

Sida and the Tsunami of 2004

– a Study of Organizational Crisis Response

Fredrik Bynander
Lindy M. Newlove
Britta Ramberg



Sida and the Tsunami of 2004

– A Study of Organizational Crisis Response

Fredrik Bynander
Lindy M. Newlove
Britta Ramberg

This report is published in *Sida Studies in Evaluation*, a series comprising methodologically oriented studies commissioned by Sida. A second series, *Sida Evaluation*, covers evaluations of Swedish development co-operation. Both series are administered by the Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit, an independent department reporting directly to Sida's Board of Directors.

This publication can be downloaded/ordered from:

<http://www.sida.se/publications>

Authors: Fredrik Bynander, Lindy M. Newlove, Britta Ramberg.

The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

Sida Studies in Evaluation 05/02

Commissioned by Sida, Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit

Copyright: Sida and the authors

Registration No.: 2005-000171

Date of Final Report: September 2005

Printed by Edita Sverige AB, Sweden 2005

Art.no. SIDA17577en

ISBN 91-586-8688-6

ISSN 1402-215X

SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY

Address: SE-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden. Office: Sveavägen 20, Stockholm

Telephone: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Telefax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64

E-mail: sida@sida.se.

Website: <http://www.sida.se>

Preface

This report describes and analyses Sida's actions in relation to the Tsunami disaster in December 2004. The study was carried out by Crismart, the Centre for Crisis Management Research and Training at the Swedish National Defence College at the request of the Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit at Sida. The study is based on interviews with informants within and outside Sida and on printed reports.

Eva Lithman
Director
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit

Table of contents

Abbreviations	1
Summary	3
1. Framing the Sida Tsunami case	5
The structure of the report	6
Conducting the study.....	7
Methodology.....	8
2. Sida: mandate, goals and organizational structure ..	10
Humanitarian assistance to development cooperation	11
3. The Tsunami and Sweden's response	14
The affected countries	16
Swedish response to consolidated appeals	17
5. Sida and the Sri Lankan experience	19
Agency response	19
Beyond the immediate relief phase in Sri Lanka	22
Bilateral assistance	23
6. Occasions for decision	27
Sida's acute response to the humanitarian needs	28
Earmarking funds?.....	30
How is Sida's personnel affected?	31
Pressure from media and the public	34
From humanitarian assistance to reconstruction	35
7. Analyzing Sida's central response.....	37
Sida units activated	38
Distributing resources	40
Planning reconstruction efforts	43
8. Communication.....	46
Internal communication	47
External communication	47

9.	Coordination	51
	Internal coordination	52
	External coordination	53
10.	Conclusions from Sida's Tsunami response	56
	Lessons	60
	Appendix 1 Terms of Reference	63
	Appendix 2 Sida's mandate and goals	70
	References	75
	Government reports	80
	Other media	80
	Internet	81

Abbreviations

ASIA	Sida's Asia Department
CAP	Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
FO	Field Office
FORUT	Forbundet Mot Rusgift in Norwegian (League Against Intoxicants)
FU	Sida's Field Unit
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GS (UD/GS)	Foreign Ministry's Department for Global Security
HRF	Human Response Fund
HUM	SEKA's Division for Humanitarian assistance and conflict management
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMC	International Medical Corps
INFO	Sida's Information Department
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KAMEDO	Swedish Disaster Medicine Study Organization under the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen)
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LIC	Other Low-Income Countries
LMIC	Lower-Middle-Income Countries
LTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PEO	Sida's Human Resources Department
SC	Save the Children
SEKA	Sida's Department for Cooperation with NGO's and Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Prevention
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SLMM	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise Management Development
SRC	Swedish Red Cross
SRSA	Swedish Rescue Services Agency
UMIC	Upper-Middle Income Countries
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster and Assessment Coordination Center
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USGS	United States Geological Survey
UTV	Sida's Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

Summary

Sida and the Tsunami of 2004 is a study, commissioned by Sida and conducted by the Center for Crisis Management Research and Training (CRISMART), covering a number of basic organizational aspects of Sida's response to the Tsunami disaster. It draws upon the growing literature on public organizations in crises, and uses the Tsunami disaster as a test case for core organizational functions to crisis management and mitigation capacity.

This report begins with mapping out and specifying the questions needed to be addressed in order to describe Sida's response to the Tsunami consequences in Southeast Asia as well as the means employed in order to answer them. As Sri Lanka was particularly hard-hit by the Tsunami and because of Sida's engagement in the country, both prior to and after the disaster is high, Sri Lanka is the main case which this study focuses. Sida is also the main actor at the Embassy of Sweden in Colombo. The report builds on basic knowledge of Sida's mission, organizational structure and resources placed in relation to the tasks identified in the crisis management literature and its related analytical disciplines. A number of interviews have been used to navigate the Sida organization, and sharpen the focus on relevant issue areas. It is important to note that the conclusions in this report are circumscribed by the short time available to the authors, and that more can be done to assess the crisis management capacity of Sida.

The acute sense of urgency on the first days of the disaster was substantial, which we argue is the true meaning of 'warning'. We have claimed that this was partly due to extraordinary circumstances related to the proximity and involvement in the tragic events, a feeling shared by many Swedes. The challenge for the future is to replicate that organizational process and have everybody in relevant positions notified and briefed at an early stage.

One function that was crucial for Sida's actions, and that seemed to work only at the top of the organization, was the continuous process to have a common 'big picture' between the involved departments and units. The INFO representatives we interviewed reported intense contact with SEKA, PEO, and increasingly ASIA, during the first week. Others have testified that at the program officer level, information was much harder to come by, and the grinding tasks of responding to calls from the public and handling low-level external contacts were not prioritized. The supervision functions in certain divisions and departments were handicapped by absent senior personnel, which left the junior staff to largely fend for themselves and create their own information base. The report specifies ways of reinforcing what can be referred to as the 'intelligence function'.

The main findings of the report is that the organization was only modestly tested as a crisis management actor, but that most tasks that were required under some threat to basic organizational values, time constraint, and uncertainty were completed. The report does notice a number of potential vulnerabilities that have become more or less apparent in the retrospective assessment of Sida's operations. They include the tight staffing situation that leaves the agency susceptible to loss of key personnel, coordination difficulties that spring from the complex environment of interagency and interorganizational exchange involved in disaster response, and other functions internal to the organizations communication practices that may not answer to the challenges of a full-blown emergency to the agency as such.

1. Framing the Sida Tsunami case*

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) is by its very construction an organization that is partner to societies under severe and long-term strains, prone to contingencies such as natural disasters and civil unrest and often lacking sufficient funds to effectively deal with the suffering of large parts of their populations. In one sense, Sida is a crisis management organization with a toolbox full of techniques for dealing with situations featuring threats to core values, uncertainty, and time pressure, to quote Crismart's definition of crisis (Stern, 1999:8). Especially the Division for Humanitarian assistance and conflict management is a crisis response organization that can be mobilized rapidly to commission and fund basic humanitarian relief. Nevertheless, as disaster struck the coastline of the Indian Ocean on Boxing Day 2004, the challenge for the aid organization to live up to its ambitious goals, to coordinate acute relief efforts with ongoing programs, as well as assisting its own personnel exposed on the ground was a daunting one. The study presented here will aim at analyzing the procedures applied to get the job done and the difficulties encountered while doing it, taking advantage of analytical knowledge derived from a multitude of other organizations facing similar situations. And although Sida was not in full crisis mode (in terms of full use of organizational resources), strains were felt unevenly across the different units and their effects on performance can be used to simulate or anticipate organizational limitations. In the nuclear safety business they talk about analyzing 'near misses' to improve safety – we treat the Tsunami as an incident that tested important parts of the contingency mitigation ability of Sida.

The main question to be analyzed regards how decisions were made as information of the disaster started to slowly accumulate with one eye on the humanitarian relief work and the other on long term effects both for the stricken areas and for the aid organization itself. All crisis related activities are a combination of responding to unclear problems, and trying not to trade off freedom of action for the medium to long term future.¹ Measuring that response against the situation 'on the ground' and against what other actors are doing becomes largely a matter of communication and coordination,

* The authors would like to thank those at Sida and others who have helped us gain insight into their organization and their work after the tsunami, despite their often full agendas. Also, our colleagues at Crismart have assisted us greatly by reading and providing helpful comments on different drafts of this report.

¹ See George 1980; Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 2002; Farnham 1997.

which is why we will devote a large part of the study to those processes as they played out within Sida and in relation to external organizations. Two parts of the organizational sequence that are especially relevant is the relation between the humanitarian aid and the development programs on site, as well as the interplay between the civil service and the cabinet office in Sweden. Both issues will be probed as part of this study.

The structure of the report

This report will begin with mapping out and specifying the questions needed to be addressed in order to describe Sida's response to the Tsunami consequences in Southeast Asia as well as the means employed in order to answer them. It describes Sida's mandate, goals and organizational structure briefly (which is expanded in appendix 2) in order to give some background on issues especially relevant to the Tsunami management effort. Chapter 4 is a description of the main events in the affected area and the Swedish initial response to consolidated appeals. In chapter 5, five pertinent occasions for decisions that has been shown to be consequential for the outcome of the organizational decision-making are elaborated. As Sri Lanka was particularly hard-hit by the Tsunami and because of Sida's engagement in the country, both prior to and after the disaster is high, developments and actions in Sri Lanka are probed in chapter 6. Chapter 7 analyzes Sida's central response with respect to forces of centralization and decentralization in contingency response, a prevailing feature of organizational decision-making according to public administration literature. Chapter 8 takes a serious look at how the information communicates, internally and externally. The last analytical chapter addresses coordination, especially with a focus on the gray zone between humanitarian relief and development assistance. The concluding chapter is divided into two sections: the first one outlines the generic findings of the report and the second lists a number of viable lessons that can be drawn from the Tsunami experience from a crisis management perspective.

The report builds on our combined knowledge of Sida's mission, organizational structure and resources placed in relation to the tasks identified in the crisis management literature and its related analytical disciplines. A number of interviews have helped us navigate the Sida organization, and sharpen the focus on relevant issue areas.² It is important to note that the conclusions in this report are a 'first cut' as any organizational analysis of this kind cannot be conducted in the three months that have been available to the authors. The concluding chapter will outline urgent issues for further study, and the analytical uses possible of this tentative collection of material.

A short background on Sida's organization and the manner in which projects are typically funded and administered is provided at the outset. In the inter-

² Interviews are listed in the bibliography.

est of clarifying our understanding of Sida and its relation to other actors important in development coordination, a preliminary description of the organizational procedures and where possible contingency plans that were in place to deal with disaster relief before the Tsunami are included. Mention of ongoing missions in Sri Lanka gives an idea of the scale of operations in the country at the time the Tsunami hit, and some of the direction that relief following the disaster took as partners in development cooperation active in the country at the time of the Tsunami are also primary actors in the response and reconstruction phases. We provide a narrative of the events after the Tsunami, and the measures taken by Sida. A number of main actors involved in Sida's response to the disaster and located within the larger organizational setting are identified. Three important areas for scrutiny in the light of these contextual dimensions are mapped out: decision-making; communication; and coordination. Finally, we propose a number of lessons and conclusions to draw from the disaster response effort that may be used to improve operations and procedures to be more prepared to deal with the next catastrophe that undoubtedly will trigger Sida operations in the future.

Conducting the study

This study describes Sida as an organization, the international and domestic environment in which it is active, and the challenges it faced after the Tsunami disaster. It analyses in detail the decisions made and actions taken at different levels during the first two months after the disaster (we also follow some important processes beyond that time-span). Finally it targets a number of narrowly defined analytical aspects that are prominent in the crisis management field. Of special importance is the inherent ability of different parts of the organization to contribute to a coherent disaster response focusing not only humanitarian relief, but also key aspects of the agency repertoire, such as public relations, human resources, and situational analysis. The so-called gray zone between disaster relief and reconstruction is a major dilemma for the entire aid community, and this report will examine in detail how Sida worked to alleviate its counterproductive consequences.

In order to understand and appraise the actions of Sida and their cooperation and collaboration with other organizations during the crisis, it is extremely helpful to gain as complete an understanding as possible of Sida operations and interactions in typical, non-acute situations. This has primarily been assessed from Sida's and partner organization's official documentation in order not to burden interviewees with mundane aspects of Sida's operations. Furthermore, any plans and procedures designed for the unusual circumstances under scrutiny have been of great interest for the analysis. We have gone through a broad range of written material internal to the organization and the political/administrative complex that surrounds it.

In addition, literature from other organizations has been examined, particularly those with which Sida has standing framework agreements in the Tsunami-affected areas. Organizations with a longstanding Sida partnership and history of working in Sri Lanka have been particularly interesting. Post-crisis government memoranda and reports from for example the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been probed, especially when they contain relevant information on Sida issues.

In terms of the response phase, our organizational focus has been a natural consequence of our analytical questions. For the immediate response phase, we have scrutinized the actions of SEKA, PEO, INFO, and the Embassy of Sweden in Sri Lanka, with some consideration for the Director General's office, ASIA, and other involved Swedish agencies (and as an exogenous factor, the international aid community). For the gray zone issues, SEKA and ASIA are the main actors, again taking into account the Director General's office, the MFA, and international actors. The sections on communication and coordination have drawn from the findings of these initial areas, and added a few aspects of the organization's activities that are especially pertinent, in order to thematically address Sida's ability to incorporate these broad fields of expertise into the contingency management effort.

Interviews have been conducted with Sida personnel in Stockholm and at the Embassy in Colombo as well as other relevant officials. Representatives of aid organizations subsidized by Sida and active in the Tsunami response have been interviewed, as well as representatives of pertinent agencies. Our focus has been to pinpoint the most centrally placed individuals, in this case 43 persons, and get their view of their own and their organization's actions. Several representatives of the affected units at Sida have all been interviewed, the Embassy of Sweden in Sri Lanka, SEKA, PEO, INFO, ASIA, as well as the Director General Maria Norrfalk. The most difficult external actor to access has been the MFA, where both our interviews were made on a background basis on the requests of the interviewees. We wish to emphasize, however, that we have throughout this report strived to ground our findings in written primary sources, such as official documents, and use interview material as complementary evidence. This also means that we owe the interviewees extra gratitude for pointing us the right way on many of the thorny issues of the report.

Methodology

The study has been conducted using a process tracing method, where the researcher is able to define a causal path by searching for manifest 'traces', derived from general knowledge in the literature. Process tracing allows for 'within-case' explanation:

A process tracing approach entails abandonment of the strategy of 'black-boxing' the decision process: instead the decision proc-

ess is the centre of investigation. The process tracing approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that then occurs; the effects of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behavior. (George and McKeown 1985:35)

The bottom line is that the researcher combines the actor's perspective, as best as it can be reconstructed, with an understanding of the institutional structures constraining it. Actor-orientation is a defining feature of the process tracing approach. At the core of any study of organizational behavior must lay the formal traces of the crisis response process, that is, official documentation, working papers and an account of the incoming information to different parts of the agency. This will not give a full account of the process as experienced by actors in different levels of the organization, but it does establish the boundaries within which the analyst can pursue more detailed data (see Eckstein, 1975; George, 1997; Stern 1999).

A central method for corroboration of document based empirical evidence is actor interviews. All material is used in explicit combination, verifying whenever possible all accounts of actions and events. The potential for bias is a problem that will have to be taken into account in assessing the reliability of a source, in this case particularly with respect to sensitive organizational issues, and those of blame and accountability. Trying to judge personal and organizational interests that may distort the judgment of an informant is a difficult procedure that must be performed to some extent. Another basis for source critique is the question of centrality: Was the source experiencing events first hand or is second- or third-hand information being relayed? As we run into source-oriented problems in the analysis, we will comment on and explain our decisions.

2. Sida: mandate, goals and organizational structure

Sida is the state aid organization responsible for the oversight and administration of development assistance, both in terms of disaster relief – referred to and categorized as ‘humanitarian assistance’ – and long-term aid projects and programs – development assistance. Organizationally it is located under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Sida has its origins in the 1950s and 1960s and its work has gradually evolved from “expert assistance” to execute parts of what is today referred to as “policy for global development” (Sida, 2005a). The different concepts for labeling international work indicate that the nature of the work has also changed somewhat over the years. Partnership and cooperation have come increasingly to form Sida’s role in recipient nations, with an emphasis on encouraging self-actualization, independence and partnership as opposed to paternalism. The main criterion under which Sida operates is that foreign aid should be geared at eliminating poverty in the countries of development partners (Sida, 2002a).³

The focus on poverty reduction at Sida can also be seen as part of a larger set of development objectives in the global context of the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals, whereby international consensus was reached in 2000 on among other things, halving world poverty by 2015. The guiding principle of poverty reduction at Sida is particularly relevant with respect to the planning of long-term projects, which while understandably only partially developed during the period of time this study focuses on (the disaster and two months following), should be seen to guide at least some of the planning following the Tsunami. The not wholly unproblematic relationship between more immediate humanitarian assistance and more long-term development assistance is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter and indeed throughout this report.⁴

³ Sida’s chief goal of eliminating poverty is outlined in the main policy document, *Perspectives on Poverty* (2002). The other main steering policy documents identified in Svensson and Holmgren (2003:43) are *Sida at Work* (2003) and *Sida Looks Forward* (1997).

⁴ An elaborated description of Sida’s organization is provided in appendix 2 in order to keep this presentation brief and to the point.

Humanitarian assistance to development cooperation

The scope of this study covers the direct response to the Tsunami disaster and the following two months. This means that the long-term reconstruction work is mainly left out and focus is primarily on the humanitarian relief phase. The two ‘phases’, however, cannot be separated, as the very initial, acute relief work has consequences for the longer-term reconstruction work also. Moreover, the transition in this case started early, when the ASIA department began assessing its activities in the area, and commenced deliberations with SEKA and other actors to get an overview of the situation in the field and the consequences for the imminent reconstruction work. We therefore need to clarify the concepts and discuss the *gray zone* between the two areas.

*Humanitarian assistance*⁵ refers to often short-term support for people who have been affected by war or natural disasters and need immediate help in order to survive. Humanitarian assistance addresses affected individuals and is provided mainly through non-governmental and international organizations. Sida’s humanitarian mandate is stated in the annual appropriation directives and gives Sida the role to contribute to saving lives, alleviating distress and maintaining human dignity to the benefit of distressed people in man-made and natural disasters (Regeringen/UD, 2004:7). Humanitarian aid is based on the principles of impartiality and neutrality. As it should be strictly need-based, humanitarian actions, different from development cooperation, often takes place in countries where the donor has no bi-lateral agreement with the government, and regardless of political relations. But also in countries where country strategies and plans exist, humanitarian assistance is mostly provided outside these frameworks (Swedish Humanitarian Assistance, Sida Report, 2002:2).

Development cooperation aims to support autonomous development policies and strategies. For Sida, as well as for other donors, these programs are provided mainly through cooperation programs agreed with the partner country (EU Commission 2001:3). More specifically, Sida’s key instruments for development cooperation are the regional and country cooperation strategies. These strategies are drafted by Sida⁶ and approved by the government and aims at specifying the general guidelines provided by the Government, in the application to the current situation in a specific country at operational area level. These strategies are then valid for three to five years.

The gray zone refers to the differences between instruments and working methods of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, differences in

⁵ The earlier term “disaster relief” has been changed to “humanitarian assistance”. This is a result of the wider definition of disasters after the Cold War. Disasters today are not only natural, but to a high degree also man-made and thereby more complex.

⁶ The Regional Department has the main responsibility for the formulation of country strategies, while in practice the draft strategy is written by the Swedish Embassy concerned in consultations with the Regional and Sector Departments. (From 2005 Country Strategies are replaced by Cooperation Strategies and they are produced through a partly different procedure than before.)

terms of time perspective, implementing partners, the role of national authorities and the content of interventions (EU Commission 2001:3). Poor coordination between acute relief operations and long-term development programs is not only a question of wasted resources, but risks in fact a negative impact on the long-term developmental goals. Efforts to increase the coordination and close the gap between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation concern all aid donors and implementers and have been on the political and academic agenda since the mid-80's. Several international organizations, such as the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the United Nations and European Commission began a dialogue around the issue and the process is today slowly moving from policy discourse to implementation practices. The previous approach to bridge the gap between relief and development implied viewing the process as a linear continuum, where relief precedes rehabilitation and is followed by development. This approach is to an increasing extent replaced by the so called 'contiguous approach', which implies a more 'holistic' view on the entire aid cycle, where relief, rehabilitation and development activities and initiatives overlap and have a mutual impact on each other (Campanaro et. al. 2002:5).

An important principle, according to Parliament, is that Sida should allow the largest possible freedom for decision-making to the humanitarian organizations which they support. Sida is directed to minimize earmarking of aid, as well as to provide aid in cash format. The complexity of humanitarian assistance and the link to development assistance is recognized by parliament, but the objective of clarifying the different types of assistance is nonetheless clearly maintained. With respect to Swedish response to UN coordinated appeals – Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals (CAP) – the funds come from Sida's humanitarian assistance (i.e. SEKA's) budget (Sveriges Riksdag, 2005-04-26).

The EU is using the 'Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Framework' to which the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) has confirmed its commitment. Also the establishment of the Europe Aid Cooperation Office in the Commission is partly a result of this coordination goal. The office is responsible for the implementation of all external aid instruments of the EU Commission that are funded by the European Community budget and the Social Development Fund and is responsible for all phases in the policy cycle (http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/index_en.htm).

In their analysis of how actors within the field have embraced the ambition to address the relationship between relief and development, Campanaro et. al. (2002:6) discern different mechanisms in the organizational structure that serve to illustrate this: "[A]lteration of existing relief programs to incorporate development activities; establishment of a new department within the organization to address the needs of developmental relief programming;

integration of previously separate relief and development sections into a single department; or the creation of an entirely separate organization to implement developmental relief activities”.

While Sida has a formally clear-cut and well defined division of labour between humanitarian aid (SEKA) and development cooperation (Regional Departments), the organizational structure does not give a complete picture of how the gray zone is dealt with. An examination of Sida’s policy documents concerning this, however, shows that Sida clearly has adapted to the ‘contiguous approach’. Similarly, government directives, while perhaps somewhat ambivalent, support in large a flexible address of the complexity of the gray zone between humanitarian and development assistance. The parliament notes for example

With the purpose of strengthening the conditions for sustainable development and enabling societies’ ability to recover from catastrophes, Sida shall fund the reconstruction and other contributions in the transition between a disaster situation and long-term development. Such contributions should in a first-case be funded through development cooperation, but shall, in order to ensure flexibility, also be funded by Sida’s humanitarian budget (Sveriges Riksdag, 2005-04-26:9).






Operations accomplished under the framework for humanitarian assistance at Sida are not thus seen as isolated from long-term development operations. Rather, “[t]here is reason to assess closely the initial stages of short-term emergency interventions, in order to certify they are planned in a manner which promotes long-term aims.” The concept ‘developmental humanitarian assistance’ expresses an ambition to bridge the two areas and implies that all humanitarian assistance ought to have a developmental objective (Developmental Humanitarian Assistance: A concept paper, January 1999). The government appears supportive, at least formally, of such a strategy. Parliamentary submissions from 2001 (see 2001/02:UU2 and 2003/04:UU12), reiterated in 2005, “emphasize that acute aid should be planned with a long-term vision right from the initial stages of a contribution”. Furthermore, “Swedish aid contribution planning in order to counteract the effects of natural disasters has a holistic perspective which is much wider than the disaster and its immediate consequences” (Sveriges Riksdag, 2005-04-26:11.).

The degree to which this approach was taken into account in the response to the Tsunami disaster is an empirical question and will be elaborated in connection to the internal communication and coordination between SEKA and ASIA Department, as well as between Sida Headquarters and the field.

3. The Tsunami and Sweden's response

This chapter will give an overview of the developments in the affected area on a country-by-country basis to provide a perspective on the impact of the Tsunami disaster. It continues to discuss the Swedish response to consolidated appeals.

Time line for the Tsunami progress⁷

	Earthquake off Sumatra	Tsunami hits Sumatra	Tsunami hits Kalmunai, Sri Lanka	Tsunami hits Trinco, Sri Lanka	Tsunami hits Thai coast
Time zone					
Stockholm	01.58	02.30	03.27	03.55	04.05
Colombo	06.58	07.30	08.27	08.55	09.05
Aceh	07.58	08.30	09.27	09.55	10.05
Thailand	07.58	08.30	09.27	09.55	10.05

The staggering earthquake that broke the ocean floor off the west coast of Sumatra on December 26, 2004 at 7:58 in the morning local time caused multiple waves that had devastating consequences for a number of countries, particularly in Asia but also on the African continent over 4000 kilometers from the epicenter. The quake, estimated at 9.15 on the Richter scale, resulted in enormous waves that radiated throughout the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean (USGS, 2005), at speeds of over 500 km per hour and heights of up to 10 meters (SRSA, 2005). Indonesia was hardest hit with deaths exceeding 170,000 followed by Sri Lanka with over 31,000 deaths. Thailand and the southeast coast of India as well as India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands

⁷ Adopted from USGS, 2005; The World Clock –Time Zones (www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/); The Tsunami Research Program (www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami/). The exact times for impact of the flood waves, however, varies across different accounts and should correspondingly be seen as approximations.

were extremely hard-hit as well with thousands from each of these areas confirmed dead and many more thousands still missing (BBC, 2005).

Tsunami waves is a complex and only partially understood phenomenon, their impact much dependent on underwater formations and sea depth as well as the nature of the geological fault from which they arise. Myanmar (Burma) was left comparatively unscathed (Jost and Banjeree, 2005), as was Bangladesh. Damage in the Maldives, while substantial, would have been much worse according to researchers, had high underwater ledges that impeded impact not surround the islands (USGS, 2005). Similarly, Myanmar's high coastline, combined with the fact that the Tsunami took a much stronger east-west than north-south direction contributed also to the comparative lesser destruction (Vinberg, 2005). In contrast and despite the comparative distance, the Seychelles were hit, as well as Kenya, Tanzania and Somalia in Africa, the latter sustaining the worst damage of the three countries with 150–200 dead and many fishermen reported missing (BBC, 2005). Malaysia, largely shielded by Sumatra, suffered most on the northern island of Penang, where 68 deaths have been confirmed.

The possibility to provide humanitarian assistance in the affected countries was formally unproblematic as all of the countries hit by the Tsunami are in fact so-called DAC aid recipients,⁸ and all are classified by DAC as 'Developing Countries' in receipt of 'Official Development Assistance' (as opposed to the wealthier 'Countries and Territories in Transition' which receive 'Official Aid') (OECD, 2003).⁹ Politically, there were issues that complicated the picture as India refused assistance, and Thailand was approached cautiously by Swedish government representatives due to a belief that the Thai government would look unfavorably upon too overt advances with for example medical aid.

Eva Asplund, Head of SEKA, pointed out that with the majority of the countries affected by the Tsunami, Sida has established relations (Asplund, interview). Moreover, there are pre-existing agreements with both agencies and organizations in Sweden as well as with Sida partners abroad that deliver the aid that Sida provides (Ibid.). The question of whether or not a country affected by the Tsunami received development assistance from Sida on a regular basis prior to the Tsunami is important, not only because of the 'gray zone' between humanitarian assistance and development assistance explained in a preceding chapter, but because existing partnerships are heavily relied upon in the post-Tsunami reconstruction phases and return to development (interviews, Bjerninger, Brisman).

⁸ With respect to DAC, see also chapter on Sida's mandate and organisational structure.

⁹ Within the DAC developing country classification, the tsunami-affected countries of the Maldives, Myanmar, Somalia and Tanzania are classified as "Least Developed Countries (IDCS)", India and Kenya are classified as, "Other Low-Income Countries (LICS)", and Sri Lanka and Thailand are both classified as "Lower-Middle-Income Countries (IMICS)" As LMIC countries both Sri Lanka and Thailand have a per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of between \$746-\$2975 US. Malaysia and the Seychelles are classified as "Upper-Middle Income Countries (UMICS)" (Ibid.).

Relationships with partners within Sweden are also important in determining the direction of humanitarian as well as development assistance. Regular bi-monthly meetings are held between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' Division for Global Security (UD-GS) and SEKA to discuss humanitarian issues (Expeditionschefen, UD 2005-02-15). Humanitarian assistance, which is by design less politically contingent than development assistance, was provided by Sida to all countries hard-hit by the Tsunami.

The affected countries

Some countries with a firmly rooted history of development cooperation with Sweden have integrated embassies in which Sida is the main responsible authority.¹⁰ Of the countries affected by the Tsunami listed above, Sida operates through fully delegated embassies for which they are primarily responsible in Bangladesh, Kenya and Sri Lanka (all since 2004), and in Tanzania (since 1999) but of these four countries only *Sri Lanka* was so badly hit by the Tsunami that actions were required of Sida at the local level. It is important to emphasise that although Sida is main responsible authority, the fact remains that the embassies are autonomous agencies, and that they report to the MFA on matters that belongs to the ministry's domain.

Indonesia was the country worst hit by the Tsunami and is one of the countries in Asia with which Sweden has had long-term – if comparatively small – development cooperation.¹¹ There is an Embassy of Sweden in Jakarta, managed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Only one Sida staff works in the country (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2000:12). Initially – the first twenty-four hours after the Tsunami – Sida was under the impression that Sri Lanka was the worst hit by the catastrophe, and not Indonesia (Asplund, interview). The enormous impact on the Aceh peninsula was not initially known, Asplund explained, because of conflict there and inaccessibility. Other experts have disputed the inaccessibility of information from Aceh and suggested a bias in Sweden characterized by a low level of attention to Indonesia as opposed to, for example the former colonial power, the Netherlands (interview, 't Hart April 27, 2005).

India initially declined assistance from the UN during the disaster. When it is apparent that countries require humanitarian assistance but decline it, Sida typically makes an effort to convince them that accepting assistance is a good idea given the circumstances. Aid to India has been somewhat delicate and at times problematic the last few years as India is struggling to rid itself of its developing country status and assert independence at the same time that aid is sometimes required (interview, Thybell). Sida's regular development assistance with India while long established, is currently being phased out¹² and

¹⁰ See chapter 2 for a more detailed description of the Swedish Foreign Service.

¹¹ In 2002 Swedish support to Indonesia totalled 15,210,000 SEK, a figure significantly lower compared to other Asian partners. Of other Asian Sida partners, only the Philippines receive marginally less financial support at 15,100,000 SEK (Sida, 2004).

¹² Regular development assistance to India totalled SEK 75,548,000 (Sida, 2004).

Sida's humanitarian assistance in response to the Tsunami, similar to the case of Indonesia, is always channeled via consolidated appeals, multilateral funds, and NGOs.

With respect to *Thailand*, offers of Swedish humanitarian help to the Thai government were also initially declined. As many Swedes were in the affected areas in Thailand, Swedish commitment and attention, both governmental and private, were focused on Thailand in an unprecedented manner. There are two Swedish missions in the country, the embassy in Bangkok, and the consulate at Phuket. A 'mini-embassy' was instated in Phuket during the catastrophe. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is the main responsible authority at both missions in Thailand. A Sida field-stationed employee was however in Bangkok at the time of the disaster and attended the first crisis meeting at the Embassy of Sweden in Bangkok 26 December, 12:30 local time, together with the ambassador, first and second secretaries, a Swedish priest, around 6 local embassy employees, and a chauffeur (Expeditionschefen, UD, 2005:14). Thailand is, as mentioned, on the list of DAC aid recipients and Sida financing of both humanitarian and development assistance occurs normally, albeit on a small scale in Thailand.¹³ Interestingly however, several interviewees both from Sida and another agency were under the impression that Thailand is not on the list of DAC aid recipients and that Sida aid to Thailand was thus not much of an issue.

Myanmar was initially a matter of concern for Sida because as Head of the Asia Department Jan Bjerninger noted, the department "doesn't have very good channels" and "don't know very much about what has happened there" (Studio 24, SVT, 2005). There is no Embassy of Sweden in Myanmar or established development cooperation. While neither first-hand nor reliable information was initially available from the military dictatorship,¹⁴ it became evident in the weeks following that the reports of minimal damage were substantiated. *Bangladesh* too sustained lesser damage from the Tsunami due to the more subdued nature of the waves in a north-south fashion.

Swedish response to consolidated appeals

As the United Nations waited to come out (January 6, 2005) with a consolidated appeal,¹⁵ SEKA made the decision to support individual appeals from UN organs such as UNICEF and IOM and appeals from the IFRC (Asplund, interview). SEKA also contributed to UN missions sent out to assess the situation. According to Asplund, Sweden is comparatively less bureaucratic than many

¹³ SEK 34,247,000 was paid out by Sida to projects in Thailand, the vast majority (22,000,000) for Burmese refugees living in Thailand (Sida, 2004).

¹⁴ The Ministry for Foreign Affairs took contact with the British embassy in Myanmar on December 26 in order to try to obtain information regarding possible Swedes in the affected areas (Expeditionschef, UD, 2005:29).

¹⁵ The UN Flash Appeal for coordination of multilateral humanitarian resources has gathered in excess of 950 million USD (Expeditionschef, UD, 2005:27) It was launched in Jakarta at the ASEAN meeting on January 6, 2005, attended by Sweden's Minister for International Development Cooperation, Carin Jämtin (ibid.).

other donor countries, making it possible to quickly decide to support individual UN and IFRC appeals, and making an impact in the critical early stages of the catastrophe relief.

IFRC records confirm that Sida was indeed quicker to respond than the vast majority of other donor countries to the IFRC Tsunami appeals. Of 26 donor governments worldwide, only the governments of Canada and Iceland were quicker than Sida to respond, with their contributions registered already December 26.¹⁶ A smaller contribution from Sida (1,250,000 SEK) reached the IFRC via the Swedish Red Cross on December 28, the same day as a contribution of the Estonian government. A substantially larger Sida and Swedish Red Cross contribution (17,000,000 SEK) reached the IFRC December 29, the same day as contributions from the governments of Ireland and Switzerland (IFRC, 2005). Sida had already pledged an initial 5 million SEK contribution to IFRC 26 December (Expeditionschef, UD, 2005:27; Sida, 2005).

On January 6, at the ASEAN meeting in Jakarta, the UN launched an appeal for immediate humanitarian assistance of USD 977 million. On January 7, Sida proposed to the government that 150 million SEK be allocated for humanitarian support to the affected areas. On January 10, the Swedish government assigned Sida to support the UN appeal with 150 million SEK. By September 30, Sida had paid out a total of 246,4 million SEK – almost half of the 500 million SEK the government set aside for the Tsunami disaster relief (Expeditionschef, UD, 2005:27; see further chapters 5, 7).

¹⁶ Note also the time difference between Canada and Sweden – the disaster struck for example at 16:58 on December 25 in Vancouver and at 01:58 am on December 26 in Sweden.

5. Sida and the Sri Lankan experience

Sri Lanka is for Sweden a major recipient country. Sweden has a long-standing commitment to the fragile and conflict-ridden democracy since 1958. The Embassy in Colombo is administered by Sida as main responsible authority, and oversees a number of development projects and functions as a contact for the Swedish personnel participating in the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. The involvement in the peace process, the number of Swedish nationals in the country, and the development projects all contribute to make the Sri Lankan case crucial for Sida's disaster preparedness. In Thailand, the MFA was the most active of Swedish authorities, and in Indonesia, Sweden elected to contribute primarily through multilateral channels due to its modest presence in the country before the disaster. This makes Sri Lanka the more 'researchable' of the affected countries. This chapter initially describes the response to events in Sri Lanka by Swedish authorities and then elaborates on longer-term actions and plans.

Agency response

Word of the Tsunami that struck the island of Sri Lanka came in to the Embassy of Sweden in Colombo at 10.45 in the morning of December 26, 2004 local time when First Secretary Lotta Jacobsen was informed by a Swedish travel agent. She immediately contacted Fallenius and the two met at the embassy. Jacobsen called the off-hours on-duty officer at the consular division at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm at 12:20 Sri Lankan time, 7:20 Swedish time (Expeditionschef, UD, 2005:15). Jacobsen informed them that they did not yet know how affected the tourist areas in Sri Lanka were, and thus did not know what the situation was for Swedish tourists in Sri Lanka (Interview, Jacobsen).

Ministry for Foreign Affairs Division Head Jan Nordlander, who along with other personnel in Stockholm took several calls after the switchboard began answering and directing calls to the off-hours on-duty consular division at 7:20 Swedish time, called the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' administrative head (Expeditionschef) Per Thöresson at 7:35. Nordlander informed Thöresson at this time that while there was not yet information regarding Swedish deaths, around 30 persons were reported to have died in Sri Lanka (Expeditionschef, UD, 2005:15).

Both the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) and the Ministry of Defence telephoned the Head and officer responsible for the Humanitarian Group under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' Global Security Division between 8:15 and 8:30 Swedish time December 26 to inform them that SRSA had been contacted by the UN requesting disaster assistance for Sri Lanka and that a delivery of tents, blankets and other essentials was being prepared (Expeditionschef, UD, 2005:16). SRSA was able to get immediate financial approval from Sida to fulfill the UN request for humanitarian assistance (interview SRSA).

According to the operational leader at SRSA, relations with Sida are functional and well established and the turnaround time on approval for humanitarian assistance is short, requests are typically answered directly via telephone and fax (interview). The Head of the Humanitarian Group under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was also informed by SRSA and the Ministry of Defence that personnel from a special analysis group were also to be sent to Sri Lanka with the humanitarian assistance and the Minister for International Development Cooperation, Carin Jämtin was to be kept abreast of this shipment during the morning and afternoon of the 26th (Expeditionschef, UD, 2005:16).

Before 15:00 Swedish time on December 26, this relief package was ready and the UN notified. The UN had also placed a manpower request for specialists from SRSA to help the UN Disaster Assessment Coordination Center (UNDAC) analysis group in Sri Lanka. While two officers from SRSA were able to leave for Colombo already on December 26 to assist the UNDAC team in their appraisal of the Sri Lankan situation, the equipment requested by the UN could not lift until the following day. A plane loaded with 340 tents and humanitarian essentials from SRSA left Landvetter Airport in Gothenburg for Sri Lanka Monday December 27 (Ibid: 16; 26-27). According to an Embassy staff member in Colombo, some of the equipment in the SRSA shipment was inappropriate for humanitarian assistance in Sri Lanka. The 340 heavy, windowless tents in particular were completely unusable in the hot tropical climate (interview, Colombo). According to experts at KAMEDO, the Swedish Disaster Medicine Study Organization under the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen), delivery of inappropriate materials in humanitarian assistance is a general and recurring problem (interview).

The Human resource department at Sida (PEO) contacted all embassies in the affected region December 27 to find out if there were missing Swedes and to find out how the working situation was at the affected embassies (PEO, 2005-02-18). It was apparent to the PEO leadership that the Embassy in Sri Lanka had been working hard as there were a large number of Swedes in the region (Interview Wibom, Helleday). The situation was discussed with Ann-Marie Fallenius, the Chargé d'Affaires there, and the need for MFA reinforcements to Colombo was established.

At 16:00 Swedish time December 27 the Consular Division at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs ordered an ID-commission to identify Swedes in both Sri Lanka and Thailand (Expeditionschef, UD, 2005:26). The team in Sri Lanka arrived on January 1 and was redirected the next day, when they concluded that the situation was under control (see further chapter 9).

The personnel department (PEO) in Stockholm established contact via email December 27 with Swedish personnel from the Sida-financed Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). SLMM staff were hit by the Tsunami but all survived.

December 28 the decision was made at PEO to economically support Swedish SLMM staff who had lost all of their possessions in the wave. This reimbursement was apparently not covered by insurance in the typical fashion via the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency (Kammarkollegiet) who is normally responsible for insurance of public service employees overseas.

In a radio interview in Stockholm on January 13, Eva Asplund, Department Head of Humanitarian Aid at Sida, talked about the stages in which aid needs to be administered in Sri Lanka. In the first stage, health and medical care, clean water, sanitation, shelter and food had been prioritized, but also schooling, as it is considered vital that children can be returned to a normal routine as quickly as possible. This type of support would continue, but the next step involved initial efforts at restoration to improve the situation. Finally, a need for a more long-term restoration was noted (Studio ett, 2005).

Sida's job, according to Head of ASIA, Jan Bjerninger, is "to maintain a very good contact net, to know what Swedish and international organizations are in, for example, Sri Lanka, and have knowledge about the local situation there" (Studio 24, SVT, 2005). The organizations in the field and with knowledge of the local situation are often the Red Cross and United Nations Bjerninger added. In the case of particularly Sri Lanka however, there is for example "IOGT-NTO, the temperance/sobriety organization, which has worked there very many years and knows the local conditions, and therefore has gotten funding from us" (Ibid.).

On December 28, representatives of the Government Offices of Sweden (Regeringskansliet), Sida and larger NGOs met to discuss in a coordinated fashion what the humanitarian needs were and how the financial response for these requirements should be managed (Expeditionschef, UD, 2005:27). These humanitarian needs analyses were formulated on the basis of communication with, among others, UNDAC and OCHA.

Three personnel from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs were sent to the Embassy in Colombo to help Sida personnel there December 29 (Expeditionschef, UD, 2005:37). On January 4, one more support person was sent.

The acute phase was characterized by SEKA's activities through the UN and NGOs in parallel to the Embassy's consular preoccupation. Given the many actors, within Sida and other Swedish agencies, as well as international organizations, the picture is quite complex and the coordination aspect will need further elaboration below.

Beyond the immediate relief phase in Sri Lanka

Beginning in late January and continuing until the middle of February 2005, Sida participated in coordinated 'bilateral' verification missions "to gather information about ongoing relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in Tsunami affected coastal areas", the findings of which Embassy personnel documented in a summary report.¹⁷ A "common focus" of the mission was placed on "coordination efforts, issues of equity and political sensitivity". An appreciation of the difficulties inherent in many areas due to the conflict between the LTTE and the government and a generalized poverty, also palpable in the conflict areas informed the mission and report. While the summary report concluded that "the immediate relief phase is over in all districts", a number of very serious distribution problems were still evident mid-February, many of them connected to the issue of inequitable disbursement of relief and resources (Bilateral Donor Group, 2005-03-14:2). The Sri Lankan Government had for example, promised relief packages to "those who lost their family members, houses and livelihoods". By mid-February however, no evidence of these relief packages – promising "15,000 SLR compensation for each deceased family member" and "5,000 SLR for each damaged house" – was found in the northern and eastern districts of Sri Lanka, only in the southern areas (Bilateral Donor Group, 2005-03-14).

The verification mission found also that, while many areas had received help in the area of education, health, water and sanitation, there existed a "clear gap in the provision of water and sanitation services in Muslim areas in the North and East" (Bilateral Donor Group, 2005-03-14). Psychosocial assistance appeared to be lacking throughout.

Generally, the southern coastal areas were "ahead of the North and East in terms of rehabilitation and reconstruction". In Hambatota in the south for example, it was apparent already in mid-February that the "permanent housing plan [was] well on its way and probably already over funded" (Bilateral Donor Group, 2005-03-14). However, questions regarding the 'buffer zone' and where and how people are allowed to rebuild were found to be problematic in Hambatota as well as the majority of other Sri Lankan affected coastal areas, north and south alike. Sri Lankans and development partners were still

¹⁷ These verification missions are a novelty as is the form of cooperation between bilateral donors developed in Sri Lanka. Presumably, they can be a complement to the UN system and they can be activated rapidly by using personnel on site (Bilateral Donor Group, 2005-03-14:2; CIDA, 2005). The verification mission and subsequent report involved seven bilateral themes covering the following nine districts: Jaffna; Mullaitivu; Kilinochchi; Trincomalee; Batticaloa; Ampara; Hambantota; Mantara; and Galle

waiting in mid-February for decisions from the central government on a number of integral issues and a national ruling on the buffer zone. Government response has generally been perceived as inordinately slow, complex, redundant and bureaucratic, with poor coordination between district and divisional levels and central levels. Government response, when existent, is often inconsistent and inequitable, leading to corruption and abuse of funds.¹⁸ Certain sectors, such as fishing, have received funding while others have been ignored, and inadequate attention and sensitivity has been given to conflict areas, already poor regions and minorities (Bilateral Donor Group, 2005-03-14).

Concerns regarding NGOs in the affected regions have been documented. Some areas are over-funded and NGO competition and rivalry rather than coordination and cooperation have been identified as problems, for example in Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi. “[t]he system is open to abuse and corruption” as many organizations are now operating under hugely inflated budgets (ex. Hambantota) and may receive funding from a number of different foreign sources for the same purposes. In certain areas (e.g. Ampara) an influx of NGOs of uncertain legitimacy has “implic[d] inflation and an unhealthy pressure to spend funds” (Bilateral Donor Group, 2005-03-14:7). Coordination problems with UN assistance have been observed:

UN assistance to the GA offices for coordination and supervision seems directed by internal UN procedures and is not adequate and effective. In LTTE controlled areas no UN personnel were found to be attached to the GA offices. Current and planned support to district and divisional levels for direction and coordination is clearly not proportional to the tasks at hand (Bilateral Donor Group, 2005-03-14:8).

Obviously, this problem affects Sida as well as their partners when they are caught up in an over established ‘market’ of reconstruction activities that risks draining expertise and government cooperation from prioritized projects.

Bilateral assistance

The Sida Country Plan for Sri Lanka for 2005–2007 was adopted January 3, 2005 as originally planned, albeit with a note that the country allocation for 2005 (110 million SEK) “will be reviewed and possibly changed during the year” (ASIA, 2005-01-03:1). Of the 110 million SEK, “the financial authority of 105 MSEK will be delegated to the Head of the Embassy in Sri Lanka, and

¹⁸ The Country Plan for Development Cooperation with Sri Lanka 2005-2007 describes the situation in the following manner: “Sri Lanka is ranked 66 in the corruption perception index of TI [Transparency International] for 2003. Corruption undermines legal security and favours established elites at the expense of the poor. Close attention should be paid to issues of corruption in planning and implementing programmes” (Asia 2005-01-03).

5 MSEK will be delegated to the Head of FU [Field Unit] as indicated in the Asia Department's decision on delegation of right to use funds for 2005".¹⁹ In a March 22, 2005 Memo of the Embassy of Sweden in Colombo however, it was indicated that "[b]ecause of the Tsunami, but also [due to] other trends and developments, the 2005 country plan must be revised and agreed with the Asia Department continuously during the year" (Embassy of Sweden Colombo, March 22, 2005:1).

The Embassy memo sketches out four areas where revisions, at time of writing, were deemed necessary:

- 1) transformation of projects within the country plan to make them Tsunami relevant, but still within their original and pre-Tsunami plans; 2) additions to the country plan of new projects and funding initiatives that represent a more direct response to the Tsunami; 3) revisions that have to be made irrespective of the Tsunami, but that still must be taken into account when planning for transformation and additional projects; 4) new requirements for additional capacity at the Embassy to undertake all of the above (Embassy of Sweden Colombo, March 22, 2005:1).

According to Program Officers at the Embassy in Colombo, the post-Tsunami approach at the Embassy is a rather conservative one, whereby existing networks and partnerships are to be relied upon and expanded in some cases and new projects kept to a minimum (interviews). Generally, the necessity of having both a conflict and rights perspective in cooperation is emphasized in the Sri Lanka country plan, as well as bilateral and multilateral cooperation, awareness of the increasing prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the country, awareness of corruption, and the increasing emphasis in the development cooperation on "fewer but bigger clusters of support", through for example the UN and SME, "leaving room for smaller and strategically important projects" (ASIA, 2005-01-03:2). Projects are to stimulate the following areas in particular: pro-poor economic growth; democratic governance; civil society; peace-building and humanitarian assistance; research cooperation; concessionary credits; and dialogue issues with respect to democracy and human rights, more effective and efficient administration, economic reforms and HIV/AIDS.

Revisions to the country plan include the transformation of five planned or ongoing projects and the addition of 6 additional projects and funding initiatives, as well as a couple of revisions unrelated to the Tsunami. The five projects transformed as a result of the Tsunami involve rehabilitation of provincial roads, rural electrification, Chambers of Commerce development, equal access to justice, and an employment program, Jobsnet. The roads

¹⁹ The Country Strategy for Sri Lanka, published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2002 and covering the period of January 2003 through December 2007, emphasises as does the country plan, the importance of a conflict sensitivity and the promotion of peace and democracy that at the same time entails a pro-poor economic development, an approach that Sida has forwarded in the country since 1998 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2002:1).

project was originally intended to improve roads in the conflict-affected regions and now is extended to include roads in southern Sri Lanka as well. The equal access to justice project, a pro-poor program launched in October 2004 will now also help those who lost key legal documents in the Tsunami. Necessitated changes to the rural electrification, Chambers of Commerce and Jobsnet programs have been identified, the details of which will be made clear later (Embassy of Sweden Colombo, March 22, 2005).

The six new projects and funding initiatives proposed as changes to the country plan by the Embassy as a result of the Tsunami are in the areas of environmental assessment and capacity building, support to International Labor Organization (ILO), livelihood and income recovery, the supply of emergency bridges from Sweden, a railway signaling system, a contribution to a Reconstruction Trust Fund and a Campaign for Development and Solidarity (FORUT)/Swedish Temperance Organization (IOGT-NTO) program (Embassy of Sweden Colombo, March 22, 2005).²⁰ Some scepticism from the Swedish Embassy in Colombo apparently exists with respect to the proposed environmental assessment and capacity building program, as it is unclear if the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) will be a leading actor in the program as originally understood (interview, Brisman). The contribution to a Reconstruction Trust Fund involves the notion of a group of smaller bilateral donors (e.g. Sweden, Norway, UK, Netherlands, Finland and Italy) as well as the European Commission engaging in the establishment of a joint mechanism fund administered by the World Bank (Embassy of Sweden Colombo, March 22, 2005:4).

The success of the reconstruction fund project is dependent on the LTTE and Sri Lankan Government's acceptance of such a joint initiative. Moreover, Swedish participation – the Embassy suggests 30 million SEK – would be dependent on either administration of Swedish responsibilities from Sida headquarters, or provision of extra personnel to the Embassy in Colombo. The Embassy notes that, “the Embassy will continue to follow the development closely at the Colombo level, but Sida HQ will have to assume overall responsibility for the assessment of Swedish support to the fund (unless a full time additional staff is granted to the Embassy)”. The problem of insufficient personnel at the Embassy in Colombo is clearly articulated in the memo on country plan revisions. The Embassy indicates the difficulties inherent in meeting the demands of post-Tsunami development with the current manpower situation:

The proposed Embassy approach to post-Tsunami reconstruction of course has far-reaching consequences in terms of Embassy capacity. It is important to remember that it is not only transformation and new projects that imply and increased workload, but

²⁰ An in-depth discussion of all post-tsunami projects and their current status is beyond the scope of this report. However, the possibility and implications of Swedish contribution to a smaller reconstruction fund are however briefly discussed.

also, and perhaps in particular, Embassy participation in Tsunami-related meetings and working groups. Most program officers at the Embassy felt that at least half of their office time so far in 2005 has been devoted to Tsunami-related work, and much of it in terms of meetings with other stakeholders (Embassy of Sweden Colombo, March 22, 2005:6).

In order to meet increased demands at the Embassy in Colombo, it has: 1) asked for and received “short-term postings for development of the pro-poor economic growth portfolio”; 2) examined the possibility of getting extra staff members “either in Stockholm or at the Embassy for the management of the peace, democracy and human rights proposal (still not settled)”; and 3) “propose[d] a re-delegation to Sida Stockholm of responsibility for assessment and agreement for most of the additional and Tsunami-related projects” (Embassy of Sweden Colombo, March 22, 2005:6). The Embassy is of the opinion, however, that “these measures are neither sufficient nor efficient” arguing that “[t]he best way of dealing with the capacity problem at the Embassy would be to get one additional full-time staff sent out on a one or two year contract, ideally starting in June, July or August” (Embassy of Sweden Colombo, March 22, 2005:6-7).

The suggested revisions to the country plan conclude with the financial plans and forecasts for 2005. The Embassy notes that “[t]he best but still shaky guess for 2005 disbursements within the country allocation is 130.1 MSEK” which would exceed the current country plans budget with 20.1 MSEK. The Embassy points out that it is difficult at the time of the report’s writing to arrive at a definite figure, primarily due to the uncertainty surrounding the provincial road, emergency bridges and FORUT-IOGT projects. Further, the Embassy notes, “[i]t is also unclear at this stage if the last two of these projects should be accounted for within the country allocation or not. If the Tsunami Trust Fund is realized and Sida contributes with 30.0 MSEK up front, all these figures will change at the same rate” (Embassy of Sweden Colombo, March 22, 2005).

As a case of disaster response, the Sri Lankan experience is illustrative not only of organizational flexibility, intragovernmental coordination and development policy continuity, but also of interdependence between Sida and the MFA that at times create problems and tension (e.g. role conflicts for the staff, different agendas), as well as a lack of backup resources both in Stockholm and in the field. Maintaining the policy goals of the Swedish government under the severe pressures of a disaster situation is naturally difficult and sometimes has to take second place to more acute tasks such as consular assistance or protecting employees from direct or indirect consequences of the contingency at hand. These issues will be probed more in detail in the concluding sections of the report.

6. Occasions for decision

This chapter applies the practice of dividing crisis response processes, whether on a national or an organizational level, into occasions for decision that is a basic methodological tool for Crismart. It construes the task for involved decision-makers at different levels as responding to ‘what do we do now?’ – type questions, triggered either by external developments or internally generated problem descriptions that cause incentives to act (Sundelius et al., 1997). Thus, initiatives taken by the organization itself feed into the development of the emergency response as a whole, and cause subsequent decision points. It allows for the dissection of often intricate and compartmentalized decision problems of which the response is composed, and isolates vital aspects of information management, communicational practices and organizational divisions of labor. It also does justice to the sequential nature of crisis response, since separate decision problems feed on preconceptions of the problem, established organizational repertoires, and routinized practices for (de)centralization of decision mandates. The criteria for a decision problem to ‘qualify’ is that it either proved important for the longer term policy of the organization, or that it seemed vital to central actors at the time.²¹ The following occasions for decisions have been selected in the analysis of Sida’s response to the Tsunami:

Occasion for decision	Actor(s)	Core values
Acute response to the Humanitarian needs	SEKA	Prompt action vs. do no harm.
Ear-marking funds?	Jämtin, MFA, Acting Director General, SEKA	Independence of agency, budgetary discretion.
How is Sida’s personnel affected?	PEO, Field Unit, Crisis Management Group	Personnel safety.
Pressure from media and the public	SEKA, Info	Legitimacy and public trust.
From humanitarian aid to reconstruction	Asia Department	The gray zone problem. Development goals.

²¹ There is a dual quality to this distinction that allows for both an immediate actor-centered and a retrospective perspective, due to an analytical demand for post-hoc coherence. This means that some precision given by a clear-cut situational decision analysis is lost at the expense of a more inclusive assessment of the full span of activities and their consequences.

Sida's acute response to the humanitarian needs

On December 26, Kjell Larsson and Johan Schaar coordinated Sida funding for a Swedish contribution to an UNDAC team to Sri Lanka. Schaar also met with Björn Eder from the Swedish Red Cross and discussed Sida's commitment to support the International Red Cross Appeal. Schaar was also in contact with Eva Asplund and discussed the situation and the possible measures to be taken by SEKA. Schaar and Asplund decided to approve the requests from SRSA (Swedish Rescue Services Agency) and the Red Cross. They also decided to contact Sida's Information Department and ask them to send out a press release with this information (interview Schaar, Asplund). Later the same day, Marina Berg from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called Schaar "to get information on the SRSA's response".

In general, SEKA's initial response to the Tsunami was in many respects uncomplicated (Interview, Schaar, Asplund, Zinn). In order to facilitate swift assistance and avoid lengthy decision-making procedures in its response to acute humanitarian crises, Sida has established a mechanism for rapid response (Swedish Humanitarian Assistance, Sida Report, 2002:71). The mechanism is a tool for Sida, and more specifically SEKA, to quickly release funds for some of its regular cooperation partners (i.e. different NGOs, the SRSA, and Swedish Red Cross through the International Federation of the Red Cross). Instead of having a dialogue to establish a joint assessment of the needs following a sudden emergency, the participant organizations sign a yearly framework agreement with Sida, which gives them a mandate to act independently and respond to sudden emergencies. For releasing funds that do not exceed the agreed sum²², the personnel at SEKA can approve an application solely via fax. The procedure of preparing the application is also simplified, taking into consideration the limited time and information that necessarily characterizes an emergency situation. The cooperation is built on trust between Sida and its partners that has evolved during several years of experience of working together (Interview Zinn). In addition to this formal preparedness in the organizational system, there is a fundamental knowledge among the people at SEKA concerning the acute needs following a disaster (interview Asplund). Without accurate information and hard facts, this knowledge became decisive for the first decisions made by SEKA. There is however no escaping the fact that Sida is largely in the hands of its partners to achieve concrete results, and that no funding decision is better than the organization that receives the funds.

In contacts with the UN and the Swedish Delegation in Geneva, the personnel at SEKA were informed that the integrated UN Appeal would not be ready until the first week in January. Therefore, SEKA decided to support individual appeals from UN organs, such as UNICEF, as well as IOM, etc (Asplund, inter-

²² For NGOs this sum is one million crowns, for the Red Cross it is two million and for the Swedish Rescue Board it is five million crowns (Regeringen/UD, 2004).

view). This is something that Sida usually does not do, but in this case it was motivated by the desire to respond quickly with aid to the affected regions. But there was at the same time an initial awareness among the decision-makers at SEKA concerning the problems of matching the contributions to the needs: "...all these projects means that within certain sectors and certain working areas, there is too much money and too many projects, which are overlapping [...] while there in fact are areas that are not covered at all" (interview Zinn). This argument was the underlying rationale for SEKA's decision to channel the lion's share of its support to UN coordination functions rather than to operational aid projects by individual organization. Sida's ability to take strategic decisions in such a direction is, according to Zinn facilitated by the fact that the organization is independent from the government and therefore does not need to take direct political considerations into account in acute humanitarian aid decisions (Interview Zinn).

The discussion relates to a more general, and we believe inescapable, concern of crisis management decision-making: at what point – under which level of uncertainty and/or adversity – do you step away from the situation and wait for more information at the risk of large scale human suffering? The crisis management literature labels this a typical 'tragic choice' situation and would decidedly favor the aid community's 'do no harm'-principle. It would also emphasize the need for a 'worst case strategy' if the opted solution should backfire or prove difficult to implement effectively. The institutionalized practice at Sida is that the appeals designate the needs, and available resources in combination with perceived gravity of the situation set the amounts, thus shifting a large part of the information management tasks to the multilateral level of the appeal process.

On December 27, Asplund contacted Sida's financial department to check the cash liquidity situation for humanitarian assistance. As the crisis occurred the last week of the year, it meant that SEKA had limited funds available for humanitarian assistance. Only nine million SEK remained in the budget for humanitarian assistance and Asplund had the information that according to the formal regulations, no payments could be made without a special decision from the government. The personnel at Sida's Financial Department, however, managed to arrange an exception that meant that the remaining nine million could be disbursed if the agreement was signed before December 28 at 10:00 (interview Asplund). Sida had remaining financial means in other budget allocations, but following a new regulation for 2004, Sida was not allowed to reallocate funds between the different budget lines without a decision from the government.

Following the first occasion for decision, with SEKA in focus, we can conclude that the existing institutional and mental preparedness provided the conditions for Sida to be one of the first actors in the world to decide about humanitarian assistance to the countries affected by the Tsunami. Experience as well as personal contacts and previously established networks of

information proved to be important for SEKA's rapid response. The bureaucratic impediments to transfer money between the budget allocations, however, constitute a potential obstacle for swift response. Situation based improvisation often proves necessary and even fruitful in crisis management. It is however not a solid ground in preparing for challenges to come. It is also prudent to ask at what price the expediency comes, which will be further developed below.²³

Earmarking funds?

The public announcement of the creation of a 'Tsunami buffer' is an act with significant implications for Sida, and a telling process with regard to the functioning of a modern national development policy. The initiative came from Minister for Development Jämtin, who telephoned Director General Norrfalk to call for a "demonstration of decisiveness" (interview Norrfalk). The discussion led to a suggestion from Norrfalk to stay away from committing funds to particular projects, but rather set aside a larger sum for both the humanitarian assistance and the reconstruction phase. The Minister conceded the point and Norrfalk had telephone contact from her home in Jönköping with Asplund and they agreed to a general Tsunami pledge. The understanding was that the arrangement would not constrain Sida, yet provide the government with a forceful political statement. Additional funds were never mentioned (interviews, Norrfalk, Schaar, MFA source²⁴, Asplund).

The agreement was codified in a meeting at the MFA on the afternoon of December 29 that included Asplund and the acting Head of INFO, Ulf Källstig from Sida (Sida, 2005-02-20). The logic was that the government needed to display action, and the solution would mean next to nothing for Sida's budget although the 'propaganda effect' would benefit the MFA and the government. It is a well-established practice in times of great media pressure to phrase rather mundane administrative decisions, such as setting up a buffer for disaster relief within the confines of the existing budget, as extraordinary action taken by 'the government' (vaguely defined).²⁵ Furthermore, Sida had virtually no way of refusing the arrangement, as the government could always opt to pledge the money itself through the MFA and multilateral channels, rather than through Sida (interviews, Norrfalk, MFA source). The remaining problem was that the statutes say that 20% of SEKA's humanitarian funds

²³ The pros and cons of the administrative budgetary system in Sweden is admittedly outside the scope of this report, as well as a heatedly debated issue in the crisis management research community in Sweden. Suffice to say that fiscal responsibility under normal conditions not always translates into efficient contingency response.

²⁴ Our interviews with officials at the MFA were not recorded at the request of the interviewees, and we have decided to keep the one person we quote in this report anonymous.

²⁵ This line of action has been observed in the Swedish context in response to the Palme and Lindh assassinations (marginal reallocations of police resources), M/S Estonia ferry disaster (Maritime safety regulations), as well as internationally regarding everything from anti-flooding measures in Poland to nuclear safety in the United States (Hansén & Hagström, 2003; SOU 1998:132; Bynander et al. 2005; Perrow 1986. See also Sundelius et al. 1997)

should be intact by July 1 each year. This has turned out to be a difficult principle to overcome, and several budgetary solutions have been discussed but it seems none would be sufficient on its own (interviews, MFA source, Norrfalk).

The core of this decision problem concerns the much-avowed ‘autonomy’ of Swedish government agencies. The Weberian ideal of a bureaucracy free from political entanglements and conducting its business strictly by legal requirements and the dictates of area expertise has fostered an image that the position of the agencies is strong even in politically sensitive areas. Scientific analysis, however, has demonstrated that the informal and formal modes of control available to the government and its ministries are substantial, starting with the revamped budgetary process of the mid-nineties (Pettersson, et al. 1990; RRV, 1996; see Wockelberg, 2003). In deciding whether to accept the Minister’s pledge of Sida funds during the first days after the Tsunami, Sida did not have much choice, but their composition of resources did not suffer that much, either. Also, Sida is no stranger to push an image of decisiveness in humanitarian aid and correspondingly, the conflict should not be exaggerated.

How is Sida’s personnel affected?

Early in the morning on December 26 the Head of Department at Sida’s Human Resources Department was woken up by a phone call. A relative of a Sida employee told her that his brother-in-law was standing on a beach in Phuket with his two children while his wife was missing after a big wave had swept in over the country. Upset by the alarming story and by the thought that she maybe had lost a friend and colleague, Wibom immediately assumed responsibility for the situation. Without realizing the proportions of the disaster, she called INFO, the Head of Security, the Director General and the Embassy of Sweden in Bangkok to report her colleague missing²⁶ (interview Helleday & Wibom).

In accordance with Sida’s existing contingency plan, the Head of Security activated the Crisis Group, which was transformed to a Crisis Management Group²⁷. When the group first met, on the morning of December 26, representatives from PEO, INFO, Security and the Asia Department were present. As time went on and more information came in, the insights of the magnitude of the crisis and the potential consequences for Sida’s field personnel started to take shape. The crisis management group could take a wider grasp of the

²⁶ Fortunately, this particular employee called in to Sida Headquarters later the same day. PEO had then already prepared lists of relatives that they would call if it proved necessary (interview Helleday & Wibom).

²⁷ The crisis management group is set up on the initiative of the Head of Security and consists of representatives from PEO, INFO, Security and the involved Regional Department. It has regular meetings as long as the crisis goes on. In order to spread information throughout the organization, minutes from these meetings are distributed. Examples of situations where the crisis management group has been activated are SARS and the Iraq crisis. The crisis management group is operational and coordinates the measures taken by the agency (interview Helleday & Wibom).

situation and three main questions came in focus: What staff do we have in the region? How do we get in contact with them? And how can we best support them? (interview Helleday & Wibom).

The first task was to identify what staff Sida had in the region. Sida has different categories of personnel out in the field, such as Embassy personnel, personnel at organizations that are financed (or partly financed) by Sida, such as the SLMM (Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission)²⁸, and assisting bilateral experts that work on consultancy basis for Sida. At the first meeting of the Crisis Management Group, these categories were mapped out and all Swedish Embassies in the region were contacted through e-mails and phone calls (interview Helleday & Wibom). It was rather soon discovered that the personnel situation in Sri Lanka was under control. Although two people from SLMM had been at risk, all Sida's personnel in Sri Lanka had survived. The tragic loss of a Sida employee occurred in Thailand, where one of the employees based at the Embassy in Bangkok lost her life (she was reported missing on December 28, and confirmed dead much later).

The work to map out and make an inventory of the Sida personnel that were working in the region was to a great extent carried out on a routine basis and was not described as very challenging by the staff at PEO at Sida Stockholm. What proved more difficult was to identify the personnel that possibly were on vacation in the region. To this challenge should be added also the personal dimension of the situation, i.e. the fact that the personnel in the field were also friends of those working in Stockholm, something that made it more complicated to handle the situation professionally. This initial uncertainty concerning the Sida personnel that actually had been in the region during the disaster resulted in a lot of rumors that flourished in the corridors the first few days.

The question of how Sida Stockholm could best support the personnel in the field was frequently discussed during the meetings of the Crisis Management Group (interview Helleday & Wibom). As soon as the personnel situation was mapped out and the people that were affected in one way or another were listed, a personnel adviser was involved in order to call the people from the list and check how they felt. Based on follow-up discussions with this adviser, the staff at PEO perceived that the personnel situation was not acute (interview Helleday & Wibom). But as the proportions of the disaster gradually crystallized during the first week, PEO also realized that even if the direct consequences for the Sida personnel were limited, many people in the organization might be indirectly suffering, through losses in the family or among

²⁸ The most recent Country Strategy for Sri Lanka published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs elaborates on the SLMM and their position with respect to the mission: "In order to monitor the survival of the ceasefire, to together with representatives for the parties [LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka] ease conflict negotiation on the local level and to report on the security situation, a monitoring mechanism was formed in March 2002, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. SLMM consists of unarmed observers from the Nordic countries including Sweden. SLMM has gained great appreciation from both parties [LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka] and civil society. The Swedish Government is positive to an extension and expansion of the SLMM" (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2002:10).

friends. Following this insight, Wibom sent out a request to all Heads of Department in the organization to assess the situation with the staff at their respective Departments. In connection to this, PEO also published contact information and phone numbers that were open day and night for employees that needed support (interview Helleday & Wibom). Another measure that was made was to send Sida's affiliated physician, Olle Norrbom, to talk to the personnel at the Embassy in Colombo. (According to Ann-Marie Fallenius, Norrbom's trip was made on her initiative.) Helleday and Wibom also had direct contacts with the personnel in Colombo and asked them what they needed. Based on these discussions, where First Secretary Lotta Jacobsen, in charge of administration at the embassy, also was advised to be generous with free days, PEO decided to offer the staff at the Embassy in Colombo an extra trip home²⁹. This has been followed, but respondents from the Embassy expresses certain skepticism about the free trip home, as it was only available until the end of April and with the situation they still have at the Embassy it is very difficult to find the time to use it (interview Jacobsen).

In general, the relations between Sida Stockholm and the personnel at the Embassy in Colombo seem to be more complicated than what PEO and other actors at the Headquarters first realized. Several of the respondents from Sida Stockholm indicate a more or less expressed perception that they did not want to interfere too much in the field staff's situation. Instead of proactively sending personnel to release the field staff from some of its workload, or offer someone in Stockholm to take more of the responsibility, the actors at the Headquarters were content with oral reports that the field personnel were coping with the situation. Head of Division at the Field Unit explains that; "our strategy was that we do not take initiative to anything that has not been concretely requested from them down there" (interview Engstrand). In Colombo, the need for additional staff was balanced by a reluctance to accept personnel without the right qualifications. (The authors have had a correspondence with embassy representatives on this issue and they claim that the personnel reinforcements on 30 December and 4 January were adequate. The authors argue that more could be done, both from the embassy and the Consular division of the MFA, to get consular expertise to the embassy earlier, although we accept that longer-term needs were met. We realize that it is not common practice for Swedish embassies that are usually inclined to be selfsufficient to the farthest extent possible to ask for immediate assistance, but that is no reason for not pointing to the problem.) Experiences from other crisis management situations tell us that individuals that are involved in the acute response to a crisis often overestimate how much he or she can work (Newlove et. al. 2000). Central actors often get a sense of indispensability, whereas it is important to have mechanisms in the organization to proactively prevent people from overworking.

²⁹ In light of recent revelations of inappropriate work conditions for local employees of Swedish embassies, we can only note that no serious grievances was reported to the authors during the interviews in Colombo.

In terms of reimbursement and insurance, the responsible officials at the PEO quickly decided to assume a generous approach towards requests from people in the organization that needed support. The first impulse was that the important thing was to provide support, while the bureaucracy was of secondary significance (interview Helleday & Wibom). Based on that approach, PEO approved for example to cover expenditures for participants of SLMM, although Sida has no formal personnel responsibility for SLMM. This approach was initiated and followed by the Head of PEO was not discussed with the Director General, Maria Norrfalk.

In sum, Sida's crisis organization for managing personnel issues in other countries was alerted quickly. One single phone call was enough to trigger PEO to alert the crisis group, despite the fact that the situational information available at the time was very limited. While the contingency plan was followed, the process of providing support to the Sida personnel was also marked by a great deal of improvisations and ad hoc solutions. This relates to the formal responsibility Sida has to cover expenditures for the staff. There was also an unclear division of labor with the MFA on this point that needed attention in the weeks following the Tsunami.

Pressure from media and the public

“What made this a bit special was that it was such a media pressure and a pressure from the Swedish public” (interview Asplund). Several of the respondents describe how decision-makers spent most of their time on the phone the first week after the Tsunami.

Thanks to close contacts between INFO and SEKA, INFO could take care of most of the phone calls from media and explain how Sida works and what it did in response to the Tsunami. Respondents from INFO explain that this close relation with SEKA is a natural part of the organization's routines (interview Åkerblom & Källstig). The two units often work under the same conditions, marked by rapid decisions and short time frames. Following that, there is a mutual dependency between the two, where SEKA needs channels to communicate their response following a disaster and INFO is dependent on updated information on what SEKA is doing in order to maintain an active approach towards media.

Although INFO could take a great deal of the responsibility for information to the media and the public, it was also considered important to have the relevant experts represented in media. From the fact that Asplund was interviewed in radio and TV several times a day during this first week, we claim that this strategy was consistent and prioritized. In addition, large numbers of people called and asked for advice of how they could assist the victims and they wanted to get in direct contact with the responsible decision-maker. Interesting here is that those interviewed by us from INFO did not perceive the pressure from the public as a problem, while some responsible officials at

SEKA saw this as a major obstacle to their ability to do their jobs (interview Zinn). The many phone calls from people that wanted to help the victims in South East Asia took time from the officials that already experienced high time pressure. It also constituted a pedagogic challenge.

On the one hand, all development assistance work rests upon some basic sense of solidarity in the civil society. The long-term political viability of national policies in this area requires a measure of public relations effort in difficult situations that may strain the organization, but nevertheless feed back into the parliamentary process that sustains Sida's legitimacy. On the other hand, it had to be explained to the people that called that Sida is a donor and does not accept private donations. This became a time consuming task for the staff at SEKA and others. One of the respondents also describes it as difficult to be representing the whole organization and at the same time be in the middle of the management of a crisis (interview, Rosendahl).

The situation was not helped by the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs directed people with these kinds of questions to Sida (interview Asplund). The temporary staff brought in to answer the telephone at the MFA did not have full insights into how Sida works. This was something that Sida's spokesperson later discussed with the MFA.

We can conclude that Sida's policy towards media was not compromised during the crisis. Instead, the relations to media and to the public seem to have been a prioritized and integrated part of the work at most levels of operation, to the point where it was perceived to hamper or divert attention away from operations. This is a common problem for public organizations across the fields, and derives from the conflict between informational and operative needs that cannot always be avoided.

From humanitarian assistance to reconstruction

The immediate responsibility to manage the Swedish response to the disaster fell on SEKA's desk. Rather soon, however, it was evident that with the proportions of the disaster it would require massive reconstruction efforts as well. The first week after the disaster, the State Secretary at MFA contacted Bjerninger at the Asia Department and requested him to prepare some preliminary ideas of Swedish contribution to the reconstruction. Based on experiences from other major humanitarian contingencies (i.e. the Mitch disaster, and the recent refugee crises in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo) and on the annual directions from the government, it was almost immediately decided to use previously established channels for implementation. This meant that for Sri Lanka the conditions for bilateral assistance existed, while on Indonesia, all the money will go through a multilateral fund created for the reconstruction.

The responsible program officer for Sri Lanka at the Division for Asia was new in the organization. He had previously worked at the SLMM and had solid knowledge about Sri Lanka. He was not, however, familiar with the development cooperation sector or the working procedures at Sida, but he was left to handle most of the running tasks at the Asia Department during Monday and most of Tuesday of the first week of the disaster. On January 10, Johan Brisman, an experienced Sida employee on leave, was called in and requested to coordinate Sida's preparation of the reconstruction work. The humanitarian part was still going on, but the most acute phase was over. At this time, the majority of contribution agreements were signed and SEKA had responded to the UN Flash Appeal. Brisman's first task was to formulate a document to the government (Sida, 2005d), where Sida's level of ambition and possible project were outlined. This is described by Brisman both as a way to inform the government on how Sida perceived the situation and a possible role for Sweden, but also a possibility to get a mandate from the government of what Sida's role should be in the region. The example illustrates the move towards a more political dimension of assistance, which is prohibited by the so-called humanitarian imperative³⁰ in the initial response to a crisis (see further chapter 9).

The challenge here was to maintain continuity between projects that were under accomplishment within the humanitarian aid framework and projects that were going to be decided upon in the medium and long run. This balance needed to be considered in parallel to the process of discerning Sida's future role and level of ambition in the region. Especially the tendency towards a multilateralization of assistance that has been discernible after the Tsunami can be seen as a rather complex number of risks and opportunities that demands flexibility from donors as reconstruction continues and the political situations in the affected countries develop. Weighing acute decisions that might constrain future policies against efficacy in the short to medium term comprised the decisional dilemma here, and the final assessment if how that was solved is not yet possible to make.

³⁰ "Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women, the displaced and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all those in need of humanitarian assistance must be respected and protected. The humanitarian imperative implies a right to receive humanitarian assistance and a right to offer it. At times, humanitarian access to civilian populations is denied by authorities for political or security reasons. Humanitarian agencies must maintain their ability to obtain and sustain access to all vulnerable populations and to negotiate such access with all parties to the conflict." UNICEF's Humanitarian Principles, July 2003.

7. Analyzing Sida's central response

This chapter will draw from an idea that has been quite common in the literature, and that states that the response to crisis by an organization and an administrative system as a whole tends to be influenced by forces of *centralization* and *decentralization*. This has certain bearing on Sida and its response to the issues studied here, as it highlights how the organization navigates its internal setting and external environment. The traditional thesis being that as organizations face requirements of urgent decision-making and immediate response, they cannot rely on 'formal, time-consuming policy procedures' ('t Hart et al. 1993:14). Centralization has been noted as a common ad hoc strategy to deal with the new requirements, often leading to a concentration of decisional power to a small number of ranking officials, sometimes selected arbitrarily or simply by grabbing whoever is around the relevant office corridor (Hermann, 1963). Organizations have been noted to take on a more military type hierarchical structure as crises unfold: "A hierarchy of information and communication coincides with a functional hierarchy. Lower-level operatives are briefed on a very limited 'need to know' basis and are often oblivious to the wider context and significance of their actions." ('t Hart et al. 1993:18). It can simply seem too cumbersome and time-consuming to start involving lower-level officials, when the person in charge knows what to do and senses that it had better been done correctly. To aggravate the tendency even further, contingency plans and operational logistics often codify such a management model into legal doctrine. This version of observed crisis response has been ascribed to government actors in an almost knee-jerk fashion over the years.

This picture, however, need some serious qualification. Most importantly, the succession of events in major disasters and other serious contingencies often forces decisions 'in the field' that have pivotal and lasting effects for the strategic level of emergency response. Under conditions of information overload, the diligence of one employee directing attention to a problem or a mistake in the operations can cause the entire organization to shift focus and change its representation of the underlying problem to address. Similar, seemingly mundane actions, often concerned with the selective distribution of information within an organization and to other actors, can significantly alter the organizational agenda and cause the focus of attention to be unevenly distributed across the main causes for concern.³¹

³¹ 't Hart et al. 1993 mention informal and formal decentralization, non-decisions and decisions not to act, as well as paralysis, situational dominance and strategic evasion as factors that can disrupt the tendency towards centralization described above.

These dimensions of organizational decision-making will be used to assess Sida's actions. For maximum clarity, we need to stress that (de)centralization can go on inside a particular agency (Sida) as well as across the policy area, in the latter case vis-à-vis the MFA and other agencies with stakes in the situation. This chapter deals with both types of (de)centralization. Also, the related but distinct process of (de)formalization interacts with pressures towards centralization or decentralization in ways that is partly predictable.³²

Sida units activated

As news of major disasters such as the Tsunami reaches Sida, different functions are activated throughout the organization. In the case that is studied here, three units were especially important in the acute phase: PEO, INFO, and SEKA. We have previously noted that all three units had personnel on call that were available on the morning of the Tsunami. The first known incoming communication to the organization was a message to the head of PEO, Ingrid Wibom, of a missing employee from PEO itself, on vacation in Thailand. The employee reported in a few hours later, but Sida was now alerted at a central capacity to the fact that something potentially very serious had happened. Other units of the agency were notified and activated by this early indicator of disaster, and INFO went to work preparing for reacting to the missing colleague, but also started on an escalating path to 'contingency mode'. Meanwhile, SEKA's attention was directed to the situation by a phone call to Head of the Humanitarian division Johan Schaar from Kjell Larsson, head of department at the Swedish Rescue Services. SRSA had received an UNDAC alert with a request for tent deliveries to Sri Lanka and the Maldives. SEKA was also contacted by the Foreign Ministry/Global Security (GS) and the Swedish Red Cross.

This sequence of events had several ingredients that were organizationally 'beneficial' in the sense that they made the gravity of the situation clear across large parts of Sida. Furthermore, as crisis studies show, concern for colleagues and friends in prevailing uncertainty can help lift the perception of the situation beyond 'push button' type procedures into vigilant information seeking and open-minded problem assessments (unless the effect becomes over-whelming and paralyzing) (see Lindgren 2003). The initial activities by PEO and INFO made sure that a sense of awareness penetrated relevant units as Sida, including the office of the Director General.³³ The contrast to how

³² Formal centralization, easily understood as 'pulling rank' in a relationship within a hierarchical system by citing rules for decision mandate, can thus be contrasted with informal centralization, e.g. putting pressure on a civil servant to act in the interest of the higher authority and against agency norms. Likewise, the agency may quote legal autonomy in a certain matter, especially in the Swedish system with its ban on ministerial rule, to achieve formal decentralization. The informal equivalent can be seen as using the agency's legitimacy in the area and/or lack of attention from the higher authority to enforce agency preferences in a certain issue.

³³ For insight on the dynamics of warning and procedure, see Vertzberger, 1998: 33-42; Perrow, 1986: 21.

some ministries (e.g. Foreign Affairs and Defence) in Sweden and the cabinet itself were caught off guard cannot be dismissed as organizational culture or mere functional differences, but has to be attributed to a combination of routinized communication channels into the organization and access to top officials and leaders, as well as preparedness and situational primers such as the perceived threat to employees and core missions at Sida (more on this in following chapters). PEO employees continued to receive worrying and tragic news starting with reports of exposed members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (see previous chapter) that prompted Sida to assume responsibilities for their material losses.

On January 28, a Sida employee in Thailand was reported missing, and she was later confirmed deceased. Considering the extent of Sida's activities in the area (and that many employees were there on vacation at the time of the Tsunami), and the fact that over 200,000 people perished, the consequences for its personnel could have been even more severe. Nevertheless, dealing with this tragedy and the added confusion of having a quite large number of employees in the area and concerned relatives in search of information kept PEO busy over the first few days (Interview, Wibom & Helleday). This function is crucial not only for reasons of acute dangers to colleagues, but also for the legitimacy (and legality) of the organization as a responsible employer and partner (See Boin et al. 2005: 96). Ambiguity in insurance coverage or lack of resources for expedient risk communication to exposed staff and their relatives can seriously damage future recruitment to field operations, especially in areas affected by conflict or recurrent natural disasters. Sida communicated its resolve to compensate the SLMM members for damages that were not covered by their Swedish government insurance.³⁴ This was part of an established practice, but still raises questions on the type of insurance packages available for field operatives. Trusting an agency or a government to cover losses can be acceptable, but in situations with many responsible institutions, employees may find it much more reassuring with the binding quality of broader insurance coverage. The processes described here complies quite clearly with an informally decentralized decision process ('t Hart et al. 1993:21), where the Director General (and other agency-wide decision making functions) were informed of what was going on but not central actors in the operative activities that developed, which rested fully with each functional department and division.

Although, as has been noted, the challenge for Sida as a whole was not overwhelming, and the contingencies faced were ones it was equipped to handle, the strains for its upper management concerned political, administrative, and credibility risks (see Heyse, 2004; Bos, 2003). Running a 'tight ship' takes not only doing what is required by organizational guidelines, but also appearing to be a professional, thorough, expedient, and in public perception perhaps above all caring, institution. Sida's previous experiences had not fully pre-

³⁴ Issued by the Swedish legal, financial and administrative services agency (Kammarkollegiet).

pared it for the type of media attention provoked by the Tsunami.³⁵ The Mitch disaster in Central America and the Bam earthquake in Iran were both enormous disasters in terms of lost lives and material destruction that Sida and its partners helped alleviate, but they lacked one important factor – dead and missing Swedish citizens.³⁶ The Tsunami represented an extreme media focus, primarily on the situation around the tourist resorts in Thailand, but also on the other affected areas (Sida/Källstig, 2005-02-17). The humanitarian situation, too, was the object of much scrutiny as attention shifted over the first week towards the desperate situation in the Aceh region of Indonesia with ultimately close to 200,000 dead and an overwhelming number of displaced people and orphaned children in what soon reappeared as a conflict zone.

Distributing resources

The image of Sida and by extension Sweden as a reliable donor of disaster relief hinges on clear commitments to the appeals of credible multilateral institutions and NGOs. As our inventory of the decisions made indicate, from cabinet level to the discretionary funding decisions by the head of SEKA, Sida channeled large funds in a very short time span.³⁷ The initial disaster relief packages are usually quite unproblematic, in that they mainly target the basic needs of food, water and provisional shelter, and this makes the main concern when approached with requests one of logistical capacity and regional presence. Quite soon, however, the real problems connected with the crowding effects of humanitarian relief started to surface.³⁸ In Sri Lanka, for example, the housing projects that have been quite amply funded have largely ground to a halt because of dilemmas involving safety, fairness and land rights. The buffer zone being enforced by Sri Lankan authorities raises demand for land plots in the 100–200 meters-from-shore areas that cannot easily be met, and many projects are idle at the time of writing. Sida and their partners have mostly opted out of these fields, according to some sources primarily to put the resources in areas and sectors with less friction, according to others to concentrate on activities that were funded before the disaster and thus provide for continuity.³⁹

We have mentioned that Sida reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which carries out cabinet policy and prepares the annual appropriations

³⁵ The INFO department feels that it could handle the media pressure and related information management well. However, the potential for politicization in a situation like this one is a large risk for any stakeholder. This was evident by the extreme pressure fielded at the Foreign Ministry for its consular difficulties in Thailand at the time, which increasingly assumed a political dimension and led to infected blaming in the media and between governmental levels. Interview, Åkerblom & Källstig, April 8, 2005.

³⁶ For comparison, see Frühling, 2002; IFRC appeal, June 24 2004.

³⁷ Up until January 26, when Sida presented its proposal for reconstruction programs to the government, it had granted SEK 200 million, of which 150 million went to the UN (CAP) flash appeal of January 6, 2005.

³⁸ For Sida/ASIA's view on these dangers, see Brisman & Bjerninger, 2005.

³⁹ Interviews, Schill, Brisman; for a comprehensive perspective see Sida January 26, 2005.

directive that regulates Sida's activities (see Regeringen/UD, 2004). The relationship is naturally a complicated one, marred by all the generic idiosyncrasies of the political-administrative level dynamics. Although many of the overarching goals and policies are the results of dearly bought compromises, often developed incrementally over a long time period, sudden emergencies can disturb the relative equilibrium and reopen latent conflicts over the means and ends of international aid.⁴⁰ In this case, the cabinet level was active and took several measures to show resolve in meeting the humanitarian situation in the affected area.

The most salient announcement in the early days of the Tsunami relief effort was the pledge by the Minister for international development cooperation, for SEK 500 Million on December 30, described in chapter 5. The content of the pledge, which represents a sizable amount in the aid budget, has both political and organizational/operative repercussions which illustrate the interlinkages of the sector. The domestic importance of making the pledge was at the time considered high as it channeled the outpour of public compassion for the victims through government action. At the same time, the concentration of resources to mediatized needs is something that is often resisted by professional organizations with responsibilities for a broader assessment of both humanitarian concerns and development (see Rosenthal et al. 1991; Heyse, 2004). To allocate large sums in this fashion is often seen as a constraining practice on the work by the very organizations that are experts in the field. During the meeting to set the parameters for this announcement, including Sida and Foreign Ministry officials, the impression of one MFA official was that the sum 500 million seemed "a lot" to the head of SEKA, who worried that the humanitarian assistance budget would be diluted.⁴¹ The nature of these allocation pledges is that they are often seen as new funds by outsiders, something that the government or Foreign Ministry seldom objects vehemently to, whereas in fact they consist of 'scraping' operations from other budget areas, in this case primarily from Sida's humanitarian assistance and the ASIA budget. The compromise between the broad political and long-term aid perspectives, suggested at an early stage of the process by the Director-General of Sida, was to regard the 500 million as a 'buffer' to be used at Sida's discretion for Tsunami relief, and to publicly state that efforts would be made to compensate programs in other regions in the world with considerable humanitarian needs (Interviews Norrfalk, Asplund, MFA source). Had Sida not tolerated the arrangement, the cabinet could have funneled funds directly to multilateral organizations and thus sidestepped Sida, which they also made clear to Sida representatives (interview MFA source, Norrfalk). The centralization forces here are quite apparent as the MFA keeps the initiative over the decision.

⁴⁰ See Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Wilson, 1989; Pettersson, et al. 1990.

⁴¹ This according to MFA source, but is not reflected in interview with Asplund who never interpreted the pledge as exclusively funded on the humanitarian aid budget.

Obviously, what is at stake in a situation when the operative authority and its guiding ministry are debating this issue is relative autonomy (formal decentralization). The perceptions of the ‘big picture’ are often different between the two, as the agency sees the coordinated operations on the ground and their long-term effects as the main focus, and the ministry tends to weigh that situation against domestic opinion and political ‘realities’. And although the differences should not be exaggerated – the two levels have core interests in common, such as the good standing of the country as an efficient and generous donor – the administrative structure creates seeds for conflict. Any modern, democratic administrative system has this tension at some level, but the well-functioning ones have mechanisms for finding acceptable solutions to both levels of government. In this case, the general impression is that the solutions chosen ultimately were widely accepted, and that the operative units were well equipped to carry out their jobs. This does not mean that future high profile humanitarian situations will be handled as smoothly, and a more formal process for the allocation of exclusive funds in extraordinary situations would probably help.

In a recent submission to Parliament debated in the Foreign Affairs Committee, the government maintains its endorsement of the link between acute humanitarian assistance and long-term development assistance, noting a grounded understanding of the difficulties concerning this so-called gray zone. Response to the Tsunami is provided as an illustration of understanding of the problems inherent to the gray zone, something which according to the parliamentary submission, the Minister for International Development Cooperation, Carin Jämtin addressed during the crisis (Sveriges Riksdag, 2005-04-26:11). “Sida seeks, from their activities and experience in the area of humanitarian assistance, to integrate preventive measures and risk analysis into their long-term development assistance”. According to the Parliamentary submission, “the government agency also contributes to the development of methodology geared at minimizing the risks for, above all, natural disasters with extensive humanitarian consequences” (Sveriges Riksdag, 2005-04-26:11).

Notwithstanding the above, the need for Sida to be able to freely move resources from one department to another as it once could (for example to the humanitarian assistance department SEKA if more finances are needed there) advocated by Sida and the centre-right parties in Sweden following the Tsunami disaster, is rejected at this time by the parliamentary submission of the Foreign Affairs Committee (Sveriges Riksdag, 2005-04-26:24; see also Regeringen/UD, 2004). The parliamentary committee concluded in this regard that if it becomes apparent during the year that funds should be reallocated, the government could then decide to do so.

If funds for follow-up and evaluation in conjunction with, for example the Tsunami disaster demonstrates that currently appli-

cable conditions in the Annual Appropriations Directive [Regleringsbrev] regulating Sida have had undesirable consequences, the Foreign Affairs Committee assumes that the government, in the following year's directive will address the problem (Sveriges Riksdag, 2005-04-26:24).

The actions by the government are formal centralization at work. Norrfalk notes that whereas Sida usually acts within an hour in these matters, it would be surprising if there could be a formal cabinet decision reached within 24 hours of such a request (interview, Norrfalk).

Planning reconstruction efforts

Sida, in a letter to the government May 15, 2005 "Humanitarian Assistance to Those Affected by the Tsunami and provided to the UN Consolidated Appeal", documented their contributions to the UN appeal from January 2005 and those planned to June 2005. Sida did not ask the government for more money for the costs of the Tsunami relief but rather the right to reallocate funds within the organization. According to Sida, not permitting internal redistribution of funds will compromise Sida's (through SEKA) ability to respond to other humanitarian crises.

In order that Sweden may also respond to other consolidated appeals for other ongoing crises it is of the utmost priority that the funds for humanitarian assistance at their present level not bear the entire burden of the Tsunami disaster. Sida therefore suggests that the government approve a return to the system which made it possible for Sida to redistribute finances within Sida's budget areas (Sida, 2005d: 2).

Sida argued that because so large a portion of SEKA's allotted funds have already been distributed during the first weeks of 2005, the government should nullify the conditions of the governmental directive regulating Sida which require that 20% of SEKA's allocated budget should remain unused by July 1, 2005 (Sida, 2005d: 2-3; Regeringen/UD, 2004). This has been a bone of contention between the MFA and Sida, and the fact that the government announced that 500 million would partly come from the SEKA budget makes the case even more complicated. When having the 20% rule and its operative consequences pointed out to her by Sida's Director General, Carin Jämtin wondered why such a provision was in place. It had come into effect just weeks before the occasion by her authorization (Interview Norrfalk). Cabinet office aftercare of crises with financial repercussions has demonstrated this trait across several sectors in Sweden over the years and especially after the budgetary reform of the mid-nineties (see Sundelius et al. 1997). It is not in the mandate of this study to review the cabinet's fiscal prudence, but we do note that 'fining' agencies that carries large burdens in times of crisis or contingency for extraordinary spending does not foster an administrative culture

of proactive decisions to mitigate serious and potentially costly problems (See Boin et al., 2005).

When it comes to the crucial transition from humanitarian assistance to development aid, Sida started quite early to consolidate its Asian programs in the light of the Tsunami and the new donor environment that had emerged. The Asia department called in an experienced Sida hand, Johan Brisman, to manage the transition plan and assess the altered realities in the area. The apparent goal for this process was to reintroduce core Sida development goals into the reconstruction phase: "...the level of ambition, and some kind of hypothesis on what the Swedish support for reconstruction would look like." (Brisman, interview) The core of the first report to the government is a clear statement of principles that should guide reconstruction efforts. They are not very specific, and they read more as a number of possible pitfalls along with sound principles that, if abided by, will improve efficiency and sustainability of the positive assistance effects (Sida 2005-01-26).

For Sida, this can be a dilemma as well as a blessing. First of all, on January 26 when the report was delivered, many important multilateral processes were still under way and hard to factor into the Swedish approach and thus warranting caution. Second, proposing to get into the practical problems on the ground, by for example procuring infrastructure projects, is avoided by the far-reaching commitment of multilateral constellations. During the Mitch relief, Sweden was active in this field, seemingly with some success, but coordinating such projects with host governments and the donor community is hard work and given the substantial multilateral funding from Sweden it is reasonable to leave most aspects of this coordination to multilateral actors (see Frühling 2002). Third, and on a more tactical note, being too specific in what Sida and the government should spend reconstruction funds on would unnecessarily involve the Foreign Ministry in details (i.e. inviting formal centralization) (Sida 2005-01-26). Furthermore, restating established goals equips Swedish representatives in different steering committees and boards for multilateral coordination with a clearer mandate to act on these principles. The second Sida report to the government has more concrete recommendations in it, which could lend more structure to the process. In the crisis management literature, the 'aftercare' issues are treated as a combination of 'restoring normality' and seizing opportunities for positive change that is often present as the chips are still falling (See Boin et al. 2005:98). Underlying much of Sida's thinking is the need for socio-economic reform in the societies in question, and although Sida has no mandate for political initiatives, the fact that the international donor community is in a much improved position to make demands on the governments especially in Indonesia and Sri Lanka is not left unnoticed.⁴² By this line of action, Sida secures a more decentralized role vis-à-vis the government and the MFA.

⁴² See Sida 2005d, Brisman & Bjerninger 2005.

Another opportunity seized was the debate piece signed by the head of the Asia department, Jan Bjerninger, and Johan Brisman on the day of delivering the January 26 reconstruction report, in DN Debatt, the debate forum in Sweden with arguably the highest impact on the public agenda (Hadenius, 1994). It claimed that “flawed Tsunami aid risks creating chronic deprivation” and spells out the main points in the report. It clearly takes advantage of the centrality of aid issues in the wake of the Tsunami to further some of Sida’s (and Sweden’s) main principles. It sheds light, perhaps primarily, on how the combined weight of the international aid community can affect vulnerable societies and what should be done to avoid mistakes in the process (Brisman & Bjerninger 2005). The article can also be seen as a statement of Sida’s expertise vis-à-vis the Government’s or the Foreign Ministry’s as it cautions an undefined actor not to commit certain transgressions. In terms of our ‘centralization-decentralization’ scale, it constitutes an attempt to advocate the profession over politics. Regardless of this, it is often shrewd to give an organizational declaration of intent and proposed strategy for future reference, as administrative cycles often distort the public images of original objectives and plans by the logic of ‘the resultant’.⁴³ The ultimate verdict on the Tsunami reconstruction efforts across the affected areas will probably fall incrementally and over many indicted ‘suspects’, but it probably does not hurt to have declared one’s honorable intentions before the trial.

Summing up the opposing pressures towards centralization and decentralization it is interesting to observe the ubiquity of these factors in the Swedish development cooperation sector. It should definitely lay to rest widespread perceptions that the sector is characterized only by a collective commitment to common development goals and replace it by the more sober realization that the ‘profession’ and the political leadership are going to have conflicts of interest in any field worthy of tax payer’s money and political attention. One modest conclusion is that everybody involved may be served by firm principles to guide decision-making and functioning politico-administrative mechanisms for arbitration.

⁴³ A resultant is, according to Graham Allison, an outcome of a policy process with several acting parties that does not correspond to either party’s primary preference, and which thus becomes orphaned in the accountability phase of policy review. Allison & Zelikow 1999:302; see Halperin, 1973:232pp.

8. Communication

Our reading of Sida's external communication during the disaster response suggests that it worked rather well in relation to the limited difficulties that were experienced, and that it was grounded in functional procedures that had been reasonably institutionalized by training of recruits and had attained a high general level of attention in the highest echelons of the organization. There needs to be more reflection and planning on the staffing of certain information intense functions, however, and this goes especially for functions close to operations and area expertise. Also, handling the Swedish development-related share of a disaster such as the Tsunami is well within Sida's area of expertise, but more infected problems can arise in parallel that targets the organization itself and force difficult judgments on the credibility of internal actors. Crismart's studies show that even a hint of impropriety within an organization at the time of a serious incident can paralyze an organization, as it has to find credible spokespersons and decision-makers outside or at different levels of the normal 'chain of command' (see Newlove et al. 2000; Bynander 2003). The more thorny (full-blown crisis type) problems need to be addressed, too, especially if the organization (like Sida) has developed competence in handling the low to medium complexity problems.

The literature on organizational communication in crisis situations identifies a number of challenges for institutional information processing and public relations. The fact that crises often disrupt societal systems in fundamental ways creates a need for collective sense making and places pressure on organizations that are dependent on the systems for their operations (Seeger et al., 2003). Individuals caught up in major catastrophes tend to experience the calling into question of their entire belief structures, premises, and assumptions, something which, collectively and in the aftermath of a disaster, causes organizational instability and increases the demand for information about basic social and societal structures, resources and norms (see Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). The questioning often concerns well-established beliefs about risk and its relationship to the organization, norms for risk avoidance, and probabilities for the failure of these norms (Turner, 1976; Slovic 1987). A possible complicating factor is that individuals directly affected by the main event experience emotional arousal, fear, and intense stress. In communicating with colleagues or others removed from the event, the differences in psychological context may cause a number of problems and obstacles to inter-subjective understanding of the situation and the organizational needs that are developing.

Internal communication

These traits are apparent when listening to the experiences of some of the people at the Embassy in Colombo. The situation they found themselves in was at times quite chaotic and dramatic as distressed and sometimes traumatized people came in to the Embassy in numbers that exceeded by far the normal rate. The rules that guide normal consular emergency procedure (found in the MFA security handbook, SäkH 2004) were rapidly found to be inadequate for the occasion, and when they called Stockholm for advice the response was initially sluggish in some instances. It becomes quite clear that the ability to communicate risk and a sense of gravity is important in this situation. Being compelling in the description of serious urgency can be facilitated by personal acquaintance, a formalized contingency scale that triggers certain operating procedures, and a model for assessing who is supporting whom under a given set of circumstances. Making other units perceive urgency also has to do with quantifying needs at an early stage. It is not enough to ask acceptance for delays in reporting or processing of assignments as in some instances observed at Sida, but crucial to assess immediate needs of assistance, reinforcements and support (National Research Council 1989).

Crises tend to create information consumers. People who are usually apt at gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information often feel urged to stay too long with the gathering phase, trying to get a full read of the situation, thus becoming less efficient as information producers. At Sida, the decision process was at the focus of the information strategy, which helped create the image of an active organization. During the first few days, however, some employees saw little energy being put into creating an authoritative and collective situational overview that is needed to maintain a coherent response from different units of the organization as well as their partners (interview, Rosendahl). SEKA's multilateral channels and the Swedish collaboration with verification missions and assessment teams are excellent examples of strategies for overcoming information gaps, but the results need to be retrieved rapidly, disseminated broadly, and used to develop the situational knowledge at a central capacity of the organization.⁴⁴

External communication

A parallel problem for organizations in crisis environments, and usually a challenging one, is media relations. For example, situational specifics of crisis-like developments often cause asymmetric pressures on different parts of an organization. Fact-finding procedures may for example be in focus with operative units in or close to the events, and strategic/normative ques-

⁴⁴ For literature on "situation room" techniques, see Dynes & Tierney, 1994; Bohn, 2003; Flin & Arbutnot, 2002.

tions at the top decision-making level (see Pauchant & Mitroff 1992). Although units are typically geared towards that difference under normal circumstances, the discrepancy in preoccupations often causes a lack of organizational coherence that becomes public when media accounts and/or governmental assessments converge on an organization and evaluate distinct images of its response to the crisis events.

The main strategy to minimize these communication problems is usually a combination of organizational procedures directed at conformity both of analysis of incoming information and the messages conveyed in outgoing information (Seeger et al., 2003). However, these processes are time-consuming generally and even more so in situations where organizational units are geographically dispersed. Moreover, this handicap can cause great initial differences in describing the event as well as the organizational response. Further, crises strain communication assets throughout organizations and create obstacles to the conformity process that may take time to overcome. If we add the diversion of key personnel's attention away from organizational cohesion due to the immediacy of operative tasks, the challenges for successful communication indeed appear great (Quarantelli 1988).

After the Tsunami, Sida's information department was quickly in the action. They were alerted by Ingrid Wibom at PEO, and were in contact with SEKA and the MFA. The initial focus was on conveying the decisions to the media. According to INFO representatives, the initial discussion focused on what other major disasters had demanded of the organization, they mention Mitch, Bam and Kosovo (interview, Åkerblom & Källstig). In terms of the 'magnitude-requirements'⁴⁵ relationship, this is often a useful mental shortcut to recapitulate the situational conditions that have prevailed earlier. The drawback is a risk for overemphasis on the analogy used, which can lead to rigidity in response and biased information gathering on aspects that separate the events. This can be avoided by the use of several analogies, intimate contacts with operators, and a focus on general problems, rather than ready-made solutions, all which can be said to be present in this case (Interview, Åkerblom & Källstig; Khong 1992; Brändström et al. 2003). In Sida's case the 'analogy bank' should be substantial, but seems personalized. We will return to ways of improving the institutional memory in the final chapter of the report.

INFO was involved in the highest-level meetings, both internally and externally, and was thus able to get a good read on the policy related issues affected by the situation. This is seen as crucial in the literature dealing with crisis communication, and something that Sida should both relish and be careful to cultivate and develop. The close cooperation between communicators and practitioners (who at the end of the day are the only people that can author-

⁴⁵ The process of matching realization of the magnitude of the disaster to what is required by the organization to help deal with it.

itatively explain the operations) is an ongoing problem almost regardless of well-intended procedures and broad initial consensus. That is, most individuals in operations has a breaking point when communication issues plunges in the list of priorities, and only repeated training and pervasive institutionalization of the function has a lasting effect.⁴⁶ That side of the coin was apparent, too, as some of the most pivotal officials were heavily burdened by the information aspect along side their operative duties. SEKA/HUM was one such division that had a tight staffing situation and was central to operations (interview Zinn). Across Sida's organization, moreover, there was a prevailing reluctance to call in staff from their Christmas holidays; sometimes even turning down frank offers to come in. As will be developed in the section on coordination, the fear of time-consuming supervision of inexperienced staff can be behind this, but also a ubiquitous under-estimation of communication resources needed.

Communication on an organizational level serves a great many purposes, but arguably its most fundamental function is to uphold, restore or build legitimacy for the organization. It is not unthinkable to see an explicit connection between Sida's communicative practices in the post-Tsunami crisis phase and its accumulated organizational legitimacy as displayed in media accounts and official government documents (assessments of organizational expediency, efficiency, resilience, and relevance to core societal projects). If so the preliminary image derived from the first three weeks of media coverage is indicative of a focus on the issues and the long-term problems (much along the lines argued by representatives of Sida) rather than mismanagement of resources or substantial policy critique. There are exceptions to this representation, such as a scathing assault on the Swedish Red Cross and critical articles against Sida-related activities.⁴⁷ Other criticism, such as the government's preoccupation with humanitarian aid rather than consular crisis management can hardly be considered detrimental to Sida (Carlbohm 2005-02-22). Managing to keep media focused on the issues is to a large extent a matter of producing facts that are interesting to a media audience, and that is highly contingent on the nature of the organization's activities. In this case, the aid issues were portrayed as a way to ease the suffering in the region. The next disaster may carry different connotations for humanitarian assistance and tempt journalists to pursue different storylines.⁴⁸

Another aspect of communications during crisis is the direct lines to the public and other stakeholders that tend to rise sharply when lives are at risk or large groups want to contribute to the effort in some way. At Sida, as well as many other Swedish agencies and ministries, the phone lines were packed

⁴⁶ The literature on the subject is vast, but quite coherent on this point. Sturges 1994; FEMA 2001/2003; Grunig & Hunt 1984; Reynolds 2002.

⁴⁷ Holmkvist 2005-01-07, Cavling 2005-01-27; Bodin 2005-01-21; Wolodarski 2005-01-11.

⁴⁸ See Stone 2002. She argues that a quite small number of generic stories are told in connection with dramatic events, and the one featuring administrative neglect and policy fiasco may be just as compelling as, for example, describing victims of disaster and government action to help. Bovens & 't Hart 1996.

with people wanting information, volunteering advice and offering help. Sida's approach was to shift that weight, as much as possible, to its website. This probably worked to satisfy some queries before the phone call, but was also used to direct calling individuals to written information (interview Åkerblom & Källstig). Journalists used internet information too and Sida could cement coherence in outgoing information in a way that most likely created a less scattered image in the media and with the concerned public. The trend in society seems to enforce the possibilities for this kind of information pipelining, as more people are computer savvy and have Internet access, they will increasingly get used to retrieving and trusting official information on the web. However, in this atmosphere of rising confidence in electronically accessible information, glitches and mistakes will be costly. Sida has had problems with reliability of its web servers in the period after the Tsunami, and although they were mild they can become significant in a time of crisis.

9. Coordination

The practice of coordination is a positively construed phenomenon that is often used to describe ‘all good things’ that go on between and within cooperating organizations. We frame it in a more precise fashion. Coordination is part of a spectrum of cooperative modes that ranges from rule-based behavior, through established procedures, and coordination into modes of cooperation that are more prone to conflict (Kingdon, 1995; Baumgartner & Jones 1993). Coordination is generally more successful if it is supported by rules and procedures that confine the range of issues in need of coordination to a strategic selection of important common problems. If coordination fails, the ability of an organization to fulfill its tasks decreases. Should the situation entail intra-governmental issues, the tension on the government system as a whole increases (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In such cases, the occurrence of which are not to be underestimated, coordination entails power and influence, as well as the ability to run cooperative projects. Few agencies or bureaus want to be ‘coordinated’, and the drive to resist power plays by actors pushed to the centre by crisis-like events can be strong (see Stone, 2002). This aspect of coordination, which we call ‘political’ (referring both to politics and bureaucratism) must be juxtaposed with the more technical side of coordination. A problem may at any point in time contain both elements, but one usually dominates the other, and a common assertion is that the political has more compelling dynamics than the technical.

In its ambition to cover the gray zone between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, and avoid those measures that are taken in the acute phase of a crisis that might harm the long-term work, Sida has an explicit ambition to take long-term considerations into account already in acute humanitarian projects (the so called ‘development humanitarian approach’). This ambition produces strong requirements on a well functioning coordination, both between the involved departments at Sida, in this case SEKA and the Asia department, and between SEKA and the implementing partners. In this report we have opted to concentrate on this particular aspect of coordination as a ‘litmus test’ for the organization since the entire scale of coordination within and outside it would be too extensive for a short analysis such as this one.

Internal coordination

Following the organizational division of labor, the Asia department⁴⁹ has the day-to-day responsibilities for the stricken countries and for the relations with the embassies in these countries. At the same time SEKA is responsible for humanitarian assistance, independently of where in the world the crisis occurs. The Tsunami was immediately defined as a crisis under SEKA's responsibility. As the Asia department is the most active Sida unit in the area, the officials here arguably have access to important contact points and networks in the field. According to one of the responsible officials at SEKA, however, they were not dependent on the Asia department for information. SEKA has established contacts with Sida's partner organizations and with the UN, that in turn have vast networks in the field. For example, IOGT-NTO was used, as the organization has long been active in Sri Lanka. In addition, the officials at SEKA had its own contacts with the Sida personnel at different levels on the embassies, who they know well and had a working relationship with before the Tsunami. Both Eva Asplund and Katarina Zinn⁵⁰ were in direct contact with the Embassy in Sri Lanka, although the embassies soon became overloaded and unsuited as information points.

When the scale of the disaster became clear it was also realized that this was not only a question of humanitarian aid, but also reconstruction and the Asia department assumed a more active role in the process. According to all respondents, the coordination between these two departments went smoothly. Related to the institutional division of labor, the accounts we have suggest that this primarily is a result of individual characteristics, long experiences and personal acquaintance, rather than being facilitated through a rule-based institutional setting (Interviews). It should also be mentioned that an official at SEKA describes the culture at Sida as non-hierarchical and informal. Irrespective of formal status and grade, the responsible officials are able to get in direct contact with people higher in the hierarchy and to get access to formal and informal exchange of information (Interview Zinn). This could arguably provide constructive conditions for internal communication and coordination within the organization.

It would be misleading to define ad hocism and improvisation as a pervading characteristic in Sida's institutional system in general. According to one of the officials at SEKA, there is sometimes a lack of steering capacity at Sida, which has to do with the far reaching delegation of responsibilities, but in the case of the Tsunami, individual characteristics of responsible decision-makers produced a quick strategic overview and a line of action was established for the reconstruction work (Zinn is referring to Bjerninger, April 7, 2005). In the next step, however, in transforming the strategies to concrete

⁴⁹ And to a certain extent the Africa Department, although the assistance to the stricken countries in Africa was limited, due to the disaster's restricted consequences in this region.

⁵⁰ Zinn became the acting head of HUM when Johan Schaar left for a post at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in February.

projects, there has been a gap between the top leadership and the decentralized level. According to Zinn, it has to do with the fact that part of the middle level leadership seems to have entered the process late. This points to a common problem in high-stakes situations: that only individuals with a clear sense of responsibility and departmental overview get fully engaged with difficult issues, as routine delegation and supervision fall victim to time constraints. Evidence shows that this happened at several of Sida's units (Interviews). Senior and select mid-level managers are sucked into external coordination and high-level decision-making, while lower-level operators and officials in peripheral decision units are left to their own devices. An example of this is provided by temporary staffer Per Rosendahl who had to react to a large number of requests from both internal and external sources with little or no supervision during the initial days of the response phase (Interview, Rosendahl). Research on 'blue-light' organizations shows that these officials are well served by routinized procedures that support the larger processes in terms of information and logistics needs (see Flin & Arbuthnot 2002). I.e. to keep an organization functional and active in times of high-level management preoccupation, procedures need to be in place that guides supportive staff to the secondary needs of the decision-making apparatus.

External coordination

As noted, a strategic decision to channel reconstruction assistance through future multilateral donor funds was taken by the Asia department at a quite early stage in the process. This multilateral solution is best described as a large-scale coordination instrument under the auspices of the World Bank that assess as many projects as possible through the criteria and strategies that have been agreed upon by the donors and host governments (Interview Brisman). What is interesting from a coordination perspective is that the fund that was created (for Indonesia) obviously will not only be multilateral, but also multi-sectoral. This implies a potential organizational challenge for Sida in the future (Interview Brisman). Several of the projects in the multilateral strategy for reconstruction will not have a natural place in Sida's organization, and the questions of how this will be organizationally dealt with and which different sector departments that will be involved, will have to be considered as they come, arguably on more or less ad hoc basis.

A smooth transition from humanitarian assistance to reconstruction has implications for Sida's relations with its partners. A weak point, following the development humanitarian assistance approach was identified by one of the officials at SEKA. Many of the partner organizations that have framework agreements with Sida, and thereby are given facilities to mobilize rapidly, are not only humanitarian. According to one of the respondents this has both a negative and a positive side. On the one hand it facilitates the ambition to take long-term considerations into account also in acute humanitarian emergency projects, and thereby the coordination between humanitarian assist-

ance and development cooperation is facilitated. On the other hand, these organizations do not necessarily have humanitarian assistance as their primary focus and over all goal, "...but that is what is our [Sida's] task to safeguard, that everything is in line with the humanitarian goals" (Interview Zinn).

Dealing with uncertainties and time constrains is in the very nature of an organization like Sida. Instead of basing urgent decisions on 'hard facts', they are based on routines and previous experiences. Ad hoc decision-making and improvisation are anticipated and part of the institutional structures of Sida in general and SEKA in particular.⁵¹ This is particularly clear when it comes to Sida's relations with its partners. As Sida is a donor and not an operational actor, it is entirely dependent on its partner organizations. Efforts to strengthen the relationship with partners are an important part of Sida's operations, and the relationship evidently rests upon a large amount of trust. A high degree of mutual understanding illustrated in the response to the Tsunami, was that SEKA and some of its partners decided that Sida would cease further funding to these organizations. The reason was that the organizations had received such an extraordinary amount of money from the public, and both Sida and some of the partners agreed that this should mean that the financing from Sida should decrease correspondingly (interviews Schaar, Asplund).

Sida is in a process of strengthening the field organization (previously known as the 'field vision'). One part of this is to increase the number of staff abroad, and also to have local staff that is familiar to the structures in the particular country. Contacts with the field organization and access to their network of contacts are obviously important in the initial response to a crisis. The picture of the relationship between the field organization and Sida Stockholm is not unitary. While some respondents at the Embassy in Colombo are pleased with the early contacts they had with Stockholm, others experienced Sida Stockholm's lack of understanding of the situation they had in Colombo regarding deadlines and time to prioritize between pressing needs. The Embassy in Colombo has full delegation, which means that Sida Headquarters formally has a mainly advisory role. Following the chaotic situation at the reception of the Embassy, this advisory role needed to be strengthened with more practical support (e.g. transferring money, write reports etc.). At an operative level this was rather unproblematic "we know each other well, they did not make great demands, and they were able to help me" (Interview Jacobsen). Neither was it a problem at highest level, as Norrfalk and Bjerninger showed great understanding during their visit in Sri Lanka. Rather, it appears to have been a problem at the middle management level, among the Heads of Unit, where there, according to one of the respondents, was a

⁵¹ The literature talks of "fuzzy gambling" as a mode of decision-making that rapid response authorities are sometimes forced to resort to. Clinging to anything that creates structure and stability is one common reaction, but the tension between acting fast and getting it right is strong in many crisis situations. Dror, 1985.

resistance to be generous and flexible. Officials at Sida Stockholm had to defend activities beyond their formal responsibilities vis-à-vis their Heads of Division. The policy from the (Stockholm) Field Unit was at first to not initiate measures that not had been requested from the field organization, except communicating the demand for reinforcements to the MFA (interview Engstrand). In our perspective, this is a double-edged sword; on the one hand not forcing solutions on fatigued field operatives, on the other potentially adding to the sense of exposure they felt.

Although Sida and not the Foreign Ministry is main responsible authority for the Embassy in Colombo, the Ministry finances some of the staff. It seems that the coordination between the staff at the Embassy in Colombo and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not optimal. Ann-Marie Fallenius had been in contact with Jan Nordlander at UD. Nordlander had informed Fallenius that they were to send the Identification Commission to Sri Lanka. Fallenius informed him that it was not needed, as there was only one Swedish victim and she was already identified. Nordlander, however, decided to be 'better safe than sorry' and sent the commission which arrived on 1 January. They stayed one night, and thereafter continued to Thailand. Apparently, the ministry was under so much pressure in several of the related areas, that they primarily acted to minimize criticism, sometimes at the expense of efficient solutions suggested by operatives in the field. This approach is not generally sustainable as the field organization is tempted to disown some of the practices and procedures laid down on them and loose faith in coordination with the central level. Even the sensible decisions will start to look suspicious to disenfranchised employees. In this case, the situation did not degenerate that far, but a general rule is that internal legitimacy, too, is hard-won as well as easily lost.

10. Conclusions from Sida's Tsunami response

The research conducted for this report, although fairly preliminary, has revealed an organization embedded in an unusually high degree of complexity – legal, normative, political, as well as operative. Our remaining job here is to identify relevant conclusions and perhaps some lessons for the organization from this crisis event and refer their institutional cursors back to the structure and institutional practices of Sida. We first state some of our more general findings on the processes of warning and threat assessment that has been illustrated by the Tsunami case. The response to consolidated appeals is discussed in light of Sida's position in the administrative system. A discussion on the supply and maintenance of expertise commences, with its bearing on process focus in the organizational hierarchy. The last section of this concluding chapter suggests a number of important lessons that may be drawn from the Tsunami experience and used to strengthen the organization and its preparedness for future serious and difficult contingencies.

Our main findings have cast Sida's response to the Tsunami in a positive light. Although the pressure on some parts of the organization at times were high, and given the size of the affected area, the main responsibilities were carried out, and due attention was paid to core tasks such as planning for reconstruction measures and coordinating them with external actors. Sida is efficient in using its strengths, such as providing expertise to multilateral functions and allotting scarce resources to coordination of cooperative endeavors with NGOs.

Many of the identified difficulties in mounting an efficient crisis response have been external to Sida, originating in governmental and administrative arrangements or in the logic of the international aid community. Notwithstanding, they need to be dealt with, and a structured – while flexible – approach based on analytical evidence is preferable to an ad hoc approach. For example, it could be helpful to work with the Foreign Ministry to make sure that personnel at Sida staffed Embassies have access to maximum support and reinforcements in consular crises, given their limited experience in these matters (See Pettersson, 2003; SäkH 2004). Other dynamics feature institutional characteristics designed for routine activities that may easily be adapted to accommodate a crisis response function, something that merits specific attention in this project. Here, the work with the field orientation can be mentioned, which can be designed to incorporate a component targeting supportive functions of local employees in times of emergencies.

Some vulnerabilities of an institution can prove costly to mitigate, and regarding such vulnerabilities, a report such as this can function as an indicative guide in helping direct or balance the thorny cost-benefit analyses all organizations must face. In effect, although Sida has no interest or insufficient resources to make their own targeted needs assessments across the affected areas, it can make a virtue out of providing expertise for multilateral ones, and get a step ahead in anticipating the core points of incoming appeals. It can also serve as an explanation for different stakeholders by observing that credibility as an employer, partner and administrative aid-provider is of the essence. One other possible function of this report could be to eliminate any potential for back-slapping in the corridors at Sida, and pose the question: what if something worse happens the next time around? Are we ready to handle a large number of casualties? Can we deal effectively with politically infected issues carrying repercussions for Sweden domestically? The preparedness of an organization to manage crises needs an element of morbid imagination to create the mindset and flexibility that can be crucial for a combination of rapid response and careful consideration. The findings of the report do not support an overly optimistic 'prognosis' in such events. The organization is too 'slim', the support functions too few, and procedures for personnel reinforcement and turnover too tentative, for protracted and agency-wide crisis management. Given, however, the limited operative responsibilities of Sida as an organization (beyond funding and situational assessment), one might well question how many of these added resources are worth their cost.

The acute sense of urgency on the first days of the disaster was substantial, which we argue is the true meaning of 'warning'. We have claimed that this was partly due to extraordinary circumstances related to the proximity and involvement in the tragic events, a feeling shared by many Swedes. The challenge for the future is to replicate that process and have everybody in relevant positions notified and briefed at an early stage. Key staff does not always have to suspend vacations and other important activities in response to contingencies, but there may be a need for serious consideration of such actions in light of the development of a new major disaster requiring the full attention of Sida. There is a sense gained that only SEKA, and perhaps INFO and a few select functions in other departments at Sida are really 'on call'. That approach may need consideration if the organization is to be 'prepared' in the contingency management sense of the word. The Swedish culture of the 'sacred holiday' has hurt the crisis response of more seasoned organizations than Sida, and although the organization scraped by quite effectively this time, there is a lesson to consider here.

Another successful side of the effort was the early commitments to flash appeals. This seems to be part and parcel of what a professional and efficient aid organization does, but it hinges on some underlying conditions that may be prudent to point out. First of all, the shared values and commitment to broad humanitarian objectives are apparent throughout Sida and care and concern evidently guided much of the work. The fact that Swedish foreign aid presently, and especially under the collective bewilderment and empathy that followed the Tsunami, is not submitted to major political conflict is a

factor that typically facilitates smooth decisions in the sector. That has not always been the case, and chances are it might not be in the future either. Parliamentary majorities and political shifts can change the requisites of proposals and policies in the area and put them on the center stage of political controversy. Such changes could introduce a number of constraints on the actions of the organization and several of its subunits, and create a media environment far different from the one that seriously debated multilateral solutions and gray zone issues after the Tsunami. A Bai Bang type controversy in the region at the time had potentially made response much more difficult, maybe even for the humanitarian effort. Of course, Sida cannot and should not prepare for fundamentally altered political conditions, but worst case scenarios can enhance preparedness for performing under circumstances of adversity or uncertainty, something that is conspicuously absent in many of the strained civil services of modern welfare states.

A pervasive issue that we have argued surfaced briefly in the debate concerning cabinet's ear-marking of funds for specific purposes, and that is the autonomy of Sida in particular and Swedish government agencies in general. This is a long-standing struggle with many prevailing myths (most of which we are probably wise not to touch upon in this brief report), with an ability to provoke fierce debates between the administrative levels. Fully penetrating the organizational culture of Sida is beyond the scope of this report, but it is arguably an important part of the institutional context that affected the disaster response by government actors.⁵² We do conclude that differences between Sida as a member of the international aid community, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that primarily belongs to the diplomatic culture and high-level multilateral cooperative structures can be significant and cause friction. Agency autonomy issues are especially conducive to friction, as they also trigger bureau-political reactions that can put principle in the way of practical collaboration.

A more practical issue that we have identified as important is the ability to enlist advanced expertise to deal with unexpected assignments. Sida's employees are mobile within the international and national aid communities, which can and often does create problems in retaining or strengthening human resources at mid to high levels of expertise. A positive example is the success in getting Johan Brisman back into active service to oversee the reconstruction plans at the Asia division (see lessons below). The reverse seems to be true for the loss of HUM division head Johan Schaar to the IFRC. Losing key personnel like Schaar, although a single example, and probably positive in terms of strengthening Sida's reputation as a solid background for international leadership and conducive to entrenching intimate contacts with the main international players, can still be a problem if retention failures become frequent. In this case, Sida was quite lucky to have a competent employee to

⁵² Recent reports on this and related subjects have however, been carefully examined, among them *Organisation Cultures at Sida* (Eriksson, Forsberg and Holmgren, 2004).

replace him in the organization already, although the concerned persons have testified that SEKA lost some pace and proficiency. The relative shortage of administrative funds makes the stakes higher when only a select number of centrally placed individuals have the overall picture and long experience of policy and implementation. Like any 'elite' organization, recruiting fresh talent and developing it carefully is the common solution, but one that becomes increasingly difficult as personnel turnover in 'knowledge intensive' workplaces in Sweden and across the western world is increasing. Arguably, more funds need to be spent on building expertise, but economic constraints frequently make that objective marginally attainable at best.

A corresponding issue of personnel resource management is the tendency at many highly specialized establishments, including Sida, to focus the acute response process almost entirely at the top and mid levels of management. Less experienced members of the staff are left to do regular tasks, and are often not called in to assist in acute situations if on leave when they occur. The crisis management research field indicates that well-structured support functions are particularly crucial in trying times, and that concerns about time-consuming supervision are often exaggerated. With respect to Sida (and the MFA, for that matter), this was apparent in the relative lack of knowledgeable or otherwise appropriately equipped operators in some departments to answer public queries over the phone (interview, Rosendahl). Another example can be found in the situation with the consular work at the Embassy in Colombo. Local staff was not called in, and although they may not have been best suited to speak to distressed Swedish tourists, they could have provided back-office functions and support. In both cases, supportive staff was needed and in some instances available but not utilized.

One function that was crucial for Sida's actions, and that seemed to work only at the top of the organization, was the continuous process to have a common 'big picture' between the involved departments and units. The INFO representatives we interviewed reported intense contact with SEKA, PEO, and increasingly ASIA, during the first week. Others have testified that at the program officer level, information was much harder to come by, and the grinding tasks of responding to calls from the public and handling low-level external contacts were not prioritized. The supervision functions in certain divisions and departments were handicapped by absent senior personnel, which left the junior staff to largely fend for themselves and create their own information base. There are ways of reinforcing what can be referred to as the 'intelligence function' (see lessons below).

To summarize, the disaster response at Sida following the Tsunami has taught us many interesting and valuable things about the organization – it is equipped to handle many of the difficulties that can arise under its jurisdiction, and that it has a high level of expertise on core issues regarding humanitarian relief, reconstruction, information and personnel. At the level of difficulty that was confronted after the Tsunami, a somewhat reinforced normal

response mode is largely functional. The more challenging questions will be posed at a higher level of adversity, and certainly with a less stable political backing. As with most highly professionalized organizations, problems are often located at the fringes of normal operations and in procedures for escalated workloads. Many of the areas we have pointed to are conditioned by the influence of other actors, or part of the daily budget constraints that all public organizations suffer, but the awareness of soft spots within the organization fosters realistic expectations. The image given here of a situation under some pressure is, as alluded to in the introduction, far from complete and additional research is needed for authoritative lesson drawing. Nevertheless, below we summarize some of the provisional lessons we believe are relevant for Sida's future crisis and contingency preparedness.

Lessons

As a last attempt to summarize the finding of the report, we will list a number of possible ways to improve Sida's ability to deal with adverse and complex emergencies. Not, perhaps, to respond to another Tsunami disaster, but rather to be prepared for the full scale of complexity that an organization with close to global activities may face. Some suggestions are 'easy and cheap', some are complicated and costly, but they all focus on the *institutionalization* of emergency preparedness into the organization.

1. It can be lonely at 'the top' – Create guidelines for department heads stating when to call in staff if they suspect a major rise in workload. In the long run, their situation will be helped by an early shift to 'problem solving mode'. This may also mean a more coherent look at the entire personnel situation.
2. Communicate internally at least what is communicated externally – Employees do not want to read about the latest development at the agency in the newspaper. Brief INFO and make use of the intranet and other means to keep everybody informed. Make reality checks – are we reaching our own employees?
3. Make sure that there are automatic functions for debriefing of personnel after serious incidents – They are probably not going to ask for help, so make sure that they get it, and that they accept it.
4. The 'Brisman solution' may be a model for a more organized experientially based retention plan, including ways of keeping seasoned aid experts in the Sida network in for example reference groups or advisory committees on a number of targeted issues. A different model that was active for many years in the Swedish context was an agreement between the Armed Forces and the governmental agencies in the nuclear power sector to reinforce each other's information management capacities in times of acute needs. This might be functional for Sida, possibly in collaboration with the MFA.

5. One way to further incorporate appropriate and robust staffing into Sida's routines is to emphasize contingency support functions in the work with the field vision that is currently underway at the Field Unit. A more ambitious and long-term approach would be to make an overhaul of all Sida's guiding documents from a crisis management perspective.
6. A concrete measure that would likely facilitate faster national coordination for complex emergencies is a uniform system for rapid emergency assessment and warning in tandem with the MFA, SRSa and other core Swedish agencies. The mid to long-term, more analytical, efforts we have seen seem to be working quite well, but in order to ensure greater reliability, the simple contacts between units in different geographical locations could take place with the help of 'code words' or at least a common established language to communicate (base-line) levels of emergency. Military units and 'blue light' organizations have long used such codes to indicate the gravity of a message or the general situation. A slightly more ambitious system would categorize a number of contingencies into types that warrant a certain response. Such a system would include markers of which actors to alert, which rules and ordinances are applicable, and give firm guidance as to calling in staff on leave, etc. However, it does not do much good unless it is a uniform, multi-organizational system, which makes such an initiative more difficult to implement, and the international character of the activities of many of the organizations is a complicating factor.
7. Sida's Department for evaluation and internal audit (UTV) regularly commissions reports on every aspect of Sida's operations, including the management of large incidents such as the Tsunami, which consolidate collective experiences for future reference and comparison. There is however, something to be said for the structured documentation of employee experiences from grappling with a large span of issues along the normal to crisis spectrum. Setting up a reference system containing best practices as well as potential pitfalls, a 'lessons learned bank', that can be used to navigate new and ambiguous operative situations in the future could be useful for the individuals currently working in the organization, but also for recruits in their familiarization process with their new assignments and ways to accomplish them.⁵³ That way, important organizational learning can be preserved inside the organization over a longer time.
8. Solutions need to be contemplated to vamp up the agency wide information sharing. One would be to create a common 'situation room' for INFO,

⁵³ It might be useful to note here that recent reports on the organizational culture and shared values at Sida have indicated that there are some problems in this regard. While an overarching commitment and shared passion for development cooperation and humanitarian issues is evident, it is apparently difficult particularly for new employees to familiarize themselves and learn the – frequently unarticulated – codes of conduct at Sida. Moreover, the existence of sub-cultures within Sida and between Sida and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs may exacerbate problems (Svensson and Holmgren, 2003; 2004).

SEKA, the relevant regional department and other central actors on Sida premises that could be activated in particularly demanding fact-finding and/or coordination situations. Experience show that better coherence can be achieved when everybody knows where to turn for the latest development, and there is a physical place (perhaps with whiteboards and hand-outs of important documents) to go to for a comprehensive and expedited overview of the situation. The maintenance of an authorized division of labor chart that is updated continuously would be a core function for this group.

Appendix 1

Terms of Reference

Study of Sida's response to the Tsunami disaster of December 26, 2004.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to describe and analyse how Sida operated in relation to the Tsunami disaster of December 26, 2004. The disaster provides an opportunity to examine procedures and interaction in the humanitarian field and to learn more about how to deal with complex emergencies while actions are still fresh in everybody's minds. Also, the attention the tsunami disaster has attracted in media and among the general public is a further argument to carry out the study. Steps will be taken to ensure that this study does not unnecessarily overlap with the work to be carried out by the independent commission on crisis management in relation to the tsunami disaster.

The Sida study will be carried out in two steps. The first step will be a description of processes within the agency, and how Sida interacted with other organisations and actors in relation to the event. The second step, which will be decided upon later, will be an assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of Sida's actions. It will be designed in detail on the basis of the first part of the study.

This study, while not a proper evaluation, may form part of possible later evaluation efforts, either separately by Sida or in collaboration with other donors and international organisations.

Scope and background

On December 26, an earthquake off the coast of Sumatra unleashed gigantic waves which hit the countries bordering the Indian Ocean with unparalleled force. At the time of writing, the estimate of fatal casualties exceeds 200,000 people, with the number of homeless and deprived many times larger. Affecting a dozen countries, the disaster is thus among the worst that have hit the world for decades.

The catastrophe triggered an immediate response by the international donor community including private relief organisations to assist the affected populations.

Sida was no exception. As an organisation specialised in aid delivery and development cooperation, Sida possesses experience, routines and procedures for handling humanitarian assistance in response to sudden catastrophic events. It is the goal of the present study to examine the extent to which such routines and procedures permitted Sida to respond to the challenges involved in this complex and large scale emergency.

It should be understood that the tsunami disaster, albeit being an extraordinary occurrence in terms of its size and complexity, is the kind of event that Sida and presumably its partners in the humanitarian field have prepared for. The starting point for the study is thus to look at Sida's handling of this particular disaster as a "normal" crisis which the organisation should be equipped to handle. Sida's response to the disaster was not limited to support to immediate relief actions but included planning of long-term support for rehabilitation and reconstruction purposes.

It should be kept in mind that Sida's typical role in the humanitarian area is being financier and mediator, responding to proposals and appeals, not having operational responsibilities of its own. This role does not preclude taking initiatives, but they are normally taken in the context of a high degree of interaction with national and international organisations

The study is to cover the first two months after the tsunami disaster. It will thus include both the immediate response and subsequent actions linked to planning of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Sida's field organisation, i.e. Sida staff and others at embassies in the region, shall be included in the study.

Stakeholder involvement

The proposed study should ideally be performed in a participative manner, and should attempt to involve Sida staff both for providing material and formulating questions, as well as for feedback on findings and recommendations. However, given that those parts of the organisation which should be involved are also burdened with urgent work related to the tsunami disaster the actual participation may be limited. Efforts should be made to stimulate involvement in ways that not unnecessarily increases the workload of those affected.

Principal questions

The primary purpose of the study is to look at how Sida's routines and procedures functioned in response to the Tsunami disaster. More concretely, the focus can be divided into two main themes: On the one hand, focus shall be on internal Sida processes concerning themes such as information, decision-making and staff management. On the other, focus shall be on Sida's interac-

tion with other actors involved in the response to the disaster, particularly the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSa), the UN organisations, and Swedish and international NGOs.

In particular, the study shall focus on the following issues:

Preparation:

- What preparation and routines for emergencies and sudden humanitarian catastrophes existed within Sida prior to the tsunami disaster?

Communication:

- How was information concerning the disaster received and spread within Sida at different stages?
- What staff was available at Sida and in the field in the days following the disaster?
- When, and on whose initiative, were contacts established with other relevant actors (e.g. MFA, SRSa, ICRC, affected embassies)?
- How did Sida handle requests from its staff in general for information and support in relation to the disaster?
- How did Sida respond to questions/requests for information by the general public and the media at different stages?

Operation:

- When, and on whose initiative, were the relevant decisions taken within Sida?
- What was the nature and scope of the decisions taken?
- To what extent were standard routines followed in Sida's operation in relation to the disaster?
- What was the nature and extent of contacts between Sida's departments in relation to the disaster?
- What was the nature, content and extent of contacts between Sida headquarters in Stockholm and affected field offices?
- To what extent was Sida's response to the disaster proactive (i.e. initiatives by Sida itself) or reactive (i.e. responses to proposals from other actors)?
- How did other actors involved in the event perceive their interaction with Sida?

In addition to providing a description of Sida's actions in response to the disaster that considers the issues the consultants are requested to identify crucial factors and events in the process.

A second step of the study may be carried out. In this latter step the consultants will also be asked to assess Sida's actions according to criteria of rele-

vance and effectiveness. In this the consultants should take account of relevant policy documents guiding Sida's actions in this regard, particularly the government guidelines*. Due to lack of material for a direct comparison with other, similar events, the assessment will also have to be based on the consultants' prior experiences of similar studies, combined with statements made by the actors directly involved.

Conclusions and lessons learned

In addition to providing a description and later an assessment of Sida's response to the Tsunami disaster, the purpose of this study is to provide lessons learned as a basis for reflexion about Sida's preparations and capacity for handling similar events. The lessons from the study shall be used to discuss possible ways to enhance Sida's preparation and capacity to respond to similar events in an efficient and adequate way. Hence, conclusions and lessons learned shall be directed at the entire organisation, rather than at any particular department.

Methodology

The study shall both provide a general account of the above issues in relation to the disaster, and a more focussed enquiry into certain areas which shall be decided on the basis of the general description of the process.

The study shall consider material both internal and external to Sida. In particular, the following sources of data shall be used:

- *Interviews.* The consultants are requested to interview relevant staff at Sida/Stockholm (in particular, from the following departments; ASIEN, FU, INFO, PEO, AND SEKA), along with persons who dealt with Sida in relation to the disaster from the following institutions; MFA, affected embassies, Swedish NGOs, other Swedish government authorities, and international actors involved (e.g. within the UN system). The consultants should undertake at least one visit to an affected Sida office to this effect (supposedly Sri Lanka). Interviews may be anonymous, following normal academic routines of reference in such cases. In all, some fifty to sixty interviews should be conducted.
- *Internal documentation* at Sida. Such material includes, correspondence, minutes from meetings, decisions and other documents, along with relevant manuals (e.g. Sida at Work) and established procedures for the handling of humanitarian appeals. Furthermore, the consultants are asked to juxtapose their findings with the conclusions from previous Sida studies of other disasters (e.g. the Mitch hurricane).

* Riktlinjer för Sidas arbete för humanitärt bistånd [Guidelines for Sida's work with humanitarian assistance] (Regeringsbeslut UD2004/60685/GS; bilaga 1) [Cabinet decision...]

- *External documentation.* The consultants will also be requested to consider a certain amount of written material including media reports on the disaster, other studies regarding the handling of the catastrophe, material from the Swedish MFA, and from other actors involved.
- In addition, the consultants are encouraged to use *other methods* such as “witness symposium” which allows for the open discussion and juxtaposition of views between the main actors in the process.

It will be the responsibility of the consultants to gather material from interviews, symposia, and from external sources. Sida-UTV will assist in the collection of internal Sida material.

The consultants are asked to familiarise themselves with Sida’s organisation and mode of operation prior to the collection of material. UTV will provide material and information to that purpose. UTV will also facilitate the organisation of seminars.

Work plan and schedule

The assignment shall be completed by June 22, 2005.

The following preliminary schedule is suggested for the study:

Month	Material	Contacts with Sida	Reporting	Other
February	Interviews. UTV to deliver internal documentation.	Preparatory meetings. Discussion of inception report.	Inception report.	Familiarisation with Sida’s organisation and mode of operation
March	Interviews. Collection of external documentation.			Planning of field study.
April	Field visit. Interviews	Seminar on first report. Discussions on Step Two	Report on Step One	
May	Supplementary data collection. Analysis			Possible “witness symposium”.
June	Additional material if necessary.	Comments on draft report.	Draft Step Two and final report.	Seminar on conclusions (could be later).

In total, it is estimated that fifty to seventy workdays shall be sufficient to make initial interviews and revision of material, along with production of the first report. On that basis, time consumption will be specified for the subsequent stage of the assignment.

Reporting

Five instances of reporting are included in the study:

1. Following the first interviews and consideration of the most relevant Sida material, the consultants shall prepare *an inception report* that shall present the main lines of investigation, experiences from interviews, and identify possible problems in the following study. Such a report shall be no longer than ten pages, shall be delivered to UTV at the end of February, and discussed with relevant Sida staff at a meeting arranged by UTV.
2. Upon completion of the visit(s) to Sida office(s) in the field, the main findings shall be presented to the embassy and other relevant parties before leaving the country.
3. When the consultants have completed the reconstruction of the chain of events, and identified what they see as the crucial points in Sida's actions during the period of study for a possible further enquiry, *a descriptive report* that shall be submitted to Sida not later than 15 April 2005. It shall also include such observations that should be included in a subsequent assessment report. This Step One report shall be written in such a way that it can be published separately.
4. On the basis of the previous report, a decision by mutual agreement between Sida and the consultants shall be taken about the focus of the subsequent part of the enquiry.
5. On June 1, 2005, the consultants shall present *a draft final report* to Sida which shall contain the description, evaluation, conclusions and recommendations from the entire process of enquiry. Sida will comment on the draft both in writing and at a seminar for the staff concerned. Based on such comments, the consultants shall make pertinent revisions to the final report, which shall be delivered to Sida no later than a week after Sida's comments.

The *final report* should not exceed 40 pages, excluding annexes. Format and outline of the report shall follow the guidelines in Sida Evaluation Report – a Standardized Format. The report shall be submitted to Sida electronically and in three hardcopies. The report must be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing.

The assignment also includes the completion of Sida Evaluations Data Work Sheet (including an Evaluation Abstract) as defined and required by DAC. The completed Data Worksheet shall be submitted to Sida along with the final version of the report.

All reporting shall be in English.

After the conclusion of the report, Sida may request the consultants to present their report and their main findings at a seminar, which may take place in September or August 2005, if not earlier.

Team of consultants

The persons (ideally two to four) working on the theme shall between them possess the following qualifications:

- Knowledge of processes of crisis management
- Knowledge about natural disasters and international responses to such events
- Knowledge of Swedish bureaucratic structures at the level of ministries and authorities.
- Experience of performing similar studies.
- Experience and knowledge of relevant research methods.

The team shall possess an adequate balance of junior and senior participants, and the interviews shall ideally be conducted with at least one senior consultant present.

Proposal

UTV will ask CRISMART (The Centre for Crisis Management Research and Training) at the Swedish National Defence College to present a proposal for undertaking this study. In their proposal, CRISMART are asked to describe their understanding of the assignment and the methodology that they propose to apply to it. Furthermore, they should make their own estimation of a realistic time schedule and present a budget in accordance to this.

The proposal should also state the names and specifications of those of CRISMART's staff that will be working on the project, and in what capacity and to what extent they will be employed. Fees shall be specified for each person involved.

Appendix 2

Sida's mandate and goals

Sida's mandate is provided by the government through long-term ordinances and annual appropriation directives (Sida, 2003:18). Classification as what is referred to as a DAC⁵⁴ aid recipient is instrumental in steering the foreign aid of Sweden and other member countries, both in terms of humanitarian and 'regular' development cooperation. A 2004 Swedish Governmental Decision of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs explicitly states for example, that foreign aid funds may only be dispersed under adherence to DAC guidelines for development work and, with certain exceptions, only to DAC-defined 'developing countries' (Regeringsbeslut, UD, 2004-12-22:18). While humanitarian aid may be given by Sida to any country or territory that is on the DAC list, in order to receive development assistance from Sida, a recipient must also be selected by the Swedish government as a development assistance country, and the arrangements under which that assistance is to be provided clarified in country strategies and plans.⁵⁵

Sida is not to be regarded as an independently acting operator in their response to humanitarian disasters such as the Tsunami, but rather as a financier and mediator, typically taking initiative in a highly collaborative manner. As a governmental agency Sida does however, have an overall fiscal responsibility for development cooperation projects in partner countries and their operations as well as staff affected by disasters. Thus Sida is primarily a donor of resources, and not an implementer of aid projects. The fact that the operational capacities are not located within the organization facilitates flexibility and enables the possibility to draw upon a wide range of specific instruments and capacities that are resources available in various partnership organizations. But the system requires a well-established and consolidated network of cooperation partners that can take responsibility for operational work. Sida's cooperation partners are mainly governments or government institutions in the development region, but also NGO's and private entities (Sida, 2003:36).

⁵⁴ Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the OECD organisation for foreign aid distribution within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Sweden joined DAC in 1965 and the Commission of European Communities in 1961 when DAC was first formed, originally as the Development Assistance Group (OECD, 2005).

⁵⁵ In order to specify the general guidelines provided by the Government, and apply them at operational area level, Sida, in conjunction with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, formulates 'Country Strategies' that identify how these objectives should be applied to the current situation in a specific country. The Government approves the country strategies, which are normally valid for 3–5 years. Country and regional strategies are then key instruments for development cooperation. Regional departments have the main responsibility for formulating country strategies. The Swedish embassy concerned draws up the draft country plan in consultations with Sida's sector and regional departments (Sida, 2003). (From 2005 Country Strategies are replaced by Cooperation Strategies and they are produced through a partly different procedure than before.)

As for the division of responsibility between the donor (i.e. Sida) and the implementer (i.e. the cooperation partner), the latter has “the overall responsibility and power over the formulation, implementation and follow-up of development activities”. Further, “[g]enuine ownership by the cooperation partner is recognized as one of the key conditions for success in development work.” (Sida, 2003:39). In order for development partners to enhance this ownership responsibility, Sida takes on the role of strengthening the capacities and resources required for this task.

Sida currently administers approximately 15 billion SEK in foreign aid annually (Expeditionschef, UD, 2005). The Swedish Parliament allocates these funds to Sida in their annual budget, and exercises the “right to make additional commitments for development cooperation purposes”. While the aid decisions of Parliament “determine allocations for major regions”, e.g. Asia or Africa, they “do not specify allocations at the sub-regional or country level” (Sida, 2003:17). Country-level decisions, “within the framework provided by the Government in approved regional and country strategies and other strategic directives”, are decided upon by Sida’s Director General, who in turn delegates further within the organization. The *Board* constitutes the highest level of authority within Sida.⁵⁶ The *Director General* is the Chair of the Board and has the executive responsibility of guiding and supervising Sida’s activities. The current Director General and at the time of the Tsunami is Maria Norrfalk. The Board decides on Sida’s annual report, interim reports and budget proposal, as well as on plans and activities concerning UTV’s evaluations, guidelines and audit reports (Sida, 2003a). In addition, the Director General has executive power in the areas of decision making that are delegated to Sida.⁵⁷

Sida’s *Regional Departments* have the overall responsibility for development cooperation in the following respective regions: Africa; Asia; Latin America; and Europe. These departments formulate the draft regional strategies and follow and monitor the development cooperation programs in order to ensure that they correlate with the established strategies (Sida, 2005c). Of particular relevance for this study is the *Asia Department*, and more specifically the *Division for Asia* located under it. The Division for Asia is involved in operations in 13 countries in Asia⁵⁸ and supports, to a lesser degree, activities in several other countries in the region.⁵⁹ Under the regional departments, a specialized division belonging organizationally to the Asia Department: the *Field Unit*, responsible for the coordination of the administration and development of the field organization. The Field Unit was involved in the Tsunami crisis and is included in the analysis of vertical coordination during the crisis response.

⁵⁶ For an organizational chart depicting the different functions and departments at Sida, see Sida at Work (2003:21) or <http://www.sida.se> About Sida: Organization

⁵⁷ Some decisions are reserved for the Board or the two Special Decision Forums: the Research Committee (Forskningsnämnd) and the Personnel Committee (Sida, 2003a).

⁵⁸ Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, East Timor, India, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.

⁵⁹ Among them Bhutan, Burma, Malaysia, Nepal, North Korea, and Pakistan.

The geographic division in the matrix organization is complemented with a sector division. The main role of the *Sector Departments* is to support the field offices in planning and monitoring operations (Sida, 2005c). They are also enlisted with the task of ensuring that projects and programs are designed in a way that will fulfill intended goals. In certain cases a sector department has the entire responsibility for judging incoming proposals for partner organizations. Of particular interest in this study is the *Department for Cooperation with NGO's and Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Prevention* (SEKA). On a general level, SEKA is responsible for the cooperation with NGOs and other state agency partners (SRSA) that have framework agreements with Sida. SEKA is comprised of the following four divisions, the first two of which were involved in the Tsunami response and will be further elaborated on in following sections of this study: the *Division for Non-Governmental Organizations*; the *Division for Humanitarian Assistance*; the *Division for Peace and Security*; and the *Sida Civil Society Center*.

Another department at Sida involved in the Tsunami response was the *Information Department* (INFO). The role of INFO is to coordinate Sida's external and internal information and to support the information activities of national aid organizations in Sweden. The instruments available for dealing with information management at Sida are, in addition to the officials at INFO, a spokesperson, a divisional information manager, and an Information Center that answers questions from the public (interview Åkerblom & Källstig). In recent work with a risk analysis at Sida, it was agreed that there is a sufficient buffer in terms of internal and external information resources in the existing organization to deal with situations that place extraordinary demands on information provision.

A central part of this study is the personnel situation and the presence of many Swedish nationals in the affected areas. The task to establish contacts with all Sida personnel in the stricken countries and to thereafter provide them with adequate support was a challenge that primarily fell under the responsibility of the *Division of Personnel Administration* under the *Human Resources Department* (PEO). PEO is responsible for “[a]dvisory support in personnel issues to managers in Stockholm and abroad” (interview Åkerblom & Källstig).

Sida's field organization has an important role in linking the policy guidelines, provided by Sida at the headquarters level,⁶⁰ with the operative work, accomplished by Sida's cooperation partners in the field (Sida, 2003). Sida's field organization is part of the Swedish Foreign Service, which is composed of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Sweden's “102 missions abroad, which include embassies, representations, delegations and consulates” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2004). The MFA, too, is a matrix organization and the relevant *regional* unit for this study is the Department for Asia and the

⁶⁰ Sida headquarters, often referred to internally as Sida-S are located in Stockholm.

Pacific Region (ASO), whereas the functional units for our concern are Global Security (GS – handles among other issues humanitarian assistance), Global Development (GU – development cooperation), and Consular Affairs and Civil Law (KC – assistance to Swedes in distress abroad).

Swedish Embassies are “separate Government Office authorities under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” (Narrowe and Engstrand, 2005:7). In 1993, the Swedish Parliament decided that in countries where Sida had foreign aid offices and where there were also Swedish representation such as embassies, these offices would be integrated, something which takes place via cooperation contracts between the Swedish Offices of Government/Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida (Riksrevisionen, 2004: 35). Among the arguments put forward for this integration were the need for a holistic perspective regarding the politics of foreign aid and foreign affairs as well as the necessity of financial savings and effective resource utilization (UD/Sida, 2004:6). This integration and subsequent decisions have suffered critique over the years for a number of reasons (Förslag till Riksdagen 1997/98:RR4; Statskontoret/Eklund, 2001; Riksrevisionen, 2004; UD/Sida, 2004), and the terms of the integration are currently under discussion by the government.

Certain embassies are designated ‘Sida embassies’ and others – the vast majority – are designated ‘Ministry for Foreign Affairs embassies’. The designation with either Sida or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as what is officially referred to as the ‘Main Responsible Authority’⁶¹ (Huvudman) at a given Embassy (Riksrevisionen, 2004) has much to do with the amount of development cooperation Sweden has with the particular country in which the Embassy is located. Embassies with Sida designated as the ‘Main Responsible Authority’ are further divided into ‘full or advanced delegation’ embassies, ‘partially delegated’ embassies or ‘field offices with no delegation’ (Narrowe and Engstrand, 2005:6). Sida interchangeably refers to the embassies for which they are responsible as ‘Field Offices’ (FO). Since 2002, Sida has been actively striving to strengthen their field office orientation at the embassies for which they are the ‘Main Responsible Authority’, increasing personnel in the field (particularly locally recruited), improving communication capacity and developing a new format for country plans (Sida, 2002a).

The main difference between full delegation embassies and others is that full delegation embassies have full autonomy in decision-making and financial resources at their disposal. They have the “right to decide on a specified number of projects up to and including 50,000,000 SEK” (Narrowe and Engstrand, 2005:11). Generally, and even at embassies where the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is the ‘Main Responsible Authority’, Sida is accorded, at least *de jure*, with significant power over Embassy operation.

⁶¹ An agreement reached during 2004 places administrative authority for all embassies with the Ministry, but as of the events studied here, the change had not been implemented.

The embassies that have extended authority or full delegation can make a large number of decisions at the field level, covering the whole circle of development projects from initiation to follow-up and evaluation (Sida, 2003, 16; 23). It should be noted that the present capacity building of Sida field offices is not however without its problems, perhaps in particular as Sida embassies remain integrated with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, something that is reported to entail a variety of administrative difficulties. The Embassy in Sri Lanka, located in the capital of Colombo, is a full delegation Embassy with 'Main Responsible Authority' since 2004.

References

- ASIA (2005-01-03) Country Plan for Development Co-operation with Sri Lanka 2005-2007. Decision No. ASIEN 13/5. Stockholm: Sida, ASIA
- Allison, G., and Zelikow, P. (1999) *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (2nd ed). New York: Longman.
- Baumgartner, F. & Jones, B. (1993). *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Bilateral Donor Group (2005-03-14) Summary Report: Bilateral Verification Missions to Tsunami Affected Districts in Sri Lanka January to February 2005-05-16 Unpublished document. Colombo: Bilateral Donor Group.
- Bodin, A. (2005) "Expert befarar bidragskaos," [Expert fear relief chaos.] *Dagens Nyheter* (2005-01-21).
- Bohn, M. (2003) *Nerve Center: Inside the White House Situation Room*. Dulles, Va.: Brassey's Inc.
- Boin, A., 't Hart, P., Stern, E., and Sundelius, B. (2005) *The Politics of Crisis Management: Understanding Public Leadership When it Matters Most*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bos, P. L. J. (2003) *Crisis Management in a Crowded Humanitarian Space: The Politics of Hosting Refugee Influxes*. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab
- Bovens, M. & 't Hart, P. (1996) *Understanding Policy Fiascoes*. New Brunswick: Transaction.
- Brändström, A., F. Bynander and P. 't Hart (2004) "Governing by Looking Back: Historical Analogies and Crisis Management." *Public Administration*. Spring Issue 2004.
- Bynander, F. (2003) *The Rise and Fall of the Submarine Threat: Threat Politics and Submarine Intrusions in Sweden 1980–2002*. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab.
- Bynander, F., Chmielewski, P. & Simons, G. (forthcoming 2005) *The Politics of Crisis Management in Transitional Poland*. Stockholm: FHS/Crismart.
- Campanaro, G., Davidson, H., Malgorzata, K., Wang, A. (2002) *Developmental Relief: The European Perspective*. InterAction report.
- Carlbon, M. (2005) "UD saknade ledning första katastrofdagen. Trots larmrapporter behandlades ärendet först som biståndsfråga, visar rapport," [The Ministry for Foreign Affairs lacked leadership on day one of the disaster. Despite alerts the matter was treated as an aid issue shows report.] i *Dagens Nyheter* 2005-02-22.

- Cavling, V. (2005) "Mina åsikter: Tänk om Sida också kunde bli bäst i klassen," [My views: What if Sida, too, was best in its class.] *Resumé* (2005-01-27).
- CIDA, (2005) "Canada: Delivering on its Promises to Tsunami-affected Countries" *Relief Web*. 1 March. <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/o/fd1783a6bafdee7185256fb70070937f?OpenDocument>
- Dror, Y. (1985) *Policymaking under Adversity*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
- Dynes, R. & Tierney, K. (Eds.) (1994) *Disasters, Collective Behavior and Social Organization*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Eckstein, H. (1975). "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." In Greenstein, F. & Polsby, N. (Eds.) *Strategies of Inquiry: Handbook of Political Science*. Vol. 7. London: Addison-Wesley.
- Embassy of Sweden Colombo (22 March, 2005) "MEMO – Support to Post-Tsunami Reconstruction in Sri Lanka: Country Plan Revisions". Embassy of Sweden Colombo. Unpublished document – Memo.
- Eriksson, C., Forsberg, B. & Holmgren, W. (2005) *Organisation Cultures at Sida*. Stockholm: Sida.
- Farnham, B. (1997) *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) (2001/2003) *Emergency Management Guide for Business and Industry*. <http://www.fema.gov/library/bizindex.shtm>
- Flin, R., and Arbuthnot, K. (eds.) (2002) *Incidents Command: Tales From the Hot Seat*. Aldershot: Ashgate
- Frühling, P. (2002) *Turning Disasters into Opportunities: Swedish Contributions to reconstruction & Transformation in Central America after Disaster Mitch*. Report. Stockholm: Sida.
- George, A. L. (1980) *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: the Effective Use of Information and Advice*. Boulder: Colorado.
- George, A. L. and T. McKeown (1985). "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making." *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations* 2 (21-58).
- George, A. L. (1997). "The Role of the Congruence Method for Case Study Research" The 38th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto.
- Grunig, J. E. & Hunt, T. (1984) *Managing Public Relations*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

- Hadenius, S. (1995) "DN Debatts position inte nyttig för landet," DN Debatt (1995-10-06).
- Halperin, M. H., (1973) *The Next Phase in Foreign Policy*. Washington D.C.: The Brookings institution.
- Hansén, D. & Hagström, A. (2004) *I krisen prövas ordningsmakten*. Stockholm: Jure.
- 't Hart, P., Rosenthal, U. & Kouzmin, A. (1993) "Crisis Decision Making: The Centralization Thesis Revisited," *Administration & Society* 25:12-45.
- Hermann, C. (1963) "Some Consequences of Crises which Limit the viability of Organizations." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 8:61-82.
- Heyse, L. (2004), *Choosing the Lesser Evil, Understanding Decision Making in Humanitarian Aid NGOs*, dissertation. Leiden: Leiden University.
- Holmgren, Wiveca and Arne Svensson (2004) *Resultatstyrningen inom Sida* [Control and Direction of Outcomes, Outputs and Impacts within Sida] Sida, Internrevisionen Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).
- Holmkvist, L. (2005) "Dina pengar går till löner," i *Expressen* 2005-0107.
- Kingdon, J. (1995). *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. New York, NY: Harper Collins.
- Khong, Y. F. (1992) *Analogies at War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lindgren, K. (2003) *Vad styr ledaren: om beslutsfattare och policyförändring i säkerhetspolitiska kriser*. [What Guides the Leader: On Decision-Makers and Policy Change during Security Policy Crises.] Stockholm: Elander Gotab
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2000) *Country Strategy for Development Cooperation: Indonesia 1 January 2000–31 December 2004*. Article no: UD 00.121, Stockholm: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs Information Office
- Narrowe, Elizabeth and Göran Engstrand (2005). *Vision for a Strengthened Field Orientation*. Stockholm: Sida.
- National Research Council (1989) *Improving Risk Communication*. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
- Newlove, L.M., Stern, E.K. & Svedin, L. (2000) *Auckland Unplugged*. Lanham, MD: Lexington.
- Pauchant, T. & Mitroff, I. (1992). *Transforming the Crisis Prone Organization*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

- PEO/L (2005-02-18) Sammanställning av åtgärder vidtagna av avdelningen för personal organisationsutveckling i samband med naturkatastrofen i Asien till följd av tsunamin [Summary of Measures Taken by the Department for Personnel Development in Conjunction with the Natural Catastrophe in Asia as a Result of the Tsunami] Promemoria. Unpublished document. Stockholm: PEO/L.
- Perrow, C. (1986) *Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay*. New York: Random House.
- Pettersson, A. (2003) "Sidas krishanteringskapacitet i ljuset av Fältvisionen" Mimeo. Stockholm: Sida.
- Pettersson, O. et al. (1990) *Demokrati och makt i Sverige: Maktutredningens huvudrapport*. SOU 1990:44. Stockholm: Allmänna Förlaget.
- Quarantelli, E.I. (1988) "Disaster Crisis Management: A Summary of Research Findings," *Journal of Management Studies*. 25(2):273-385.
- Regeringen/UD (2004) *Regleringsbrev för budgetår 2005 avseende Styrelsen för internationellt utvecklingsarbete* [Annual Directives for budget year 2005 regarding Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency]
- Reynolds, B. (2002) *Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication*. Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
- Riksrevisionen (2004) *Bistånd via ambassader. En granskning av UD och Sida i utvecklingssamarbetet* [Aid Via Embassies: An Investigation of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Sida in Aid Cooperation]
- Rosenthal, U., 't Hart, P. & Kouzmin, A. (1991) "The Bureau-Politics of Crisis Management" *Public Administration*. 69:211-233.
- RRV, (1996) *Förvaltningspolitik i förändring: en kartläggning och analys av regeringens styrning av statsförvaltningen*. Stockholm: Riksrevisionsverket.
- Sabatier, P. & Jenkins-Smith, H. (1993). *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Seeger, M., Sellnow, T. & Ulmer, R. (2003). *Communication and Organizational Crisis*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Sida (1997) *Sida Looks Forward: Sida's Programme for Global Development*. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).
- Sida (1999) *Developmental Humanitarian Assistance: A concept paper*. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).
- Sida (2002a) *Perspectives on Poverty*. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

- Sida (2003a) *Sida at Work: A Guide to Principles, Procedures and Working Methods*. Stockholm: Sida.
- Sida (2003b) *Swedish Humanitarian Assistance*. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).
- Sida (2004) *Kört om...Asien*. [Briefly on...Asia] [Sida Fact Sheet] 04-02-23 SIDA819sv. Stockholm: Ateljé Idé.
- Sida (2005) "Pressaktiviteter med anledning av flodvågskatastrofen 26/12-31/12" Memo to the Swedish Tsunami Commission of 2005. 2005-02-17.
- Slovic, P. (1987) "Perception of Risk," *Science*. 236: 280-286.
- Snyder, R.C, Bruck, H.W, and Sapin, B. (2002) *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (Revised). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stern, E. K. (1999). *Crisis Decisionmaking: A Cognitive Institutional Approach*. Department of Political Science. Stockholm: Stockholm University.
- Stone, D. (2002). *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*. New York: Norton.
- Sturges, D.L. (1994) "Communicating through Crisis: A Strategy for Organizational Survival," *Management Communication Quarterly*, 7(3): 297-316.
- Sundelius, B., Stern, E. Bynander, F. (1997). *Krishantering på svenska: teori och praktik*. [Crisis Management Swedish Style: Theory and Practice.] Stockholm: Nerenius & Santerus.
- Svensson, Arne and Wiveca Holmgren (2003) *Sida's Control Environment – a Feasibility Study*. Sida, Internrevisionen. Stockholm: Sida.
- Thomasson, Therese (2004-12-28) "Ett hårt slag mot de fattiga" [A Hard Hit on the Poor] *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*.
- Turner, B. (1976). "The Organizational and Intraorganizational Development of Disasters." *Administrative Science Quarterly*. 21: 378-397.
- Vertzberger, Y. Y. I. (1998) *Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions*. California: Stanford University Press
- Wilson, J. Q. (1989) *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do, and Why They Do It*. New York: Basic Books.
- Wockelberg, H. (2003) *Den svenska förvaltningsmodellen. Parlamentarisk debatt om förvaltningens roll i styrelseskicket*. Uppsala: Skrifter utgivna av den Statsvetenskapliga Föreningen.
- Wolodarski, P. (2005) "Varning för biståndsromantik," [Beware of Aid Romanticism.] *Dagens Nyheter* (2005-01-11).

Government reports

Expeditionschefen, UD (2005-02-15) *Promemoria* [Memo] Utrikesdepartementet [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. “Utrikesförvaltningens hantering av följderna av flodvågskatastrofen i Asien – en preliminär redovisning.” [The Foreign Ministry’s Management of the Effects of the Tidal Wave Catastrophe in Asia – A Preliminary Account] Stockholm: UD, Regeringskansliet [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government Offices of Sweden].

Förslag till Riksdagen 1997/98:RR4 (1997) [Parliamentary Proposal] Riksdagens revisorers förslag angående utrikesförvaltningen [Parliamentary Accountants Proposal Regarding the Foreign Service] <http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/9798/forslag/RR4/RR00015.ASP>

SOU 1998:132. Analysgruppen för granskning av Estoniakatastrofen. 1998. *Rapport av analysgruppen för granskning av Estoniakatastrofen och dess följder*. Stockholm: Fritzes.

Statskontoret/Eklund, EU-Enheten (2001) [Swedish Agency for Public Management/Eklund, EU-Division] Uppdrag att se över fördelningen av kostnader för ambassador mellan Sida och UD [Assignment to Review Embassy Cost Distribution between Sida and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs]

Sveriges Riksdag (2005-04-26) [The Swedish Parliament, 2005-04-26] Utrikesutskottets betänkande 2004/05:UU11 Sveriges politik för humanitärt bistånd [Foreign Affairs Committee Submission 2004/05:UU11 Sweden’s Politics Regarding Humanitarian Assistance <http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/200405/utskott/UU/UU11/UU11.ASP>

SäkH (2004) *Säkerhetshandbok: Säkerhets- och beredskapsärenden*. Stockholm: Utrikesförvaltningens handböcker.

Other media

Studio 24, Swedish Television (svt) (2005-01-04) “Den största biståndsinsatsen någonsin” [The Largest Aid Contribution Ever]

Studio One, Swedish Radio P1 (Studio ett) (2005-01-13) “Tema – Sri Lanka efter katastrofen” [Theme – Sri Lanka after the Catastrophe]

Internet

- BBC (2005) “At a Glance: Countries Hit” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/4126019.stm> (8 May 2005).
- EU Commission (2001) “Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment” http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001_0153en01.pdf
- EU Commission (2005) “EuropeAid Co-operation Office” http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/index_en.htm (5 May, 2005)
- Government Offices of Sweden (2004) Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Organization <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3367> (7 March 2005).
- IFRC (2005) “Tsunami Emergency and Recovery Plan of Action 2005–2010” http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_appeals.pl?04/2804PlanofAction2005-2010.pdf (10 May 2005)
- IFRC (2005) “Integrating relief, rehabilitation and development policy” <http://www.ifrc.org/who/policy/rrdpolicy.asp> (5 May, 2005)
- Jämtin, Carin (2004) “Alla kan hjälpa” [Everyone can Help]. Article from *Aftonbladet*. 30 December 2004. Available at: <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/1388/a/37743>
- Ministry of Finance (2005) Sweden will Offer Debt Relief to Indonesia. 12 January 2005. <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/5137/a/36753> (13 May 2005).
- OECD (2003) “DAC List of Aid Recipients – As at 1 January 2003” <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/9/2488552.pdf> (10 May 2005).
- OECD (2005) “Development Assistance Committee (DAC)” <http://www.oecd.org/dac> (10 May 2005).
- Regeringskansliet (2004) “Ambassader och konsulat” [Embassies and Consulates] <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2366/a/12869> (16 March 2005).
- Sida (2003b) The Field Vision: The Field Takes the Lead. <http://www.sida.se/Sida/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=3156>
- Sida (2005a) FAQ – Sida in Brief. www.sida.se/sida/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=2799&a=21144 (11 May 2005).
- Sida (2005b) “Bilateralt och multilateralt utvecklingssamarbete” [Bilateral and Multilateral Development Cooperation] (16 March 2005).
- Sida (2005c) About Sida: Organisation. <http://www.sida.se/Sida/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=160&a=19916> (May 12, 2005).

- Sida (2005d) "Humanitært Bistånd till Tsunamidrabbade genom fNS Samlade appell" [Humanitarian Assistance to Those Affected by the Tsunami and Provided to the UN Consolidated Appeal].
- SRV (2005) *Räddningsverkets internationella katastrof- och biståndsinsatser oktober–december 2004* [The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) International Humanitarian Aid October–December 2004]. Räddningsverkets kontaktperson: Leila Biglert, Operativa Avdelningen [SRSA contact person: Leila Biglert, Operative Department].
- The Tsunami Research Program www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami/ (July 22, 2005).
- UN/ECOSOC (2004) "Remarks to roundtable D: Enabling environment and resource mobilization for the LDCs emerging emerging from conflict: the experiences from Guinea Bissau and Burundi" (5 May, 2005) <http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecosoc/hl2004/remarks.vaher.pdf>
- UNICEF (2003) *UNICEF's Humanitarian Principles*, July 2003. <http://www.unicef.org/path/Documents/Session%204%20Humanitarian%20Principles/Participant%20Manual/4.2%20UNICEF%20Humanitarian%20Principles.doc>
- USGS (2005) "Magnitude 9.0 off the West Coast of Northern Sumatra Sunday, December 26, 2004 at 00:58:53 UTC" http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eq_depot/2004/eq_041226/neic_slav_ts.html (8 May 2005).
- Vinberg, Patrik (2005) "Burma räddades av kustlinjen" [Burma Saved by the Coastline] Press Release 05-02-11. <http://www.redcross.se>
- The World Clock – Time Zones www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/ (July 22, 2005).

Interviews

- Asplund, Eva (2005-04-13) Head of Department, SEKA, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
- Bjerninger, Jan (2005-04-01) Head of Department, Asia Regional Department, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
- Brisman, Johan (2005-04-01) Coordinator of the reconstruction after the Tsunami, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
- Engstrand, Göran (2005-04-06) Head of Division, Field Unit, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
- Fox, Jennifer (2005-04-20) Receptionist, Swedish Embassy in Colombo.
- 't Hart, Paul (2005-04-27) Professor of Public Administration, Utrecht School of Governance, Utrecht University, The Netherlands.

Heijne, Åsa (2005-04-21) Programme Manager and Deputy Head of Mission, Swedish Embassy in Colombo.

Helleday, Agneta (2005-04-07), Human Resources Department, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)

Jacobsen, Lotta (2005-04-20), First Secretary, Swedish Embassy in Colombo

Källstig, Ulf (2005-04-08), Information Department, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)

Larsson, Kjell (2005-03-08) Operative Head, Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSV)

Leslie, H.W. (2005-04-21) Driver, Swedish Embassy in Colombo.

Melander, Lena (2005-04-16) Duty Officer, Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, Colombo.

Norrfaik, Maria (2005-05-25) Director-General, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)

Perera, Roshan (2005-04-19) Driver, Swedish Embassy in Colombo.

Richards, Sheila (2005-04-19) Programme Manager, Swedish Embassy in Colombo.

Romeshun, Kulasabanathan (2005-04-21) Programme Manager, Swedish Embassy in Colombo.

Rosendahl, Per (2005-05-22) Former temporary desk officer, Asia Department, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)

Thybell, Leif (2005-04-13), Asian Regional Office, Diakonia

Schaar, Johan (2005-06-07) Telephone interview. Head, Division for Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

Schill, Göran (2005-04-21), Program Manager and Analyst, Swedish Embassy in Colombo.

de Silva, Charmaine (2005-04-19) Accountant, Swedish Embassy in Colombo.

Wibom, Ingrid (2005-04-07), Head of Department, Human Resources Department, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)

Widén, Ewa (2005-04-13), Asia Desk Officer, Diakonia

Zinn, Katarina (2005-04-07), SEKA, Acting Head, Division for Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)

Åkerblom, Johan (2005-04-08), Head of Department, Information Department, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) MFA source (2005-04-26) Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Authors

Fredrik Bynander has a PhD in Political Science and is Assistant Professor at the Swedish National Defence College. There, he serves as Research Coordinator at Crismart, the Center for Crisis Management Research and Training. His published work ranges from security studies and foreign policy analysis to the use of history in crisis decision-making and leadership succession.

Lindy Newlove has an MA in Sociology from the University of Stockholm's International Graduate Program and is a doctoral student with the interdisciplinary Tema Institute at the University of Linköping, within the Department of Technology and Social Change, from which she is currently on leave. She specializes in critical infrastructure, environmental and energy crises and has written on nuclear power and electricity outages. Lindy is a Senior Analyst at Crismart.

Britta Ramberg has an MA in International Relations from Stockholm University. Her main interest concerns European crisis management, and her publications include a case study on the EU Commission's management of the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey. During 2002 and 2003, she worked with the UNDP project "Building Crisis Management Capacities in the South Eastern Europe". Britta is a Research Analyst at Crismart.

Sida Studies in Evaluation

- 96/1 *Evaluation and Participation – some lessons.*
Anders Rudqvist, Prudence Woodford-Berger
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 96/2 *Granskning av resultatanalyserna i Sidas landstrategiarbete.*
Göran Schill
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 96/3 *Developmental Relief? An Issues Paper and an Annotated Bibliography on Linking Relief and Development.*
Claes Lindahl
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 96/4 *The Environment and Sida's Evaluations.*
Tom Alberts, Jessica Andersson
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 97/1 *Using the Evaluation Tool. A survey of conventional wisdom and common practice at Sida.*
Jerker Carlsson, Kim Forss, Karin Metell, Lisa Segnestam, Tove Strömberg
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 97/2 *Poverty Reduction and Gender Equality. An Assessment of Sida's Country Reports and Evaluations in 1995–96.*
Eva Tobisson, Stefan de Vylder
Secretariat for Policy and Corporate Development.
- 98/1 *The Management of Disaster Relief Evaluations. Lessons from a Sida evaluation of the complex emergency in Cambodia.*
Claes Lindahl
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 98/2 *Uppföljande studie av Sidas resultatanalyser.*
Göran Schill
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 98/3 *Evaluating Gender Equality – Policy and Practice. An assessment of Sida's evaluations in 1997–1998.*
Lennart Peck
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 99/1 *Are Evaluations Useful? Cases from Swedish Development Cooperation.*
Jerker Carlsson, Maria Eriksson-Baaz, Ann Marie Fallenius, Eva Lövgren
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 99/2 *Managing and Conducting Evaluations. Design study for a Sida evaluation manual.*
Lennart Peck, Stefan Engström
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 99/3 *Understanding Regional Research Networks in Africa.*
Fredrik Söderbaum
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit

- 99/4 *Managing the NGO Partnership. An assessment of stakeholder responses to an evaluation of development assistance through Swedish NGOs.*
Claes Lindahl, Elin Björkman, Petra Stark, Sundeeep Waslekar, Kjell Öström
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 00/1 *Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment. A DAC review of agency experiences 1993-1998.*
Prudence Woodford-Berger
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 00/2 *Sida Documents in a Poverty Perspective. A review of how poverty is addressed in Sida's country strategy papers, assessment memoranda and evaluations.*
Lennart Peck, Charlotta Widmark
Department for Policy and Socio-Economic Analysis
- 00/3 *The Evaluability of Democracy and Human Rights Projects. A logframe-related assessment.*
Derek Poate, Roger Riddell
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 00/4 *Poverty Reduction, Sustainability and Learning. An evaluability assessment of seven area development projects.*
Anders Rudqvist, Ian Christoplos, Anna Liljelund
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 00/5 *Ownership in Focus? Discussion paper for a Planned Evaluation.*
Stefan Molund
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 01/01 *The Management of Results Information at Sida. Proposals for agency routines and priorities in the information age.*
Göran Schill
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 01/02 *HIV/AIDS-Related Support through Sida – A Base Study. Preparation for an evaluation of the implementation of the strategy "Investing for Future Generations – Sweden's response to HIV/AIDS".*
Lennart Peck, Karin Dahlström, Mikael Hammarskjöld, Lise Munck
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 02/01 *Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability. An Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation. Main Report.*
Elinor Ostrom, Clark Gibson, Sujai Shivakumar, Krister Andersson
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 02/01:1 *Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability. An Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation. Summary Report.*
Elinor Ostrom, Clark Gibson, Sujai Shivakumar, Krister Andersson
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 03/01 *Reflection on Experiences of Evaluating Gender Equality.*
Ted Freeman, Britha Mikkelsen
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit

- 03/02 *Environmental Considerations in Sida's Evaluations Revised: A follow-up and analysis six years.*
Tom Alberts, Jessica Andersson, with assistance from:
Inger Ärnfast, Susana Dougnac
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 03/03 *Donorship, Ownership and Partnership: Issues arising from four Sida studies of donor-recipient relations.*
Gus Edgren
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 03/04 *Institutional Perspectives on the Road and Forestry Sectors in Laos: Institutional Development and Sida Support in the 1990s.*
Pernilla Sjöquist Rafiqui
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 03/05 *Support for Private Sector Development: Summary and Synthesis of Three Sida Evaluations*
Anders Danielson
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 04/01 *Stronger Evaluation Partnerships. The Way to Keep Practice Relevant*
Gus Edgren
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 04/02 *Sida's Performance Analyses – Quality and Use*
Jane Backström, Carolina Malmerius, Rolf Sandahl
Department for Policy and Methodology
- 05/01 *Sida och tsunamin 2004*
Fredrik Bynander, Lindy M. Newlove, Britta Ramberg
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit
- 05/02 *Sida and the Tsunami of 2004*
Fredrik Bynander, Lindy M. Newlove, Britta Ramberg
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit

Sida and the Tsunami of 2004

– a Study of Organizational Crisis Response

The Tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004 tested the crisis preparedness in Sweden. This report provides a picture of how Sida responded to the test. It was carried out by Crismart, Centre for Crisis Management Research and Training at the Swedish National Defence College at the request of the Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit at Sida. The focus of the study is Sida's headquarters in Stockholm and the Swedish sponsored activities in Sri Lanka. The study shows that Sida is able to respond fast to major disasters – Sweden was one of the countries that reacted very early to international appeals for humanitarian support to those hit by the disaster. There are, however, reasons to use the experience from the Tsunami disaster to identify weak points in Sida's organisation. The report provides proposals for how to handle even larger and more complicated crises in the future.



SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COOPERATION AGENCY

Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit

Address: SE-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden.

Visiting address: Sveavägen 20, Stockholm.

Tel: +46 8 698 50 00. Fax: +46 8 698 56 15

E-mail: sida@sida.se

www.sida.se