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# Review and Systematization of Disaster Preparedness Experiences in Urban Areas In the Caribbean Region

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# SUMMARY

## 1.1 Introduction

Oxfam's portfolio of urban disaster risk reduction projects in the Caribbean region are at the forefront of current practice. They offer an opportunity to review outputs, practice and lessons learned for Oxfam and the wider DRR community. This report aims to take that opportunity. Specifically it presents a review of DRR work in four urban contexts:

- Inner-city settlements in Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic (Intermón Oxfam projects 2007-current) with The European Commission
- Peri-urban settlements around Georgetown, Guyana (Oxfam projects 2006-2009) with The European Commission
- The municipality of Cap-Haitien, Haiti (Oxfam projects between 2003 and 2009) with The European Commission
- Metropolitan region of Port au Prince, Haiti (Oxfam projects from 2006-current) with Government of Haiti/World Bank

This summary provides an overview of key findings. The structure presents comments on the methodology used in the review, outcomes, interaction with local government and populations at risk, gender equity, challenges and opportunities for disaster risk reduction specific to urban contexts and an assessment of the sustainability of project outcomes. Finally lessons learned relevant to urban disaster risk reduction more generally are put forward

## 1.2 Review methodology

Analysis presented here draws both from documentary evidence and field work. Data was collected from site visits using semi-structured interviews with respondents representative of all stakeholder groups in each study, supported by a small number of group discussions with community members and visual assessment of mitigation works, early warning, community alert and first response equipment.

## 1.3 Brief description of the four case studies

Each project had similar aims, methods and followed a similar structure, as laid out in **Figure 1.1**. Risk associated with hydrometeorological hazards (flooding and mass movements) were the target of interventions. Partner populations were low-income with limited access to basic services.

**Figure 1.1** Basic project template

Pre-Project	Sensitisation	Implementation	Transfer	Post-Project
Identifying and nurturing any pre-existing relationships that can provide a foundation for project activities.	Introducing the project goals to stakeholders to generate buy-in, especially of local and national government agencies.	Core project activities and their management, usually involving multiple partners. Includes iterative, process evaluation.	Preparing and actualising the transfer of responsibility from Oxfam to local partners.	Activities between partners to help maintain project outcomes beyond implementation. Post-project evaluation.

**Pre-project** activities identified assets, the availability of which helped shape project design (for example if potential implementing partners were available). **Project** work commenced with a **period of sensitisation** when stakeholders – especially those in the urban risk management community - were made aware of the project and potential for collaboration. The core deliverables of each project were produced in the implementation phase. Once complete a formal **period of transfer** allowed local actors to take control of project outputs and prepare for Oxfam’s departure from project activities. **Post-project** was a period of evaluation but also for local actors to build or at least maintain partnerships through which outputs could be sustained. This model was interrupted in several cases by extreme weather events, including the disastrous 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Port au Prince, and also by political violence in Cap Haitien.

Each urban centre had a distinct institutional context and this affected project focus and the choice of implementing actor. In Santo Domingo a pre-existing legal and organisation framework for urban risk reduction was engaged with positively. The presence of a strong developmental NGO,

IDDI, which had partnered Intermón Oxfam on previous projects provided an excellent local partner for Oxfam. IDDI’s ongoing work with a number of low-income, at risk communities was instrumental in the final location of community level project activities. In Haiti, the absence of strong civil society meant Oxfam remained responsible for implementation.

Weak capacity in government, despite municipal governments being legally bound to provide civil protection services, led Oxfam to upscale its focus of activities in Cap Haitien. Twenty two local urban DRR committees formed as an outcome of Oxfam’s first project here were used to derive community membership for three municipal level committees founded in collaboration with municipal government. Under instruction from the Government of Haiti/World Bank, the Haiti, Port au Prince project targeted solely the municipal level for organisational strengthening, though this was underpinned by a range of community level awareness raising and mitigation works. In Guyana difficulties in formalising linkages between community level groups and the wider disaster management system constrained their influence and functions.

## 1.4 Description of the methods and tools used

Figure 1.2 identifies the two levels at which project activities were undertaken: local actors at risk and the urban risk management community. For both the tools used under each project phase are listed. This is a simplified model, and while each project implemented some aspect of the tools listed timing varied, in some cases with overlap as project planning responded to contextual challenges and opportunities

**Figure 1.2** Tools used

Project Targets	Pre-Project	Sensitisation	Implementation	Transfer	Post-Project
Local actors at risk	Defining project scope and potential partners	Informing potential stakeholders about the project	Local organisational re-structuring, community based disaster risk awareness raising, training in local disaster management skills, community based and technical risk mapping, , local early warning and evacuation planning, local mitigation works and rescue tool kit donations. Iterative, process evaluations.	Activities used to mark and reinforce transfer	Post project evaluation and support
Risk management community	Defining project scope and potential partners	Informing potential stakeholders and the wider risk management community about the project	Professional disaster risk management training.		Advocacy and coordination



While none of these tools are unique to urban DRR most have required careful application.

The novelty of urban DRR work required careful **pre-project** scoping and **sensitisation** phases. This was especially so, as for example in Guyana, where the urban risk management system was in flux with a number of overlapping jurisdictions and gaps in policy, but also in Haiti where formal structures were not supported by financial or human capacity. In some projects this period was longer than expected putting pressure on subsequent elements in an already compressed agenda.

During **implementation** the most creative and time consuming activities fell under community awareness raising. This was essential as a pre-requisite for building community groups and also as an end in its own right for raising knowledge of local risk and risk reduction options. Tools applied were influenced by local resources. In Santo Domingo, IDDI's strong local ties and existing network of street level promoters enabled awareness raising to be delivered direct to individual families. In Guyana the implementing partner, WAD used contacts to deliver street performance and school training days. In Cap Haitien local DRR groups managed community days.

A significant investment was also made in skills training for local community group members including hazard and vulnerability mapping, evacuation, search and rescue, water rescue, first aid and shelter management. Training on organisational and project management were also provided. In Haiti municipal and local groups took responsibility for financial and operational management during the completion of local mitigation works.

The formation of community DRR groups built on sensitisation, awareness raising and training. Group focus and momentum was maintained through ongoing training activities and participation in project deliverables such as risk mapping, mitigation works and the development and implementation of community early warning systems and (in Santo Domingo) emergency drills.

**Transfer** was marked most clearly in Cap Haitien, where a community event attracted 500 people. Training certificates and prizes for the best community group activities were given. **Post-project** activities included project evaluation with some support for community groups and further advocacy at the municipal level.



## 1.5 Main impacts and changes on the population

Project evaluation reports indicate the scope of project impacts, and these are summarised in **Figure 1.3**. This shows the number of local and community level groups formed. Community level groups operated at the level needed to be recognised by local government and in Haiti were closely linked to local government. Indeed in Port au Prince this was the focus of work. This also explains why there is no data on popular awareness raising as efforts targeted committee members who were offered training in disaster preparedness, emergency management and project management. In addition to the target groups identified in **Figure 1.3**, work in Santo Domingo and Guyana reached out to school children (3,000 and 865 respectively).

**Figure 1.3** Indicators of project scope

	Santo Domingo	Guyana	Haiti, Cap Haitien	Haiti, Metropolitan Port au Prince
Community groups formed	24 local, 8 community	18 community	22 community 3 local	3 municipal
Estimated number of residents made aware	18,500	25,000	8,000	500 committee members targeted

Field observations highlighted the difficulty of sustaining project outputs. Few local groups were active and in Guyana only two community groups showed vitality at the time of this study. This said, groups continued to provide local representatives where opportunity existed in municipal risk management (e.g., in Haiti and Santo Domingo), and a resource of skilled and informed local individuals strengthening local capacity during disaster response. This was evident in Tabarre, Port au Prince where the municipal committee reported acting immediately following the 2010 earthquake. They organised search and rescue and first aid for four days until support from the Dominican Republic arrived. Where groups were strong, and especially in Santo Domingo, impacts

went beyond DRR to include contributions to local social capital and improved relationships with city authorities. In Santo Domingo improved relations between the community and police were notable and important during everyday life as well as at times of emergency when police were present on streets and in public shelters where they would have been absent before.

Urban risk mitigation projects were delivered with each project. These served instrumentally to mitigate hazard or reduce vulnerability but more than this provided a focus for community group mobilization and a vehicle for training. The impacts of these works were greatest when they met an everyday development need (e.g., improved access stair-ways

or bridges) as well as improving risk management (evacuation and emergency services access routes). On only two occasions was this not the case, where drain cleaning was undertaken in preference to capital projects. The resultant impacts were much needed but short-lived. At the level of urban risk management the most notable impact was felt in Guyana.

## 1.6 Internal and external coordination/collaboration and level of participation

Local as well as city level actors participated in each project to varying degrees. The level of participation increased through the project lifetime from consultation and information sharing during sensitisation, to more formal partnership at implementation (which included collaboration in the planning and implementation of local awareness raising and mitigation works). During transition and into the post-project phase local actors took over the management of community and local groups and responsibility for future activity.

The short lifespan of most projects proved a barrier when compared to the deep rooted social, economic and political pressures experienced by local partners that pulled them away from community activity. Where groups were confronted by disasters during their formative stages this galvanised support and membership.

Where migration was common this was also a challenge but across the project communities in and out migration rates were not high. In Santo Domingo, IDDI's permanent networks of neighbourhood level social promoters identified and included recent in-migrants in ongoing social development programmes including those relating to Oxfam's urban DRR work.

Here, for the first time the Civil Defence Commission and other government and non-governmental actors were exposed to the Sphere Standards. While these standards have not been accepted uncritically they had been welcomed and put to use in designing emergency parcels and shelter management guidelines.

Local government was a central partner for each project but one that proved difficult to engage with. In Guyana while willingness to engage varied, in all cases resource scarcity limited practical collaboration.

Nationally without recognition of the community groups formal relationships with the Guyanese Civil Defence Commission or local government was not possible – although some informal linkages were achieved, enabling the Civil Defence Commission to contact local leaders to appraise flood levels and receive advice on aid distribution during subsequent events.

In Haiti, political tensions, resource and human capacity shortages made meaningful and lasting partnerships very difficult.

The one clearly successful partnership, in Tabarre, Port au Prince was built on the good will and priorities of the responsible Mayor and could not be replicated (despite the efforts of Oxfam which included peer learning with other mayors).

## 1.7 Gender equity and youth

Concerns for social equity, including those influenced by gender, youth and also ethnicity were mainstreamed into project design and implementation. From a gender perspective, in practical terms this meant encouraging involvement in local groups and activities for women in Haiti and men in Santo Domingo and Guyana.

While opportunities were created there appears to have been little social impact beyond specific cases. This is to be expected in projects with short implementation periods. Important progress was made in planning decisions, for example by including women's perspectives in the management and selection of shelters and in the behaviour of emergency personnel. Efforts to bring men into project activities included local sports and social events but impacts were short-lived.

Young people were targeted through school training days and by lively community activities including sports, music and other social events (these were also directed at drawing the participation of men). These initiatives met with some success.

Youth involvement especially in Haiti and Santo Domingo was high. Impact in Santo Domingo can be seen by the numbers, especially of young women who wanted to act as social promoters.

Young people were an important beneficiary group that benefitted from greater interaction within and between neighbourhoods with some respondents describing reduced tension and gang violence as a result. These are impacts that go beyond but reinforce and add value to urban DRR.

## 1.8 Urban hindering and facilitating factors

Urban contexts influence risk and its management in many ways. Discussions with respondents identified a number of local pressures that were felt to influence the local production of hazard, social vulnerability or shape the capacity of local actors and their partners seeking to reduce disaster risk proactively. These are presented in **Figure 1.4**.

The complexity and density of urban life underlie these influences which focus largely upon multi-hazard exposure, social tensions and mobility and political or administrative weaknesses. The latter partly explain the greater emphasis often placed on governance and infrastructure in urban DRR, compared to the centrality of livelihoods in rural work.

**Figure 1.4** Challenges and opportunities in urban disaster risk reduction

Hazard	Vulnerability	Capacity to reduce risk
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Physical and social hazards overlap</li> <li>•Too much focus on ‘urban’ space misses opportunity to manage risk at ecological scales, e.g. through water shed or integrated rural-urban or urban system scales.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Intense and concentrated populations.</li> <li>•Concentrated land-use means fewer options to avoid or cope with risk.</li> <li>•Rapid demographic growth exceeds management capacity.</li> <li>•Failure to regulate land-use and building.</li> <li>•Heterogeneous communities generate tensions.</li> <li>•Lack of information access.</li> <li>•Limited first-hand knowledge of hazards (amongst managers and those at risk).</li> <li>•In-migrants have no knowledge of local disaster history.</li> <li>•Skills, knowledge and social connections lost through out-migration.</li> <li>•Politicised governance.</li> <li>•Governance system is slow to change.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Un(der) employment can provide opportunities to engage through money or food for work schemes including training.</li> <li>•Logistics are easier, both to mobilise people and materials.</li> <li>•Inter-agency communication is easier.</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Little flexibility and long working/commuting hours in the urban economy limits time for participation.</li> <li>•Drugs crime is a barrier especially for youth.</li> <li>•Little established solidarity or history of local collective action.</li> <li>•Volunteers may be available but want/need payment.</li> <li>•Leaders put themselves at personal/political risk.</li> <li>•Few urban social development NGOs that could act as implementing partners.</li> <li>•Tendency to stay with old partners as little opportunity to change, even if old partners are not ideal.</li> <li>•City officials and politicians are less visible and directly accountable than rural counterparts.</li> <li>•City and local government is too busy to take on new policy agendas, even if mandated.</li> <li>•DRR is not an immediate priority for managers or those at risk.</li> <li>•Need agreement from government for interventions.</li> <li>•Overlapping roles between municipal, regional and national government entities.</li> <li>•Educational system, policy system etc may be oriented towards rural development, e.g., restricting access to technical skills like civil engineering.</li> <li>•Relocation is difficult, costly and often unsuccessful.</li> <li>•Risk may be seen as only amenable to large scale engineering projects.</li> </ul>

## 1.9 Sustainability

Projects hoped for medium to long term sustainability. Measuring this is difficult. Physical mitigation works will likely last into the long-term. Other outputs are less easy to monitor. Awareness raising was one of the most creative and dynamic aspects of projects and had a dramatic impact over the short term, training in disaster management for community and committee members was similarly well supported during project implementation. There are few lasting changes to behaviour that would indicate sustainability in risk reduction. Where hazards were experienced (in Haiti and Santo Domingo) evacuation and shelter management were improved.

Least sustainable were electronic flood level and alert systems installed in some communities in Santo Domingo, none of these systems were still functional. Instead residents had installed simple water level marker posts with local residents volunteering to raise alarm.

Good will from Civil Defence meant this could be coordinated and resources focussed at times when extremes events are expected.

Beyond local project elements, Oxfam's legacy includes enhanced awareness and willingness to reduce urban risk amongst key stakeholders, IDDI's new Risk Management Unit being an example.

## 1.10 Lessons learned

1. Urban DRR is a relatively new policy domain, projects likely to deliver significant impact may not fit well within existing donor frameworks, this restricts scope and misses opportunities for sustainably addressing the root causes of urban risk.
2. The complexity of urban society and politics requires careful analysis to maximise opportunities for project impact.
3. Local hazards and vulnerability experienced in urban areas may have their root causes in distant environmental and social processes suggesting a need for consideration of urban-region and rural-urban projects.
4. The additional importance of governance in urban DRR highlights the need for multi-level approaches, which could include national level advocacy to encourage support of local government and citizen action.
5. Urban social inequalities are stubborn but can be challenged by sensitive project planning and implementation.
6. Cultivating new and maintaining existing local implementing partners helps secure outcomes, extend competencies and stimulate future project inputs.



7. Sometimes uncomfortable decisions may have to be made in deciding how far to work in urban vulnerable communities influenced by exploitative political or criminal organisations.
8. The most useful and sustainable urban DRR interventions (physical and social) serve everyday basic needs as well as providing a function at times of emergency and disaster.
9. Local and municipal government are the cornerstones of sustainable urban DRR.
10. Urban DRR provides a focal point for integrated development planning and should also capitalise on this to ensure its integration across all urban humanitarian and development activities.



# INTRODUCTION

Oxfam's recent activity in the Caribbean region has placed it at the forefront of international experience in the relatively new field of urban disaster risk reduction. This evaluation report provides an opportunity for a critical reflection on that experience. It draws from work undertaken with participating communities and government in Santo Domingo (the Dominican Republic), Greater Georgetown (Guyana) and Port au Prince and Cap Haitien (Haiti), with funding from **Humanitarian Aid Department Of The European Commission** and the **World Bank**.

The experience of Oxfam provides an opportunity for lessons to inform further practice. This is a timely intervention as rapid urbanization, economic crisis and global environmental change increasingly push urban disaster risk and its reduction up the agendas of development and humanitarian actors as well as governments and communities directly facing disaster risk.

Specifically, this systematization report covers the following projects:

- **Inner-city settlements in Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic** (Oxfam projects 2007-current)
- **Peri-urban settlement around Georgetown, Guyana** (Oxfam projects 2006-2009)
- **The municipality of Cap-Haitien, Haiti** (Oxfam projects between 2003 and 2009)
- **Metropolitan region of Port au Prince, Haiti** (Oxfam projects from 2006-current)

As indicated above, in addition to country differences, each project is set within a particular urban form (see [Figure 1.1](#)). This influences the scale and focus of the works and impacts discussed below.



Figure 1.1 The four project sites

While acknowledging the multi-hazard exposure of partner communities Oxfam's consistent focus across these cases has been on vulnerability related to hydrometeorological hazards. In particular flooding (river, coastal and rainfall accumulation), associated rainfall induced mass movements (landslides and rock-falls) and wind damage, caused by tropical storms and hurricanes. Very often in these cases hazard is an outcome of urban land-use and management weaknesses which serve to exacerbate underlying environmental processes and raise them to the status of hazard. Failure to maintain urban drainage and the settlement of low-lying river bank and coastal locations or steep hillsides are cases in point.

Risk drivers highlight the roots of urban disaster risk in development challenges. Urban disaster risk reduction therefore needs to address urban governance and livelihood as well as supporting focussed disaster preparedness and prevention initiatives. Helping translate this into action is made difficult by the realities of funding mechanisms, contingent upon the sensitivity and support of local and national political actors and constrained by access to resources for actors at risk.

Three projects ([Santo Domingo](#), [Georgetown](#) and [Cap Haitien](#)) were completed with The European Commission funding, the fourth ([Port au Prince](#)) was funded by Government of Haiti/World Bank. Dedicated funding for disaster risk reduction (DRR) is very limited with The European Commission offering rare and valuable support for this. It is because of this that the time and scope constraints that come with The European Commission funding are also important and reflected on in the report.

As important in assessing these projects are Oxfam's goals that its interventions in urban disaster risk reduction should be sustainable (i.e. long-lived and locally owned) and replicable. They should also further Oxfam's core values, for example of gender equality. Taken together



1. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic



2. Peri-urban Georgetown, Guyana



3. Cap Haitien, Haiti



4. Metropolitan Port au Prince, Haiti

these lines of assessment offer important insights into the ways in which future programming for urban DRR might be directed in the Americas and globally.

Following a summary of findings the review presents its methodology, describes the broad approach and specific tools used in the case studies under analysis, and presents the main impacts observed. Specific attention is then placed on reviewing the ways in which

local government and populations have been partnered, the inclusion of gender equity in programming, challenges and opportunities for disaster risk reduction specific to urban contexts and assessment of the sustainability of project outcomes. Finally lessons learned from Oxfam's experiences relevant to urban disaster risk reduction more generally are put forward.



# METHODOLOGY OF THE INVESTIGATION

## 3.1 Introduction

The report methodology consisted of the following tasks:

- Reviewing of the systematization framework (topics, objectives, instruments etc.).
- Primary data collection in each case study area
- Data analysis and write up.

**Review** work drew primarily from Oxfam project documents. These included bid and review documents for The European Commission and Oxfam's own project specific systematization and evaluation reports. These documents were especially useful in providing material to help describe the impacts of each case study as the collection of primary data for systematic outcome assessment was beyond the scope of this review.

Additional background material was obtained from UNDP country reports and documents collected in the field. These included training reports, evaluations, local development plans, national legislation and disaster management plans. A list of the most important documents used in this report is provided in **Appendix I**.

**Primary data** was collected in each case study through a mixture of key informant interviews and group discussions supported by direct observation of physical works. Translation was used to facilitate data collection in Santo Domingo and Haiti and in all cases the researcher was accompanied by at least one member of the

Oxfam team or its local implementing partner to help gain access to respondents. Time for data collection was limited to at most four days for each project.

Consequently respondent selection and resulting data and **analysis** were intended to be indicative rather than representative or comprehensive of all stakeholder experience. In no study were all community level partners interviewed.

This was a result of time constraints but also of the availability of respondents. All interviews were held in the offices or houses of respondents. A full list of those participating in interviews and discussion groups for each case study is provided in **Appendix II**.

**Table 3.1** shows the coverage of interviews with local level partners for each case study – usually the chair or other senior member of a community level disaster risk reduction committee.

The comparatively low proportion of coverage in Port au Prince is a product of difficult access and the shifting capacities and priorities of

local partners following the 12 January 2010 earthquake reconstruction.

In each case primary focus was on that level of community organisation and actor that was recognised by local or municipal government (in Santo Domingo and Haiti, Cap Haitien these

groups were supported by more local groups, members of these groups were also interviewed but not comprehensively). In this way the choice of community level respondent allowed focus on issues of governance which lie at the heart of this report.

**Figure 3.1** Respondent coverage for community partners in each case study site

Case Study	Number of community level partner organisations	Number of organisations interviewed
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic	8	7
Georgetown, Guyana	18	14
Cap Haitien, Haiti	3	3
Port au Prince , Haiti	5	2

In each project assessment local government partners, responsible national agencies (e.g., civil defence) and national and international non-governmental actors with a stake in shaping the policy landscape for urban disaster risk and its management (e.g., national Red Cross Societies and UNDP), project managers and community promoters engaged by Oxfam and any implementing agencies (e.g., Instituto Dominicano Desarrollo Integral in Santo Domingo and Women Across Differences in Guyana) were included.

In each project assessment a small number of focussed discussion groups were undertaken, usually with community level actors to gain insight from members as well as leaders of local groups. Generally though time constraints meant that it was difficult to develop rapport with respondents to the level required to make group discussions useful and one-on-one interviews, or interviews held with others in attendance, were found to be a more appropriate technique for data collection.



All interviews were semi-structured with a number of pre-prepared key themes but allowing scope for diversions to match the knowledge and interests of individual respondents. There was little opportunity for spontaneous interviews, for example with community members in the street, because of time and language constraints, though these were welcomed when they arose.

Several visits were made to physical mitigation works completed under Oxfam projects (with the exception of Port au Prince where time and security concerns did not allow this). These visits provided an opportunity to judge at first hand the outputs of Oxfam's work and opened a more informal space for discussion with respondents. Especially in Santo Domingo community partners and the implementing agency were proud of their

work and site visits provided a useful way of showing Oxfam's continued interest in this.

In closing interviews respondents were asked if they had any questions. Some touched on broad issue of disaster risk reduction practice or initial findings of the study and were answered. At other times direct requests for Oxfam assistance were made, requests were noted and communicated to Oxfam staff but it was made clear that the interviewer had no influence over Oxfam policy.

In analysing data and writing up, cross-referencing between the views expressed by project management staff and those of other stakeholders, and also with preceding review documents based on more detailed studies provided a means for verifying data.



# BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FOUR CASE STUDIES

## 4.1 Introduction

Each project followed a generic implementation structure, though with significant differences in each case forced by project timetabling, local political and organisational realities and priorities. These are discussed in this section

**Figure 4.1** helps to structure this discussion by mapping out a basic project template showing the five stages through which projects tended to progress, through with some overlap (for example where transfer activities and responsibilities were initiated during sensitisation and reinforced by training during implementation). Projects also acted along three levels of intervention: **individuals, community groups and the wider urban or national risk management system.**

This strategy sought to raise awareness of disaster risk and potential for its alleviation amongst individuals, form or strengthen local community based disaster risk reduction groups and re-structure overarching risk governance systems to provide formal connections between community groups and responsible local or national government agencies with the aim of providing a mechanism for project sustainability.

**Figure 4.1** Basic project template

Pre-Project	Sensitisation	Implementation	Transfer	Post-Project
Identifying and nurturing any pre-existing relationships that can provide a foundation for project activities.	Introducing the project goals to stakeholders to generate buy-in, especially of local and national government agencies.	Core project activities and their management, usually involving multiple partners. Includes iterative, process evaluation.	Preparing and actualising the transfer of responsibility from Oxfam to local partners.	Activities between partners to help maintain project outcomes beyond implementation. Post-project evaluation.

Each of the four case study projects is described below according to the structure described in **Figure 4.1**. The shape of projects was strongly influenced through constraints imposed by funding sources – in particular through limited project lifetimes and budgets. The principal donor was The European Commission (supporting all projects except for Haiti, metropolitan Port au Prince).

Funding for DRR activities was not tied to any disaster event but was firmly time-bound with a maximum of 15 months for project completion. Work in Haiti, Port au Prince was undertaken in response to a tender call made from the Government of Haiti with support from the World Bank with prescribed project components.

All project design in Haiti preceded the January 12 2010 earthquake although work in Port au Prince overlapped with response and reconstruction activity. In each case disaster events with at least local impacts had occurred after project completion providing an opportunity to assess project outcomes (see section 6).

## 4.2 Dominican Republic: Santo Domingo

Santo Domingo is exposed to flooding and mass-movements associated with tropical storms and hurricanes. These hazards were the focus of Oxfam's work (there is a risk of earthquakes but this was not included).

The communities selected include some of the most densely populated and exposed in the city characterised by hundreds of household dwellings perched on precarious limestone cliff faces and ravines or on the flood plain immediately adjacent to the River Isabella.

Poverty was high though basic services and in some cases tenure had been attained, local social organising was also evident but had been stressed by drugs crime. These were not the only high risk communities in the city but they did represent a considerable and contiguous population at risk.

The choice of these sites was determined by their risk profiles but also because of the strong local connections enjoyed by the implementing partner, a social development NGO called the Instituto Dominicano Desarrollo Integral (IDDI).

Given IDDI's implementing role, Oxfam's main contribution was in project formulation and as technical advisor, IDDI had not been involved with DRR before. This arrangement was a key element of the project and benefitted from an existing good relationship between Intermón Oxfam and IDDI built up through previous project collaborations. IDDI also had a long history of engagement with the target communities and was well respected both within communities and with government actors. Because of past work IDDI could offer the project an active network of local health promoters and had already successfully helped to build local community organisation and social

businesses. IDDI was thus uniquely placed in Santo Domingo to support Oxfam's project goals of raising individual awareness and building local organisational capacity for urban disaster risk reduction.

Two project cycles have been completed: 2006-07 (with the communities of Capotillo, La Zurza, Simon Bolivar, Gualay and Los Cañitas) and 2008-09 (with the communities of Los Guandules, Guachupita and Las Ceinega).

A third project underway at the time of the review (Tres Brazos) took IDDI into a community where no previous links existed and in itself demonstrates the confidence of this group and their popular success with local actors having invited IDDI to work in this community.

Community level work under each completed project was formally disaggregated into three phases. Months 1-6 included sensitisation and implementation of awareness raising (including family visits, talks with groups of families, video forums and discussion, community theatre a song contest and vulnerability fair to celebrate the international day of DRR), training (including

monitoring hazard and early warning, shelter management and first aid), risk mapping (both using community and technical knowledge) and community group formation; months 7-12 saw the completion of physical mitigation works (applying the risk maps and managed with community groups); months 13-15 focussed on facilitating transfer and IDDI's retreat from a leadership role.

From the end of the project IDDI continued to keep in touch with committees and individuals through a range of other social and environmental projects with additional interaction during times of disaster. IDDI's long-term local commitment, including the employment of local residents guaranteed an ongoing relationship.

During the project lifetimes one member of IDDI stayed in direct contact with community members and leaders to make communication easy and maintain trust.

**Three early warning and evacuation drills** were practiced with increasing complexity. The **first** used only a megaphone with no preparation for the community, the **second** was able to use





constructed evacuation routes and identified shelters, the **third** integrated non-local actors – ambulances, civil defence – and simulated injury. The aim was to prepare people and agencies, but also to witness the contributions of each stage of the project and maintain community interest. Evaluation was formalised and ongoing throughout the project lifespan.

The wider risk management community and public were engaged through a media campaign ‘Reduce Vulnerability’ using television and radio.

### 4.3 Guyana: Georgetown’s peri-urban communities

From Georgetown’s urban core and stretching more than 100km linear peri-urban settlements lie between the sea-wall and inland water conservancies of Guyana’s Atlantic coastline. Many of these settlements lie at or below sea-level and are exposed to flooding from heavy rain, breaches and overtopping of the sea-wall and conservancy dam.

The communities are largely segregated into predominantly Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese populations with local government reflecting the racialised politics of the country. Livelihoods are mixed including small-scale urban livestock, poultry and cash-crop farming, and commuting along the coast or into Georgetown for work (and in some cases secondary school).

Poverty is high exacerbated by physical vulnerability with the poor often residing in ground level wooden or concrete houses. Traditional housing is built up on stilts to aid air circulation

Actors such as civil defence, the police and Dominican Red Cross sat on local committees and were made aware of the project from its inception, but no specific effort was made to alter the overarching institutional architecture.

Rather the municipality was integrated into the project through its role in coordinating disaster response with civil defence and as a gatekeeper to political interests and the provision of basic needs underpinning disaster risk reduction.

but also provides a flood risk reduction function, however as families expand and cultural tastes change the ground floor space has frequently been converted for new accommodation.


Localised flooding is very frequent and in 2005 a national emergency was declared following heavy rainfall and flooding along the entire coast including Georgetown.

Two project cycles have been completed (**2005-2007** and **2007-2009**) building on relief work undertaken following the 2005 floods. Local initiatives focussed on 21 settlements within several local councils (neighbourhood democratic councils) one regional council (Region 4) .Two local partners were engaged to help in implementation, Women Across Differences (WAD), a predominantly Afro-Guyanese gender NGO and the Guyana Rice Producers Association (GRPA), an NGO supporting small rice farmers. Neither organisation had any previous experience with DRR work, although the GRPA had activated its network of extension

workers to provide impact assessment and in relief distribution services during the 2005 floods. During the DRR projects WAD managed local awareness raising and GRPA livelihood development, with Oxfam maintaining a considerable role in managing implementation of community level activity through a cohort of young community mobilisers employed and trained by Oxfam's temporary project office. Guyana's limited civil society and Oxfam's lack of experience in Guyana generated challenges for project management. That Oxfam closed its country office at the end of the project also led some respondents to describe a sense of abandonment. This was despite the Guyana Red Cross having taken on management of community groups at the close of the project.

**Twenty communities** were initially targeted, ten having been partnered by Oxfam during relief and risk reduction work associated with the 2005 floods. The choice of these and additional sites was taken with the Guyana Civil Defence Commission, which had no existing reach to the community level. Of these 20 communities one was abandoned though lack of local interest and two combined into a single case in response to security concerns following an upsurge in armed crime.

The largest proportion of effort, time and resource in project management and implementation was expended on local risk awareness raising and training activities including street theatre and school days, the latter also providing an opportunity to showcase first aid and other risk related skills. This work was prioritised in an effort to first sensitise individuals to then provide a resource for community group formation and leadership. Community group members then underwent further training including evacuation



and shelter management, participated local knowledge to risk mapping activities (that also included a technical component) that fed into the location of small physical mitigation works. These works helped provide a focus for group activity, most common outputs were small bridges across drainage canals. Additional small projects were specifically targeted at making schools safer from flooding. Regional and local government permission was required for mitigation projects providing an opportunity to engage these actors.

#### 4.4 Haiti, Cap Haitien

A regional capital, Cap Haitien has grown rapidly in the last decade with low-income households forced to colonise increasingly marginal land, Many families now live on steep hillsides or on the coastal plain. Some of the most marginalised live on land reclaimed from the sea through the dumping of compressed solid waste. This is the main destination for waste in the absence of a landfill or other waste management system. The city is administered through three city district

The lack of a developed risk management culture and set of supporting institutions in Guyana required additional emphasis in this project on institutional strengthening at the national level. A series of workshops on the Sphere standards was provided for Civil Defence, Guyana Red Cross and other interested parties such as the UNDP. A key challenge for this project remained the weak institutional context so that there was no easy home for community risk reduction groups to receive support once the project closed.

and one city centre authority. Projects concentrated on the three district level administrations and their residents, with the city centre population displaying less relative hydrometeorological risk. Flooding was primary hydrometeorological hazard, associated with poor drain maintenance, mass movements also occur made worse by the clearance of slope vegetation around dwellings. Earthquake risk was present but was not formally integrated into this study.



The extent to which project initiatives may be transferable to seismic risk (e.g., shelter management, and first aid), or might exacerbate risk (a lack of awareness raising) have not been assessed.

Civil society and government are weak in Haiti. Consequently Oxfam acted as the primary implementing agent through a permanent office that continues to operate.

Three projects were completed. Each developed a different organisational or physical element of disaster risk reduction.

**The first project (2003-2004)** was interrupted because of political insecurity. Despite this it succeeded in widespread awareness raising (e.g., using radio programmes) and from this built 22 Neighborhood Civil Protection Committees (NCPCs). Physical investment to improve evacuation (stairs, paths and bridge) was also undertaken. The project also sought to strengthen the national Civil Protection system through training.

## 4.5 Haiti, Port au Prince

Metropolitan Port au Prince is a rapidly expanding urban centre. Very weak civil society coupled with a long history of corruption, state violence and organised violent crime and widespread poverty mean there are few local institutions or resources. The city is exposed to hurricanes and tropical storms with large numbers of residents living on steep ravine and hill slopes also exposed to mass movements. On January 12 2010 the city was hit by a devastating earthquake.

In contrast to the other projects reviewed here work in Port au Prince was contracted to Oxfam through

**The second project**, undertaken in four months in 2005, supported the continued development of the NCPCs through organized drain cleaning in advance of the hurricane season. This was accompanied by further public awareness raising (radio programmes were aired once more and information packs distributed).

In neither project were the NCPCs able to forge strong links with local government as they operated at too local a scale to be officially recognized.

**The third project (2008-2009)** aimed to address this by creating three organizations (called Local Committees). Each corresponded with the administrative boundary of a municipality allowing it to be recognized by the appropriate mayor. The Local Committees groups included representatives from NCPCs together with local government elected members.

a World Bank/Government of Haiti programme on disaster risk reduction, this followed major flooding in 2004.

Project aims were predetermined by the programme structure. The principal difference with Oxfam's The European Commission funded work was the lack of a community level organisational building component (excluded by at the request of the Government of Haiti).

Instead, emphasis was placed on strengthening at the urban municipal level and more ambitious local mitigation works were possible.

Municipal level committees were formed in association with the mayors in five municipalities. Members, including representatives from government offices and community groups were trained, risk assessments were undertaken with participation of group members and scientists. These led to the formulation of risk management contingency plans.

Emergency response equipment was given to each committee and mitigation works of up to US\$45,000 planned. To support each district level committee one or two community groups were formed and members trained.

Civil Protection contributed through providing trainers and in helping the choice of mitigation projects.

A public information campaign was also undertaken and administered through the Mayor and district level groups.



# DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS AND TOOLS USED

## 5.1 Introduction

The methodologies described above outline the array of tools applied by Oxfam in its urban DRR work. The aim of this section is to provide short technical briefs for the most important of these tools and comment on any re-orientation or particular emphasis that came from working in an urban context.

**Table 5.1** lists the tools used (sometimes informally) by Oxfam and its project partners in completing the projects under review. While there is overlap in focus of works engaging with local actors at risk and the wider risk management community the specific nature of the engagement as described for particular tools can be rather distinctive.

**Figure 5.1** Tools used to engage local actors and the wider risk management community

Project Targets	Pre-Project	Sensitisation	Implementation	Transfer	Post-Project
Local actors at risk	Defining project scope and potential partners	Informing potential stakeholders about the project	Local organisational re-structuring, community based disaster risk awareness raising, training in local disaster management skills, community based and technical risk mapping, local early warning and evacuation planning, local mitigation works and rescue tool kit donations. Iterative, process evaluations.	Activities used to mark and reinforce transfer	Post project evaluation and support
Risk management community	Defining project scope and potential partners	Informing potential stakeholders and the wider risk management community about the project	Professional disaster risk management training.		Advocacy and coordination



The majority of tools presented below are targeted at building the capacity of local actors at risk. These are discussed first and where work also included interaction with the wider risk management community (e.g., in organisational re-structuring) this is noted.

A second smaller section describes those tools targeted specifically at the wider risk management community. In both cases the greatest effort is placed on project implementation tools which were formally designed.

Pre- and post-project and project sensitisation tools as well as project evaluation were less clearly defined in the project literature, nonetheless they were important aspects of project work so have been included here.

## 5.2 Working with local actors at risk

**Scoping:** The aim of local level scoping was to identify (1) hazard objects (including the kinds of risk – in the project reported here hydrometeorological risks were the target but within this included multi-hazard contexts (coastal, riverine and rainfall flooding, landslides and rockfalls); (2) vulnerable populations by location (e.g., urban city centre or peri-urban) and scale (e.g., city region or internal urban locale), and; (3) governance contexts to prepare for limitations (e.g., from a weak, disinterested or oppositional government administration and organisational system for disaster risk management) and opportunities (e.g., local champions and reliable implementation or post-project support partners).

Methods were not well documented and appear to be informal. Competitive project proposals to The European Commission were made under time pressure with scoping working best when Oxfam had good previous project experience and strong local partners. This made it difficult to innovate either in the character of a bid or to broaden the

scope of work geographically. This is important in urban DRR where there is as yet only limited local experience and demographic change, globalisation and global environmental change mean the sites and quality of disaster risk are changing rapidly.

The effect on the projects reviewed here has been to narrow the focus of activities around awareness raising and training supported by small mitigation projects and limited work with wider risk management actors. This excluded work that could tackle head-on the developmental causes (and possible solutions) of urban disaster risk – e.g., developing community businesses in plastic recycling or solid waste management to help keep drains clean, or community based fruit orchards to help stabilise slopes, or its wider socio-ecological context – e.g., work that sees urban risk as a product of wider processes in the watershed region so that efforts outside the urban can help mitigate risks within.

**Sensitisation:** Sensitisation was important at local and wider management levels. The aim of sensitisation at the community level was to introduce the project to local leaders, local government and the community. This was important in preparing the way for local support and collaboration.

Methods included open community forums in which the project and its goals were presented and the use of pre-existing social networks to informally advise community members of project aims and opportunities for participation. Both these approaches worked especially well in Santo Domingo where the implementing partner had very strong local links.

There is no guarantee of automatic support. In Guyana regional government was reluctant to grant support, especially for mitigation works but also suspicious of local group formation. Both were seen to be a function of the regional and neighbourhood administrations. Frequent visits backed up by growing support from national level actors were important in the eventual gaining of support.

### **Local organisational re-structuring:**

Local organisations were a key element in building sustainability. They provided a focal point for community and government engagement on local DRR and during response and reconstruction, and acted as a target for future training, information and other support from government or elsewhere (in Guyana the Red Cross invited all community group members to attend a training session). During project implementation they provided a contact point for interaction between the community and implementing agents and were frequently used in this way for helping select mitigation projects,

lead on community risk mapping and selection of people for training as well as leading on public awareness raising.

Committee formation was time consuming. In Santo Domingo stages included: identifying members following initial community sensitisation and awareness raising, training for all members in technical subjects but also organisational management subjects (e.g., committee structures, defining objectives, committee functions). In the initial phase of organisation formation a play-off arose in Santo Domingo between using established or previously known and trusted community leaders, while wishing to develop new skills and hear new local voices.

There was quite some advantage in local organisations being formally recognised by government. This magnified the impact of a group by providing a formal channel for any information on local hazards, vulnerability or impact. This needs to be balanced against the danger of co-option by the political process and some possible examples of capture were identified, for example in Guyana where community group and local government membership overlapped considerably.

Where government support was strong, for example in the WB/GoH funded Haiti, Port au Prince project, this helped to force local government cooperation. Although this may achieve little beyond short-term compliance with regulations to form a group. This was especially so in a context like that of Haiti where government resources were very limited. Local champions were used to promote the case for reform in Haiti with a supportive Mayor from Port au Prince (Tabarre) talking with mayors in Cap Haitien.



In contexts where urban communities had a long experience of political repression and/or lacked a tradition of public service and representative leadership in local collective action generating and maintaining membership and especially leadership was a major challenge. It can arguably take generations to reverse deeply felt cultures of alienation and distrust of collective organisation as little more than a career or self-enriching strategy for those involved. Where this is the context and people have retreated into family or other close nit networks for social support building community organisation will be challenging. This was the case in Guyana where few groups exhibited any genuine levels of independent activity.

### Community based disaster risk awareness raising:

The aim of this suite of tools was to increase awareness amongst the vulnerable of local environmental risk: underpinning vulnerabilities and hazards, their proximate (e.g., littering) and root (e.g., land-use planning) causes and capacities to reduce risk before and impacts after hazard events. This did not include training, formal risk mapping or organisation building, but was a very valuable precursor in building popular support and willingness to become involved in subsequent activities.

Methods varied but all required a considerable expenditure of resources and time. This demonstrated the importance placed on awareness raising as a foundation for all subsequent community activities and the desire for achieving the widest possible participation of local community members. Emphasis was also placed on awareness raising under the WB/GoH project in Haiti, Port au Prince. Specific tools across these projects included:

- Street theatre with national if not local writing and actors. This was sometimes (e.g., in Guyana) also videoed and shown on commercial TV.
- Specifically commissioned radio and TV plays (successful in Santo Domingo)
- School based ‘open days’ with a number of activities for all community members to observe and participate in. These included walk-in events (e.g., first aid demonstrations) but also those requiring some preparation and forethought (e.g., a song competition). These were a highlight in Guyana.
- Community outreach methods including talks between community promoters and individual families or with small groups of families, sometimes including the showing and then discussion of a locally produced video.

Where awareness raising events were planned and presented by local DRR organisations they met the dual purposes of strengthening local DRR organisations and promoting popular awareness.

- Local DRR group led community events included song competitions, dances, football matches, door-to-door awareness raising campaigns, reports on local activities and the design of local group project signboards. These were a key component of the Cap Haitien projects with Oxfam providing prizes based on
  - (1) Information on sign-board to be placed in the neighbourhood.
  - (2) Quality of community gathering event
  - (3) Other initiatives e.g., door-to-door awareness raising.

4) No political or religious messages. US\$1,000 was awarded for each of the top 8 events but each event was awarded something.

Local contexts shaped community awareness raising activities. In Santo Domingo the implementing partner IDDI had strong local ties and an existing network of street level promoters enabling awareness raising to be delivered at the individual family and street levels. In Guyana and Haiti no such ties existed.

In Guyana the implementing partner WAD had good relations with street performance artists and school administrators so that these aspects were dominant. In Haiti, Cap Haitien using local DRR groups arguably reinforced outcomes, indicated by some community risk signs still being in place three years later – though they were then soon covered in election posters!

## Training in local disaster

**management skills:** A core component of all projects. Training was both an outcome in its own right indicating increased local capacity, and also a task that reinforced and provided a rationale for local community organisation for DRR.

Methods including training local promoters in the theory of disaster risk reduction. In Santo Domingo project T-shirts and bags were emblazoned with the formula  $R = H + V/C$ , with promoters then being able to explain the hazard, vulnerability, capacity and risk relationship to community members. All projects delivered focussed, technical training to community group members. Such training included:

- Hazard and vulnerability mapping
- Alert and Evacuation
- Search and rescue
- Water rescue
- First aid
- Shelter management

Quite some effort was needed to make sure that skills were spread amongst committee members and that the same individuals did not become the experts in all subjects. Notwithstanding the laudable enthusiasm of community members, concentrating skills in few people adds risk. In a disaster it is difficult to function in multiple roles, and indeed impacts can mean key individuals are unable to contribute at all.

Training was also given in community group management and where community groups were given responsibility for administering local mitigation projects in project management, financial accountability and purchasing (e.g., Haiti, Port au Prince and Cap Haitian).



Where training in DRR was provided by state actors (e.g., Haiti, Port of Prince by the Interior Ministry which contains Civil Protection; Haiti, Cap Haitien by the City Fire Brigade) this had the potential to help also to integrate local groups into national networks and encourage sustainability through independence from Oxfam.

In urban areas it is important to scope out any potential local trainers and appraise their quality and appropriateness for providing training, bringing external trainers is expensive and less effective if local skills are available.

Skills and the confidence to use them are lost easily without frequent practice. Organised groups can help encourage training. This was observed in Haiti, Port au Prince where new members to the local/municipal committees had been given training by existing members.

There were opportunities for training exercises during the lifetime of the project. For example in Santo Domingo evacuation drills were held at intervals with increasing complexity (spontaneous, with evacuation routes, early warning systems and shelters identified and managed, and with role play to practice first aid and water rescue with ambulance and civil defence teams).

Once projects finish, maintaining skills without any formal programme is very difficult, especially where resources are limited. In Guyana the Guyanese Red Cross was able to invite individual community group members to training days, but had no resources for directly strengthening or working with community groups.

## Community based and technical risk mapping:

Also serving multiple purposes, community risk mapping was used to reinforce and exemplify risk theory, as a tool for bonding community groups and instrumentally to help identify local assets (such as schools that might be used as shelters or safe passages as evacuation routes) and hazards (low-lying or steep land). Technical risk mapping was an input to identifying risks and assets (evacuation routes, shelters, potential mitigation projects) for risk management.

For the projects reviewed here the balance between community and technical risk mapping varied. In Cap Haitien it proved difficult to integrate community and technical maps. Technical mapping based on geographic information system analysis, while scientifically excellent relied on specific computing software and user skills limiting its long-term utility at the local level.

In Guyana a relatively simple approach that held vulnerability constant and varied risk according to hazard geography (for all sites higher hazard was reported in land where land was low-lying) was mapped and used primarily to help formally locate sites for local mitigation works and the location of buildings suitable for use as shelters. Members of the committee had a more nuanced mental map of local vulnerabilities and hazards than could be mapped.

In Santo Domingo community and technical maps developed and successfully integrated through technical support from the University of Barcelona.

The outcomes of risk mapping were rather intangible. It seems reasonable to assume that their creation provided a focus for building community group cohesion and contributing to raising risk awareness in the wider local population. The failure of technical mapping to prove appropriate (Cap Haitien) or sufficiently detailed (Guyana) for risk management use suggests real care is needed in applying this tool. Integration of lay and technical knowledge did work (Dominican Republic) and maps have been demonstrated to benefit both the community and technical management needs, but less consistently than might be expected from experience in rural participatory and risk mapping.



**Local early warning and evacuation planning:** This offered a key organising role for local risk management communities, particularly those in areas subject to seasonal or frequent hazard events. Local warnings and any coordinated evacuation that result also provide an opportunity to keep skills in these and related subjects like shelter management fresh. They build on the risk map and help to integrate this with the training, organisation building and emergency tool donation components.

The most developed early warning was found in Santo Domingo. Here the first round of Oxfam - The European Commission projects had included setting up of electronic flood monitors (a buoy connected to an electric monitor and emergency lights and sirens). This proved inappropriate and in every case equipment had either broken or been stolen. In subsequent The European Commission projects simpler tools based on visual observation of river levels using riverbank posts to mark depth were more durable. In Guyana water levels in drainage canals were also monitored using simple observation posts.

Evacuation planning was based on committee members taking responsibility for their own locales and being prepared to take initiative in raising alarm and coordinating evacuation with the wider committee. Where committees had representation from relevant authorities this was useful in accessing wider support (for example from Civil Defence and the Police in Santo Domingo).

**Local mitigation works:** Beyond providing a physical mechanism for local hazard reduction, local mitigation works acted as demonstration projects for potential future donors including government, provided focal points during the early period of community organisation and a legacy that helped to maintain community memory of disaster risk, the potential for local action in risk reduction and the partnership with Oxfam and any implementing agencies.

They also provided an opportunity to extend skills training to include project management and maintenance. In Cap Haitien, the community group managed US\$5000 with training in management subjects including:

**for logistics, financial reporting, buying, storage, financial management and human recruitment.**

The method of selecting projects and their implementation varied across case studies, but in each there was an emphasis on local involvement. In all projects local committee members contributed to the selection of sites. In Santo Domingo the local community was involved through local discussions followed up by negotiations between community leaders and those whose houses and property would be effected by works.

In Guyana the local committee decided upon local works and then negotiated agreement with local government, which was granted in each case. In Port au Prince the selection of project proposals by committee included consultation with Civil Protection under the Ministry of the Interior, and representation from the local risk reduction committees from each Mayor's office.

The final choice of projects in this case rested not with community actors but with the government agency managing World Bank project funds.

Once released, funds were administered by a local management committee including members of the Mayor's Civil Protection group trained in project development with support from Oxfam on project management.

Implementation was administered through a social audit group with members having no interest in local projects but including local leaders and technicians.

The range of final projects reflected the diversity of risk environments. They were (with the exception of Santo Domingo) small works but strategically chosen so they would benefit as many people as possible (e.g., bridges in Guyana providing access for many people to evacuation routes).

The projects included many **small bridges and some drain cleaning** in Guyana, drain cleaning in Cap Haitien, retention walls and levees in Port au Prince and in Santo Domingo a network of concrete evacuation routes from the flood plain of the River Isabella up adjacent, steep ravine slopes (made possible because of including large contributions in kind though labour from the local community).



**Rescue tool kit donations:** Small scale and very practical, such donations were important for marking the capacity of local community groups. Groups had responsibility for the safe care of such tool kits and regulating their use. Tool kits usually comprised of excavation equipment (shovels etc), first aid hardware (stretchers) and other emergency equipment (hard hats and chain saws).

Tools had been used, for example in Santo Domingo to cut away fallen tree branches, but were not always accessible. Also in Santo Domingo the requirement of two committee member signatures made rapid access difficult. Tool kits were also a source of some controversy with government agencies that felt they should have control of any tools, this noted by Civil Defence in Santo Domingo and some local governments in Guyana.

**Transfer:** Where interventions aimed at provoking long-lasting community centred risk management a formalised event or period of transition was useful to help mark the withdrawal of Oxfam or any implementing partner.

Methods used to mark transfer varied. In Cap Haitien a public festival was organised with all partners and community members invited and over 500 participating with prizes and certificates awarded for those who had undertaken training and a speech from the Mayor. In Santo Domingo specific 'terminal' workshops were held with each community group and the implementing agency to help instil ownership of mitigation works and the wider project by the community group and encourage community leadership to look for other agencies or support to further risk reduction work. At this time community groups were also presented with and asked to draw

up a plan for the safe storage and use of equipment (shovels, stretchers, hard hats, chain saws etc).

The position of withdrawal differed across projects. In Santo Domingo the continuing engagement of IDDI (the implementing agency) with local communities provided a lasting contact. In Cap Haitien and Port au Prince local Oxfam offices remained as points of reference, though the latter had shifted markedly to a disaster response and reconstruction mode with only little risk reduction activity being mainstreamed at the time of this report. In Guyana the closure of the country office ended communication between Oxfam and community actors.

**Post project support:** A delicate aspect of implementation, support can help the transition to independence but also become a source of creeping dependency between community and external actors.

Post project support relied on both a strong – or at least an active – local community organisation and an accessible and open supporting agency (either the implementing actor, Oxfam or a proxy). The transfer period can be a time to discuss expectations and responsibilities for the post project period.

In Santo Domingo the ongoing visibility of IDDI at community level facilitated interaction and maintained a sense of partnership that was very valuable to maintaining community organisation even if no more financial support was available. In Port au Prince formal ties between the Ministry of Interior's Civil Protection department and local Civil Protection under the auspices of city Mayors provided a direct line of support used to access further training. The withdrawal of Oxfam from Guyana left community partners feeling isolated.

**Evaluations:** Systematic evaluations of project progress and outcomes were undertaken for all projects and by The European Commission. Resulting documentation is listed in Appendix I. The current document also forms a review function to identify lessons learned for planning and implementing urban DRR.

Methods used in the evaluations described above include quantitative assessments comparing pre-intervention baselines and post-project data, for example on risk awareness and use of local coping strategies. More qualitative assessment methodologies have also been used. Results have been targeted for technical audiences in Oxfam, but also with the wider community of interest. For example following completion in Guyana's second Oxfam - EUROPEAN COMMISSION project experiences were reviewed and then disseminated to stakeholders and beneficiaries using a 12-page booklet highlighting lessons learnt.

Activities were typically reviewed on a monthly basis to evaluate: amount of activities finished, quality of the activities carried out, beneficiaries feelings and expectations, problems and obstacles found, measures to overcome the difficulties found and set up to the work plan for the next period.

Impact was usually assessed through two evaluations, one at the beginning and another at the end of the project.

The final evaluation measuring the effects of the project on the target population, to see whether the objectives had been met and the extent to which observed changes could be attributed to the project.

This evaluation also provided an opportunity to assess any novel techniques, replicable models or other aspects be taken considered for future work.

## 5.3 Working with the wider risk management community

**Scoping:** This was an opportunity to sketch out how organisations responsible or with a stake in urban disaster risk and its management might fit within wider national administrative systems. As with community level scoping, previous experience in country was useful

**Sensitisation:** The aim of sensitisation amongst the wider risk management community was to inform those that may be affected by the project of its purpose and likely outcomes. It included an element of visibility raising for Oxfam and the project amongst the wider community to build good relations and identify any potential conflict or synergies with other projects.

Methods included formal visits with known stakeholders in disaster risk management from government agencies, municipal and local government and civil society. Some respondents (e.g., Guyana Red Cross) remarked on appreciating repeat visits which demonstrated commitment to the organisation and aim of urban DRR, and the honesty of such meetings with proposals for collaboration being followed-up. In urban contexts where DRR was a novel policy theme few established organisations had urban DRR as a priority. This required some initiative on the part of project managers to seek out and sensitise those responsible for local capital development

projects or drain maintenance and actors in the international community (e.g., UNDP) that could be active in promoting national disaster risk management plans and legislation.

Sensitisation was helped by clear project rationale and goals, especially when communicating with those new to the idea of urban DRR. Sensitisation was an on-going responsibility, it required committed time at the start of the project life-time and should transform naturally into regular project communications.

Where project sensitisation worked well this provided for flexibility (e.g., with the Guyana Red Cross who subsequently took responsibility for local group support after Oxfam's withdrawal) and eased integrated programming (e.g., in Santo Domingo where local representatives sitting on community groups from the municipality, police and civil defence, local health and educational facilities were supported by their city and national level counterparts as a result of sensitisation at these higher administrative levels).

The high number of organisations with often overlapping or unclear responsibilities in urban governance meant this task may require more effort and time (and diplomatic abilities) than would be the case for many rural projects.



## Professional disaster risk

**management training:** This helped resolve strategic gaps in knowledge at the professional level above community organisation. It was important that experts were used, though these may be in-house.

In Guyana professional training focussed on exposing the national Civil Defence Commission and other civil society and government relief actors to the Sphere standards for humanitarian relief and action. This was the first time that the Civil Defence Commission and others had encountered the Sphere standards and made a considerable impact on their conceptualising and planning for relief work. Many generic texts and information systems, like the Sphere standards, may need some reflection to meet the specific demands of local contexts and urban places in particular. In the case of Guyana, while the Sphere standards were welcomed, they opened a debate on appropriateness in Guyana rather than wholesale and immediate application.

**Advocacy and Coordination:** While not formally part of the urban DRR projects reviewed here. The experience generated by these projects, especially those funded under The European Commission has contributed to the forming of an advocacy coalition with other developmental NGOs based in Santo Domingo. The aim being to promote greater risk governance advances at the national level. Similar work in Haiti has been less successful, limited to an email discussion group between European Commission funded DRR projects, and was interrupted by the 12 January 2010 earthquake.

The coming together of project teams in Santo Domingo provides scope for more coordinated action and could potentially overcome some of the short coming of the limited budget and time frames available from The European Commission funding.

In particular this offers scope not only for exchange of practices and skills but for the development of integrated projects that can move from local to more ecologically centred framings for risk management – for example by acting in several places across a single watershed.

For urban DRR this makes good sense with the possibility of up-river, rural land-use contributing to down-river, urban risk reduction.



# MAIN IMPACTS AND CHANGES ON THE POPULATION

## 6.1 Introduction

This section highlights the main changes and/or impacts observed for local actors at risk and those with a stake in disaster risk management as a result of Oxfam's projects. Information is arranged into three principal categories common to all projects (urban community DRR organisations, urban risk culture and urban mitigation projects) with an 'other' category capturing a range of project specific outcomes.

These results draw from field interviews and observations, before presenting these most recent findings some context (and potentially trajectory for the erosion or building up of impact) is provided by a short review of project synthesis reports.

## 6.2 Documentary evidence

### Santo Domingo

Work in Santo Domingo unfolded through two consecutive European Commission grants ('Reduction of vulnerability to natural disasters in high-risk areas in Santo Domingo' and 'Neighbourhood preparedness for vulnerability reduction in the Dominican Republic') reported impacts are combined here. In each of the eight target communities a Community Emergency Committee was established. Each committee had representation from and decentralised responsibilities for local risk management to a small number of more local Sectoral Emergency Committees (24 in total). These in turn helped to coordinated Workers Groups that contributed to the construction of mitigation works and were a vehicle for awareness raising. Some 198 community promoters were trained.

City and national level agencies (Civil Defence, Police, Municipality, Dominican Red Cross) were aware of the CECs and some had strong linkages with local representation. In each community evacuation routes were reviewed and improved through mitigation works, shelters were also inspected and a parallel system of neighbour shelters established. Information on evacuation routes and shelters were widely distributed including by maps painted on walls.

The efforts of local community promoters meant that in total some 18,500 residents were made aware of project activities and local emergency response plans. An additional 3,000 children participated in school promotional work. 36 separate mitigation projects were undertaken

and 65 evacuation routes demarcated, 26 evacuation simulations were undertaken. Emergency equipment was also provided. Meetings with municipal and national authorities included discussion of post-project maintenance but no agreements were formalised. Coordinated efforts did result in a major solid waste clean-up. Habitat had also begun efforts to secure title for those without.

### Peri-Urban Georgetown

Work in Guyana aimed to benefit 19 per cent of the population living in the target communities (a total of 25,000 people). An independent review of impacts undertaken in March 2009 (one month after completion of the Oxfam - European Commission project 'Strengthening disaster preparedness and reducing vulnerabilities in flood prone communities of Guyana') found that 20 local groups were successfully established with good gender balance and active membership, 18 were active at the end of the project and had developed emergency plans completed mitigation works and received emergency equipment. In total 387 group members received training, 253 in disaster management. All groups were recognised by Civil Defence and the Regional authorities but formal support for post-project maintenance of mitigation works or support for committees had not been achieved.

The impact of training and awareness raising is indicated qualitatively through responses to flooding in December 2008/January 2009, additional measures were reportedly undertaken to protect property and lessen the impacts of these events by some local actors. Impact in terms of observed attitudinal and behavioural change was varied, and might be summed up as slow, but in a positive direction. Some two thirds



of respondents reported implementing various risk management measures in anticipation of the rainy season, however it is not clear how far this is an outcome of the project or a reflection of established practices. Some 12 per cent of respondents were familiar with their community alert and evacuation systems and 11 per cent aware of flood preparedness measures, an improvement on pre-project levels where no knowledge on either aspect of risk management, and indeed very limited investment was reported. In addition some 855 students participated in school based public health training with nine school safety plans being completed.

Training successfully heightened gender awareness and school based events led to improved awareness amongst students of school safety plans.

Capacity in the civil defence system was also enhanced. For the first time members of this system were trained the Sphere standards. This has influenced policy in shelter and emergency response management.

Also for the first time, gender training was provided to the Guyana Defence Force, which has since integrated gender sensitive approaches into its evacuation and shelter management planning and training

## Cap Haitien

Two Oxfam – European Commission projects in Cap Haitien worked consecutively to build local capacity and then strategically enhance this to better interact with state level agencies at the local level.

The first project provided safer access/evacuation paths and stairs for about 7880 families in nine communities and created 22 community level groups (18 considered to function well at completion of the project) all received emergency response equipment, evacuation boats were also provided for two groups. Each group also developed an emergency plan and nine communities completed local mitigation works which they managed providing new skills and experience in project management. Throughout the project a total of 714 people were trained in aspects of disaster management.

Public awareness through radio campaigns and local activities is thought to have reached 60 per cent of the population in the nine communities – though the effect on attitudes and behaviour is thought to be small. More successful were community group organised public events which attracted over 8,000 people and allowed individuals to participate in learning how they could reduce their own disaster risk. Following these events 77 per cent of respondents to an evaluation survey identified ways in which they could, and were willing to, reduce their own risk.

The first project also strengthened the city level organisational capacity for risk management. Oxfam provided training for 21 members of municipal level Civil Protection and other stakeholders. Other outputs included the drafting

of a Manual of Standard Operating Procedures in Disasters and the revision of a 3-year operational plan to mainstream disaster prevention.

The effectiveness of these groups, their planning and awareness raising amongst the public was well tested by Hurricane Jeanne, 2004, with positive results. More responsible and proactive behaviour was observed with residents being more willing to evacuate. This was the first time that people in Cap Haitien had undertaken preventative evacuation willingly. About 430 families (2,550 people) whose houses were located in the most high risk areas were recorded in evacuation centres managed by local committees during the night preceding the approaching of Hurricane Jeanne. This helped to build cohesion amongst and community respect for the community groups.

The second project formed three urban district level committees building on the more local community committees formed in the first project. Committee members were trained in emergency response and disaster management. Some 44 members took part in developing emergency plans. Emergency response tools were provided. Institution building included a regional conference. Some 14 members were trained in project management with three mitigation projects completed including the construction of an emergency operations centre and improved drainage. Efforts were made to engage with municipal authorities so that the district level groups (and by association the community groups) could be integrated into city and national structures, this was not always easy. In addition around 8,000 people participated in awareness raising activities including sports and social events

## Port au Prince

This project was interrupted by the January 12 earthquake in Port au Prince and consequently no evaluation report was available. Some indication of the scale and scope of impact has been derived here from the project proposal document. This project was undertaken in five municipalities within the Port au Prince metropolitan area. In each area a municipal level committee was either created (Port au Prince and Tabarre) or strengthened (Delmas, Petionville, Carfur).

Each committee developed an emergency plan, a plan identifying specific social vulnerabilities and helped identify and manage a local mitigation project. Committees were provided with basic materials for local emergency response. At least one public awareness campaign and disaster simulation exercise were organised by each committee.

Work focussed on institutional strengthening. Beneficiaries did not directly include local populations, who were not trained in awareness programmes. Around 500 committee members benefitted from training in disaster management and organisational/project management. Committees were also supported through networking activities within the wider national system of Civil Protection. This said, improved organisations will benefit 2,400,000 residents of municipal Port au Prince.



## 6.3 Field Observations

### Urban Community DRR organisations

The results of rapid assessment observation and interviews with community level organisations in each project site are presented in **Table 6.1**. This should be seen as providing only first order results but the common methodology allows a basis for comparing the status of the groups in May 2010. It should be remembered that some groups had been formed and left without significant support for some years (e.g., Guyana) while others (e.g., Port au Prince) retained formal links with Oxfam. This undoubtedly affected results. The unequal sample size also needs to be considered, the number of organisations included in the review and number of organisation built as part of the project are indicated in the far left hand column.

**Figure 6.1** Activity levels for community based DRR committees

INDICATORS OF ORGANISATIONAL ACTIVITY									
Project site	Group cohesiveness			Group networks			Group impacts		
	Describe as active	At least one meeting held	Hold regular meetings	Members received post-project training	Civil Defence link	Local government link	Organised at least one drain clean-up	Organised a public awareness campaign	Monitored hazard or coordinated early warning and evacuation
Peri-urban Georgetown 14/18	39% 5/13	85% 11/13	31% 4/13	69% 9/13	23% 3/13	15% 2/13	23% 3/13	8% 1/13	8% 1/13
Haiti, Cap Haitien 3/3	100% 3/3	100% 3/3	100% 3/3	-	100% 3/3	100% 3/3	-	-	-
Haiti, Port au Prince 2/5	100% 2/2	100% 2/2	100% 2/2	100% 2/2	100% 2/2	100% 2/2	-	-	100% 2/2
Santo Domingo 7/8	100% 7/7	100% 7/7	86% 6/7	-	100% 7/7	100% 7/7	-	-	86% 6/7



A key finding of **Table 6.1** is that formal recognition and support for a community group by both responsible local government (as was the case in both Haiti projects) or a long-term development NGO (as was the case in Santo Domingo) has provided the framework needed for strong group cohesiveness and networking, including access to post-project training. Even where this was not the case (i.e., in the majority of cases for Guyana) community groups still persisted, though at a lower level of overall activity.

Community groups in Guyana were often quite independent and where groups functioned well this led to some strong impacts: self-organised drain cleaning and public awareness campaigns for example, as well as impacts beyond technical DRR including the building of local social capital.

This was mentioned in particular as a positive output adding local social cohesion by Victoria LEC (Local Emergency Committee). In less strong groups, membership retreated to neighbours (Sophia LEC), old friends (Success LEC) or church members (Melanie LEC). Where groups did function the character of DRR as a cross cutting policy issue created opportunities for local residents to think about and possibly address a range of underlying issues.

This was mentioned by Bachelors Adventure LEC chair whose group had discussed solid waste management, the effectiveness of the local government and responsible citizenship, all from a starting point of DRR. Impacts were also more practical, **Box 6.1** describes some of these from the experiences of a single local group.

**Box 6.1** Better Hope Local Emergency Committee (LEC), Guyana: A successful group

Better Hope is a highly vulnerable peri-urban area. Many households keep poultry or livestock on small house plots for consumption as well as sale. In 2005 the community flooded for 3 weeks to about 1 m depth. Residents evacuated to the local primary school but many livestock perished. Since its formation, the Better Hope LEC has been one of the most active and self-reliant. Two neighbourhood drain clean-up campaigns have been completed and at the time of the study preparation for a third clean-up day was underway with flyers already distributed. Each LEC member takes responsibility to pay for the photocopying of 6 sheets of flyers and to distribute these to 30 houses. If one member cannot do this another member will step in to pay for or deliver flyers. Any unmet publicity costs are covered by the chair.

The clean-up days are widely supported, some 55 people came out for the last clean up day, mainly LEC members and their families with an over representation of women and children. But not all events run smoothly. In the second clean-up day the local government refused to let their tractor be used to transport waste. In response the Better Hope LEC asked and was given financial support from a local religious organisation (CIOG) that paid for a tractor, LEC group members brought bags etc. to clear drains.

In addition to its local activities the group has links outside the community, for example with the Civil Defence Commission (CDC) which has used the group chair to advise on impacts during recent floods, especially at night when CDC vehicles and observers cannot be used.

The experience of being part of the LEC had impacts beyond technical DRR, importantly the group provided a vehicle for making new and strengthening existing friendships, especially amongst those from different parts of the community where people would not often meet. As one group member put it “now I can call many more women than before Oxfam”.

While the group continues to be strong and function well its main challenge is to generate more involvement from men and youth. Men say they will wait for Oxfam or the local government to undertake works. While young people have had their names on the LEC they have not been active. Cricket and dominoes events were used in the past to bring out youth and men but they are not planned for the future, prizes are needed and the LEC does not see value in giving prizes away to people who will not contribute to community activities willingly.


Source: Interview with Better Hope LEC chair and focus group with members.

The most common impact beyond material impact on DRR was to build local social capital. For a healthy group such impacts were just part of everyday activity – groups were fun as well as functional and focussed. In Santo Domingo one committee member reflected on how the group had provided a vehicle for people living by the river and on ravine slopes (high risk, poorer) to meet and become friends with those living in higher land (low risk, richer). Beyond the quality of life impacts these ties were used instrumentally in disaster where those at risk could find shelter in the houses of friends on higher land. Friends' houses were perceived to be more private, safer and comfortable, even if crowded and preferred to public shelters.

Groups also provided a vehicle for trust to be built between the community and other institutions. This was especially so with the Police in Santo Domingo. In La Zurza, for example respondents explained how having police on the committee helped and was reinforced by a positive police presence during Tropical Storm Noel when 20

police patrolled the neighbourhood and another 10 were stationed in local shelters. This helped security, making people more willing to leave their homes and go to shelters and also improved longer-term relations.

Evidence of enhanced social capital was less clear in Haiti. This may be a reflection of interview technique but is equally explained by the more formalised constitution of these groups. The first groups to be formed in Cap Haitien were very local, with 22 groups formed across three city districts. However the refusal of the national government (The national Civil Protection System) to recognise any groups operating below the city district level led to the creation of three district level groups. These had representation from local level community groups. While no neighbourhood community groups were studied for this report, the view of district level groups was that some individuals could be called on, that relevant skills and equipment were available, but that the groups did not meet regularly.



## Urban risk culture

Through the delivery of awareness raising and training for those at risk and risk managers, projects successfully promoted urban risk cultures and associated behavioural change. These indicate disaster risk is now more appreciated and being mitigated locally. There are several elements to building an urban risk culture: awareness, behavioural change, and communicating and reinforcing such changes. Box 6.2 describes the interaction of these elements in one community.

### Box 6.2

Simon Bolivar, Santo Domingo: Awareness, training and mitigation projects reinforce each other to reduce risk

An interview with community leaders revealed the following account:

Following training the local community committee is now more sensitised about the causes of disaster risk. This has coincided with a change in relationships with, for example, the police: as the police have come to play a positive role in evacuations, providing street and shelter security, so local residents have come to trust them more. In the past the most vulnerable, who lived by the river were scared of thieves so did not want to go to a shelter during rains, now they spontaneously evacuate. We do not need to persuade them at all. This is also partly because of better shelter options including the neighbour shelter system where people are short-term guests of others in the neighbourhood, mothers and children benefit from this in particular.

The friendships needed to make the neighbourhood system work are special as they require relationships between those living in risky places, by the river or on steep slopes and those living on higher ground. In the past people living in these different areas did not interact very much. The experience of working together to construct mitigation projects and through training and workshops has helped to build these relationships, which are now put to good use and flourish. The experience of Tropical Storms Noel and David where community shelters were crowded with poor sanitation has encouraged the neighbour shelter system even more.

## Awareness

At a most fundamental level awareness raising served to reveal the social root causes of risk. As the chairman from Bachelors Adventure LEC, in Guyana explained, “Oxfam brought the first level of awareness for me”. In this way Oxfam provided the first structured attempt for people to reflect on their assumptions about flooding. One limitation in this case was a focus on response, while this matched the interests of local actors it might usefully have been followed up by some more critical discussion of the root causes of vulnerability and risk.

In Santo Domingo, the Director of Civil Defence noted a change in local attitudes around disaster. That before Oxfam’s projects all focus was on response but that now people are more aware and

prepared, they are more self-sufficient and self-organised in disaster preparedness. This made the work of Civil Defence much easier when responding to a disaster or when trying to sensitise local groups about disaster risk. This view was confirmed at the community level where respondents described having changed attitudes, being more cautious and active with regard to risk, for example in La Cienaga where community members had requested talks and additional training from Civil Defence. Civil Defence stated that the Oxfam project communities were now the most disaster prepared in the city and that this signified a cultural change, everyone in the community can talk about disaster risk. The Director was aware that other at risk areas would like to participate in similar programmes.



## Behavioural change

Community group members often spoke of the challenges of moving from broad public acceptance of disaster risk, with its roots in development weaknesses, to action.

### Explanations included:

- A lack of social capital and civic identity, e.g., in Guyana, the chairman of the Buxton/Foulis local council noted there was **“no collective action for drains, all that long gone, everything is individuals now”**.
- A lack of trust and suspicion of any collective organising, e.g., in Guyana, the chairman of Sophia local committee described the public as being suspicious of organised activity, assuming that are political motives lie beneath. This acted as a barrier for people to attend meetings even if they were interested, a social stigma existed around local organising.
- Limited time for those at risk to undertake public work, especially when risk management is not seen as an urgent priority
- Uncertainty over the value of local action for risk reduction. It was argued that the local was not an appropriate scale for risk reduction.
- Free riding problems were described, with some arguing if they took individual action – for example in cleaning drains outside their house - but others did not there would be no individual benefit.
- Being associated with successful community actions that can garner resources generated social tension. In Guyana having commenced operations with relief following flooding in 2005 local disaster risk reduction groups were seen popularly as a place to access resources, with pressure put on members.

- Moral dilemmas and lack of political will. Community members rightly argued that it was the local authority’s responsibility to clean drains, and that if community members did this they would provide an excuse for local government to continue shirking responsibility.

Despite these challenges, changes in behaviour were noted in the case studies. This was clearest when comparing local actions in emergencies before and after the project. In Santo Domingo the community of La Cienaga described three tropical storms experienced after the Oxfam project where there was greater willingness of people to move to shelters, this compared with neighbouring Guachupita which at the time had not participated and people were less willing to use shelters. Before Oxfam’s interventions any local early warnings were communicated by local leaders to high risk groups.

Leaders said it was hard work to get any response, but that now local committees organised warnings and those at risk knew what to do without any pressure from leaders. Hurricane Georges (1998, no preparedness) and Tropical Storm Olga (2007, after the Oxfam project) hit Santo Domingo and provide an opportunity for comparison, without exception community groups reported residents being more prepared for and where necessary more willing to evacuate during Olga than Georges.

In Haiti, Port au Prince, disaster management skills were applied during the January 12, 2010 earthquake, see **Box 6.3**



**Box 6.3** Tabarre, Haiti, Port au Prince: Risk management is transferable from hurricanes to earthquake.

The municipal civil protection committee of Tabarre which was supported by Oxfam organised evacuation and maintained shelters during hurricanes and tropical storms e.g., Noel, Ike, Gustave, Anna, Fay in 2009.

When the earthquake struck, the group was able to apply its skills. The group was well organised and started work immediately, on the same day as the earthquake. People knew of the disaster committee and came to the Mayor's office for help, but also to offer assistance. First aid was administered and when materials and drugs ran out a megaphone was used to ask for medical personnel and materials. There was the only organisation and leadership for the first four days until help arrived from the Dominican Republic Civil Defence who brought doctors. At this point the priority for the mayor's Civil Protection group shifted from first aid to co-ordinating the distribution of water and food and this is still so almost 4 months on.

While awareness raising activities were diverse and full of energy and invention, their impact is difficult to measure. The Guyanese Red Cross suggested some schools involved in hosting DRR community outreach days had since performed regular fire drills, although this could not be verified in the field.

## Communicating and reinforcing

Disaster events themselves served as important points for reinforcing skills and awareness. Following the Haiti earthquake, IDDI and local groups in Santo Domingo mobilised and observed the coast for a tsunami and local earthquake or landslides. None occurred. IDDI then coordinated with Civil Defence to send four volunteers from the project communities to Haiti. The link with Haiti is ongoing.

The appetite for further training and reinforcement of skills was well exemplified in Cap Haitien where community groups asked fire-fighters for additional training paid for out of community group funds. The structure of mayoral civil protection committees requires members change as they are moved on

government business and a constant need for the training of new members. Groups have taken on the responsibility for induction and basic training.

In Santo Domingo, out and in migration were noted by some communities as potential challenges to the maintaining of a comprehensive risk culture. The system of household community promoters managed with support from IDDI provides a reliable mechanism for reinforcing risk reduction messages. The one caveat to this approach is that while engaging the community promoters network in multiple projects maintains social interaction it can also mean old messages are forgotten or drowned out by new ones.

## Urban Mitigation projects

Mitigation projects had both direct (risk reduction) and indirect (livelihood, quality of life) benefits. Indeed, the best mitigation projects met an everyday development need as well as providing a function during disaster. Those that did this proved additional value for money and likely extended their lifespan as residents valued and were more likely to look after any infrastructure.

The symbiosis between vulnerability reduction works that provided both development and DRR functions included: access bridges (Guyana, Santo Domingo) and stairways (Santo Domingo, Haiti,

Cap Haitien) that connected parts of a community improving everyday access, but also provided safe evacuation routes. Works that targeted hazard mitigation, like retention walls (Haiti, Port au Prince and Santo Domingo) or concreted gullies (Santo Domingo) had to be justified by their contribution to risk reduction alone. This observation goes against the preference for mitigation works in many urban DRR projects. It suggests a broader view of risk reduction that places it in development can help make better decisions on how to invest to reduce risk.



**Risk mitigation projects** – both vulnerability and hazard oriented - also had unforeseen benefits or local social capital:

- Building a bridge and covering a stream to build social capital in Santo Domingo. Guallay and Las Cañitas have a long history of rivalry and mistrust with competing drugs gangs. Early on in the project a volunteer saw children crossing a ravine to go to school and suggested building a bridge between the communities to facilitate evacuation. Residents were initially opposed, scared gangs would be able to cross more easily, but in the end relented. The bridge is so open that no gangs use it and the area has now become a symbol of harmony between the two communities. In Capotillo a strong social division based on economics but also physical difficulty prevented interaction between upper and lower parts of the community. This has been improved through joint training, walks and the filling of the gully which now means people can walk or even drive up and down improving physical communication.
- Unforeseen economic and social benefits. Respondents in Gualey noted that since the mitigation works were complete people were less likely to move out of the area. Residents were more willing to stay because works had increased property values and also provided access allowing micro-businesses by the river to continue and do well (e.g., making pillows, bags, shoes) with improved market accessibility. Importantly the combination of improved livelihoods goes together with knowledge on disaster risk. Residents can make informed decisions on trade-offs generated by continued settlement in these places that remain exposed to hazard and potentially at high risk following extreme future events which can not be mitigated locally.

## Risk Governance

Oxfam's interventions changed the knowledge and behaviour of key organisations with stakes in risk management at the city and national levels. This was a result of targeted interventions but also a product of the sensitisation of local partners – especially implementing partners – as part of the project process.

One of the organisations that expressed and demonstrated most notable change was the Civil Defence Commission in Guyana. Change has been successful in two areas. First, exposure to the Sphere standards prompted a period of reflection on the rationale behind emergency response and

especially the content and distribution of emergency aid packages. There has been debate at the national level on the appropriateness of Sphere standards for Guyana providing some rationalisation in emergency planning. Second, experience of participating in the Oxfam project has reinforced arguments internal to the commission and within government on the importance of a decentralised approach with local/community based civil defence risk observation, early warning and first response groups. The Civil Defence Commission is taking both areas of change forward into proposals to reform the Commission as part of a project supported by the IDB.



Change at the level of risk governance was less clear in Haiti or Santo Domingo. Key actors in Santo Domingo's urban risk governance system are well sensitised to disaster risk and supportive of the project. Local networks were already in place within the Civil Defence and Red Cross. Urban planning at the local level was facilitated through neighbourhood groups (Junta de Vecinos) which were voluntary but charged with promoting local developmental aims both in the municipality and locally, these included issues related to disaster risk reduction. Interviewees expressed high levels of support for the Oxfam initiatives and a desire that they be replicated, if funding were to be found. The one exception to this was the Police. Inclusion of the police in local communities and sensitisation of the police at higher levels had a major impact in building trust with the community providing very tangible outcomes when police were present providing security in the streets and shelters during subsequent disasters. This has promoted a positive spiral with community-police relations improving.

In Cap Haitien, impact was limited, risk management continued as a low priority for municipalities in the context of a weak political/administrative system suffering from extreme financial scarcity. In Port au Prince, targeted work at emphasising risk governance within municipalities had succeeded (for example in Tabarre) where mayors were already supportive. Elsewhere mayors were more or less supportive but showed little sign of new energies or enthusiasms for disaster risk reduction as a direct result of the Oxfam interventions. In all cases municipal level civil protection groups had received training in emergency response and preparedness skills and also in organisational management, with the created community level groups providing a local input alongside government agencies. These two contributions changed the quality of disaster risk management capacity at the municipal level, even if little change in the commitment and overall capacity of mayors meant more tangible outputs were hard to find.

Changes in attitudes and practices were also observed within project implementing partners as a bi-product of their exposure to project aims and underlying rationale. These are very significant outcomes but lie outside the formal project evaluation mechanisms. IDDI, the implementing partner in Santo Domingo had not considered disaster risk reduction as an area of work before working with Oxfam. In addition to the considerable technical and practical experience now gained by IDDI's staff in community based disaster risk management IDDI established a Unit for Risk Management in 2008.

This outcome was independent of Oxfam and was operationalised through responding to the earthquake in Haiti. In Guyana WAD also had not considered disaster risk as a policy area before working with Oxfam. Since this collaboration however disaster risk, and especially climate change adaptation has grown in importance in Guyana and WAD have been well positioned to contribute to this rapidly growing national policy debate.

Not only has this enhanced WAD's profile but provided a voice for a community oriented organisation in national (and even international) policy debates. This is indicated, for example in WAD helping organise a Conference on Climate Change for 18 Commonwealth Countries, an invitation from UNDP to consult on the draft National Disaster Management Plan and discussions with the Red Cross in Trinidad and Tobago to explore regional collaboration.

Perhaps the key outcome demonstrated by IDDI and WAD is that well chosen local implementing partners can take on disaster risk management once exposed to this as a development challenge and build their own internally driven agendas for further work.

# INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COORDINATION/COLLABORATION AND LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION

## 7.1 Introduction

The participation of local government and populations in project activities was central to the design of each project. These stakeholders also interacted with each other throughout the project, and this was an important element of wider capacity building.

## 7.2 Kinds of participation

Each of the Oxfam-European Commission projects shared a common vision of a progressive transfer of power from Oxfam and the implementing agencies to local partners (community or municipal groups), this is presented in **Figure 1**, and incorporates both local government and populations at risk. Haiti, Port au Prince was more firmly embedded within Government of Haiti structures so that while the pattern of increasing local control presented in **Figure 7.1** is also accurate in this case, this is local control set firmly within the mandates of municipal and government authorities.

**Figure 7.1** is a simplification but useful in broadly placing Oxfam's experience with deviations discussed below. The stages of participation described in **Figure 7.1** follow Arnstein's Ladder of Participation<sup>1</sup>, a widely used tool in development theory and practice which identifies eight increasingly locally owned forms of participation.

Local actors were not formally involved in pre-project scoping or planning. Participation commenced with sensitisation. Here participation

as informing and consulting (3 and 4 respectively) indicate local partners had a voice but not a role in decision-making. This reflects the early stages of project sensitisation where communities were engaged and made aware of the project goals while also reflecting the pre-determined structure and goals of the projects. During implementation, partnership indicates that local partners were able to trade-off specific aspects of planning with project managers.

Though still a limited form of participation this shows the increasing participation of local actors as the project progressed, with local actors taking responsibility for example in the identification and management of mitigation projects or the design of community awareness raising events (e.g., in Cap Haitien). The strength of local actor influence continued to increase though transition to post-project. In transition power was formally delegated to local actors. Citizen control post-project indicates the decision of Oxfam to withdraw at project end. In some cases support was still provided by the implementing partner (e.g., IDDI

<sup>1</sup> <http://lithgow-schmidt.dk/sherry-arnstein/ladder-of-citizen-participation.html>




in Santo Domingo) or through the presence of an Oxfam Office (in Haiti) but limited to psychological support with no transfer of financial resources or formal support. In all projects maintenance of project outputs (risk culture, organisations, mitigation works) and any further development was left to local control. This strategy creates risks as well as opportunities for project impact.

The shape of **Figure 7.1** is indicative of a project determined by extra-local perceptions of development priority and this can lead to challenges for sustainability where by the end of

the project local actors do not share this vision or local institutional contexts are not in place to maintain project outputs (see Section 10). This is especially so given the control of local actors in post-project. Within Oxfam’s projects this approach promoted both commitment and enthusiasm (e.g., Tabarre in Haiti, Port au Prince) but also isolation and decline (e.g., many local groups in Guyana). For the short lifespan projects discussed in this report successful citizen control was ambitious. It should be said this was not a state project goal, rather implicit in the philosophy of Oxfam and in the methods applied.

**Figure 7.1** Project Participatory Progress



### 7.3 Building and maintaining local participation in the projects

The participation of local policy actors was promoted through early and regular interaction. Some level of government sanction was required for Oxfam to operate and this was best gained through open consultation, though did not always bring easy support. In Guyana regional government delayed the commencement of mitigation works and in Santo Domingo Civil Defence disagreed with the placing of emergency tools under the control of local community groups. Liaising with government can be frustrating, in Guyana despite final agreement from regional authorities for mitigation works, no further support was extended to local groups.

At the same time groups were not formally recognised by Government preventing even supportive agencies like Civil Defence from establishing formal partnerships and entering into post-project agreements. In Santo Domingo, initial differences were soon overcome and Civil Defence remained supportive with formal linkages but without resources to offer post-project support. The differences between these two case studies reflect political and cultural contexts rather than any differences in approach taken by Oxfam teams. Building and maintaining participation in DRR projects is often challenged by the sometimes distant nature of disaster threats – especially when compared to the more immediate threats of poverty or crime. This was arguably the case in Guyana and may reflect the low survival rates of community groups beyond transfer. While widespread flooding was experienced in 2005 it is still conceived as exceptional – rather than an outcome of everyday development failures.



Local floods were commonplace with individual coping relied on traditional behaviour (raised houses, yards and chicken coops) or the normalising of flooding as something to live with. In Guyana it was not clear that awareness raising activities, while well supported and remembered vividly by respondents and clearly providing useful information, led to lasting attitudinal change.

In Santo Domingo by contrast, tropical storms including Noel and Olga, experienced during project implementation, served to focus and drive participation. These projects also built on a pre-existing local culture of participation and the reputation of IDDI as a non-political developmental NGO. Still respondents described new volunteers coming forward after these tropical storms.

In urban contexts migration can be a challenge for maintaining momentum in participation. In-migration waters down community knowledge while out-migration can mean the loss of skills. Movement of participants was most significant in Haiti, Port au Prince. Here the circulation of government officials caused regular changes in the membership of municipal civil protection committees. This was responded to by sitting members providing some training but overtime will undermine sustainability. Less easy to overcome was the lack of motivation expressed by many members who were present on municipal groups

## 7.4 Internal interaction

Horizontal linkages provide opportunities for peer learning and support. In Guyana this was successfully achieved amongst management agencies through workshops on Sphere standards.

Horizontal linkages between community actors were observed in Santo Domingo and Haiti. In Santo Domingo residents were invited from across project neighbourhoods to workshops and intentionally mixed up to help build new relationships. This was reported to have contributed to improved relations, for example between Guallay and Las Cañitas where a long history of rivalry was overcome. In Haiti efforts to raise local commitment within mayor's offices in Cap Haitien included a visit from the Mayor of Tabarre, Port au Prince who had become a champion for the project. This may have won some recognition for the project but did not galvanise practical action or noticeable change in attitudes. Cap Haitien also received a visit from Santo Domingo at the level of community organiser as part of the sensitisation process for Santo Domingo. In Guyana there was no mechanism for

through professional duty rather than interest. The 12 January earthquake dramatically changed the demography of individual municipalities as those made homeless sought shelter. It is to be hoped that the municipal system will enable future support for community group formation as post-earthquake settlement continues. In Santo Domingo community groups, and especially each groups network of local community promoters helped to identify and introduce new arrivals to IDDI's work including that with Oxfam. Out migration was not considered prominent in this project.

horizontal exchanges between community groups, although some informal overlap was provided by individual members attending the same Red Cross training days or when members of community groups sat on a local council. In neither case did this result in any stated strengthening of ties or demonstrable support.

Urban contexts can be difficult because of the number of actors with stakes in DRR. This can lead to competition and resistance to interventions if not carefully managed. In Santo Domingo and Haiti policy interests were represented on committees. In Haiti, as discussed above, groups tended to suffer from this legal requirement. In Santo Domingo by contrast the involvement of representatives from police, civil defence, neighbourhood groups (junta de vecinos), health centres and schools on local committees helped to build improved relations. Success in Santo Domingo was perhaps helped by voluntary group memberships and reinforced through recent tropical storms that provided an opportunity for

individual agencies to demonstrate commitment. In this case good relations were perhaps a trade-off for a lack of legal recognition of community groups by the government. This meant they had no formal voice with which to lobby for resources from government or criticise any state agency.

In Santo Domingo some community groups were also assisted by being physically housed and sometimes closely managed with community businesses that had been formed in collaboration with IDDI in the past. These were community owned solid waste management businesses with a natural linkage to DRR. In Capotillo, for example, close relations with the community business **ESCOBA** opened access to community funds for work. This also benefited ESCOBA, which had to spend any profit on community works (capital and maintenance projects for evacuation stairs, protection walls, roads and a canalised gully).



# GENDER EQUITY AND YOUTH

## 8.1 Introduction

Gender equity was formally mainstreamed into all programmes and participation in all training activities was monitored. In Guyana the use of a gender oriented development NGO (WAD) as an implementing partner reinforced the centrality of gender as a guiding principle for project planning and implementation. **Table 8.1** compares data on gender participation in training across the projects.

In Santo Domingo women were over-represented as participants in almost all activity as well as in membership of community DRR organisations. Most social promoters were women, almost all volunteers were women. IDDI accepted this and explained that while there was no gender preference in the project, women had more time, were more interested in community work and were most affected by the local environment so more willing to participate. The exception to this was a group that received training to interpret GIS maps, perhaps presenting this knowledge

as scientific/technical stimulated male interest, or intimidated women. Guyana also experienced over-representation by women in community groups and training. Bias was more extreme than that experienced in Santo Domingo with men dominating in leadership positions within community groups. Youth were also under represented. In Guyana racialised communities also influenced group membership with more Afro- than Indo-Guyanese members and leaders, this in part reflects the demography of the project sites. In Haiti bias was reversed with men having a more dominant and larger presence than women in training and group participation as well as leadership.

The following discussion draws on field observation and interviews to provide some qualitative characterisation of the challenges and solutions observed in each project in trying to integrate young people and balance gender participation

<b>Table 8.1</b> Gender disaggregated participation in selected project activities		
<b>Project</b>	<b>Woman</b>	<b>Men</b>
<b>Santo Domingo</b>		
Art competition	159	159
School talks	782	702
Summer camp for children	47	43
Social promoter training	96	70
Interpreting GIS risk maps	19	36
<b>Guyana</b>		
School talks	432	432
Trained in first aid	126	26
Trained in disaster risk management	204	49
Majority of committee membership	18	1
Chair of committee	6	13
<b>Haiti (Cap Haitien)</b>		
Identified for training as community trainers	9	13
Trained in search and rescue	20	45
Trained in risk management	26	92

Women continued to dominate community organisations in Guyana. One respondent complained her group was full of “women, women, women, women, the men not coming forward’. A similar situation was found in Santo Domingo. In Haiti, women were a minority on committees. This was partly explained in Port au Prince by the need for municipal committees in Haiti to have the majority of members from government agencies, and these tended to be over-represented by men. This cultural bias was also felt in Cap Haitien where men dominated. One exception was the neighbourhood committee of Fort San Michelle. Here the woman chair of one NCLC created a space where women were more comfortable to participate attracting higher numbers of women.

Women were also very active during mitigation projects. In Santo Domingo and Guyana drain cleaning, step building and painting was all dominated by women. In some instances men were encouraged to participate with the promise of a social time. In Haiti respondents reported men tended to dominate training sessions, especially for those more physical skills such as water rescue. In contrast women’s skills in social organising and motivation were recognised in Haut du Cap (Cap Haitien) with a majority of women amongst active community facilitators.

The influence of women on committees was clear where shelter management explicitly took women’s and children’s needs into account, for example, in



Las Cañitas, Santo Domingo men and women were allocated separate floors.

Youth involvement was also an aspiration and one promoted through the use of schools as hosts for open community workshops in Guyana, and more generally though a great emphasis on making awareness raising activities fun and relevant to young people as well as men and women.

Santo Domingo's projects were perhaps the most successful at integrating young people. Young women in particular were interested to become social promoters. Respondents explained that this gave them something rewarding to do, some responsibility and a way to meet new people from different neighbourhoods. **Box 8.1** provides some case material of young people's involvement with projects in Santo Domingo.

**Box 8.1** 'They wear the cap and shirt with pride', youth participation in Santo Domingo.

Membership was not only important for achieving project goals but played a social function in Santo Domingo. In Guachupita one respondent recounted how membership had helped stabilise one family where a young, sometimes aggressive, man wanted to join the local promotion group. His Mum agreed on condition that he could control himself and this commitment together with the self esteem and camaraderie from membership is claimed to have helped turn around his anti-social behaviour.

Integration of youth into projects was undoubtedly helped by IDDI's reputation and long-term engagement in the initial communities engaged with. But even here success was not guaranteed. In the first projects parents were unwilling to let their children take part in weekend training camps. Convincing parents took time and careful work. Now though as past camps have been seen to have been run responsibly parents are less concerned.

Young people have benefited also from higher degrees of interaction between barrios. During training sessions people from different barrios are mixed up. This is quite intimidating for some, especially where tensions exist between barrios driven by competition between local drugs gangs. But overcoming some of these tensions has been a key part of building social capital and reducing vulnerability in communities.

The end of the 'war' between Capotillo and Gualey has been helped by this approach and was symbolised by the construction of a bridge between these two communities. A bridge that young people have benefited from when crossing over to go to school as well as through the reduced social tensions that the bridge represents and keeps alive through facilitating easier and more visible interaction in these areas.

In Haiti many young people had also joined community and municipal groups. They were regarded as a strength of community organisation. Youth were targeted at the formation of local committees with each member being asked to introduce nine youth members! Those that came were given training and many have continued to participate. Maintaining community activity, including that of the young has been more difficult as project funding has come to an end. As the community from Petite Anse explained: 'you have to at least give people lunch'. In Port au Prince continued funding and the closure of colleges and loss of work more generally means young people continue to be involved where they can.

In Guyana youth involvement was more mixed and depended on the energy and personality of individual leaders, such as a college teacher in Bachelor's Adventure who had the respect and attention of local young people. Elsewhere initiatives such as sports days, dances or competitions involved youth but with no lasting commitment to community activities. This left some groups feeling community members had given only to reward people who had no intention of contributing to community life. Lack of youth involvement was confirmed by the Guyana Red Cross who reported no young members of community groups having joined their youth leadership programmes.

# URBAN HINDERING AND FACILITATING FACTORS

## 9.1 Introduction

This section draws together comments made in each project site on the challenges and opportunities for community based DRR that are specific to urban contexts. These are summarised in **Figure 9.1** which categorises opportunities (in green) and challenges (in red) according to their influence on shaping hazard, vulnerability or capacity, the three elements that combine to determine disaster risk.



**Figure 9.1** Challenges and opportunities in urban disaster risk reduction

OPPORTUNITIES			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Un(der) employment can provide opportunities to engage through money or food for work schemes including training.</li> <li>•Logistics are easier, both to mobilise people and materials.</li> <li>•Inter-agency communication is easier.</li> </ul>
	Hazard	Vulnerability	Capacity to reduce risk
CHALLENGES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Physical and social hazards overlap</li> <li>•Too much focus on 'urban' space misses opportunity to manage risk at ecological scales, e.g. through water shed or integrated rural-urban or urban system scales.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Intense and concentrated populations.</li> <li>•Concentrated land-use means fewer options to avoid or cope with risk.</li> <li>•Rapid demographic growth exceeds management capacity.</li> <li>•Failure to regulate land-use and building.</li> <li>•Heterogeneous communities generate tensions.</li> <li>•Lack of information access.</li> <li>•Limited first-hand knowledge of hazards (amongst managers and those at risk).</li> <li>•In-migrants have no knowledge of local disaster history.</li> <li>•Skills, knowledge and social connections lost through out-migration.</li> <li>•Politicised governance.</li> <li>•Governance system is slow to change.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Little flexibility and long working/commuting hours in the urban economy limits time for participation.</li> <li>•Drugs crime is a barrier especially for youth.</li> <li>•Little established solidarity or history of local collective action.</li> <li>•Volunteers may be available but want/need payment.</li> <li>•Leaders put themselves at personal/political risk.</li> <li>•Few urban social development NGOs that could act as implementing partners.</li> <li>•Tendency to stay with old partners as little opportunity to change, even if old partners are not ideal.</li> <li>•City officials and politicians are less visible and directly accountable than rural counterparts.</li> <li>•City and local government is too busy to take on new policy agendas, even if mandated.</li> <li>•DRR is not an immediate priority for managers or those at risk.</li> <li>•Need agreement from government for interventions.</li> <li>•Overlapping roles between municipal, regional and national government entities.</li> <li>•Educational system, policy system etc may be oriented towards rural development, e.g., restricting access to technical skills like civil engineering.</li> <li>•Relocation is difficult, costly and often unsuccessful.</li> <li>•Risk may be seen as only amenable to large scale engineering projects.</li> </ul>

The themes raised in **Table 9.1** are not exhaustive, nor are they necessarily transferrable to other urban contexts. They are though, with few exceptions, relevant to all of the projects reviewed in this document.

From the perspective of hazard, an urban focus was seen to increase threat through the interaction of multiple hazards. Multiple environmental hazards can act in the same place in rural contexts as well, but this interaction is intensified in the urban and added to by the interaction of social, economic and political hazards as well as environmental as part of everyday urban life. This is well recognised in the literature and has led many to call for urban disaster risk management to take on a multi-risk approach – one that can embrace economic, social and political as well as various environmental hazards. Hazard is also exacerbated through a tendency in urban DRR work to focus on the local rather than on environmental systems. This is an opportunity missed. Hazards that are felt in urban places – especially flooding but also food and water security, are often shaped by rural land-use. The implication that risk management would benefit from a more integrated rural-urban approach to confronting hazards experienced in cities is useful.

Vulnerability is shown to be exacerbated by urbanisation. Intense, concentrated and heterogeneous urban populations were associated by respondents with social tension, and reduced options for living with or reducing risk locally. Rapid demographic growth, lack of community cohesion and poor risk/urban development governance were cited as root causes of vulnerability. The failure of land-use and buildings regulation is often noted in urban risk analyses as a driver of

vulnerability and symptomatic of governance weaknesses. More contentious is the association of urbanisation with lack of community cohesion. This reflects the realities of life in Haiti and also to an extent Guyana but holds less well in Santo Domingo and many other urban centres where well organised neighbourhoods are a resource for local risk reduction. The additional vulnerability experienced by recent migrants who are unaware of disaster history and potentially also of any community based risk reduction initiatives including local early warning and evacuation systems is a more generic concern. Frustration that municipal authorities were slow to take on DRR as a new policy agenda and more generally were slow to change policy or practice also reflect the contexts of the projects reviewed here, but certainly has relevance to many other cities, large and small, where municipal budgets do not match responsibilities and where political and technical culture does not easily reward innovation.

Discussions with respondents on capacity to reduce risk identified opportunities, most commonly the greater ease and speed with which goods and people could be accessed and distributed both before and after disasters. This included advantage gained from easier direct communication between humanitarian or developmental NGOs and also with government offices. There was also some suggestion that urban un(der) employment offered an opportunity in providing a labour pool for mitigation works and way into awareness raising amongst the vulnerable poor. More often in urban area the apparently un(der)employed are very busy securing basic needs, the exception to this may be in the recovery phase where labour markets are still disrupted.

Unfortunately respondents found it easier to identify constraints on capacity building. Several comments focussed on challenges for local mobilisation (lack of time, drugs crime destabilising community coherence, limited histories of collective action, demands for payment, leadership risks). These observations are not repeated throughout urban centres, but they are common with drugs crime become as important of local politicisation as a reason for the failure of local community action worldwide. Other comments focussed on urban governance. This included civil society.

The limited number of established urban social development NGOs that could act as partners is still not uncommon worldwide, once response is to stay with any existing partners – even if they may not be the most appropriate. Municipal government was also identified. Respondents argued that urban politicians were less visible and so less directly accountable than their rural counterparts. This is a serious issue and especially true for larger cities. As in many cities municipalities expressed being too busy, did not have DRR as a priority and were delayed by overlapping responsibilities with line ministries.

The need for central government sanction delayed work and was a potential barrier to action when municipal and central government

were run by competing political parties (often the case in capital cities). Educational systems may be oriented towards a rural economy (in Haiti a chronic lack of civil engineers delayed local mitigation projects) limiting needed skills. Similarly, the dangers inherent in relocating those at risk within urban systems (social and economic disruption almost always exceed any advantages from risk reduction for human wellbeing and poverty alleviation) make this a last resort strategy. In turn this realisation places more emphasis on the need for risk reduction in situ.

Some more cross-cutting challenges were also identified by respondents. Importantly the time and priority constraints imposed by The European Commission funding were noted. The need to build capacity, engage with and strengthen government or address major critical infrastructure weaknesses is not easy within a 15-month European commission funded project and this was reflected in the design and outcomes of the projects reviewed here. Repeat funding has provided some way around these problems.

In Santo Domingo the implementing partner, local communities and municipal risk governance actors have benefited from this with improved outcomes for sustainability and project relevance.




# SUSTAINABILITY

## 10.1 Introduction

Sustainability (i.e., long-term impact) of project outcomes was planned for within project strategies with some success. Projects aimed for medium-term or long-term sustainability, this was not defined but indicates expectations of outputs lasting in the order of five to ten years, or beyond. The extent to which individual outputs were or are able to meet these expectations depended upon the nature of the output and its institutional context. This section examines those factors influencing the sustainability of key outcomes (as identified in section 5): local urban disaster management group, urban risk culture (awareness, behavioural change and communication/ reinforcement), local mitigation

works and risk governance. Each outcome had the potential to reinforce others so that achieving strong and sustainable project impacts was most likely when, for example, sensitised urban risk managers welcomed collaboration with and supported local groups, or local groups could reinforce local risk awareness. Such relationships generated virtuous feedback loops. The corollary, where weakness in one output created a sustainability challenge for others was also observed. These feedbacks are shown in Figure 10.1 framed by the project operating environment which includes institutional and risk contexts but also the priorities, strategies and capacities of Oxfam and any funding agencies.

**Figure 10.1** Feedback loops between urban DRR actors and outcomes



The most explicit sustainability plan was developed for the Santo Domingo project. This included designing for work to influence all points in **Figure 10.1** through a four point plan:

1. Establishing local emergency committees that were linked to neighbourhood grassroots organisations provided with technical and conceptual tools to continue working after the project lifetime.
2. IDDI was an established implementing partner with proven capacity and the will to continue supporting and to replicate project outcomes.
3. Oxfam intended to continue working in urban DRR and to promote the exchange of experiences to maximise lessons learned within the risk management community and wider operating environment.
4. Oxfam International implemented a regional Capacity Building Plan for its affiliates and local partners. This provided an opportunity for sharing experiences and lessons learned to influence work across Central America and the Caribbean.

Projects in Haiti and Guyana also planned for sustainability but found significant challenges in implementing these plans. In Haiti, Cap Haitien the second Oxfam – European Commission project was in part a response to identified sustainability challenges to investments made during the first Oxfam –European Commission project.

The formation of three municipal level groups with recognition from mayor's offices provided a mechanism for future support and sustainability for the 22 local groups formed in the first project. In practice these 22 groups became dormant but continued to provide a source of community representation on the municipal committees and may reactivate during disaster.

In Haiti a lack of capacity in government severely limited any support Civil Protection or mayor's offices provided constraining sustainability. Oxfam's continued presence in Cap Haitien and Port au Prince and the beginnings of work to integrate DRR into reconstruction for Port au Prince provided some mechanisms for sustainability in the short-medium term; although this may risk dependency in the longer-term. Local committees in Cap Haitien had already approached Oxfam in preference to municipalities for advice and support.

The following discussion looks at challenges and responses at each of the levels identified in **Figure 10.1**.

## 10.2 Operating environment

In Guyana the lack of an existing institutional framework for disaster management made it more difficult to lobby for support for project outputs from government. There was no organisation legally mandated to support DRR at the local level. A draft National Disaster Preparedness Plan will potentially provide support for community DRR groups when implemented.

WAD have been consulted in the preparation of the plan. Proposals within the Civil Defence Commission to extend activities formally to the community level will also help. Both mechanisms will benefit from the work of Oxfam in building community groups, even if many remain dormant in the interim.



## 10.3 Urban risk governance

In Santo Domingo sustainability of past and future projects was enhanced by the establishment of a Risk Management Unit within IDDI. This was a permanent working space to coordinate activities with other civil society organisations and with responsible government bodies and provide a base for advocating change in the institutional architecture for urban (and wider) disaster management. Any such advocacy was further supported by the risk reduction law (147-02) which formally requires civil defence to have a presence at the local level. This responsibility which helped build supportive links between civil defence and community groups in Oxfam's projects and so provide sustainability.

The greatest challenges to sustainability from the operating environment were encountered in Haiti. One respondent describing the limited capacity and politicised nature of Haitian government explained:

'the system is bankrupt, it does not serve the people, there are few human resources and little communication or influence on technical or policy process, instead these are driven by political interests'.

In this context any sustainability that does not fall back on implementing agencies or Oxfam is a challenge. Slightly more resources and technical capacity were available in the Port au Prince area as a capital, but these were at the time of this review distorted by the disaster reconstruction process, showing the fragility of even this capacity for sustaining outputs. Given local constraints a potential strategy is to attempt greater advocacy within national government to help prioritise and support action at the municipal level, though this might also lead to the marginalisation of any advocating NGO by government – a delicate balance.

## 10.4 Linkages between urban risk governance and local DRR groups

In Santo Domingo as part of work in Los Guandules, Guachupita and La Ciénega, relationships improved as more direct links with the municipal authorities were generated. In the community of La Ciénega a commission was set up to follow municipal plans and projects. Such activities provided dual purpose for the social capital built by Oxfam's work indicating a greater likelihood of organisation persisting. This virtual link was reinforced – at least at the level of rhetoric – by the Mayor of Santo Domingo who visited the project during the execution phase and made a verbal commitment to continue organising and supporting activities that lead to strengthening the communities in the area of risk management. Even after the project end the municipal authorities have expressed their willingness to maintain working relations with IDDI on this topic.

## 10.5 Local urban disaster management groups

Each project formed local groups that operated at an appropriate scale to engage with wider urban risk management agencies, in Haiti and Santo Domingo these were supported by a layer of more local level groups that to varying degrees of success generated popular interest, risk information and implemented local risk management activities. These local and community groups lay at the heart of Oxfam's projects and aspirations for sustainability. The failure of many of these groups to remain active (especially the more local groups and in Guyana and Haiti) raises concerns of sustainability.

Failure was associated with many causes. A large part lay with the operating environment, in

Guyana and Haiti in particular political and social history combined with contemporary politicised and private interest politics made people reluctant to form and maintain local social organisations without firm external support. Constraints imposed by The European Commission compounded this with very limited project lifetimes with little scope to invest the time and resources needed to confront such deep rooted development failures, even for specific localities. The absence of strong local implementing partners with a history of engagement in Guyana and Haiti exacerbated this. **Box 10.1** presents the views of one community group leader from Cap Haitien.

**Box 10.1** Structural barriers to community group sustainability, Petite Anse, Cap Haitien

Petite Anse has maintained a municipal level disaster management group which continues to support the mayor's municipal civil protection committee. Discussion with community members focussed on relationships with the mayor's office that limit effectiveness and sustainability:

'If we did not exist the mayor would like it. We are in a perpetual fight, they have a budget but do not link to the community group. The mayor has his own goals and structures, the group is recognised by the mayor on paper, but not in practice. For example, after floods information was sent to City Hall with no response, so now we are also reluctant to work with them. We would rather work alone, but with no resources this is not possible.

This is frustrating, we want experience to build capacity but instead skills are being lost from the community. We can not open a bank account [for the community group] as there

is no official paper from the Ministry of the Interior recognising the group. The Casec (local government representative) chairman is trained and supportive but because he is elected he will go in time and then we might have no official contact. Even now, without papers coordinating on even a basic level, for example with a hospital in an emergency can be hard. In 2008, we developed a risk management plan, sent it to Civil Protection in the Ministry of the Interior and have had no reply, they still have the plan and the community group does not have a copy. So we now have no plan.

It feels as though we are used by agencies like Oxfam or the World Food Programme or the International Migration Organisation to complete their goals but are not included in planning or any long-term partnership. NGOs come, give training but no continuity”.

The limited commitment of local groups to continue meeting is also a result of a failure to transcend DRR and make group activities more relevant to everyday life. Even when risk is seasonal and predictable group members have pressing demands on their time making little sense to continue meeting regularly if there is not a specific and urgent need.

This is rationale but sows the seeds for group collapse. Groups that functioned well went beyond DRR to provide other reasons for meeting – to maintain friendships or consider other, more everyday development challenges, or had been subsumed within other groups such as local government (Haiti and Guyana) or NGO networks (Santo Domingo).

## 10.6 Awareness

Awareness raising was a highpoint of projects. Thousands of residents were involved in many imaginative and high quality communication approaches. In so far as the aim of awareness raising was to sensitise, introduce risk management concepts and encourage group formation investments were successful. Longer-lasting impacts are hard to measure without large-scale social survey work. Anecdotal evidence suggests that risk awareness remains but that there is very limited scope for individual action to demonstrate knowledge, and as explained above structural constraints mitigate against most people's involvement in community groups. Some individuals have continued to

implement risk management, especially where this reinforced existing practices, for example in Guyana where the habit of raising chicken coops to avoid disease or injury from water and rats was often observed.

Also in Guyana risk awareness has been developed through the Guyana Red Cross and its open invitation for all committee members to attend training workshops – though no financial support is available which has limited uptake. This has been useful and also provided some focus for groups that have continued to function (e.g., Better Hope), but was not itself sited as an explanation for group maintenance.





## 10.7 Mitigation works and equipment

Mitigation works included small capital projects and drain cleaning. Equipment was also provided for emergency rescue and in some cases (Santo Domingo) for early warning. Capital projects proved to be the most sustainable and were all still in use at the time of this review. Most successful were those projects that fulfilled the dual purpose of meeting an everyday development need (e.g.. access through stairs or a bridge) and reducing risk (though providing improved evacuation and emergency access). All reviewed mitigation works met these criteria. Works were kept to a good standard with no sign of graffiti or vandalism suggesting community support. In Gualey, Santo Domingo, where neighbours had begun to repaint steps for Christmas the community chairwoman intervened explaining the existing fluorescent paint signified the stairs as an evacuation route and the neighbours agreed.

Drain clearing in Haiti and Guyana had limited sustainability with drains being clogged with sediment after annual rains or by solid waste before. Drain cleaning did not stimulate increased frequency of cleaning from local or municipal government. The exception to this was in Cap Haitien where drains were cleaned for three years with the involvement of neighbourhood committees and support of the World Food Programme and International Organization for Migration. Of potentially longer lasting impact, though less tangible, were the social and psychological impacts of project participation. Drain cleaning is a powerful way to demonstrate the human causes of flood risk and this message was communicated effectively so that awareness was raised. But the absence of follow-on drain cleaning exercises (with the exception of two communities in Guyana) shows the difficulty of



connecting changes in attitudes to behaviour. The absence of sustained local action is largely the result of the extremely limited capacity at local government level in these cases. Local groups felt they were unable to act (and in both cases legally required consent) without local government agreement and technical support. Of the two cases in Guyana where drain cleaning had been continued, one was a reflection of ongoing municipal priorities – though arguably reinforced by Oxfam’s work.

The second case reflected the personal abilities and networks of the community group leader. When local government was unable to provide drain cleaning equipment money was raised from a local charity and equipment hired. This was a successful case but one where sustainability was fragile and rested on a single personality.

Early warning and emergency response equipment were frequently presented during interviews and clearly valued. The exception was electric water level monitoring equipment and alert systems in La Zurza, Simon Bolivar and Capotillo, Santo Domingo. This equipment had either been damaged or had some element stolen. No money existed to replace these parts and community groups had not raised funds. More sustainable were simple visual warning posts placed by the river bank in other communities and the use of local observers to raise warnings.

The greater sustainability of low-tech and human resource rather than technology based hazard monitoring and alert systems is an important observation.

# LESSONS LEARNED

## 11.1 Introduction

Learning from past experience requires the distillation of context specific challenges and responses as well as examples of success into generic formulae that can be more widely applied. The following discussion aims to do this and organises lessons into five groupings: vision, urban context, equity, efficiency, sustainability and replication.

### Vision

The aims and shape of a project are influenced by many factors. The projects reviewed here were notable in presenting very similar design characteristics. This in part reflects similarities in disaster risk and development context. However, concerns around project impact and sustainability indicate constrained project vision. Oxfam is a very experienced and successful developmental/humanitarian NGO and presumably constraints were recognised and accepted as a trade off against funding opportunities. This is justifiable where projects sit within a longer-term strategy of engagement (Haiti and Santo Domingo) or where local actors have capacity to build on outputs and drive their own future work around disaster risk reduction (Santo Domingo).

Constraints on vision can be traced to The European Commission's funding rules (time, budget and priority limitations), Oxfam's competencies (limited awareness of socio-political context, especially in Guyana, and the novelty of urban DRR to the organisation) and the nature of contemporary development work (limited time for reflection, innovation or risk taking in project design).

The result of these constraints has been to narrow

considerably the range of activities undertaken. Most important is a limited engagement with root causes of risk. Two areas of urban DRR work that have been successfully applied elsewhere in the Americas but would not be easy to have developed given the constraints above are:

- Community based solid waste management and plastic recycling businesses. If connected to urban DRR awareness raising and management this can provide a market and organisation to support local actors reduce the waste in drains. Existing community solid waste management businesses in Santo Domingo have partnered urban DRR communities providing office space, a stock of leadership resources and financial support. The opportunity of learning from this experience has not yet been taken.
- Community based orchards when managed in conjunction with urban DRR management and awareness raising provide slope stabilisation and maintenance as local residents draw a livelihood. This can be a cost effective measure for reducing flood and mass movement hazards and vulnerability.

1. Urban DRR is a relatively new policy domain, projects likely to deliver significant impact may not fit well within existing donor frameworks, this restricts scope and misses opportunities for sustainably addressing the root causes of urban risk.

## Urban context

Urbanisation is a contradictory and complicated process touching all aspects of life and social organisation as well as profoundly affecting the natural environment. While illegal or unplanned settlements in one neighbourhood may be well established with basic services, community organisation and voice, these may be absent in others. Despite this diversity some key aspects of urbanisation stand as central lessons.

2. The complexity of urban society and politics requires careful analysis to maximise opportunities for project impact.

3. Local hazards and vulnerability experienced in urban areas may have their root causes in distant environmental and social processes suggesting a need for consideration of urban-region and rural-urban projects.

4. The additional importance of governance in urban DRR highlights the need for multi-level approaches, which could include national level advocacy to encourage support of local government and citizen action.

## Equity (procedural and distributional)

Identifying who is marginalised and using project frameworks to help address marginalisation requires local knowledge and sensitivity. Urban contexts bring together diverse social groups which layer their own cultural diversity on top of dominant prejudices and inequalities in society. Unpicking this to provide support is not easy and requires constant attention. This is especially so when projects integrate with government agencies where inequity may be structural. In such contexts there are play-offs to be had and local groups may prefer leaders that can work in this system.

5. Urban social inequalities are stubborn but can be challenged by sensitive project planning and implementation.

## Effectiveness

Flexibility in the methods of implementation and good communication between all partners in a project can help to overcome tensions between project design aspirations and the social context of delivery. The most important resource for project effectiveness is an experienced, self-critical, locally respected and politically independent implementing partner. Where Oxfam is intending a medium/long-term presence new partners should also be cultivated to prevent dependency and uncritical policy lock-in. In urban contexts the willingness and capacity of local or municipal government to support the project will also have a significant influence on outcomes. Locally, power structures within community, including the presence or absence of organised crime or local political activity will also determine rates and depth of participation.

6. Cultivating new and maintaining existing local implementing partners helps secure outcomes, extend competencies and stimulate future project inputs.

7. Sometimes uncomfortable decisions may have to be made in deciding how far to work in urban vulnerable communities influenced by exploitative political or criminal organisations.

## Sustainability and replication

Sustainability is a significant challenge in urban contexts where urban DRR may not be an obvious priority for city-wide and local stakeholders. It is important to be honest about what can be achieved through individual projects and the extent to which disaster risk is driven by extra local forces requiring larger scale action. There is real opportunity for urban disaster risk reduction to act as an integrating policy domain. Risk can only be reduced if urban governance, poverty, critical infrastructure, awareness and environmental assets are considered and thus DRR can benefit from being a part of other sectoral activity but also by making an argument for joined-up policy amongst NGO as well as government communities.

8. The most useful and sustainable urban DRR interventions (physical and social) serve everyday basic needs as well as providing a function at times of emergency and disaster.

9. Local and municipal government are the cornerstones of sustainable urban DRR.

10. Urban DRR provides a focal point for integrated development planning and should also capitalise on this to ensure its integration across all urban humanitarian and development activities.

# APPENDIX I: KEY BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS

## Georgetown, Guyana

- External Evaluation of the DIPECHO VI project in Guyana, “Strengthening Disaster Preparedness and Reducing Vulnerabilities in Flood Prone Communities of Guyana” by Lynette Joseph-Brown and Paloma Mohammed Martin, March 22, 2009
- Support to food security, livelihoods recovery and disaster preparedness in flood-affected communities – GUYANA - OPERATION NO. ECHO/GY/BUD/2005/02001, Final Report
- Strengthening disaster preparedness and reducing vulnerabilities in flood prone communities of Guyana, Oxfam GB application to VI DIPECHO Action Plan for the Caribbean, Version II, 1.09.07.
- Facing floods in Guyana: good practices and lessons learned in disaster preparedness, OxfamGB.

## Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

- Reduction of vulnerability to natural disasters in high-risk areas in Santo Domingo, 06-07 IF-4584-final. ECHO grant agreement form.
- Sistematización de la ejecución del proyecto, Reducción de la vulnerabilidad en zonas de alto riesgo de Santo Domingo, República Dominicana, IDDI – Intermón Oxfam - ECHO
- Neighbourhood preparedness for vulnerability reduction in the Dominican Republic, Agreement ECHO/DIO/BUD/2007/02003
- Preparación comunitaria para la reducción de la vulnerabilidad ante desastres en el sector de Los Tres Brazos, Santo Domingo Este, República Dominicana.
- Natalia Gómez de Travesedo and Paola Saenz Ramírez (2009) Análisis de riesgos de desastres y vulnerabilidades en la República Dominicana, Documento de contribución al Sistema Nacional de Prevención, Mitigación y Respuesta a Desastres Oxfam Intermón, PAZ, PLAN



## Cap Haitien, Haiti

- FinalNarrativeReportOxfamGBDIPECHOHaitiECHO.TPS.219.2003.02003  
Rapport d’Evaluation Projet Désastres OXFAM
- Rapport final du projet mitigation inondation 2005
- Rapport narrative final VFSSBR Oxfam
- Renforcement des capacités pour une gestion locale durable des risques et désastres naturels au Cap Haïtien, Oxfam, 2007
- Renforcement des capacités des structures locales pour une gestion durable des risques et désastres naturels au Cap Haïtien. Evaluation of DIPECHO Action Plans V and VI for the Caribbean, Project Partner Review. 2009
- Préparation et Mitigation des Inondations des Catastrophes au Cap-Haitien, Evaluation, Oxfam GB, October 2005

## Metropolitan Port au Prince, Haiti

- Description de la conception, de la méthodologie et du plan de travail proposés pour accomplir la mission y inclus un plan de travail detaille pour les 6 premiers mois, Formulaire tech-2, Oxfam GB
- Monitoring du PUGRD/ OUEST, Synthese de Donnees, Oxfam GB

# APPENDIX II: INTERVIEWS

## Guyana

### Interviews

#### 5 May

- Golda Gaskin, Livelihoods Co-ordinator, Oxfam project
- Andre Wilson, Community Mobiliser, Oxfam project
- Kester Craig, Director, CDC
- Mr Simon, chair, Sophia LEC
- Leone Ramnerine, LEC chair Better Hope
- Ester Cole, chair, Victoria LEC

#### 6 May

- Dorothy Fraser, Director Guyana Red Cross
- Clement Corlette, Chairman, R4 RDC
- Randolph Blair, Chairman, Buxton/Foulis NDC
- Paulette Bynoe, Consultant on CAP
- Didier Trebucq and Anvar Sabzaliev UNDP
- Renato Yearwood Bachelors Adventure Deputy Chair LEC
- Shawla Persaud Chair BV-Triumph LEC
- Rainsford Benfield Vice Chair BV-Triumph LEC

#### 7 May

- Ricky Roopchand, Guyana Rice Producers Association
- Clonel Boston Coordinator Women Across Differences
- Lynda Fraser Guyana Red Cross
- Kassia DeSantos, Risk Mapping Officer, Oxfam project
- Head Teacher, Enterprise Primary School
- Dawn Washington Anns Grove LEC

- Gillian Barker, chair Buxton N and S LEC
- Roger Gordon, chair Golden Hope LEC

### 8 May

- Jean chair, Success LEC
- Clifford Warner, chair Vryheids Lust LEC
- Elizabeth Bourne, vice chair Melanie LEC
- Melanie Odelle chair Cove and John LEC
- Cardwell King chair Beehive LEC

## Group discussions

### 5 May

Better Hope, LEC members

### 7 May

Buxton N and S LEC members

# Dominican Republic

## Interviews

### 10 May

- Luis Javier Alejo, DRR and Emergency Co-ordinator, IDDI
- Therese Morrobel, Director of Social Promotion, IDDI
- Antonio Bosque, DRR technician, IDDI

### 11 May

- Catherine Baez, Humanitarian programme officer, Intermón Oxfam
- Dan Stothart, Ex. Oxfam project manager.
- Anhil Suriel, chair CEC La Zurza
- Rafael Rosario (chair and SWM technical), Ramon Jiménez (SWM operations manager), Sandra Sierra (facilitator and health promotora), CEC Capotillo

### 12 May

- Director, Civil Defence region Distrito Nacional. Vladimir Santana
- Erol Valdes, Comite de Pobladores, and xxx, former chair, CEC Simon Bolivar
- William de Jesús (promoter) Perfecta Cobral(committee member) CEC Gualay

### 13 May

- Luna de Jesus, CD on CEC also treasured r to AGRUGUECA, Felix Castillo Community on CEC, promotora, CEC Las Canitas
- Dafna Silverio (facilitator and CEC), Anna María Cruz(facilitator and CEC and spaces for learning), Virginia (node f pobladores), CEC Los Guandules
- Margali Márquez and two daughters, CEC Guachupita.

### 14 May

- Mark van Winsberg, UNDP
- Santa Sánchez, IDDI project coordinator
- Diana Isabel Díaz, project coordinator, Oxfam
- Gustavo Lara, Dominican Red Cross

## Group discussions

10 May

IDDI project management focus group (Santa Sanches, manager; Josephina de Jesus, community mobilise; Teresa Avilla, community mobilise; Manuel Jesus Bandera, volunteer; Isac Villegas, community leader; Maria Victoria, Capotillo CEC; Denise Beseres, community mobiliser).

# Haiti – Cap Haitien

## Interviews

### 15 May

- Berly Raphael, community mobilise, assistant project officer, project officer in Cap Haitien

### 16 May

- Isabelle Bremaud, DRR Advisor and project manager
- Valery Laguerre, project manager

### 17 May

- Telo Michelle, member, Milu, Shada member, Mme August, member, Joseph Selgo, member, Odelesse, member, community group Petite Anse.
- Amos Ordena, casec, Mne Mailenne, casec, Vermont Dorcin, coordinator of community group, Charlemagne Devosin, member community group, Sinvilay Onegoy, member community group Haut du Cap

### 18 May

- Frito Joseph Mayor Adjutant Cap-Haitien
- Valery Laguerre, project manager
- Ferdinand Jean-Romel, vice coordinator, Paret third coordinator, Joseph member, Compere member, Jean member, Bande du Nort



# Haiti – Metropolitan Port au Prince

## Interviews

### 19 May

- Isabelle Bremaud, DRM regional advisor
- Valery Laguerre, project manager

### 20 May

- Germain Jean Ely, project manager Oxfam
- Madelline, coordinator CP, three other colleagues and Mayor Tabarre
- Yves Joseph Noel CCPC education, Jeannis Odeler, CCPC prevention, Refanor Obed, CCPC treasurer, Tabarre
- Losa Augustin, CCPC hospital contact, Gutenberg Destin, supporting group member, and two others, Carfur

### 21 May

- German Jean Ely, project manager Oxfam
- Cardyn Fils Aime, reviewer of project for Oxfam

### 22 May

- Marie Alta Jean-Baptiste, Director Civil Protection, Ministry of Interior

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