International cooperation is having positive and measurable results (high confidence). The Kyoto Protocol led to measurable and substantial avoided emissions, including in 20 countries with Kyoto first commitment period targets that have experienced a decade of declining absolute emissions. It also built national capacity for greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting, catalysed the creation of GHG markets, and increased investments in low-carbon technologies (medium confidence). Other international agreements and institutions have led to avoided carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from land use practices, as well as avoided emissions of some non-CO2 greenhouse gases (medium confidence). {14.3, 14.5, 14.6}

New forms of international cooperation have emerged since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC AR5) in line with an evolving understanding of effective mitigation policies, processes, and institutions. Both new and pre-existing forms of cooperation are vital for achieving climate mitigation goals in the context of sustainable development (high confidence). While previous IPCC assessments have noted important synergies between the outcomes of climate mitigation and achieving sustainable development objectives, there now appear to be synergies between the two processes themselves (medium confidence). Since AR5, international cooperation has shifted towards facilitating national-level mitigation action through numerous channels. These now include both processes established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) regime and regional and sectoral agreements and organisations. {14.2, 14.3, 14.5, 14.6}

Participation in international agreements and transboundary networks is associated with the adoption of climate policies at the national and sub-national levels, as well as by non-state actors (high confidence). International cooperation helps countries achieve long-term mitigation targets when it supports development and diffusion of low-carbon technologies, often at the level of individual sectors, which can simultaneously lead to significant benefits in the areas of sustainable development and equity (medium confidence). {14.2, 14.3, 14.5, 14.6}

International cooperation under the United Nations (UN) climate regime has taken an important new direction with the entry into force of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which strengthened the objective of the UN climate regime, including its long-term temperature goal, while adopting a different architecture from that of the Kyoto Protocol to achieve it (high confidence). The core national commitments under the Kyoto Protocol have been legally binding quantified emission targets for developed countries tied to well-defined mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement. By contrast, the commitments under the Paris Agreement are primarily procedural, extend to all Parties, and are designed to trigger domestic policies and measures, enhance transparency, stimulate climate investments, particularly in developing countries, and to lead iteratively to rising levels of ambition across all countries ( high confidence). Issues of equity remain of central importance in the UN climate regime, notwithstanding shifts in the operationalisation of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ from Kyoto to Paris ( high confidence). {14.3}

There are conflicting views on whether the Paris Agreement’s commitments and mechanisms will lead to the attainment of its stated goals. Arguments in support of the Paris Agreement are that the processes it initiates and supports will in multiple ways lead, and indeed have already led, to rising levels of ambition over time. The recent proliferation of national mid-century net zero GHG targets can be attributed in part to the Paris Agreement (medium confidence). Moreover, its processes and commitments will enhance countries’ abilities to achieve their stated level of ambition, particularly among developing countries (medium confidence). Arguments against the Paris Agreement are that it lacks a mechanism to review the adequacy of individual Parties’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), that collectively current NDCs are inconsistent in their level of ambition with achieving the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal, that its processes will not lead to sufficiently rising levels of ambition in the NDCs, and that NDCs will not be achieved because the targets, policies and measures they contain are not legally binding at the international level (medium confidence). To some extent, arguments on both sides are aligned with different analytic frameworks, including assumptions about the main barriers to mitigation that international cooperation can help overcome (medium confidence). The extent to which countries increase the ambition of their NDCs and ensure they are effectively implemented will depend in part on the successful implementation of the support mechanisms in the Paris Agreement, and in turn will determine whether the goals of the Paris Agreement are met ( high confidence). {14.2, 14.3, 14.4}

International cooperation outside the UNFCCC processes and agreements provides critical support for mitigation in particular regions, sectors and industries, for particular types of emissions, and at the sub- and transnational levels (high confidence). Agreements addressing ozone depletion, transboundary air pollution, and release of mercury are all leading to reductions in the emissions of specific greenhouse gases ( high confidence). Cooperation is occurring at multiple governance levels including cities. Transnational partnerships and alliances involving non-state and sub-national actors are also playing a growing role in stimulating low-carbon technology diffusion and emissions reductions (medium confidence). Such transnational efforts include those focused on climate litigation; the impacts of these are unclear but promising. Climate change is being addressed in a growing number of international agreements operating at sectoral levels, as well as within the practices of many multilateral organisations and institutions ( high confidence). Sub-global and regional cooperation, often described as climate clubs, can play an important role in accelerating mitigation, including the potential for reducing mitigation costs through linking national carbon markets, although actual examples of these remain limited ( high confidence). {14.2, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6}

International cooperation will need to be strengthened in several key respects in order to support mitigation action consistent with limiting temperature rise to well below 2°C in the context of sustainable development and equity (high confidence). Many developing countries’ NDCs have components or additional actions that are conditional on receiving assistance with respect to finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building, greater than what has been provided to date ( high confidence). Sectoral and sub-global cooperation is providing critical support, and yet there is room for further progress. In some cases, notably with respect to aviation and shipping, sectoral agreements have adopted climate mitigation goals that fall far short of what would be required to achieve the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement ( high confidence). Moreover, there are cases where international cooperation may be hindering mitigation efforts, namely evidence that trade and investment agreements, as well as agreements within the energy sector, impede national mitigation efforts (medium confidence). International cooperation is emerging but so far fails to fully address transboundary issues associated with Solar Radiation Modification and CO2 removal ( high confidence). {14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6}

This chapter assesses the role and effectiveness of international cooperation in mitigating climate change. Such cooperation includes multilateral global cooperative agreements among nation states such as the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and its related legal instruments, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement, but also plurilateral agreements involving fewer states, as well as those focused on particular economic and policy sectors, such as components of the energy system. Moreover, this chapter assesses the role of transnational agreements and cooperative arrangements between non-state and sub-national actors, including municipal governments, private sector firms and industry consortia, and civil society organisations. This chapter does not assess international cooperation within the European Union, as this is covered in Chapter 13 of this report.

Past IPCC assessment reports have discussed the theoretical literature, providing insights into the rationale for international cooperation, as well as guidance as to its structure and implementation. This chapter limits such theoretical discussion primarily to the new developments since the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). Important developments in this respect include attention to climate clubs (groups of countries and potentially non-state actors that can work together to achieve particular objectives), and the effects of framing the global climate change mitigation challenge as one of accelerating a socio-technical transition or transformation, shifting development pathways accordingly, in addition to (or rather than) solving a global commons problem. This chapter draws from theory to identify a set of criteria by which to assess the effectiveness of existing forms of international cooperation.

The rest of this chapter describes existing cooperative international agreements, institutions, and initiatives with a view to clarifying how they operate, what effects they have, and ultimately, whether they work. At the heart of this international institutional architecture lies the Paris Agreement, which sets the overall approach for international cooperation under the UNFCCC at the global level. In many ways, the Paris Agreement reshapes the structure of such cooperation, from one oriented primarily towards target setting, monitoring, and enforcement, to one that is oriented towards supporting and enabling nationally determined actions (including targets), monitoring as well as catalysing non-state and sub-national actions at multiple levels of governance. In addition to the Paris Agreement, many forms of cooperation have taken shape in parallel: those designed to address other environmental problems that have a significant impact on climate mitigation; those operating at the sub-global or sectoral level; and those where the main participants are non-state actors. The chapter ends with an overall assessment of the effectiveness of current international cooperation and identifies areas that would benefit from improved and enhanced action.

This section describes recent insights from social science theory that can shed light on the need for and ideal structure of international cooperation. This section starts by describing developments in framing the underlying problem, moves towards a body of theory describing the benefits of multilateral sub-global action, and ends with a theory-based articulation of criteria to assess the effectiveness of international cooperation.

As discussed above, the Paris Agreement sets in place a new framework for international climate policy albeit one that is embedded in the wider climate regime complex (Coen et al. 2020). Whereas international governance had earlier assumed centre stage, the Paris Agreement recognises the salience of domestic politics in the governance of climate change (Kinley et al. 2020). The new architecture also provides more flexibility for recognising the benefits of working in diverse forms and groups and allows for more decentralised ‘polycentric’ forms of governance (Jordan et al. 2015; Victor 2016). The next two sections address this complementarity between the Paris Agreement and other agreements and institutions.

The Paris Agreement identifies a number of pathways, or means of implementation, towards accomplishing rapid mitigation and the achieving of its temperature goal: finance; capacity building; technology and innovation; and cooperative approaches and markets (Sections 14.3.2.7–14.3.2.10 above). In this section, we examine each of these means and mechanisms of implementation, and the agreements and institutions lying outside of the Paris Agreement that contribute to each. In the following section, 14.5, we examine the agreements and institutions playing other governance roles: regulating activities in particular sectors; linking climate mitigation with other activities such as adaptation; and stimulating and coordinating the actions of non-state actors at a global scale.

Figure 14.3 maps out the interlinkages described in the text of Sections 14.4 and 14.5. It is an incomplete list, but illustrates clearly that across multiple types of governance, there are multiple instruments or organisations with activities connected to the different governance roles associated with the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC more generally.

The Paris Agreement sets in place a new framework for international climate policy (Paroussos et al. 2019), which some cite as evidence of ‘hybrid multilateralism’ (Christoff 2016; Savaresi 2016; Bäckstrand et al. 2017). While a trend of widening involvement of non-state actors was evident prior to conclusion of the Paris Agreement, particularly at UNFCCC COPs, the ‘new landscape of international climate cooperation’ features an ‘intensified interplay between state and non-state actors’, including civil society and social movements, business actors, and sub-national or substate actors, such as local governments and cities (Bäckstrand et al. 2017, p. 562). This involvement of other actors beyond states in international climate cooperation is facilitated by the Paris Agreement’s ‘hybrid climate policy architecture’ (Bodansky et al. 2016) (Section 14.3.1.1), which acknowledges the primacy of domestic politics in climate change and invites the mobilisation of international and domestic pressure to make the Agreement effective (Falkner 2016b). In this landscape, there is greater flexibility for more decentralised ‘polycentric’ forms of climate governance and recognition of the benefits of working in diverse forms and groups to realise global climate mitigation goals (Jordan et al. 2015; Oberthür 2016) (Section 1.9).

Increasing attention has focused on the role of multi-level, multi-actor cooperation among actors, groupings and agreements beyond the UNFCCC climate regime as potential ‘building blocks’ towards enhanced international action on climate mitigation (Falkner 2016a; Caparrós and Péreau 2017; Potoski 2017; Stewart et al. 2017). This can include agreements on emissions and technologies at the regional or sub-global level, what scholars often refer to as ‘climate clubs’ (Nordhaus 2015; Hovi et al. 2016; Green 2017; Sprinz et al. 2018). One forum through which such agreements are often discussed, in support of UNFCCC objectives, is high-level meetings of political leaders, such as the G7 and G20 states (Livingston 2016). It also includes cooperation on narrower sets of issues than are found within the Paris Agreement, for instance, other international environmental agreements dealing with a particular subset of GHGs; linkages with, or leveraging of, efforts or agreements in other spheres such as adaptation, human rights or trade; agreements within particular economic sectors; or transnational initiatives involving global cooperative efforts by different types of non-state actors. Cooperative efforts in each of these forums are reviewed in the following sections of the chapter. Section 14.5.1 discusses international cooperation at multiple governance levels (global, sub-global and regional); Section 14.5.2 discusses cooperation with international sectoral agreements and institutions such as in the forestry, energy and transportation sectors; and Sections 14.5.3–14.5.5 discuss transnational cooperation across civil society and social movements, business partnerships and investor coalitions, and between sub-national entities and cities, respectively.

A key idea underpinning this analysis is that decomposition of the larger challenge of climate mitigation into ‘smaller units’ may facilitate more effective cooperation (Sabel and Victor 2017) and complement cooperation in the UN climate regime (Stewart et al. 2017). However, it is recognised that significant uncertainty remains over the feasibility and costs of these efforts (Sabel and Victor 2017), as well as whether they ultimately strengthen progress on climate mitigation in the multilateral climate arena (Falkner 2016a).

Any assessment of the effectiveness of international cooperation is limited by the methodological challenge of observing sufficient variance in cooperation in order to support inference on effects. There is little in the way of cross-sectional variance, given that most of the governance mechanisms assessed here are global in their geographical coverage. One exception is with respect to the effects of the Kyoto Protocol, which we have reported. Time series analysis is also challenging, given that other determinants of climate mitigation, including technology costs and the effects of national and sub-national level policies, are rapidly evolving. Thus, this chapter primarily reviews scholarship that compares observations with theory-based counterfactual scenarios.

Many of the international agreements and institutions discussed in this chapter, in particular the Paris Agreement, are new. The logic and architecture of the Paris Agreement, in particular, breaks new ground, and there is limited evaluation of prior experience in the form of analogous treaties to draw on. Such instruments have evolved in response to geopolitical and other drivers that are changing rapidly, and will continue to shape the nature of international cooperation under it and triggered by it. The Paris Agreement is also, in common with other multilateral agreements, a ‘living instrument’ evolving through interpretative and operationalising rules, and forms of implementation, that Parties continue to negotiate at conferences year on year. It is a constant ‘work in progress’ and thus challenging to assess at any given point in time. The Paris Agreement also engages a larger set of variables – given its privileging of national autonomy and politics, integration with the sustainable development agenda, and its engagement with actions and actors at multiple levels – than earlier international agreements, which further complicates the task of tracing causality between observed effects and international cooperation through the Paris Agreement.

Understanding of the effectiveness of international agreements and institutions is driven entirely by theory-driven prediction of how the world will evolve, both with these agreements in place and without them. The predictions in particular are problematic, because governance regimes are complex adaptive systems, making it impossible to predict how they will evolve over time, and hence what their effects will be. Time will cure this in part, as it will generate observations of the world with the new regime in place, which we can compare to the counterfactual situation of the new regime’s being absent, which may be a simpler situation to model. But even here our modelling capacity is limited: it may simply never be possible to know with a high degree of confidence whether international cooperation, such as that embodied in the Paris Agreement, is having a significant effect, no matter how much data are accumulated.

Given the importance of theory for guiding assessments of the past and likely future impacts of policies, it is important to note that among the alternative theoretical frameworks for analysis, some have been much more extensively developed in the literature than others. This chapter has noted in particular the partial dichotomy between a global commons framing of climate change and a transitions framing, which include different indicators to be used to evaluate the effectiveness of policies. The latter framing is particularly under-developed. Greater development of theories resting in social science disciplines such as economic geography, sociology, and psychology could potentially provide a more complete picture of the nature and effectiveness of international cooperation.

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