 50 years globally (medium confidence), related negative impacts were mainly in mid- and low latitude regions but positive impacts occurred in some high latitude regions (high confidence). Ocean warming and ocean acidification have adversely affected food production from shellfish aquaculture and fisheries in some oceanic regions (high confidence). Increasing weather and climate extreme events have exposed millions of people to acute food insecurity30 and reduced water security, with the largest impacts observed in many locations and/or communities in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, Small Islands and the Arctic (high confidence). Jointly, sudden losses of food production and access to food compounded by decreased diet diversity have increased malnutrition in many communities (high confidence), especially for Indigenous Peoples, small-scale food producers and low-income households (high confidence), with children, elderly people and pregnant women particularly impacted (high confidence). Roughly half of the world’s population currently experience severe water scarcity for at least some part of the year due to climatic and non-climatic drivers (medium confidence). (Figure SPM.2b) {3.5, 4.3, 4.4, Box 4.1, 5.2, 5.4, 5.8, 5.9, 5.12, 7.1, 7.2, 9.8, 10.4, 11.3, 12.3, 13.5, 14.4, 14.5, 15.3, 16.2, CCP5.2, CCP6.2 }

B.1.4Climate change has adversely affected physical health of people globally (very high confidence) and mental health of people in the assessed regions (very high confidence). Climate change impacts on health are mediated through natural and human systems, including economic and social conditions and disruptions (high confidence). In all regions extreme heat events have resulted in human mortality and morbidity (very high confidence). The occurrence of climate-related food-borne and water-borne diseases has increased (very high confidence). The incidence of vector-borne diseases has increased from range expansion and/or increased reproduction of disease vectors (high confidence). Animal and human diseases, including zoonoses, are emerging in new areas (high confidence). Water and food-borne disease risks have increased regionally from climate-sensitive aquatic pathogens, includingVibrio spp. (high confidence), and from toxic substances from harmful freshwater cyanobacteria (medium confidence). Although diarrheal diseases have decreased globally, higher temperatures, increased rain and flooding have increased the occurrence of diarrheal diseases, including cholera (very high confidence) and other gastrointestinal infections (high confidence). In assessed regions, some mental health challenges are associated with increasing temperatures (high confidence), trauma from weather and climate extreme events (very high confidence), and loss of livelihoods and culture (high confidence). Increased exposure to wildfire smoke, atmospheric dust, and aeroallergens have been associated with climate-sensitive cardiovascular and respiratory distress (high confidence). Health services have been disrupted by extreme events such as floods (high confidence). {4.3, 5.12, 7.2, Box 7.3, 8.2, 8.3, Box 8.6, Figure 8.10, 9.10, Figure 9.33, Figure 9.34, 10.4, 11.3, 12.3, 13.7, 14.4, 14.5, Figure 14.8, 15.3, 16.2, CCP5.2, Table CCP5.1, CCP6.2, Figure CCP6.3, Table CCB ILLNESS.1}

B.1.5In urban settings, observed climate change has caused impacts on human health, livelihoods and key infrastructure (high confidence). Multiple climate and non-climate hazards impact cities, settlements and infrastructure and sometimes coincide, magnifying damage (high confidence). Hot extremes including heatwaves have intensified in cities (high confidence), where they have also aggravated air pollution events (medium confidence) and limited functioning of key infrastructure (high confidence). Observedimpacts are concentrated amongst the economically and socially marginalized urban residents, e.g., in informal settlements (high confidence) . Infrastructure, including transportation, water, sanitation and energy systems have been compromised by extreme and slow-onset events, with resulting economic losses, disruptions of services and impacts to well-being (high confidence). {4.3, 6.2, 7.1, 7.2, 9.9, 10.4, 11.3, 12.3, 13.6, 14.5, 15.3, CCP2.2, CCP4.2, CCP5.2 }

B.1.6Overall adverse economic impacts attributable to climate change, including slow-onset and extreme weather events, have been increasingly identified (medium confidence). Some positive economic effects have been identified in regions that have benefited from lower energy demand as well as comparative advantages in agricultural markets and tourism (high confidence). Economic damages from climate change have been detected in climate-exposed sectors, with regional effects to agriculture, forestry, fishery, energy, and tourism (high confidence), and through outdoor labour productivity (high confidence). Some extreme weather events, such as tropical cyclones, have reduced economic growth in the short-term (high confidence). Non-climatic factors including some patterns of settlement, and siting of infrastructure have contributed to the exposure of more assets to extreme climate hazards increasing the magnitude of the losses (high confidence). Individual livelihoods have been affected through changes in agricultural productivity, impacts on human health and food security, destruction of homes and infrastructure, and loss of property and income, with adverse effects on gender and social equity (high confidence). {3.5, 4.2, 5.12, 6.2, 7.2, 8.2, 9.6, 10.4, 13.10, 14.5, Box 14.6, 16.2, Table 16.5, 18.3, CCP6.2, CCB GENDER, CWGB ECONOMICS}

B.1.7Climate change is contributing to humanitarian crises where climate hazards interact with high vulnerability (high confidence). Climate and weather extremes are increasingly driving displacement in all regions (high confidence), with Small Island States disproportionately affected (high confidence). Flood and drought-related acute food insecurity and malnutrition have increased in Africa (high confidence) and Central and South America (high confidence). While non-climatic factors are the dominant drivers of existing intrastate violent conflicts, in some assessed regions extreme weather and climate events have had a small, adverse impact on their length, severity or frequency, but the statistical association is weak (medium confidence). Through displacement and involuntary migration from extreme weather and climate events, climate change has generated and perpetuated vulnerability (medium confidence). {4.2, 4.3, 5.4, 7.2, 9.8, Box 9.9, Box 10.4, 12.3, 12.5, 16.2, CCB DISASTER, CCB MIGRATE}

B.2.1Since AR5 there is increasing evidence that degradation and destruction of ecosystems by humans increases the vulnerability of people (high confidence). Unsustainable land-use and land cover change, unsustainable use of natural resources, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, pollution, and their interactions, adversely affect the capacities of ecosystems, societies, communities and individuals to adapt to climate change (high confidence). Loss of ecosystems and their services has cascading and long-term impacts on people globally, especially for Indigenous Peoples and local communities who are directly dependent on ecosystems, to meet basic needs (high confidence). {2.3, 2.5, 2.6, 3.5, 3.6, 4.2, 4.3, 4.6, 5.1, 5.4, 5.5, 5.7, 5.8, 7.2, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 9.6, 10.4, 11.3, 12.2, 12.5, 13.8, 14.4, 14.5, 15.3, CCP1.2, CCP1.3, CCP2.2, CCP3, CCP4.3, CCP5.2, CCP6.2, CCP7.2, CCP7.3, CCP7.4, CCB ILLNESS, CCB MOVING PLATE, CCB SLR}

B.2.2Non-climatic human-induced factors exacerbate current ecosystem vulnerability to climate change (very high confidence). Globally, and even within protected areas, unsustainable use of natural resources, habitat fragmentation, and ecosystem damage by pollutants increase ecosystem vulnerability to climate change (high confidence). Globally, less than 15% of the land, 21% of the freshwater and 8% of the ocean are protected areas. In most protected areas, there is insufficient stewardship to contribute to reducing damage from, or increasing resilience to, climate change (high confidence). {2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.4, 3.6, 4.2, 4.3, 5.8, 9.6, 11.3, 12.3, 13.3, 13.4, 14.5, 15.3, CCP1.2, Figure CCP1.1 5, CCP2.1, CCP2.2, CCP4.2, CCP5.2, CCP6.2, CCP7.2, CCP7.3, CCB NATURAL}

B.2.3Future vulnerability of ecosystems to climate change will be strongly influenced by the past, present and future development of human society, including from overall unsustainable consumption and production, and increasing demographic pressures, as well as persistent unsustainable use and management of land, ocean, and water (high confidence). Projected climate change, combined with non-climatic drivers, will cause loss and degradation of much of the world’s forests (high confidence), coral reefs and low-lying coastal wetlands (very high confidence). While agricultural development contributes to food security, unsustainable agricultural expansion, driven in part by unbalanced diets32 , increases ecosystem and human vulnerability and leads to competition for land and/or water resources (high confidence). {2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 4.3, 4.5, 5.6, 5.12, 5.13, 7.2, 12.3, 13.3, 13.4, 13.10, 14.5, CCP1.2, CCP2.2, CCP5.2, CCP6.2, CCP7.2, CCP7.3, CCB HEALTH, CCB NATURAL}

B.2.4Regions and people with considerable development constraints have high vulnerability to climatic hazards (high confidence). Global hotspots of high human vulnerability are found particularly in West-, Central- and East Africa, South Asia, Central and South America, Small Island Developing States and the Arctic (high confidence). Vulnerability is higher in locations with poverty, governance challenges and limited access to basic services and resources, violent conflict and high levels of climate-sensitive livelihoods (e.g., smallholder farmers, pastoralists, fishing communities) (high confidence). Between 2010–2020, human mortality from floods, droughts and storms was 15 times higher in highly vulnerable regions, compared to regions with very low vulnerability (high confidence). Vulnerability at different spatial levels is exacerbated by inequity and marginalization linked to gender, ethnicity, low income or combinations thereof (high confidence), especially for many Indigenous Peoples and local communities (high confidence). Present development challenges causing high vulnerability are influenced by historical and ongoing patterns of inequity such as colonialism, especially for many Indigenous Peoples and local communities (high confidence). {4.2, 5.12, 6.2, 6.4, 7.1, 7.2, Box 7.1, 8.2, 8.3, Box 8.4, Figure 8.6, Box 9.1, 9.4, 9.7, 9.9, 10.3, 10.4, 10.6, 12.3, 12.5, Box 13.2, 14.4, 15.3, 15.6, 16.2, CCP6.2, CCP7.4 }

B.2.5Future human vulnerability will continue to concentrate where the capacities of local, municipal and national governments, communities and the private sector are least able to provide infrastructures and basic services (high confidence). Under the global trend of urbanization, human vulnerability will also concentrate in informal settlements and rapidly growing smaller settlements (high confidence). In rural areas vulnerability will be heightened by compounding processes including high emigration, reduced habitability and high reliance on climate-sensitive livelihoods (high confidence). Key infrastructure systems including sanitation, water, health, transport, communications and energy will be increasingly vulnerable if design standards do not account for changing climate conditions (high confidence). Vulnerability will also rapidly rise in low-lying Small Island Developing States and atolls in the context of sea level rise and in some mountain regions, already characterised by high vulnerability due to high dependence on climate-sensitive livelihoods, rising population displacement, the accelerating loss of ecosystem services and limited adaptive capacities (high confidence). Future exposure to climatic hazards is also increasing globally due to socioeconomic development trends including migration, growing inequality and urbanization (high confidence). {4.5, 5.5, 6.2, 7.2, 8.3, 9.9, 9.11, 10.3, 10.4, 12.3, 12.5, 13.6, 14.5, 15.3, 15.4, 16.5, CCP2.3, CCP4.3, CCP5.2, CCP5.3, CCP5.4, CCP6.2, CCB MIGRATE}

B.3.1Near-term warming and increased frequency, severity and duration of extreme events will place many terrestrial, freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems at high or very high risks of biodiversity loss (medium to very high confidence, depending on ecosystem). Near-term risks for biodiversity loss are moderate to high in forest ecosystems (medium confidence), kelp and seagrass ecosystems (high to very high confidence), and high to very high in Arctic sea-ice and terrestrial ecosystems (high confidence) and warm-water coral reefs (very high confidence). Continued and accelerating sea level rise will encroach on coastal settlements and infrastructure (high confidence) and commit low-lying coastal ecosystems to submergence and loss (medium confidence). If trends in urbanisation in exposed areas continue, this will exacerbate the impacts, with more challenges where energy, water and other services are constrained (medium confidence). The number of people at risk from climate change and associated loss of biodiversity will progressively increase (medium confidence). Violent conflict and, separately, migration patterns, in the near-term will be driven by socioeconomic conditions and governance more than by climate change (medium confidence). (Figure SPM.3) {2.5, 3.4, 4.6, 6.2, 7.3, 8.7, 9.2, 9.9, 11.6, 12.5, 13.6, 13.10, 14.6, 15.3, 16.5, 16.6, CCP1.2, CCP2.1, CCP2.2, CCP5.3, CCP6.2, CCP6.3, CCB MIGRATE, CCB SLR}

B.3.2In the near term, climate-associated risks to natural and human systems depend more strongly on changes in their vulnerability and exposure than on differences in climate hazards between emissions scenarios (high confidence). Regional differences exist, and risks are highest where species and people exist close to their upper thermal limits, along coastlines, in close association with ice or seasonal rivers (high confidence). Risks are also high where multiple non-climate drivers persist or where vulnerability is otherwise elevated (high confidence). Many of these risks are unavoidable in the near-term, irrespective of emissions scenario (high confidence). Several risks can be moderated with adaptation (high confidence). (Figure SPM.3, Section C) {2.5, 3.3, 3.4, 4.5, 6.2, 7.1, 7.3, 8.2, 11.6, 12.4, 13.6, 13.7, 13.10, 14.5, 16.4, 16.5, CCP2.2, CCP4.3, CCP5.3, CCB SLR, WGI AR6 Table SPM.1}

B.3.3Levels of risk for all Reasons for Concern (RFC) are assessed to become high to very high at lower global warming levels than in AR5 (high confidence). Between 1.2°C and 4.5°C global warming level very high risks emerge in all five RFCs compared to just two RFCs in AR5 (high confidence). Two of these transitions from high to very high risk are associated with near-term warming: risks to unique and threatened systems at a median value of 1.5 [1.2 to 2.0] °C (high confidence) and risks associated with extreme weather events at a median value of 2.0 [1.8 to 2.5] °C (medium confidence). Some key risks contributing to the RFCs are projected to lead to widespread, pervasive, and potentially irreversible impacts at global warming levels of 1.5–2°C if exposure and vulnerability are high and adaptation is low (medium confidence). Near-term actions that limit global warming to close to 1.5°C would substantially reduce projected losses and damages related to climate change in human systems and ecosystems, compared to higher warming levels, but cannot eliminate them all (very high confidence). (Figure SPM.3b) {16.5, 16.6, CCB SLR}

B.4.1Biodiversity loss and degradation, damages to and transformation of ecosystems are already key risks for every region due to past global warming and will continue to escalate with every increment of global warming (very high confidence). In terrestrial ecosystems, 3 to 14% of species assessed33 willlikely face very high risk of extinction34 at global warming levels of 1.5°C, increasing up to 3 to 18% at 2°C, 3 to 29% at 3°C, 3 to 39% at 4°C, and 3 to 48% at 5°C. In ocean and coastal ecosystems, risk of biodiversity loss ranges between moderate and very high by 1.5°C global warming level and is moderate to very high by 2°C but with more ecosystems at high and very high risk (high confidence), and increases to high to very high across most ocean and coastal ecosystems by 3°C (medium to high confidence, depending on ecosystem). Very high extinction risk for endemic species in biodiversity hotspots is projected to at least double from 2% between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming levels and to increase at least tenfold if warming rises from 1.5°C to 3°C (medium confidence). (Figure SPM.3c, d, f) {2.4, 2.5, 3.4, 3.5, 12.3, 12.5, Table 12.6, 13.4, 13.10, 16.4, 16.6, CCP1.2, Figure CCP1.6, Figure CCP1.7, CCP5.3, CCP6.3, CCB PALEO}

B.4.2Risks in physical water availability and water-related hazards will continue to increase by the mid- to long-term in all assessed regions, with greater risk at higher global warming levels (high confidence). At approximately 2°C global warming, snowmelt water availability for irrigation is projected to decline in some snowmelt dependent river basins by up to 20%, and global glacier mass loss of 18 ± 13% is projected to diminish water availability for agriculture, hydropower, and human settlements in the mid- to long-term, with these changes projected to double with 4°C global warming (medium confidence). In Small Islands, groundwater availability is threatened by climate change (high confidence). Changes to streamflow magnitude, timing and associated extremes are projected to adversely impact freshwater ecosystems in many watersheds by the mid- to long-term across all assessed scenarios (medium confidence). Projected increases in direct flood damages are higher by 1.4 to 2 times at 2°C and 2.5 to 3.9 times at 3°C compared to 1.5°C global warming without adaptation (medium confidence). At global warming of 4°C, approximately 10% of the global land area is projected to face increases in both extreme high and low river flows in the same location, with implications for planning for all water use sectors (medium confidence). Challenges for water management will be exacerbated in the near, mid and long term, depending on the magnitude, rate and regional details of future climate change and will be particularly challenging for regions with constrained resources for water management (high confidence). {2.3, 4.4, 4.5, Box 4.2, Figure 4.20, 15.3, CCP5.3, CCB DISASTER, SROCC 2.3}

B.4.3Climate change will increasingly put pressure on food production and access, especially in vulnerable regions, undermining food security and nutrition (high confidence). Increases in frequency, intensity and severity of droughts, floods and heatwaves, and continued sea level rise will increase risks to food security (high confidence) in vulnerable regions from moderate to high between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming level, with no or low levels of adaptation (medium confidence). At 2°C or higher global warming level in the mid-term, food security risks due to climate change will be more severe, leading to malnutrition and micro-nutrient deficiencies, concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Central and South America and Small Islands (high confidence). Global warming will progressively weaken soil health and ecosystem services such as pollination, increase pressure from pests and diseases, and reduce marine animal biomass, undermining food productivity in many regions on land and in the ocean (medium confidence). At 3°C or higher global warming level in the long term, areas exposed to climate-related hazards will expand substantially compared with 2°C or lower global warming level (high confidence), exacerbating regional disparity in food security risks (high confidence). (Figure SPM.3) {1.1, 3.3, 4.5, 5.2, 5.4, 5.5, 5.8, 5.9, 5.12, 7.3, 8.3, 9.11, 13.5, 15.3, 16.5, 16.6, CCB MOVING PLATE, CCB SLR}

B.4.4Climate change and related extreme events will significantly increase ill health and premature deaths from the near- to long-term (high confidence). Globally, population exposure to heatwaves will continue to increase with additional warming, with strong geographical differences in heat-related mortality without additional adaptation (very high confidence) . Climate-sensitive food-borne, water-borne, and vector-borne disease risks are projected to increase under all levels of warming without additional adaptation (high confidence). In particular, dengue risk will increase with longer seasons and a wider geographic distribution in Asia, Europe, Central and South America and sub-Saharan Africa, potentially putting additional billions of people at risk by the end of the century (high confidence) . Mental health challenges, including anxiety and stress, are expected to increase under further global warming in all assessed regions, particularly for children, adolescents, elderly, and those with underlying health conditions (very high confidence). {4.5, 5.12, Box 5.10, 7.3, Figure 7.9, 8.4, 9.10, Figure 9.32, Figure 9.35, 10.4, Figure 10.11, 11.3, 12.3, Figure 12.5, Figure 12.6, 13.7, Figure 13.23, Figure 13.24, 14.5, 15.3, CCP6.2 }

B.4.5Climate change risks to cities, settlements and key infrastructure will rise rapidly in the mid- and long-term with further global warming, especially in places already exposed to high temperatures, along coastlines, or with high vulnerabilities (high confidence). Globally, population change in low-lying cities and settlements will lead to approximately a billion people projected to be at risk from coastal-specific climate hazards in the mid-term under all scenarios, including in Small Islands (high confidence). The population potentially exposed to a 100-year coastal flood is projected to increase by about 20% if global mean sea level rises by 0.15 m relative to 2020 levels; this exposed population doubles at a 0.75 m rise in mean sea level and triples at 1.4 m without population change and additional adaptation (medium confidence). Sea level rise poses an existential threat for some Small Islands and some low-lying coasts (medium confidence). By 2100 the value of global assets within the future 1-in-100 year coastal floodplains is projected to be between US$7.9 and US$12.7 trillion (2011 value) under RCP4.5, rising to between US$8.8 and US$14.2 trillion under RCP8.5 (medium confidence). Costs for maintenance and reconstruction of urban infrastructure, including building, transportation, and energy will increase with global warming level (medium confidence), the associated functional disruptions are projected to be substantial particularly for cities, settlements and infrastructure located on permafrost in cold regions and on coasts (high confidence). {6.2, 9.9, 10.4, 13.6, 13.10, 15.3, 16.5, CCP2.1, CCP2.2, CCP5.3, CCP6.2, CCB SLR, SROCC 2.3, SROCC CCB9}

B.4.6Projected estimates of global aggregate net economic damages generally increase non-linearly with global warming levels (high confidence). 35 The wide range of global estimates, and the lack of comparability between methodologies, does not allow for identification of a robust range of estimates (high confidence). The existence of higher estimates than assessed in AR5 indicates that global aggregate economic impacts could be higher than previous estimates (low confidence). 36 Significant regional variation in aggregate economic damages from climate change is projected (high confidence) with estimated economic damages per capita for developing countries often higher as a fraction of income (high confidence). Economic damages, including both those represented and those not represented in economic markets, are projected to be lower at 1.5°C than at 3°C or higher global warming levels (high confidence). {4.4, 9.11, 11.5, 13.10, Box 14.6, 16.5, CWGB ECONOMIC}

B.4.7In the mid- to long-term, displacement will increase with intensification of heavy precipitation and associated flooding, tropical cyclones, drought and, increasingly, sea level rise (high confidence). At progressive levels of warming, involuntary migration from regions with high exposure and low adaptive capacity would occur (medium confidence). Compared to other socioeconomic factors the influence of climate on conflict is assessed as relatively weak (high confidence). Along long-term socioeconomic pathways that reduce non-climatic drivers, risk of violent conflict would decline (medium confidence). At higher global warming levels, impacts of weather and climate extremes, particularly drought, by increasing vulnerability will increasingly affect violent intrastate conflict (medium confidence). {TS B.7.4, 7.3, 16.5, CCB MIGRATE }

B.5.1Concurrent and repeated climate hazards occur in all regions, increasing impacts and risks to health, ecosystems, infrastructure, livelihoods and food (high confidence). Multiple risksinteract, generating new sources of vulnerability to climate hazards, and compounding overall risk (high confidence). Increasing concurrence of heat and drought events are causing crop production losses and tree mortality (high confidence). Above 1.5°C global warming increasing concurrent climate extremes will increase risk of simultaneous crop losses of maize in major food-producing regions, with this risk increasing further with higher global warming levels (medium confidence). Future sea level rise combined with storm surge and heavy rainfall will increase compound flood risks (high confidence). Risks to health and food production will be made more severe from the interaction of sudden food production losses from heat and drought, exacerbated by heat-induced labour productivity losses (high confidence). These interacting impacts will increase food prices, reduce household incomes, and lead to health risks of malnutrition and climate-related mortality with no or low levels of adaptation, especially in tropical regions (high confidence). Risks to food safety from climate change will further compound the risks to health by increasing food contamination of crops from mycotoxins and contamination of seafood from harmful algal blooms, mycotoxins, and chemical contaminants (high confidence). {Figure TS.10c, 5.2, 5.4, 5.8, 5.9, 5.11, 5.12, 7.2, 7.3, 9.8, 9.11, 10.4, 11.3, 11.5, 12.3, 13.5, 14.5, 15.3, Box 15.1, 16.6, CCP1.2, CCP6.2, , WGI AR6 SPM A.3.1, WGI AR6 SPM A.3.2, WGI AR6 SPM C.2.7}

B.5.2Adverse impacts from climate hazards and resulting risks are cascading across sectors and regions (high confidence), propagating impacts along coasts and urban centres (medium confidence) and in mountain regions (high confidence). These hazards and cascading risks also trigger tipping points in sensitive ecosystems and in significantly and rapidly changing social-ecological systems impacted by ice melt, permafrost thaw and changing hydrology in polar regions (high confidence). Wildfires, in many regions, have affected ecosystems and species, people and their built assets, economic activity, and health (medium to high confidence) . In cities and settlements, climate impacts to key infrastructure are leading to losses and damages across water and food systems, and affect economic activity, with impacts extending beyond the area directly impacted by the climate hazard (high confidence). In Amazonia, and in some mountain regions, cascading impacts from climatic (e.g., heat) and non-climatic stressors (e.g., land use change) will result in irreversible and severe losses of ecosystem services and biodiversity at 2°C global warming level and beyond (medium confidence). Unavoidable sea level rise will bring cascading and compounding impacts resulting in losses of coastal ecosystems and ecosystem services, groundwater salinisation, flooding and damages to coastal infrastructure that cascade into risks to livelihoods, settlements, health, well-being, food and water security, and cultural values in the near to long-term (high confidence). (Figure SPM.3) {Figure TS.10, 2.5, 3.4, 3.5, Box 7.3, Box 8.7, Box 9.4, 11.5, Box 11.1, 12.3, 13.9, 14.6, 15.3, 16.5, 16.6, CCP1.2, CCP2.2, CCP5.2, CCP5.3, CCP6.2, CCP6.3, Box CCP6.1, Box CCP6.2, CCB EXTREMES, WGI AR6 Figure SPM.8d}

B.5.3Weather and climate extremes are causing economic and societal impacts across national boundaries through supply-chains, markets, and natural resource flows, with increasing transboundary risks projected across the water, energy and food sectors (high confidence). Supply chains that rely on specialized commodities and key infrastructure can be disrupted by weather and climate extreme events. Climate change causes the redistribution of marine fish stocks, increasing risk of transboundary management conflicts among fisheries users, and negatively affecting equitable distribution of food provisioning services as fish stocks shift from lower to higher latitude regions, thereby increasing the need for climate-informed transboundary management and cooperation (high confidence). Precipitation and water availability changes increases the risk of planned infrastructure projects, such as hydropower in some regions, having reduced productivity for food and energy sectors including across countries that share river basins (medium confidence). {Figure TS.10e-f, 3.4, 3.5, 4.5, 5.8, 5.13, 6.2, 9.4, Box 9.5,14.5, Box 14.5, Box 14.6, CCP5.3, CCB DISASTER, CCB EXTREMES, CCB INTEREG, CCB MOVING PLATE}

B.5.4Risks arise from some responses that are intended to reduce the risks of climate change, including risks from maladaptation and adverse side effects of some emissions reduction and carbon dioxide removal measures (high confidence). Deployment of afforestation of naturally unforested land, or poorly implemented bioenergy, with or without carbon capture and storage, can compound climate-related risks to biodiversity, water and food security, and livelihoods, especially if implemented at large scales, especially in regions with insecure land tenure (high confidence). {Box 2.2, 4.1, 4.7, 5.13, Table 5.18, Box 9.3, Box 13.2, CCB NATURAL, CWGB BIOECONOMY}

B.5.5Solar radiation modification approaches, if they were to be implemented, introduce a widespread range of new risks to people and ecosystems, which are not well understood (high confidence). Solar radiation modification approaches have potential to offset warming and ameliorate some climate hazards, but substantial residual climate change or overcompensating change would occur at regional scales and seasonal timescales (high confidence). Large uncertainties and knowledge gaps are associated with the potential of solar radiation modification approaches to reduce climate change risks. Solar radiation modification would not stop atmospheric CO2 concentrations from increasing or reduce resulting ocean acidification under continued anthropogenic emissions (high confidence). {CWGB SRM}

B.6.1While model-based assessments of the impacts of overshoot pathways are limited, observations and current understanding of processes permit assessment of impacts from overshoot. Additional warming, e.g., above 1.5°C during an overshoot period this century, will result in irreversible impacts on certain ecosystems with low resilience, such as polar, mountain, and coastal ecosystems, impacted by ice-sheet, glacier melt, or by accelerating and higher committed sea level rise (high confidence). 38 Risks to human systems will increase, including those to infrastructure, low-lying coastal settlements, some ecosystem-based adaptation measures, and associated livelihoods (high confidence), cultural and spiritual values (medium confidence). Projected impacts are less severe with shorter duration and lower levels of overshoot (medium confidence). {2.5, 3.4, 12.3, 13.2, 16.5, 16.6, CCP1.2, CCP2.2, CCP5.3, CCP6.1, CCP6.2, CCB SLR, WGI AR6 SPM B.5, WGI AR6 SPM C.3, SROCC 2.3, SROCC 5.4}

B.6.2Risk of severe impacts increase with every additional increment of global warming during overshoot (high confidence). In high-carbon ecosystems (currently storing 3,000 to 4,000 GtC) 39 such impacts are already observed and are projected to increase with every additional increment of global warming, such as increased wildfires, mass mortality of trees, drying of peatlands, and thawing of permafrost, weakening natural land carbon sinks and increasing releases of greenhouse gases (medium confidence). The resulting contribution to a potential amplification of global warming indicates that a return to a given global warming level or below would be more challenging (medium confidence). {2.4, 2.5, CCP4.2, WGI AR6 SPM B.4.3, SROCC 5.4}

C.1.1Adaptation planning and implementation have continued to increase across all regions (very high confidence). Growing public and political awareness of climate impacts and risks has resulted in at least 170 countries and many cities including adaptation in their climate policies and planning processes (high confidence). Decision support tools and climate services are increasingly being used (very high confidence). Pilot projects and local experiments are being implemented in different sectors (high confidence). Adaptation can generate multiple additional benefits such as improving agricultural productivity, innovation, health and well-being, food security, livelihood, and biodiversity conservation as well as reduction of risks and damages (very high confidence). {1.4, 2.6, 3.5, 3.6, 4.7, 4.8, 5.4, 5.6, 5.10, 6.4, 7.4, 8.5, 9.3, 9.6, 10.4, 12.5, 13.11, 15.5, 16.3, 17.2, 17.3, 17.5, CCP5.4, CCB ADAPT, CCB NATURAL}

C.1.2Despite progress, adaptation gaps exist between current levels of adaptation and levels needed to respond to impacts and reduce climate risks (high confidence). Most observed adaptation is fragmented, small in scale, incremental, sector-specific, designed to respond to current impacts or near-term risks, and focused more on planning rather than implementation (high confidence). Observed adaptation is unequally distributed across regions (high confidence) , and gaps are partially driven by widening disparities between the estimated costs of adaptation and documented finance allocated to adaptation (high confidence) . The largest adaptation gaps exist among lower income population groups (high confidence). At current rates of adaptation planning and implementation the adaptation gap will continue to grow (high confidence). As adaptation options often have long implementation times, long-term planning and accelerated implementation, particularly in the next decade, is important to close adaptation gaps, recognising that constraints remain for some regions (high confidence). {1.1, 1.4, 5.6, 6.3, Figure 6.4, 7.4, 8.3, 10.4, 11.3, 11.7, 13.11, Box 13.1, 15.2, 15.5, 16.3, 16.5, Box 16.1, Figure 16.4, Figure 16.5, 17.4, 18.2, CCP2.4, CCP5.4, CCB FINANCE, CCB SLR}

C.3.1Soft limits to some human adaptation have been reached, but can be overcome by addressing a range of constraints, which primarily consist of financial, governance, institutional and policy constraints (high confidence). For example, individuals and households in low-lying coastal areas in Australasia and Small Islands and smallholder farmers in Central and South America, Africa, Europe and Asia have reached soft limits (medium confidence). Inequity and poverty also constrain adaptation, leading to soft limits and resulting in disproportionate exposure and impacts for most vulnerable groups (high confidence). Lack of climate literacy46 at all levels and limited availability of information and data pose further constraints to adaptation planning and implementation (medium confidence). {1.4, 4.7, 5.4, 8.4, Table 8.6, 9.1, 9.4, 9.5, 9.8, 11.7, 12.5 13.5, 15.3, 15.5, 15.6, 16.4, Box 16.1, Figure 16.8, CCP5.2, CCP5.4, CCP6.3 }

C.3.2Financial constraints are important determinants of soft limits to adaptation across sectors and all regions (high confidence). Although global tracked climate finance has shown an upward trend since AR5, current global financial flows for adaptation, including from public and private finance sources, are insufficient for and constrain implementation of adaptation options especially in developing countries (high confidence). The overwhelming majority of global tracked climate finance was targeted to mitigation while a small proportion was targeted to adaptation (very high confidence). Adaptation finance has come predominantly from public sources (very high confidence). Adverse climate impacts can reduce the availability of financial resources by incurring losses and damages and through impeding national economic growth, thereby further increasing financial constraints for adaptation, particularly for developing and least developed countries (medium confidence). {Figure TS.7, 1.4, 2.6, 3.6, 4.7, Figure 4.30, 5.14, 7.4, 8.4, Table 8.6, 9.4, 9.9, 9.11, 10.5, 12.5, 13.3, 13.11, Box 14.4, 15.6, 16.2, 16.4, Figure 16.8, Table 16.4, 17.4, 18.1, CCP2.4, CCP5.4, CCP6.3, CCB FINANCE}

C.3.3Many natural systems are near the hard limits of their natural adaptation capacity and additional systems will reach limits with increasing global warming (high confidence). Ecosystems already reaching or surpassing hard adaptation limits include some warm-­water coral reefs, some coastal wetlands, some rainforests, and some polar and mountain ecosystems (high confidence). Above 1.5°C global warming level, some Ecosystem-based Adaptation measures will lose their effectiveness in providing benefits to people as these ecosystems will reach hard adaptation limits (high confidence). (Figure SPM.4) {1.4, 2.4, 2.6, 3.4, 3.6, 9.6, Box 11.2, 13.4, 14.5, 15.5, 16.4, 16.6, 17.2, CCP1.2, CCP5.2, CCP6.3, CCP7.3, CCB SLR}

C.3.4In human systems, some coastal settlements face soft adaptation limits due to technical and financial difficulties of implementing coastal protection (high confidence). Above 1.5°C global warming level, limited freshwater resources pose potential hard limits for Small Islands and for regions dependent on glacier and snow-melt (medium confidence). By 2°C global warming level, soft limits are projected for multiple staple crops in many growing areas, particularly in tropical regions (high confidence). By 3°C global warming level, soft limits are projected for some water management measures for many regions, with hard limits projected for parts of Europe (medium confidence). Transitioning from incremental to transformational adaptation can help overcome soft adaptation limits (high confidence). {1.4, 4.7, 5.4, 5.8, 7.2, 7.3, 8.4, Table 8.6, 9.8, 10.4, 12.5, 13.2, 13.6, 16.4, 17.2, CCP1.3. Box CCP1.1, CCP2.3, CCP3.3, CCP4.4, CCP5.3, CCB SLR}

C.3.5Adaptation does not prevent all losses and damages, even with effective adaptation and before reaching soft and hard limits. Losses and damages are unequally distributed across systems, regions and sectors and are not comprehensively addressed by current financial, governance and institutional arrangements, particularly in vulnerable developing countries. With increasing global warming, losses and damages increase and become increasingly difficult to avoid, while strongly concentrated among the poorest vulnerable populations. (high confidence) {1.4, 2.6, 3.4, 3.6, 6.3, Figure 6.4, 8.4, 13.2, 13.7, 13.10, 17.2, CCP2.3, CCP4.4, CCB LOSS, CCB SLR, CWGB ECONOMIC}

C.4.1Actions that focus on sectors and risks in isolation and on short-term gains often lead to maladaptation if long-term impacts of the adaptation option and long-term adaptation commitment are not taken into account (high confidence). The implementation of these maladaptive actions can result in infrastructure and institutions that are inflexible and/or expensive to change (high confidence). For example, seawalls effectively reduce impacts to people and assets in the short-term but can also result in lock-ins and increase exposure to climate risks in the long-term unless they are integrated into a long-term adaptive plan (high confidence). Adaptation integrated with development reduces lock-ins and creates opportunities (e.g., infrastructure upgrading) (medium confidence). {1.4, 3.4, 3.6, 10.4, 11.7, Box 11.6, 13.2, 17.2, 17.5, 17.6, CCP 2.3, CCB DEEP, CCB SLR}

C.4.2Biodiversity and ecosystem resilience to climate change are decreased by maladaptive actions, which also constrain ecosystem services. Examples of these maladaptive actions for ecosystems include fire suppression in naturally fire-adapted ecosystems or hard defences against flooding. These actions reduce space for natural processes and represent a severe form of maladaptation for the ecosystems they degrade, replace or fragment, thereby reducing their resilience to climate change and the ability to provide ecosystem services for adaptation. Considering biodiversity and autonomous adaptation in long-term planning processes reduces the risk of maladaptation. (high confidence) {2.4, 2.6, Table 2.7, 3.4, 3.6, 4.7, 5.6, 5.13, Table 5.21, Table 5.23, Box 11.2, 13.2, Box 13.2, 17.2, 17.5, CCP5.4 }

C.4.3Maladaptation especially affects marginalised and vulnerable groups adversely (e.g., Indigenous Peoples, ethnic minorities, low-income households, informal settlements), reinforcing and entrenching existing inequities. Adaptation planning and implementation that do not consider adverse outcomes for different groups can lead to maladaptation, increasing exposure to risks, marginalising people from certain socioeconomic or livelihood groups, and exacerbating inequity. Inclusive planning initiatives informed by cultural values, Indigenous knowledge, local knowledge, and scientific knowledge can help prevent maladaptation. (high confidence) (Figure SPM.4) {2.6, 3.6, 4.3, 4.6, 4.8, 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, 6.1, Box 7.1, 8.4, 11.4, 12.5, Box 13.2, 14.4, Box 14.1, 17.2, 17.5, 18.2, 17.2, CCP2.4 }

C.4.4To minimize maladaptation, multi-sectoral, multi-actor and inclusive planning with flexible pathways encourages low-regret 47 and timely actions that keep options open, ensure benefits in multiple sectors and systems and indicate the available solution space for adapting to long-term climate change (very high confidence). Maladaptation is also minimized by planning that accounts for the time it takes to adapt (high confidence), the uncertainty about the rate and magnitude of climate risk (medium confidence) and a wide range of potentially adverse consequences of adaptation actions (high confidence). {1.4, 3.6, 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, 11.6, 11.7, 17.3, 17.6, CCP2.3, CCP2.4, CCP5.4, CCB DEEP, CCB SLR}

C.5.1Political commitment and follow-through across all levels of government accelerate the implementation of adaptation actions (high confidence). Implementing actions can require large upfront investments of human, financial and technological resources (high confidence), whilst some benefits could only become visible in the next decade or beyond (medium confidence). Accelerating commitment and follow-through is promoted by rising public awareness, building business cases for adaptation, accountability and transparency mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation of adaptation progress, social movements, and climate-related litigation in some regions (medium confidence).

C.5.2Institutional frameworks, policies and instruments that set clear adaptation goals and define responsibilities and commitments and that are coordinated amongst actors and governance levels, strengthen and sustain adaptation actions (very high confidence). Sustained adaptation actions are strengthened by mainstreaming adaptation into institutional budget and policy planning cycles, statutory planning, monitoring and evaluation frameworks and into recovery efforts from disaster events (high confidence). Instruments that incorporate adaptation such as policy and legal frameworks, behavioural incentives, and economic instruments that address market failures, such as climate risk disclosure, inclusive and deliberative processes strengthen adaptation actions by public and private actors (medium confidence). {1.4, 3.6, 4.8, 5.14, 6.3, 6.4, 7.4, 9.4, 10.4, 11.7, Box 11.6, Table 11.17, 13.10, 13.11, 14.7, 15.6, 17.3, 17.4, 17.5, 17.6, 18.4, CCP2.4, CCP5.4, CCP6.3, CCB DEEP}

C.5.3Enhancing knowledge on risks, impacts, and their consequences, and available adaptation options promotes societal and policy responses (high confidence). A wide range of top-down, bottom-up and co-produced processes and sources can deepen climate knowledge and sharing, including capacity building at all scales, educational and information programmes, using the arts, participatory modelling and climate services, Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge and citizen science (high confidence). These measures can facilitate awareness, heighten risk perception and influence behaviours (high confidence). {1.3, 3.6, 4.8, 5.9, 5.14, 6.4, Table 6.8, 7.4, 9.4, 10.5, 11.1, 11.7, 12.5, 13.9, 13.11, 14.3, 15.6, 15.6, 17.4, 18.4, CCP2.4.1, CCB INDIG}

C.5.4With adaptation finance needs estimated to be higher than those presented in AR5, enhanced mobilization of and access to financial resources are essential for implementation of adaptation and to reduce adaptation gaps (high confidence). Building capacity and removing some barriers to accessing finance is fundamental to accelerate adaptation, especially for vulnerable groups, regions and sectors (high confidence). Public and private finance instruments include inter alia grants, guarantee, equity, concessional debt, market debt, and internal budget allocation as well as savings in households and insurance. Public finance is an important enabler of adaptation (high confidence). Public mechanisms and finance can leverage private sector finance for adaptation by addressing real and perceived regulatory, cost and market barriers, for example via public-private partnerships (high confidence). Financial and technological resources enable effective and ongoing implementation of adaptation, especially when supported by institutions with a strong understanding of adaptation needs and capacity (high confidence). {4.8, 5.14, 6.4, Table 6.10, 7.4, 9.4, Table 11.17, 12.5, 13.11, 15.6, 17.4, 18.4, Box 18.9, CCP5.4, CCB FINANCE}

C.5.5Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of adaptation are critical for tracking progress and enabling effective adaptation (high confidence). M&E implementation is currently limited (high confidence) but has increased since AR5 at local and national levels. Although most of the monitoring of adaptation is focused towards planning and implementation, the monitoring of outcomes is critical for tracking the effectiveness and progress of adaptation (high confidence). M&E facilitates learning on successful and effective adaptation measures, and signals when and where additional action may be needed. M&E systems are most effective when supported by capacities and resources and embedded in enabling governance systems (high confidence). {1.4, 2.6, 6.4, 7.4, 11.7, 11.8, 13.2, 13.11, 17.5, 18.4, CCP2.4, CCB DEEP, CCB ILLNESS, CCB NATURAL, CCB PROGRESS}

C.5.6Inclusive governance that prioritises equity and justice in adaptation planning and implementation leads to more effective and sustainable adaptation outcomes (high confidence). Vulnerabilities and climate risks are often reduced through carefully designed and implemented laws, policies, processes, and interventions that address context specific inequities such as based on gender, ethnicity, disability, age, location and income (high confidence). These approaches, which include multi-stakeholder co-learning platforms, transboundary collaborations, community-based adaptation and participatory scenario planning, focus on capacity-building, and meaningful participation of the most vulnerable and marginalised groups, and their access to key resources to adapt (high confidence). {1.4, 2.6, 3.6, 4.8, 5.4, 5.8, 5.9, 5.13, 6.4, 7.4, 8.5, 11.8, 12.5, 13.11, 14.7, 15.5, 15.7, 17.3, 17.5, 18.4, CCP2.4, CCP5.4, CCP6.4, CCB GENDER, CCB HEALTH, CCB INDIG}

D.1.1There is a rapidly narrowing window of opportunity to enable climate resilient development. Multiple climate resilient development pathways are still possible by which communities, the private sector, governments, nations and the world can pursue climate resilient development – each involving and resulting from different societal choices influenced by different contexts and opportunities and constraints on system transitions. Climate resilient development pathways are progressively constrained by every increment of warming, in particular beyond 1.5°C, social and economic inequalities, the balance between adaptation and mitigation varying by national, regional and local circumstances and geographies, according to capabilities including resources, vulnerability, culture and values, past development choices leading to past emissions and future warming scenarios, bounding the climate resilient development pathways remaining, and the ways in which development trajectories are shaped by equity, and social and climate justice. (very high confidence) {Figure TS.14d, 2.6, 4.7, 4.8, 5.14, 6.4, 7.4, 8.3, 9.4, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 10.6, 11.8, 12.5, 13.10, 14.7, 15.3, 18.5, CCP2.3, CCP3.4, CCP4.4, CCP5.3, CCP5.4, Table CCP5.2, CCP6.3, CCP7.5 }

D.1.2Opportunities for climate resilient development are not equitably distributed around the world (very high confidence). Climate impacts and risks exacerbate vulnerability and social and economic inequities and consequently increase persistent and acute development challenges, especially in developing regions and sub-regions, and in particularly exposed sites, including coasts, small islands, deserts, mountains and polar regions. This in turn undermines efforts to achieve sustainable development, particularly for vulnerable and marginalized communities (very high confidence). {2.5, 4.4, 4.7, 6.3, Box 6.4, Figure 6.5, 9.4, Table 18.5, CCP2.2, CCP3.2, CCP3.3, CCP5.4, CCP6.2, CCB HEALTH, CWGB URBAN}

D.1.3Embedding effective and equitable adaptation and mitigation in development planning can reduce vulnerability, conserve and restore ecosystems, and enable climate resilient development. This is especially challenging in localities with persistent development gaps and limited resources (high confidence). Dynamic trade-offs and competing priorities exist between mitigation, adaptation, and development. Integrated and inclusive system-oriented solutions based on equity and social and climate justice reduce risks and enable climate resilient development (high confidence). {1.4, 2.6, Box 2.2, 3.6, 4.7, 4.8, Box 4.5, Box 4.8, 5.13, 7.4, 8.5, 9.4, Box 9.3, 10.6, 12.5, 12.6, 13.3, 13.4, 13.10, 13.11, 14.7, 18.4, CCB DEEP, CCP2, CCP5.4, CCB HEALTH, SRCCL}

D.2.1Climate resilient development is advanced when actors work in equitable, just and enabling ways to reconcile divergent interests, values and worldviews, toward equitable and just outcomes (high confidence). These practices build on diverse knowledges about climate risk and chosen development pathways account for local, regional and global climate impacts, risks, barriers and opportunities (high confidence). Structural vulnerabilities to climate change can be reduced through carefully designed and implemented legal, policy, and process interventions from the local to global that address inequities based on gender, ethnicity, disability, age, location and income (very high confidence). This includes rights-based approaches that focus on capacity-building, meaningful participation of the most vulnerable groups, and their access to key resources, including financing, to reduce risk and adapt (high confidence). Evidence shows that climate resilient development processes link scientific, Indigenous, local, practitioner and other forms of knowledge, and are more effective and sustainable because they are locally appropriate and lead to more legitimate, relevant and effectiveactions (high confidence). Pathways towards climate resilient development overcome jurisdictional and organizational barriers, and are founded on societal choices that accelerate and deepen key system transitions (very high confidence) . Planning processes and decision analysis tools can help identify ‘low regrets’ options 47 that enable mitigation and adaptation in the face of change, complexity, deep uncertainty and divergent views (medium confidence). {1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.7, 3.6, 4.8, 5.14, 6.4, 7.4, 8.5, 8.6, Box 8.7, 9.4, Box 9.2, 10.6, 11.8, 12.5, 13.11, 14.7, 15.6, 15.7, 17.2–17.6, 18.2–18.4, CCP2.3 –2.4, CCP3.4, CCP4.4, CCP5.4, CCP6.4, CCP7.6, CCB DEEP, CCB HEALTH, CCB INDIG, CCB NATURAL, CCB SLR}

D.2.2Inclusive governance contributes to more effective and enduring adaptation outcomes and enables climate resilient development (high confidence). Inclusive processes strengthen the ability of governments and other stakeholders to jointly consider factors such as the rate and magnitude of change and uncertainties, associated impacts, and timescales of different climate resilient development pathways given past development choices leading to past emissions and scenarios of future global warming (high confidence). Associated societal choices are made continuously through interactions in arenas of engagement from local to international levels. The quality and outcome of these interactions helps determine whether development pathways shift towards or away from climate resilient development (medium confidence) . (Figure SPM.5) {2.7, 3.6, 4.8, 5.14, 6.4, 7.4, 8.5, 8.6, 9.4, 10.6, 11.8, 12.5, 13.11, 14.7, 15.6, 15.7, 17.2–17.6, 18.2, 18.4, CCP2.3 –2.4, CCP3.4, CCP4.4, CCP5.4, CCP6.4, CCP7.6, CCB GENDER, CCB HEALTH, CCB INDIG}

D.2.3Governance for climate resilient development is most effective when supported by formal and informal institutions and practices that are well-aligned across scales, sectors, policy domains and timeframes. Governance efforts that advance climate resilient development account for the dynamic, uncertain and context-specific nature of climate-related risk, and its interconnections with non-climate risks. Institutions48 that enable climate resilient development are flexible and responsive to emergent risks and facilitate sustained and timely action. Governance for climate resilient development is enabled by adequate and appropriate human and technological resources, information, capacities and finance. (high confidence) {2.7, 3.6, 4.8, 5.14, 6.3, 6.4, 7.4, 8.5, 8.6, 9.4, 10.6, 11.8, 12.5, 13.11, 14.7, 15.6, 15.7, 17.2-17.6, 18.2, 18.4, CCP2.3 –2.4, CCP3.4, CCP4.4, CCP5.4, CCP6.4, CCP7.6, CCB DEEP, CCB GENDER, CCB HEALTH, CCB INDIG, CCB NATURAL, CCB SLR}

D.3.1Taking integrated action for climate resilience to avoid climate risk requires urgent decision making for the new built environment and retrofitting existing urban design, infrastructure and land use. Based on socioeconomic circumstances, adaptation and sustainable development actions will provide multiple benefits including for health and well-being, particularly when supported by national governments, non-governmental organisations and international agencies that work across sectors in partnerships with local communities. Equitable partnerships between local and municipal governments, the private sector, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and civil society can, including through international cooperation, advance climate resilient development by addressing structural inequalities, insufficient financial resources, cross-city risks and the integration of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge. (high confidence) {6.2, 6.3, 6.4, Table 6.6, 7.4, 8.5, 9.4, 10.5. 12.5, 17.4, Table 17.8, 18.2, Box 18.1, CCP2.4, CCB FINANCE, CCB GENDER, CCB INDIG, CWGB URBAN}

D.3.2Rapid global urbanisation offers opportunities for climate resilient development in diverse contexts from rural and informal settlements to large metropolitan areas (high confidence). Dominant models of energy intensive and market-led urbanisation, insufficient and misaligned finance and a predominant focus on grey infrastructure in the absence of integration with ecological and social approaches, risks missing opportunities for adaptation and locking in maladaptation (high confidence). Poor land use planning and siloed approaches to health, ecological and social planning also exacerbates, vulnerability in already marginalised communities (medium confidence). Urban climate resilient development is observed to be more effective if it is responsive to regional and local land use development and adaptation gaps, and addresses the underlying drivers of vulnerability (high confidence). The greatest gains in well-being can be achieved by prioritizing finance to reduce climate risk for low-income and marginalized residents including people living in informal settlements (high confidence). {5.14, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, Figure 6.5, Table 6.6, 7.4, 8.5, 8.6, 9.8, 9.9, 10.4, Table 17.8, 18.2, CCP2.2, CCP5.4, CCB HEALTH, CWGB URBAN}

D.3.3Urban systems are critical, interconnected sites for enabling climate resilient development, especially at the coast. Coastal cities and settlements play a key role in moving toward higher climate resilient development given firstly, almost 11% of the global population – 896 million people – lived within the Low Elevation Coastal Zone49 in 2020, potentially increasing to beyond 1 billion people by 2050, and these people, and associated development and coastal ecosystems, face escalating climate compounded risks, including sea level rise. Secondly, these coastal cities and settlements make key contributions to climate resilient development through their vital role in national economies and inland communities, global trade supply chains, cultural exchange, and centres of innovation. (high confidence) {6.1, 6.2, 6.4, Table 6.6, Box 15.2, SMCCP Table 2.1, CCP2.2, CCP2.4, CCB SLR, XWGB URBAN, SROCC Chapter 4}

D.4.1Building the resilience of biodiversity and supporting ecosystem integrity50 can maintain benefits for people, including livelihoods, human health and well-being and the provision of food, fibre and water, as well as contributing to disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation and mitigation. {2.2, 2.5, 2.6, Table 2.6, Table 2.7, 3.5, 3.6, 5.8, 5.13, 5.14, Box 5.11, 12.5, CCP5.4, CCB COVID, CCB GENDER, CCB ILLNESS, CCB INDIG, CCB MIGRATE, CCB NATURAL}

D.4.2Protecting and restoring ecosystems is essential for maintaining and enhancing the resilience of the biosphere (veryhigh confidence). Degradation and loss of ecosystems is also a cause of greenhouse gas emissions and is at increasing risk of being exacerbated by climate change impacts, including droughts and wildfire (high confidence). Climate resilient development avoids adaptation and mitigation measures that damage ecosystems (high confidence). Documented examples of adverse impacts of land-based measures intended as mitigation, when poorly implemented, include afforestation of grasslands, savannas and peatlands, and risks from bioenergy crops at large scale to water supply, food security and biodiversity (high confidence). {2.4, 2.5, Box 2.2, 3.4, 3.5, Box 3.4, Box 9.3, CCP7.3, CCB NATURAL, CWGB BIOECONOMY}

D.4.3Biodiversity and ecosystem services have limited capacity to adapt to increasing global warming levels, which will make climate resilient development progressively harder to achieve beyond 1.5°C warming (very high confidence). Consequences of current and future global warming for climate resilient development include reduced effectiveness of Ecosystem-based Adaptation and approaches to climate change mitigation based on ecosystems and amplifying feedbacks to the climate system (high confidence). {Figure TS.14d, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.4, Box 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, Table 5.2, 12.5, 13.2, 13.3, 13.10, 14.5, 14.5, Box 14.3, 15.3, 17.3, 17.6, CCP5.3, CCP5.4, CCB EXTREMES, CCB ILLNESS, CCB NATURAL, CCB SLR, SR1.5, SRCCL, SROCC}

D.5.1Climate resilient development is already challenging at current global warming levels (high confidence). The prospects for climate resilient development will be further limited if global warming levels exceeds 1.5°C (high confidence) and not be possible in some regions and sub-regions if the global warming level exceeds 2°C (medium confidence). Climate resilient development is most constrained in regions/subregions in which climate impacts and risks are already advanced, including low-lying coastal cities and settlements, small islands, deserts, mountains and polar regions (high confidence). Regions and subregions with high levels of poverty, water, food and energy insecurity, vulnerable urban environments, degraded ecosystems and rural environments, and/or few enabling conditions, face many non-climate challenges that inhibit climate resilient development which are further exacerbated by climate change (high confidence). {Figure TS.14d, 1.2, Box 6.6, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 10.6, 11.8, 12.5, 13.10, 14.7, 15.3, CCP2.3, CCP3.4, CCP4.4, CCP5.3, Table CCP5.2, CCP6.3, CCP7.5 }

D.5.2Inclusive governance, investment aligned with climate resilient development, access to appropriate technology and rapidly scaled-up finance, and capacity building of governments at all levels, the private sector and civil society enable climate resilient development. Experience shows that climate resilient development processes are timely, anticipatory, integrative, flexible and action focused. Common goals and social learning build adaptive capacity for climate resilient development . When implementing adaptation and mitigation together, and taking trade-offs into account, multiple benefits and synergies for human well-being as well as ecosystem and planetary health can be realised. Prospects for climate resilient development are increased by inclusive processes involving local knowledge and Indigenous Knowledge as well as processes that coordinate across risks and institutions. Climate resilient development is enabled by increased international cooperation including mobilising and enhancing access to finance, particularly for vulnerable regions, sectors and groups. (high confidence) (Figure SPM.5) {2.7, 3.6, 4.8, 5.14, 6.4, 7.4, 8.5, 8.6, 9.4, 10.6, 11.8, 12.5, 13.11, 14.7, 15.6, 15.7, 17.2–17.6, 18.2–18.5, CCP2.3 –2.4, CCP3.4, CCP4.4, CCP5.4, CCP6.4, CCP7.6, CCB DEEP, CCB HEALTH, CCB INDIG, CCB NATURAL, CCB SLR}

D.5.3The cumulative scientific evidence is unequivocal: Climate change is a threat to human well-being and planetary health. Any further delay in concerted anticipatory global action on adaptation and mitigation will miss a brief and rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all. (very high confidence) {1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 16.2, Table SM16.24, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 17.4, 17.5, 17.6, 18.3, 18.4, 18.5, CCB DEEP, CWGB URBAN, WGI AR6 SPM, SROCC SPM, SRCCL SPM}