



Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

# Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response

July 2006

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition



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The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) is a multi-agency learning and accountability initiative in the humanitarian sector. It was established in February 2005 in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis of 26 December 2004.

The TEC is managed by a Core Management Group (CMG) of agencies and TEC staff are hosted by the ALNAP Secretariat. The CMG provides general oversight and direction for the TEC on behalf of its wider membership. Since February 2005 CMG members have included representatives from: *Donors*: Danida, SDC and Sida; *UN agencies*: FAO, OCHA (Chair), UNDP, UNICEF and WHO; *NGOs/Red Cross*: CARE International UK, AIDMI, IFRC and World Vision International; *Networks/research institutes*: the ALNAP Secretariat and Groupe URD.

### **The TEC has three main aims:**

1. To improve the quality of humanitarian action, including linkages to longer term recovery and development.
2. To provide accountability to the donor and affected-country populations on the overall tsunami response (from the point of view of TEC member agencies).
3. To test the TEC approach as a possible model for future joint evaluation.

More information on the TEC can be found in the TEC's Synthesis Report and on the TEC's website: [www.tsunami-evaluation.org](http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org)

### **The TEC's thematic evaluations**

This evaluation is one of five thematic joint evaluations undertaken by the TEC. The other four studies in the series comprise: the role of needs assessment in the tsunami response; coordination of international humanitarian assistance in tsunami-affected countries; the impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities; and the international funding response to the tsunami.

This evaluation is published alongside these other four studies together with the TEC's Synthesis Report, making a set of six. The Synthesis Report draws together learning and recommendations contained in these TEC studies as well as over 170 additional reports.



# Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response

A synthesis of initial findings

By Ian Christoplos

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This report represents the views of the authors only. They are not necessarily those of the managing or funding agencies.

## **Management of the evaluation**

This evaluation was managed by the Department of Evaluation and Internal Audit, Sida.

## **Financial contributions to the evaluation**

This TEC evaluation was made possible through the financial support of BMZ (Germany) and Sida (Sweden).



# Acknowledgements

This report summarises and discusses experiences from the linkages in the tsunami disaster response between immediate relief operations and subsequent efforts in reconstruction and development, also known under the acronym LRRD. It is based mainly on two country studies from Indonesia and Sri Lanka, a study on organisational policies and practices, and on a literature review of the recent professional discussion on the linkage concept. The evaluation was managed by Sida's Department of Evaluation and Internal Audit, which was also the main sponsor. BMZ (Germany) made a substantial financial contribution and initial substantive input was received from OCHA, ECHO and Unicef.

The studies constituting the LRRD evaluation are based largely on interviews with a great number of people directly affected by the disaster, including officials in national and local government agencies as well as representatives from national and international NGOs. We are immensely grateful for their generosity and patience when providing information and views on LRRD issues. We would also like to express our great appreciation to the consultancy teams involved with evaluation and the excellent support of the TEC core team in London.

The plan is to follow up this LRRD evaluation with a second study at the beginning of 2007. We hope that this current and the subsequent studies can contribute to better understanding of linkages and interdependences between various parts of disaster response as well as improving efforts in risk reduction.

Sida, Department of Evaluation and Internal Audit



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# Acronyms and abbreviations

<b>ALNAP</b>	Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
<b>BRR</b>	Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency
<b>CDD</b>	community-driven development
<b>CGAP</b>	Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
<b>FCCISL</b>	Federation of Chambers of Commerce & Industry of Sri Lanka
<b>GAM</b>	Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka)
<b>ICASERD</b>	Indonesian Center for Agro Socio Economic Research and Development
<b>IDP</b>	internally displaced person
<b>IFI</b>	international finance institution
<b>IFRC</b>	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organisation
<b>INTRAC</b>	International NGO Training and Research Centre
<b>LRRD</b>	linking relief, rehabilitation and development
<b>LTTE</b>	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka)
<b>MDG</b>	Millennium Development Goal
<b>MDTFANS</b>	Multi Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and Northern Sumatra
<b>MFI</b>	microfinance institution
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
<b>ODI</b>	Overseas Development Institute (UK)
<b>PRSP</b>	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
<b>RADA</b>	Reconstruction and Development Agency (Sri Lanka)
<b>Sida</b>	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

<b>SME</b>	small- and medium-scale enterprise
<b>TEC</b>	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
<b>TMM</b>	'too much money'
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP-BCPR</b>	UN Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
<b>UNHCR</b>	UN High Commission for Refugees



# Executive summary

The overall objective of this evaluation is to find out how operations and roles of the various actors were governed by ideas and practices regarding the linking of relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD), and to assess what consequences those ideas, practices and subsequent actions have had or may in future have for the affected population.

The tsunami had an immense impact on development processes, conflicts, patterns of risk and poverty in the affected areas. So also did the subsequent relief and development efforts. This evaluation looks at how affected populations in Aceh and Sri Lanka have coped with the disaster, and also how they have coped with the aid industry. It looks at how aid response has addressed (and often ignored) what was happening in Sri Lanka and Aceh before the tsunami. These were countries and communities dealing with conflict, chronic poverty and weak respect for human rights before 26 December 2004.

Over-fishing was a problem before, as was inequality, as was internal displacement. The disaster changed the rules of the LRRD game, but the game had started long before. It is important to stress this as the

agencies involved in the tsunami response deserve neither the full blame nor the full credit for performance in linking relief, rehabilitation and development. LRRD must be analysed from the perspective of how the aid response has related to the ongoing political, economic and social processes that enable and constrain affected populations as they rebuild their lives.

Aid agencies initiated a range of relief and rehabilitation activities right from the start. The need to proceed with relief and rehabilitation operations simultaneously was recognised and acted upon. The gap between relief and rehabilitation that commonly appears in disaster response was avoided due largely to access to un-earmarked publicly raised funds and donor flexibility. The aid community ensured that affected populations obtained the means to live with a modicum of dignity during the early rehabilitation phase. This has provided them with the security that they have needed to start rebuilding their homes and livelihoods. The humanitarian system has initiated early support for livelihood rehabilitation in the form of distribution of assets, such as small boats and fishing nets, and as cash-for-work.

The shift to rehabilitation has been much slower in the housing sector, where an unacceptably large proportion of the affected population is still living in deteriorating tents over a year after the disaster. Early promises were made that tens of thousands of houses would be built in a few months time. These promises demonstrated arrogance and ignorance regarding what should have been the self-evident challenges of recovery programming. Building communities takes much longer than building houses. Issues of land rights, environmental impacts and links to services and jobs inevitably take time to be effectively addressed, but this was not acknowledged in LRRD plans and declarations. As a result, construction of transitional housing has been delayed and insufficient, especially in Aceh. Disaster-affected people have shown a readiness to be patient in waiting for permanent housing, but they have been angered by false promises and the failure to plan for an inevitably protracted transitional period. This state of affairs is a reflection of how agencies' struggle for 'turf', by making grand promises, has superseded accountability to the affected populations.

Even though they moved rapidly into rehabilitation, most aid actors have demonstrated a limited understanding of what kinds of interventions may eventually prove sustainable with respect to livelihoods, community development and resource management. Standard packages, such as small boats, do not necessarily contribute to rebuilding a fishing industry, nor do they encourage the wider private sector development that is needed to support the livelihoods of people living on the coast who are not smallscale fisherfolk. Narrow and inaccurate conceptions of how best to promote equity (perceived of as being tied to own-account farming, fishing and trading) have stymied the search for how employment opportunities can be expanded in small- and medium-sized enterprises.

The tsunami devastated the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people. Economic activities stimulated by the tsunami have also created hundreds of thousands of new livelihood opportunities. The aid community has not assumed a strategic stance regarding how to add value and fill gaps between these two processes. The link between rehabilitation efforts and wider development trends has not been sufficiently thought through. There is therefore a risk that some rehabilitation efforts may prove ultimately ineffective and unsustainable. Furthermore, some of these poorly conceived interventions may actually undermine future development as they encourage over-fishing, damage the credibility of microfinance institutions and create dysfunctional communities through insufficiently planned resettlement.

A lack of information to affected populations about reconstruction plans greatly limits their capacity to proceed with their own LRRD projects. People need to know where they will live and what they will receive in order to make informed decisions about their own future plans and livelihoods. Information is power, and the people affected by the tsunami do not have much of either. This failure has led to distrust toward aid providers and the government. Participation is important, but information about aid and development plans is the starting point for people to decide for themselves how they wish to get on with their lives. It is also their most basic tool with which to hold their governments and aid providers to account for making links between relief, rehabilitation and development that are relevant to them.

The importance of government and community ownership of the recovery process is acknowledged by almost the entire aid sector, but there have been frustrations and delays in anchoring tsunami response in Sri Lanka and

Acehnese institutions. Genuine LRRD requires attention to how to align programming with the policies, capacities and actions of national actors, be they governmental, civil society or the affected populations themselves. The weaknesses in national and local institutions are considerable, so alignment may need to be a protracted process, but the overall direction needs to be maintained. There are indications that this is beginning to happen, but in some areas significant damage has already been done due to poaching of staff and insufficient attention to pre-existing policy frameworks. Most agencies have shown an ignorance of the historical trends in the two countries and of how aid programming could avoid repeating past mistakes and contribute to prevailing development opportunities. The aid community and governments have experienced a difficult and time-consuming process in achieving consensus on complex trade-offs between speed and quality of response and in deciding where people should be encouraged to live so as to reduce risks from future disasters. Discord and confusion regarding the buffer zones have distanced the aid community from national political processes. An unfortunate outcome of this has been a lack of attention to issues of risk reduction.

It is difficult to assess the impact of aid on the conflict trajectories in Sri Lanka and Aceh. The tsunami did not help to bring peace to Sri Lanka. It did, however, at first have a modestly positive effect, perhaps due to both genuine altruistic urges after the tragedy and also the military losses due to the tsunami. After the initial emergency phase, the patrimonial struggle to control aid resources became a point of contention rather than an incentive to cooperation. The increase in violence occurring at the time of writing this report (December 2005) cannot be verifiably attributed to the tsunami response, but the competition over aid flows and subsequent

distrust can be assumed to have had some negative impact.

Indonesia has had a very different trajectory. The rapidity with which the conflict in Aceh is being resolved was not expected before the tsunami. Although any inference of attributed causality between the aid response and the peace agreement should be treated with caution, most Acehnese see the opening up to the international community and the aid presence as a significant factor supporting this sudden change. In addition to the tsunami having a positive impact on the dynamics of the conflict, the peace agreement has had a number of other positive knock-on effects that may be even more important than the reduced violence in itself. Informal taxes by warring parties have been reduced, access to fields has been improved, rules on public gatherings have been relaxed, allowing a resurgence of civil society, and a generally more positive outlook has emerged.

LRRD is not a set-piece process. It demands knowledge of the political economies of the countries and communities affected by the disaster. It also demands capacity and readiness to learn at field level. Agencies have been insufficiently proactive in building their contextual knowledge and relationships with local institutions. The unprecedented quantity of funding available has carried with it a tendency to worry more about how an activity will appear 'back home' than about its relevance for affected populations. The overall implication for the future is that there is a need to break out of the project-focused concentration on aid provision in order to acknowledge that the most significant links between relief, rehabilitation and development are those that are made by affected populations themselves and by the national public and private institutions on which they depend for jobs, services and human security. The

people affected by the tsunami are getting on with their lives regardless of the sometimes chaotic and ill-conceived programming of the aid community. Improving LRRD programming is thus not a matter of agencies becoming better at 'doing livelihoods' or even building houses. It lies instead in deeper analysis of how 'our' meagre efforts can better contribute to supporting 'their LRRD projects'.

Attention to 'their LRRD projects' leads inevitably to greater engagement in micro- and macro- political processes. This creates a well-justified unease among some humanitarian agencies concerned about how to maintain adherence to the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. Indeed, effective LRRD does demand close engagement with local institutions, with a consequent loss of independence.

Weakened adherence to some aspects of humanitarian principles can nevertheless be balanced by political savvy, clarity of commitment and contextual awareness so as to ensure impartiality and neutrality in conflict situations and amid political efforts to influence resource flows. Geographic imbalances in provision of rehabilitation support (especially in Sri Lanka) raise questions about the ability of many agencies to maintain humanitarian principles in their overall portfolios. The predominance of staff with limited experience in Sri Lanka and Aceh raises concerns that they may not have the necessary skills to manoeuvre amid the micro-political realities of LRRD.

The concerns expressed in this evaluation point toward two overall conclusions. First, for LRRD to become more effective, the aid industry needs greatly to increase its capacities to engage with local and national development processes. This is reliant on a humble acknowledgement of the enormity of the tasks of reconstruction and a more proactive search for ways to work

constructively with institutions at national and local levels. Second, many agencies evidently lack the capacity to take on sizable LRRD engagements in an effective manner. National authorities and donors should work together to ensure that agencies are not allocated responsibilities that are reliant on skills they obviously cannot muster.

## Recommendations

**LRRD must be more firmly rooted in national and local contexts and processes.** A bridging of the current divide between aid programming and the initiatives of affected populations will require a reconsideration of how aid contributes to or hinders the LRRD agendas of national authorities, local officials, NGOs, businesses and the affected populations.

**Links between relief and rehabilitation have been achieved, but greater attention needs to be paid to the implications of programming for longer term development.** Aid has not been the only, or even the primary, motor for re-starting economic activities. It is therefore important to be cautious about attributing either the successes or the failures of development to aid interventions. However, the viability of many of the livelihoods supported by aid programming is questionable. Shelter has frequently been addressed in a narrow perspective, without sufficient concern for the functionality of the communities being rebuilt and created. There are many examples of where the implications of these programmes for sustainable natural resource use, conflicts and disaster risks have been inadequately assessed.

**For poverty alleviation, interventions need to be better related to ongoing poverty alleviation trajectories.** Effective LRRD manifests itself in a judicious balance of efforts to tackle both

chronic and transient poverty. Progress has been rapid in alleviating much of the transient poverty that was created by the tsunami. However, there is now a significant proportion of people whose tsunami-related destitution has effectively placed them in the ranks of the chronically poor. They are unlikely to be helped by small asset-replacement initiatives. Their needs are best addressed by economic development and/or social protection. Neither of these elements has been thus far effectively integrated into the tsunami response.

**More consideration needs to be given to reducing risks of natural disasters, and anchoring such strategies within national structures of social protection.**

Despite additional international attention and funding for early warning, risk reduction has not been mainstreamed in recovery programming. There is a need for deeper and more evidence-based assessment of the impacts of aid programmes on environments and natural resources. Given prevailing risks, there is a need to consider how national structures can re-shoulder responsibilities for social protection to deal with various forms of shocks from natural hazards, conflicts and other factors. Aid needs to be refocused in order to support governments as they reassume responsibility for ensuring the safety, survival and dignity of their citizens.

**Links to the LRRD efforts of affected populations should be improved through strengthened information flow.** Disaster-affected people need information about the aid they will receive so they can decide how best to rebuild their lives and livelihoods. This is more important than 'participation' since participation in aid projects is secondary to the efforts of affected populations to get on with their own LRRD projects. They have not received

sufficient information and they are justifiably angry, frustrated and confused. Provision of better information can make a modest but important contribution to strengthening the clout of affected populations in influencing the LRRD agenda.


**Links between policies and programming should be made by sector and through support to national and household efforts to bring together relief, rehabilitation and development.**

The international community and the individual agencies involved in tsunami response do not have a comprehensive master plan for linking relief, rehabilitation and development. They do not need one. Their responsibility is to ensure that aid supports the efforts of national and local actors to make these links. The fragmented nature of recovery aid and weak coordination mean that many agencies have no choice but to concentrate their LRRD programmes within specific sectors in which pressures for moving from relief to development are clear and results measurable. Since the primary concerns of the disaster-affected population are shelter and livelihoods, the potential for LRRD aid reform is greatest within these sectors.

**LRRD is best served by greater transparency about who is able to do what, and when.** The problems that have emerged in LRRD often relate more to agencies having promised too much than to them having done too little. Agencies, donors and government authorities have felt pressured to make commitments that are far beyond what they can actually accomplish. Criticism should therefore not necessarily be directed at their failures to achieve these objectives, but rather at the ways in which these claims have led to unfulfilled promises to affected populations and to dysfunctional shortcuts in development planning.



# Countries affected by the tsunami





# Introduction

## 1.1 Evaluation objective

This evaluation looks at a wide range of issues in the response to the tsunami and earthquake in the Indian Ocean region on 26 December 2004. The tsunami had massive immediate humanitarian impact including the death of up to 250,000 people<sup>1</sup> and the internal displacement of over 1.7 million people (Guha-Sapir and Van Panhuis, 2005). It also affected development prospects of countries and communities, with massive destruction of infrastructure, housing and loss of productive assets. This evaluation looks at how aid response to the tsunami has taken into account the linkages between the impacts of the disaster with regard to immediate human suffering and longer term developmental trends. It also looks at how aid agencies themselves have structured their work so to consider these two parallel challenges.

The overall objective of this evaluation is to find out how operations and roles of the various actors were governed by ideas and practices regarding the linking of relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD), and to assess what consequences those ideas, practices and subsequent actions have had or may in future have for the affected population. This has been investigated within a focus on five central themes: livelihoods, human rights, linkage to development and poverty reduction, risk reduction and conflict impact. The evaluation teams have also paid significant attention to issues of shelter and community planning, given their central importance in the reconstruction process.

In approaching the topic of linking relief, rehabilitation and development, there can be expectations that an evaluation should assess the overall outcomes and impacts

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<sup>1</sup> This figure includes people who are still missing.

of relief, rehabilitation and development activities respectively. While such a comprehensive evaluative exercise would be valuable, it is beyond the scope and capacity of this evaluation to cover these issues effectively. Although a significant level of attention has been given to looking at these outcomes and impacts in this synthesis and the other LRRD studies by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) upon which it is based, the primary focus is on the links between these different aspects of response. The objective is thus on developing a better understanding of the synergies, dysfunctions, integration and ignorance that characterise the interplay between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response.

This evaluation uses the terms rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery interchangeably. These three terms have somewhat different connotations, but are applied in a range of ways by different agencies, so no overarching definitions seem appropriate in this study. The full terms of reference for the evaluation are included as Annex 1.

## 1.2 Structure and timeframe of the evaluation

This report presents the findings of the first phase of a two-phase evaluation of LRRD in the tsunami response. It was realised at the outset that it is too early to draw firm conclusions about many aspects of the linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development. A second round of empirical research will be conducted during early 2007.

The first step in the evaluation was a review of the debate on LRRD, based on existing literature and findings of past reviews.<sup>2</sup> This study provided a background and informed the conceptual frameworks used in the other three empirical studies. The first of the three empirical studies looked at the policy context for LRRD in the tsunami response<sup>3</sup> and was based on interviews with personnel at headquarters levels and in Colombo, Jakarta and Banda Aceh. Country studies were done in Indonesia (focused almost entirely on Aceh)<sup>4</sup> and Sri Lanka<sup>5</sup> and included both qualitative and quantitative data collection, mainly to assess the perspectives of affected populations. This synthesis report is based on these four previous studies, and also draws on findings of the other TEC thematic evaluations as well as other studies made available to the TEC.

This evaluation began during the summer of 2005 when the teams were contracted and a first draft of the review of the debate was prepared. The three

2 The review was prepared by Margie Buchanan-Smith and Paola Fabbri.

3 The authors were Hugh Goyder with Cowan Coventry, Jerry Adams, Tania Kaiser, Suzanne Williams and Ian Smillie.

4 The Indonesia study was prepared by Channel Research. The authors were Emery Brusset, Anne Davies and Susanne Pedersen.

5 The Sri Lanka study was prepared by Channel Research. The authors were Björn Ternström, Ellen Girerd-Barclay and Darini Rajasingham.

other teams submitted inception reports in September. These reports were discussed at a coordination meeting held in Stockholm. The majority of fieldwork and telephone interviews were conducted during October. The quantitative studies in Aceh and Sri Lanka were completed during November and full drafts of the three reports were submitted in December. This synthesis is based on these draft reports.


## 1.3 Evaluation methods and constraints

This report has been prepared by the senior adviser to the TEC LRRD thematic review. He was contracted by Sida to advise and consult with the other evaluators and to draft a synthesis of findings. The overall approach applied throughout this report has been to contrast the differing perspectives of humanitarian and development actors. This has involved drawing attention to the different principles, conceptual frameworks and vocabularies used in humanitarian assistance and in development cooperation. In some cases, similar terms – livelihoods, communities, participation – are applied in very different ways by humanitarian and by development actors. In order to ensure that this report is useful for readers ‘on both sides’, it has been important to tease out these implicit differences and analyse them, as opposed to evaluating aid interventions against one set of principles or the other. This approach has carried with it an unavoidable emphasis on the complexity of these different conceptual frameworks. It is hoped that readers will accept these attempts to introduce a more ‘bilingual’ discussion of the challenges of LRRD.

Furthermore, the synthesis contrasts the efforts of affected populations to survive and rebuild their lives with those of the aid community in supporting them. An underlying assumption of the study is that affected populations have their own ‘LRRD projects’ that inevitably differ from those designed on their behalf by the aid community. Participatory planning methods can serve to create a closer dialogue between affected populations and outsiders, but the two perspectives on LRRD will never be entirely congruent. It is therefore important to evaluate how the efforts of affected populations, as elicited in the interviews of the two country studies and other research, are supported or hindered by the initiatives of the aid community.

The analytical approach used in the report can thus be summarised as looking at LRRD from two axes; one axis between humanitarian action and development efforts and another between the efforts of affected populations and the efforts of the aid community. This approach is illustrated in Figure 1.1.

The synthesis has been primarily based on findings from the four preceding TEC LRRD reports. Unless otherwise stated, references to interviews and respondents refer to the qualitative and quantitative data from these reports and also the interviews undertaken in the course of the synthesis evaluator’s own mission in Sri Lanka. It has also included many findings from other studies and evaluations

**Figure 1.1 LRRD analytical framework**

that have looked at aspects of LRRD in Sri Lanka and Aceh. The breadth of the topic of LRRD has required analysis of these other sources to complement the data and analysis of the four TEC LRRD studies. This synthesis has triangulated data from the TEC LRRD reviews with these other sources and drawn conclusions that expand considerably upon the data collected as part of the TEC LRRD studies. The ultimate analysis and conclusions in this report thus reflect the author's own judgements and do not necessarily reflect the findings of the four preceding TEC LRRD studies.

### 1.3.1 Limitations and constraints

The approaches used in the three empirical TEC LRRD reviews varied, and indeed the very meaning of LRRD differs between Aceh and Sri Lanka given the differences in development, conflict and sociocultural factors in the two countries. This has meant that much of the data collected are not fully comparable. Although this synthesis identifies clear overall trends in LRRD across the two countries, this non-comparability has meant that the synthesis has avoided specific quantitative comparisons between the two cases. In addition, the relevance of aid for LRRD to affected populations is a largely qualitative issue. It would therefore be misleading to apply quantitative measures to most of the issues analysed in this report.

When this evaluation was being conducted, many agencies were in the process of revising their estimates of needs and losses and revising their programmes. This has meant that even these secondary quantitative data were neither clear nor commensurate. Further and more definitive data will be reviewed in the next phase of analysis.

No attempt has been made to draw conclusions beyond Sri Lanka and Aceh. Although many of the issues raised in this evaluation are certainly of relevance to other tsunami-affected countries, the nature of LRRD has been strongly affected by the political and economic context of these two countries and therefore generalisation should be treated with caution.

Many of the findings in this report are indicative rather than conclusive. This is for two reasons. First, the assessment of LRRD processes requires longitudinal data, which are not yet available. Second, the agencies involved in the tsunami response beyond the emergency phase are in the process of learning. Many of the deficiencies noted in this evaluation may be addressed as organisations find new solutions and as staff members with more development experience take on greater responsibilities.

### **1.3.2 Policy study**

The LRRD Policy Study was prepared by the International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC). Efforts focused on interviewing staff involved in formulating or implementing policies in relation to LRRD. Semi-structured interviews were conducted using three lists of questions for donors, operational agencies and governmental departments. An introduction to LRRD was shared with the team's respondents in advance in order to stimulate their reflection and to focus subsequent interviews on issues of strategic interest.

An inception report was prepared in early October 2005 and shared with Sida, the other two field teams and the senior adviser. The research was carried out during the following five weeks. The headquarters sample included nine multilateral agencies, four bilateral donors, ten international NGOs, three government agencies, six national NGOs and two Sri Lankan research organisations. In Sri Lanka and Indonesia the teams faced the constraint of 'mission-fatigue', as three other TEC missions had contacted some of the same offices, and asked to see the same people, in the previous three weeks. There were also difficulties in identifying who to interview. LRRD is a broad concept and some felt discomfort in discussing both official agency positions and also their individual views and experiences. The research team was able to collect relatively more information from agencies in the United Kingdom, Canada and Sweden, with whom it was possible to arrange direct meetings. It proved far more difficult to collect the same quality of data from telephone interviews.

Finally, there was a bias in the sample in that it did not include the perspectives of the many hundreds of smaller agencies, both international and local, which offered humanitarian assistance to survivors in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami.

### **1.3.3 Indonesia**

The Indonesia Country Study consisted of a qualitative review followed by a quantitative survey. The primary emphasis was on understanding the perspectives of the affected populations in Aceh. People interviewed included heads of household (male and female), recipients and non-recipients of humanitarian aid, village heads (keuchik), district heads (bupatis), traders in markets, owners of small stores and roadside kiosks, representatives of two large international industries (Lafarge and Exxon Mobil) and other members of the general population. Some people were interviewed individually and others in groups. The team also interviewed people in several conflict-affected communities in order to gain a

comparative perspective, although government restrictions precluded visits to inland areas. Meetings were also held with national and international bodies, UN agencies and NGOs in the districts, in Banda Aceh and in Jakarta.

The quantitative survey was conducted in the tsunami-affected areas using a structured questionnaire based on the questions in the terms of reference (Annex 1 below). The questionnaire was designed when the qualitative research was well advanced, and reflects the issues emerging at the time. The total number of respondents was 1,227.

### 1.3.4 Sri Lanka

The Sri Lanka evaluation team interviewed tsunami-affected people living in three heavily affected districts: Ampara (on the east coast with an ethnically mixed population), Galle (on the southwestern coast with a mainly Sinhalese population) and Jaffna (in the north with a mainly Tamil population). People interviewed were: from all three ethnic groups, including those highly affected and those slightly affected; old, middle-aged and young (children were not interviewed, but their situation was discussed with parents, grandparents and teachers); those who were well-off, middle-class and destitute; those affected by conflict; males and females; people residing in various kinds of shelter; and people with multiple backgrounds in terms of how they earned their livelihoods. Minority groups, such as Muslims in the south, and Christians in the north, were also interviewed.

Findings from the interviews were triangulated with responses from local authorities and with mainly local representatives of NGOs and other agencies. Some follow-up visits and telephone interviews were made.

The evaluation also made use of a quantitative survey conducted in nine districts<sup>6</sup> and with 915 respondents. The results of the survey provided a means to assess some of the findings derived from the qualitative interviews. The quantitative survey focused on the following issues:

- impact of the tsunami
- livelihoods, shelter and use of natural resources
- to whom people turned to address their needs
- what people received, and the degree of consultation in design of relief interventions
- people's perceptions, particularly regarding the equity of distributions and on the impact, if any, of the events on the conflict.

<sup>6</sup> The nine districts covered were: Puttalam, Hambantota, Kalutara, Colombo, Gampaha, Galle, Ampara, Matara and Jaffna.

# The tsunami and its implications for LRRD

## 2.1 LRRD in context

It is important to differentiate clearly the LRRD issues in the disaster itself from issues related to the aid response, which is of course the primary focus of this evaluation. The tsunami had an immense impact on the development processes, conflicts, patterns of risk and poverty in the affected areas. So did the subsequent relief and development efforts. This evaluation looks at how affected populations have coped with the disaster, and how they have coped with the aid industry. It also looks at how aid response has addressed (and often ignored) what was happening in Sri Lanka and Aceh before the tsunami. These were countries and communities dealing with conflict, chronic poverty and weak respect for human rights before December 2004. Over-fishing was a problem before, as was inequality, as was internal displacement. The disaster changed the rules of the LRRD game, but the game had started long before. Thus the agencies involved in the tsunami response deserve neither the full blame nor the full credit for the links that have emerged between relief, rehabilitation and development. Aid is part of a bigger picture where the wider political and economic processes have had major impact on the speed of and opportunities for LRRD.

Neither the destruction caused by the tsunami, nor the sociopolitical context in which the response has occurred are unique or unprecedented. The issues being confronted in LRRD policies and programming relate closely to questions that have been dealt with extensively in other post-disaster contexts over the past two decades. The scale, structure and subsequent relationships in the tsunami aid response are, however, rather different from those of the past. There are three factors of uniqueness in the tsunami response: the quantity of funding, the predominance of funding from the general public and the types of agencies that were entrusted with these funds.

## 2.2 'Too much money'?

Due to the unprecedented quantity of funding within the aid community there is a discussion in both aid and media circles of whether or not there may be 'too much money' (TMM). The seemingly obvious question that should follow this is that of 'too much money for what?' Especially when viewed from the LRRD perspective, the tasks ahead for reconstruction and development are of such magnitude that there is not too much money relative to need. Nonetheless, there is a large amount of funding at stake and it is therefore essential to assess whether the agencies involved are able to use this magnitude of funding effectively. It is now widely acknowledged that there is too much money to spend within a year or two. The fundamental LRRD question is whether there is an awareness of what could or should be done with the money that is left when the emergency phase is deemed to be over.

The second factor of uniqueness is that humanitarian agencies have received an unprecedented level of funding from the public. One of the primary foci of LRRD discussions over the past two decades has been that of how to ensure a rapid handover to international financial institutions (IFIs) and other development actors when/before the international NGOs run out of funds for relief. Recently the need for well-structured exit strategies by humanitarian organisations has been recognised as a part of effective LRRD (Gardner et al, 2005). In most post-disaster situations one of the reasons that NGOs with a largely humanitarian profile do not receive significant levels of donor funding for rehabilitation and development is that IFIs and the United Nations (UN) are perceived to be more effective in programme areas such as infrastructure, social funds, community development grants, rebuilding public services and state institutions, and private sector development.

Despite these presumed proficiencies, the IFIs and UN also usually have difficulties mobilising funds for rehabilitation. There is often a temporal gap between relief and development wherein rehabilitation is grossly under-funded. In many disasters, some aid agencies hesitate to invest human resources in making plans for rehabilitation and development because these initiatives are unlikely to be funded and may risk raising unrealistic expectations among recipients and partner organisations. In the tsunami response this is not the case. Many humanitarian agencies have the opportunity to stay on during the rehabilitation phase. They cannot blame weak access to funds for ignoring LRRD. In the LRRD Policy Study agencies reported significant 'room for manoeuvre' to begin long-term planning much earlier since they do not need to face the normal uncertainty about whether or not they will have an opportunity to be present to participate in rehabilitation and development.

In the tsunami response some agencies that are usually satisfied with concentrating on humanitarian work have been forced to think longer term in order to plan how to use the large levels of funding at their disposal and to deflect pressures to disburse these funds on inappropriate but visible short-term relief efforts. Unusual incentives are in place to learn more about LRRD, but for some agencies this represents a steep learning curve. Easy access to funds has enabled agencies to structure their programmes to ensure strong links between simultaneous relief and rehabilitation efforts. The LRRD Policy Study within this



evaluation reported that unrestricted funding from the public has encouraged agencies to take speedy decisions and calculated risks. Disbursement regulations by major donors have also generally been made more flexible due to the obvious impracticality of spending humanitarian funds within traditional short timeframes. Where donor restrictions still exist, many international NGOs report being able to juggle funding from different sources to avoid these obstacles.

Nonetheless, due to the scale of funding, many still feel strong pressure to spend. Agency staff interviewed in the LRRD Policy Study reported pressures from headquarters, donors and host governments to disburse funds and demonstrate results quickly. Moreover, a number of respondents stated that the level of funding, combined with disbursement pressures, discouraged coordination and heightened competition over potential aid recipients. Agencies have sometimes chosen priorities according to how easy it is to spend their funds rather than according to relative need. Easily accessible areas teemed with aid agencies, and this undoubtedly contributed to lowering the quality and equity of response. One agency noted their difficulties in insisting on tighter monitoring and evaluation systems with local partners when other well-funded agencies were impatient to disburse funding without such 'conditions'.

Furthermore, the responsibilities associated with unprecedented sums of money have encouraged a virtual obsession with upward accountability to donors, the media and the public in Northern countries. This has discouraged accountability to disaster-affected populations and 'lateral' accountability to other agencies and host-country institutions. Since LRRD must be based in anchoring interventions in local and national development processes, this is cause for significant concern.

The managerial, human-resource and intellectual limits of the humanitarian sector are being tested. Indeed, as described below in this report, there are signs that there may be 'too much money' in relation to the capacities of the agencies entrusted with the majority of funds and their local partners to mount effective and efficient operations in the short-to-medium term. Therefore, the 'TMM' issue is directly related to the question of capacities within and among international, national and local organisations. Lack of international NGO capacity has clearly affected the quality of programming and is resulting in programming that is often not relevant to the development and poverty alleviation trends in Aceh and Sri Lanka. In particular, pipeline pressures are aggravating gaps between building houses and taking the time needed to plan the new communities that are being created, often in entirely new locations and with new requirements for everything from livelihood opportunities to social services. It has also aggravated gaps between simple distributions of assets, such as boats, and considering how best to manage the natural resource base upon which fishing and other livelihoods must depend.

## 2.3 Aid and conflict

In the relief phase, interviews have shown that intra-community relations fared rather well since there were plentiful resources for all. As the levels of relief handouts have diminished, so has belief in the fairness of aid. In Sri Lanka

tensions have increased within communities over who gets 'big-ticket items' such as houses and boats. Of potentially even greater concern, inter-community tensions are increasing as well. Delays in reaching areas of Sri Lanka controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), for example, are coming to be increasingly perceived as systematic discrimination. Aid has been heavily concentrated in the south of Sri Lanka, at the expense of support to the north and east. In Aceh such tensions have not been a significant problem, perhaps as a result of the peace agreement. Interviews in the Aceh study and other reviews have detected that distrust is growing between affected populations and their community leaders who have taken on a brokering role in aid response. It is too early to draw clear conclusions about how this different form of conflict will ultimately impact on social relations in Aceh.

The most notable factor regarding LRRD in the tsunami response is that there is a combined natural disaster and complex political emergency affecting both Indonesia and Sri Lanka. This combination is far from unique, but has not been given its due attention in past emergencies, or indeed in the tsunami response. The presence of a conflict in the midst of a natural disaster creates a greater onus to treat the LRRD continuum with care. Seemingly simple assumptions are far more complicated regarding what may constitute a 'sustainable livelihood', what are the responsibilities of the state for upholding basic human rights, what is an appropriate speed for making the RRD links, and whether it is justifiable to restrict support to those affected by the natural disaster. On the whole, agencies acknowledge that this combination of conflict and natural disaster is a strategic issue, but few agencies have demonstrated a clear strategy for dealing with it.<sup>7</sup>

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7 One notable exception is UNHCR's approach to IDP policy (UNHCR, 2005).

# LRRD: past, present and future challenges

## 3.1 Antecedents of LRRD concepts

LRRD is a multilayered concept. It means different things to different actors and the implications for programming fluctuate according to the levels of chronic conflict and vulnerability in which relief, rehabilitation and development are expected to be linked. Effective transitions are reliant on appropriate links within aid architecture, programming and methods development. LRRD is a matter relating to both internal agency procedures and external relationships. It demands creativity as each post-disaster context generates new institutional configurations and must be built on unique trajectories of development and change.

All links are not good links. Re-instating governmental authority and ownership in the midst of violent conflict is inherently problematic within the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. In terms of the developmental principle of sustainability, the smoothest 'link' that many humanitarian actors can make is often to leave quickly to ensure that relief modalities do a minimum of damage to the development of stable institutions.

The processes in which affected populations rebuild their lives are messy and do not slot into aid programming structures. After experiencing a disaster people are not worried about 'humanitarian principles', but rather that they may get caught in the middle of a conflict. They have to deal with trade-offs between their own survival today and their livelihoods tomorrow. They have in-depth knowledge about the local factors affecting prospects for both, but are usually woefully under-informed about the intentions of the crowds of foreigners that are suddenly in their midst. There is an inevitable tension between the struggles of affected populations and their ignorance of how they can best take advantage of relief, rehabilitation and development programmes.

Much of the older literature on LRRD is oblivious to these complexities. Methods and guidelines were filled with normative optimism. Terms such as the 'seamless web', were applied to describe the states of affairs that would emerge if the right methods were applied. Individuals, households, communities and nations were expected to follow a continuum from acute human suffering to 'normal' development. Over the years this optimism has faded. LRRD has come to refer more to a conundrum than to a gilded path. Intractable political tensions and human insecurity have come to be associated with LRRD, first in post-conflict situations and then increasingly in natural disasters as well.

LRRD first entered the aid debate during the African food crises of the mid-to-late 1980s when calls for 'prevention rather than cure' drew attention to the importance of relating relief and development processes (Wijkman and Timberlake, 1988). This early focus stressed how LRRD was essential to ensure that reconstruction efforts reduced the risks of recurrent natural disasters, primarily through more appropriate land-management and agricultural systems. The poor performance of many risk reduction programmes of that period and the emergence of a number of much higher-profile political conflicts decreased interest in linking risk reduction to development after natural disasters. In the late 1990s LRRD stayed on the agenda but attention was redirected to the challenge of rebuilding collapsed states. Conflict-related emergencies were growing in number and intensity, were absorbing a rapidly growing proportion of aid resources,<sup>8</sup> and were perceived as displacing or disrupting development. New approaches were needed to ensure that 'better development' would reduce the need for emergency relief, better 'relief' would contribute to development, and better 'rehabilitation' would ease the transition between the two (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994).

It was soon realised that this was easier said than done. Observers cast doubt on the assumption that a linear continuum from relief to rehabilitation to development could be designed. The term 'contiguum' came into general use to describe how different needs and phases of response might co-exist. Further underpinning the contiguum concept was the realisation that emergencies were not just a temporary disruption to the 'normal' process of development. Instead, they were a symptom of how the forces that created insecurity had become so entrenched as to constitute a 'crisis of developmentalism' (Duffield, 1994). Methods to engage across the LRRD contiguum were developed as faith faded in linear continuum models. Normality itself was found to be an abnormal phenomenon in countries such as Somalia or North Korea, and it was deemed both possible and essential to take on a range of activities, even if none would be easy or predictable. This has led to two realisations. First is that LRRD is not a technical process but rather is anchored in political, economic and sociocultural factors that pre-date and will inevitably post-date any aid intervention. Second is that aid has become part and parcel of international efforts to address security and political change. This latter realisation

<sup>8</sup> During the 1970s and 1980s, humanitarian aid accounted for less than 3 per cent of all official development assistance. Since 1999 it has accounted for 10 per cent (Smillie and Minear, 2004).

has made the protection of humanitarian principles far more difficult than in the past, but is increasingly acknowledged as a field-level reality that profoundly affects how RRD links are constructed.

The conflict discourse from the last fifteen years has overshadowed LRRD processes where natural hazards are major causal factors behind emergencies, and where reduction of natural-disaster risks is therefore an intrinsic part of making the recovery process sustainable. There are good grounds for the gap in the LRRD agenda. Natural disaster response was closely associated with belief in a linear continuum from relief to recovery to ongoing development since the 'disaster' was seen to be caused by a specific, time-bound hazardous event. When attempts were made to apply this model to conflict-related emergencies it became apparent that political emergencies were far more protracted than natural disasters, and that post-conflict transition was a complex and extended process during which there was a high risk of violent conflict re-igniting. However, this distinction between natural disaster and complex political emergency has since been challenged by evidence of the widespread coincidence and indeed convergence of both natural disaster and conflict-related emergencies. Vulnerability to natural disasters is related to conflict-related weakness in governance and social structures. Underlying conflicts may be exposed or aggravated by the shocks of natural disasters. There is a growing realisation that LRRD and risk reduction initiatives need to take into account the mixed nature of hazards and opportunities that arise when a natural phenomenon affects a conflict-ridden society (Buchanan-Smith and Christophos, 2004).

In addition, the link between LRRD and risk reduction that was central to the debate in the 1980s has recently re-emerged from relative obscurity due to the convergence of the occurrence of major natural disasters (including the tsunami) with the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, Japan in February 2005. One result of this has been that agencies such as Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP-BCPR) are reviewing the divide that has existed between their respective natural-disaster and conflict sections to see how better to promote a more integrated and effective response to natural disasters that have their roots in conflicts and political complexities.

## 3.2 Current approaches to rights and institutional relationships

Approaches to dealing with institutional relationships and rights are of particular relevance to LRRD in the tsunami response. It has been recognised that LRRD is dependent on flexibility, communication and trust among different actors at different levels. It is also reliant on a shift of responsibilities for upholding the basic rights of affected populations from international actors to national government and local institutions. This implies the need to consider the shifting roles of different actors including:

- humanitarian agencies
- development agencies (primarily IFIs and the UN)
- local government
- national government
- the private sector
- local civil society
- communities
- households.

The multilayered reality of LRRD implies attention to the importance of an array of institutional issues within and beyond the aid industry. This includes anything from handover strategies between international NGOs and IFIs to how households regain trust in their village leaders, local government and shopkeepers after years of conflict and amid tensions over access to aid flows.

In recent years there has been a shift in development and humanitarian aid agencies towards adopting rights-based approaches. This would seem to provide a basis for reconsidering how the aid sector relates to local and national actors in LRRD processes. Rather than focusing only on need and selection of recipients, a rights-based approach should focus attention on people's ability to claim their rights and on the identification of duty-bearers. From an LRRD perspective, a fundamental measure of progress is whether the international community is able to 'hand back' the duty to uphold the rights of the disaster-affected population to local and national authorities. In countries where conflict and risk of conflict are chronic, this is not a linear process but rather a variable requiring both caution and contextual understanding.

Despite these caveats, a rights-based approach nonetheless provides a conceptual basis for relating humanitarian and development action. ActionAid states that: 'poverty and vulnerability to emergencies often share a common root: the widespread denial of specific rights and freedoms' (ActionAid, 2000, p 2). Furthermore, the need to address disaster risk is also part of the equation. Pelling has highlighted how the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 'supports the right to personal security and for a basic standard of living during periods of unforeseen livelihood disruption' (Pelling, 2003, p 236).

Although headquarters declarations increasingly include calls for rights-based approaches, many aid agencies which ostensibly claim to have undergone such a paradigm shift still seem to be at a loss as to how to use the concept both to reduce long-term vulnerability and to address acute violations of rights. Darcy and Hofmann conclude that 'the concept of rights seems to be honoured more in rhetoric than in practice' (Darcy and Hofmann, 2003, p 22). One reason for this is that a rights-based approach must be anchored in relations with local and national government, with the international aid community playing a diminishing role. The weakness of these relationships, and mutual distrust, have stymied genuine application of this new paradigm.

In addition to these overarching conceptual frameworks for LRRD, there are two topics that have very recently become a major focus of programming, so much so that they could be described as 'fads'. These are cash-based responses and livelihoods.

Cash-based responses have been discussed and tested for nearly a decade.<sup>9</sup> Starting from criticisms of food aid in the mid-1990s (Clay and Stokke, 2000), they were seen as a way to avoid the negative aspects of food aid and were generally seen to be more developmental since recipients could themselves choose whether to use the resources for consumption or investment (or, in other words, for relief or development). In addition, cash was seen to be inherently safer in that it stimulates rather than competes with local markets for agricultural products. It constitutes a market-based approach to developing local capacities since the recipients of the cash can spend their money on the carpenter, doctor or shop that they choose, rather than one chosen for them by an outside agency. The tsunami response has seen a rapid increase in use of cash-based response. It is too early to assess the results of this large-scale 'experiment', but it appears that a major shift in the nature of aid response is underway. The second phase of this evaluation will look further into the outcomes of this potentially radical shift in aid modalities.

Livelihoods became a mainstream concern in development programming in the mid-1990s, but the term has only more recently become prominent in the humanitarian sector. It is important to stress, however, that the term 'livelihoods' has very different meanings in development and humanitarian programming. In development, the sustainable livelihoods concept was introduced in order to shed light on how people themselves struggle to survive. It focuses on choosing modest aid inputs to complement the choices that the target groups themselves make. When applied to the chronically poor, these interventions are often related to stabilising labour markets and building bridges between social protection and rural production efforts (Farrington et al, 2004; Devereux and Sabetes-Wheeler, 2004; Longley et al, 2006).

The supply-side bias of the humanitarian sector has meant that among many relief agencies the term 'livelihoods' is instead largely used to refer to the distribution of assets such as carpentry tools, sewing machines, seeds, agricultural implements, fishing nets and boats. As will be discussed in Section 7.2 below, these distributions are seldom based on analyses of the actual livelihood strategies of the intended recipients, but instead reflect stylised and often media-driven perceptions of poor farmers and fisherfolk. As such, humanitarian livelihoods programming is usually fundamentally different from the kinds of interventions that would be chosen in development efforts. This is a central issue in LRRD since developmental approaches could be expected to emanate from the livelihood strategies of the affected populations themselves, whereas humanitarian approaches tend to reflect what aid agencies think the target group should be doing.

<sup>9</sup> See Peppiatt et al (2001).



## 3.3 Future challenges in the LRRD agenda

The developments in LRRD approaches in recent years have filled many conceptual gaps, but there are other areas where emerging knowledge has yet to be reflected in the aid discourse. These areas include:

- rebuilding markets and market relationships
- transcending the 'yeoman farmer/fisher fallacy' that assumes that own-account production is the best path to follow
- finding a supportive and effective relationship with local government
- finding policy and programming synergies to take advantage of the economic boost that often accompanies a disaster
- confronting major gaps in human-resource capacities within and beyond the aid industry
- closing the gap between rhetoric and reality in disaster risk reduction.

All of these issues have affected LRRD in the tsunami response, and this report will return to these questions. It is too early to draw clear conclusions regarding many of these LRRD challenges, but it is hoped that this report will provide a basis for bringing together the most relevant aspects of a debate often previously seen by many aid practitioners as being too abstract for practical application.

In sum, and partially due to the tsunami, the age of optimism in LRRD thinking appears to be over. The belief that 'if we only had more money, things would work out' has been disproved. Things have not been easy in the first year of LRRD after the tsunami. End-of-the-year reporting and plans contain many sober reflections on the challenges ahead. Illustrating this, in its revised emergency and recovery appeal, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) states 'We were overly optimistic in our expectations regarding the pace of recovery, and we were not alone' (IFRC, 2005 p3).



# Response overview: Sri Lanka

The tsunami affected a variety of areas in Sri Lanka with totally different forms of needs, losses, poverty, vulnerability and risk (Amarasinghe et al, 2005). Caution is therefore warranted in making any sweeping generalisations about what LRRD means for the tsunami-affected populations. The common assumption that disasters affect only the poorest does not tell the full story. This disaster affected many different people with different potential for resilience and different forms of poverty. Furthermore, the resilience of the poor in Sri Lanka is often directly related to the resilience of their wealthier neighbours since the poor are very often dependent on wage employment and markets for their products, both of which are related to the vitality of the broader economy.

The tsunami caused over 30,000 fatalities in Sri Lanka and displaced over 860,000 people. In addition to the humanitarian impacts of the tsunami, economic losses have been estimated at US\$1 billion (4.5 per cent of gross domestic product), with nearly US\$700 million of private assets destroyed. The fishing industry lost assets of up to US\$97 million while tourism-related industries lost infrastructure and equipment valued at US\$250 million. The housing sector sustained damage to the value of between US\$306 and US\$341 million. Up to 3 per cent of the labour force or about 200,000 people lost their jobs, including 100,000 in fisheries, 27,000 in tourism and related activities, and the remainder in informal-sector activities. Despite these damages, the tsunami was expected to slow GDP growth by only approximately 1 per cent. In fact, growth for 2005 was ultimately slightly higher than most projections before the tsunami. The construction sector is expected to grow from an average of 5.5 per cent (in recent years) to 8–10 per cent over the coming three years (FCCISL, 2005). Commerce has recovered quickly and the majority of those who lost the primary source of their livelihoods due to the tsunami have recovered some form of gainful employment.

The shift from purely humanitarian response to a mixed portfolio of rehabilitation and development programmes occurred quickly. Distribution of cash grants and

assets for livelihood promotion began almost immediately. Some of those interviewed in the Sri Lanka Country Study noted that the decision to re-open schools was a driving force for the transition as it resulted in pressures to vacate the schools being used as temporary shelters in which a large number of people were housed. By the second half of 2005 efforts focused on transitional shelter, resettlement and permanent housing. The need to construct transitional shelters brought to fore the complexity of the reconstruction process, including issues such as property rights, design and priorities for infrastructural redevelopment, water and sanitation, and construction standards. Both the quantitative and qualitative interviews in the Sri Lanka study indicated that relief was generally perceived to have been fairly equitably distributed. However, rehabilitation efforts have been plagued by geopolitical biases and weak transparency. In most respects, relief efforts were generally seen to have 'done no harm', but criticism is increasing of potential damage to fish stocks due to over-distribution of boats and the negative impact of aid on local institutions that have lost staff to international agencies.

The international response is indeed massive. It has not been well coordinated. In some areas in the south and southwest aid has far exceeded tsunami losses, whereas in some parts of the east and northeast very limited support has been received. Little assistance has been provided to conflict-affected populations, which has created significant resentment. Despite these problems, the scale of the response has meant that few people have been completely left out. Complaints reported in the Sri Lanka Country Study about rations received referred to quality and style, not quantity, indicating that basic needs were met, if not cultural preferences.

There are two overarching factors that will govern the prospects for further rehabilitation and development. The first is the return of conflict. Initially after the tsunami, reports indicated that tensions were somewhat eased. At the time of writing this report (December 2005) conflict is rapidly escalating. The implications of this are dire but as yet unclear. The second issue is the relaxation of regulations on buffer zones. These were revised in October 2005 as the research for this report was being conducted. Regulations have now been returned to those in force (but seldom enforced) before the tsunami. It is too early to draw conclusions regarding the implications of the changing regulations, but they will clearly have profound impact on where people will live, what kinds of shelter programmes they will need and how they will pursue their future livelihoods.

# Response overview: Aceh

The response to the massive earthquake and tsunami in Aceh is in transition. Relief efforts continue, but increasingly the government and larger aid agencies are initiating major reconstruction programmes. Commerce has recovered rapidly, and the affected populations are proceeding with their own LRRD efforts. The situation differs greatly from that in Sri Lanka due to the signing and implementation of the peace agreement between the government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – GAM), ending 30 years of conflict. This has resulted in strong commitment to investments in rehabilitation and development across the province, beyond the tsunami-affected areas.

The international presence in Aceh has also created new pressures and opportunities to combine the rebuilding of Aceh with peacebuilding efforts. After the tsunami there were major concerns about restricted access in an area that was largely off-limits to humanitarian organisations before. The massive needs created by the tsunami led to a surprising openness by government to international assistance that has carried over to other areas of intervention and institutional relationships. The generous amount of funding dedicated to the tsunami recovery effort has contributed to initiating the peace process and may contribute to its stability.

International and national agencies helped to support early Acehnese initiatives in responding to the tsunami disaster, providing structure, form and most importantly funding to the necessary relief. Emergency housing needs were met through the initial provision of tents, and the construction of permanent dwellings has begun. Livelihoods in the form of trading, labour, farming and fishing have been re-established quickly, partly with support from the aid community. Private sector investment has been encouraged by the reduction of the informal ‘taxation’ by warring parties that plagued the area before the tsunami. Cash-for-work initiatives have contributed to increased economic activity and purchasing power.

The Indonesia Country Study found that over time, however, public satisfaction with the aid response has diminished. This is partly due to the slowness of

rehabilitation response (especially the provision of transitional and permanent housing) and also disenchantment with the local leaders who act as intermediaries in aid provision. The Acehnese have limited awareness and understanding of the plans of government and aid organisations, and little faith that these plans will reflect their needs and desires. Misinformation, rumour and perceived 'broken promises' are causing confusion and anger. The Indonesia Country Study found that disillusioned villagers are ready to take what they can get from aid agencies, but are otherwise mostly focused on getting on with their own lives as best they can.

The government has attempted to coordinate, but on the whole has merely endorsed the decisions made by the aid industry. The importance of strengthening government institutions has been recognised, but this will be a slow process due to the loss and lack of civil service capacity. Partly as a result of this, planning for reconstruction and development has been slow to get underway. Particularly in the initial emergency phase, community solidarity was strong and resources were shared with those most in need. There is still a general feeling that aid is being provided reasonably equitably (if not transparently). More recently, however, the disaster-affected populations' trust in their local leaders is diminishing rapidly due to concerns about corruption, politicisation and lack of accountability.

# The role of LRRD policies in the tsunami response

## 6.1 Progress in headquarters policies and response structures

In the past, the architecture of aid has often been painted as the villain in the LRRD conundrum. Aid for LRRD has been deemed to be dysfunctional both in terms of the internal workings of agencies and their relationships with ‘partners’ in the aid community and host institutions. Internal problems stem from different departments being responsible for humanitarian response and for development, and the existence of distinctive organisational cultures and operational procedures, and even distrust between departments. These structural challenges prevail, but representatives of all agencies interviewed in the policy study expressed sensitivity to these dangers, and at headquarters levels agencies were taking exceptional steps to establish cross-departmental structures and taskforces for their tsunami response. In some cases these arrangements were created specifically for the tsunami response. In others they are expected to become part of standard operating procedures. As the disaster affected a vast geographical area, there was even a need to create coordination and cooperation structures that could link African, South Asian and Southeast Asian divisions and an array of country offices. The majority of those interviewed at headquarters level reported that these structures worked well and encouraged a more collegial approach.

Most development agencies claimed a general mandate for LRRD as derived from their mission to engage in reconstruction, poverty alleviation and support to governance. Agencies with a primarily humanitarian mandate, such as the Red Cross, are supportive of LRRD but are uncertain of how far to permit ‘mandate creep’ to pull them into responsibilities for which they lack capacity. The Red Cross Movement has substantial negative past experience when, after the withdrawal of international assistance, well-meant support to host Red Cross

societies ultimately left them struggling to manage heavily over-dimensioned portfolios of projects.

The Policy Study encountered different views in Indonesia and Sri Lanka from those at headquarters levels. Operational actors expressed some doubts about whether donor-level LRRD reforms have contributed to solving their problems. Donor restrictions are still seen as a problem (albeit far less so than usual, in the tsunami response). There is a concern that further reforms are needed to achieve what they see as an appropriate balance between aid to tsunami-affected and to conflict-affected populations. Concerns were noted that programmes (or at least programme descriptions) still need to be designed to match the categories of available funding (ie, for tsunami relief) rather than for prevailing conflict-related needs. They note that when funding in response to a crisis is coming from two different departments of a single donor organisation, the need for functional links between relief and development within the donor agency is important. Other donors with broader functional and conceptual definitions of 'humanitarianism' may be easier to deal with since operational agencies need interact with only one department.

## 6.2 Limited impact on field-level operations

All three empirical TEC LRRD studies found that the topic of 'LRRD' is itself not a matter of great concern in the field. While most aid actors express general support for the need to make these linkages work, there was little evidence that LRRD policies have explicitly driven programming. The growing emphasis on contiguums in policy statements has had little impact in operations apart from encouraging earlier engagement in rehabilitation. At operational levels, LRRD is still largely conceptualised as a temporal continuum of distinct phases from relief to development. Interviews clearly indicated that LRRD policies are too vague and too disconnected from operational decision-making to impact significantly on field-level programming.

Even if policies do little to guide programming, LRRD nonetheless 'happens' all the time in decisions related to shelter, livelihoods and handover strategies, for example, and it is within these more concrete areas that potential impact from policy reform is greatest. When agencies describe their sectoral activities, these encompass a concern for needs and opportunities across the LRRD spectrum. LRRD thus seemed to be embodied more in sectoral activities than in overall country strategies. Judging from how interviewees deal with sectoral programmes it appears that these sub-contiguums are perhaps more meaningful than the LRRD discourse, which tends to be perceived as 'woolly and academic'.

At the time of the evaluation, affected populations in Aceh and Sri Lanka have both stated that their two primary needs are shelter and work, and that the two are inextricably linked. Approaches to these two sectors are by nature virtually always structured around LRRD processes. Progress has been slow in provision of shelter. Efforts have in many respects been reckless in supporting livelihoods. These sectoral LRRD policies are further reviewed in Section 7 below.

## 6.3 LRRD and the state: whose agenda?

LRRD is easily misperceived as being primarily a matter for aid agencies to sort out among themselves. The debate around aid architecture frequently portrays LRRD as a link or gap between the agendas of humanitarian and development agencies (or between the humanitarian and development wings of a single agency). In countries with functioning and legitimate host governments, as is the case in the tsunami response, LRRD is inevitably a hollow concept if it does not encompass a process by which links are made between the international community and the host state and local civil society.

Despite formal acknowledgements to this effect, many international agencies have failed to make significant efforts to align or harmonise their efforts with those of national actors. Many have failed even to try and ascertain what national policies, processes and development trajectories may be of relevance to their work. The quantity of funding available has encouraged a disproportionate emphasis on individual agencies getting on with simply implementing individual projects, at the expense of links to the local and national institutions that would need to be involved if these projects were to be made sustainable. These forms of coordination are seen to be 'political' (as indeed they are) and it is feared that they could delay programming and reduce flexibility. Some agencies perceive their role as one of acting in solidarity with the affected populations, and see the involvement of other actors in this relationship as inherently irrelevant.

There are also other reasons why responsiveness to national agendas has been limited. The weaknesses of governmental leadership in Indonesia and Sri Lanka suggest that the aid community has due cause to retain a significant decision-making role, even as operations move beyond relief. In interviews, representatives of many international NGOs referred to their desire to avoid being drawn into national political divisions as a reason for keeping a measure of distance from government. But the question of 'whose agenda' nonetheless still deserves significant attention. In some ways this issue is one of 'lateral accountability', whereby agencies make themselves accountable to inform national and local governmental actors of their actions and to ensure that coordination mechanisms are inclusive and respected. Such reporting is unsatisfactory. For example, by October 2005 there were estimated to be 438 NGOs working in Aceh, only 180 of which had reported on their activities to the government.

### 6.3.1 Sri Lanka

The Sri Lankan government has attempted to establish leadership in linking aid response to a longer term rehabilitation agenda, although this attempt has not been effective. There are several reasons for this:

- Coordination structures have had unclear and changing mandates. The Taskforce on Relief was responsible for coordinating relief operations, and the Taskforce on Rebuilding the Nation was responsible for coordinating

reconstruction efforts. Since the change of government both have now been replaced by the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA).

- Responsibility for the conflict-affected north and east was allocated to the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation; for the south it was allocated to the Ministry of Social Services. While this made sense in terms of familiarity, the geographical separation of responsibilities may have weakened coordination. Overall responsibility is now in the hands of RADA.
- There has been a lack of clarity regarding the initial buffer zone regulations and their subsequent modification, which has led to inconsistencies in governmental direction and created tension between the desires to respond to community needs and to central leadership.
- The government has accepted external funding largely without reference to its own broader strategies for development and poverty alleviation.
- Agencies working in Tamil areas (particularly LTTE-controlled areas) feel that the government has hindered their work; a perception borne out by the relatively poor aid coverage in these areas.
- Despite assurances to the contrary, response mechanisms have strengthened pre-existing tendencies toward centralisation (Shanmugaratnam, 2005, p 160).
- The Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure was intended to be a vehicle for developing national ownership; its non-implementation created delays and ultimately a vacuum in coordination between the government and the international community.

As this report is being written it is unclear how the change in government will affect the ability of the state to exert leadership over the tsunami response, but the increasing levels of violence have created incentives for agencies to distance themselves further from government authority.

### **6.3.2 Indonesia**

In contrast to initial expectations, government efforts to lead the LRRD agenda have functioned somewhat better in Aceh. The Indonesian government surprised most observers by deciding to let international NGOs work in Aceh despite the province having been largely closed to aid for many years. Further encouragement to the reconstruction process in Aceh has come from the signing of the peace treaty in Helsinki between the Indonesian government and the GAM. A new Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) was set up in April/May 2005 to oversee the reconstruction effort. BRR is trying, perhaps rather belatedly, to impose some quality control and overall coordination on the huge number of reconstruction initiatives. Much of the funding for BRR, including the Multi Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and Northern Sumatra (MDTFANS), led by the World Bank, has been channelled through the Ministry of Finance in Jakarta. MDTFANS has acknowledged a large number of bottlenecks, many of which stem from financial management issues within governmental ministries and UNDP. Despite these delays a strong commitment to building and working through national institutions has been retained (MDTFANS, 2005).



### 6.3.3 Coordination of activities versus strategic coordination

The task of coordinating the massive influx of aid has been difficult. TEC LRRD findings in both countries indicate that coordination efforts during the first year of the tsunami response have been primarily limited to gaining some measure of direction over activities, rather than in promoting and prioritising strategic outcomes, or obtaining a consensus on goals. This was less problematic when the focus was on relief operations since the basic goals of ensuring basic survival were largely self-evident. More strategic coordination is essential as rehabilitation and development efforts come to the fore, as sustainability is ultimately reliant on harmonisation and alignment with government and within the aid community. Other major reconstruction efforts, such as after Hurricane Mitch (Christoplos, 2000) and in the Balkans (Sida, 2005), have performed poorly as indicated by the abandonment of reconstructed housing and unsustainable livelihoods initiatives due to the piecemeal nature of small NGO projects (Longley et al, 2006).

Achieving better coordination is not just a question of will, but also of capacity. An estimated 20 per cent of local government staff in Aceh perished in the tsunami. The government has tried to address this by sending staff from other parts of the country. For example, 180 officers from the National Land Agency have been sent to assist in land re-registration, in a programme financed by the World Bank (Indonesia-Relief.org, 2005a). Agencies trying to work through such local structures accept that they will have to cover additional costs and experience some delays in implementation in the short term, but they see that this is the only appropriate approach.

## 6.4 Linking policies to capacities: international, national and local

A critical determinant of whether LRRD translates from policy to practice in a major emergency will be whether key staff responsible for managing agency responses understand what is entailed in linking their relief, rehabilitation and development activities both in terms of day-to-day management and also with respect to overall vision. This requires an ability to look beyond individual projects or needs to assess wider relevance and sustainability. Maintaining equilibrium between administering rapid response and analysis of strategic policy options is not a simple process or one that can be done by headquarters-led 'remote control'. The calibre of field-level management is crucial. A number of respondents in the Policy Study commented that agencies' ability to engage effectively in LRRD is dependent on having mature, experienced personnel who can 'keep their heads' and focus on the strategic while responding to the urgent.

This evaluation found no clear correlation between agencies with well-considered policies in relation to LRRD and similarly well-considered LRRD programmes and operational modalities. The quality of policies is in many respects secondary to the ability of staff in the field to conceptualise how their programmes relate to the

wider context. Albeit anecdotal, evidence in both Aceh and Sri Lanka indicated that success was related to the extent to which agencies were able to deploy staff with the skills and confidence not just to implement their own programmes but also to maintain strong communications with other actors, especially local government, the UN and NGOs. Any major emergency presents significant recruitment difficulties, and the tsunami was no exception. Most international agencies reported struggling to increase their staffing rapidly and vastly by seconding staff from other programmes, recruiting new international personnel and recruiting staff locally. Those agencies with no prior programme in country found it particularly difficult to recruit appropriate and sufficient international and national staff.

The situation regarding national staff differed considerably between Aceh and Sri Lanka. In most respects recruitment was easier in the latter due to the existence of a human resource pool with more experience in managing aid flows, language skills and generally higher education levels. In Aceh, where the number of English speakers with NGO experience is far more limited, personnel have been recruited from other areas of Indonesia. This is not to say that human resources were necessarily lacking in Aceh. At village level there appears to be stronger local traditional civil society in Aceh, but the skills needed to link these indigenous structures to the international aid industry were significantly weaker.

#### **6.4.1 Partnerships and poaching**

As is frequently the case in major emergencies, the massive influx of international agencies into the affected areas had a problematic impact on the capacity of local organisations themselves to respond to the disaster. Although many agencies profess commitments to build the capacity of partners, the competition to recruit competent personnel from local governmental and non-governmental organisations resulted in the opposite. In the Policy Study a respondent from one Sri Lankan NGO described this as ‘capacity breaking’ rather than ‘capacity building’. A representative of another NGO in Sri Lanka described the NGO as a ‘production factory’ for international agencies, having lost 25 staff members to international NGOs.

Difficulties in retaining personnel have affected international NGO approaches to capacity development as well. Although many international agencies stress the need for strengthening the capacities of local partners in financial management, monitoring and evaluation, there is the danger that well-trained staff will move on to better-paid jobs and that their own operations will therefore not benefit from such investments.

Several agencies also reported that the influx of so many new agencies searching for personnel with an appropriate combination of administrative, technical, and language skills had a severe inflationary impact on wages. The budgets of some larger national NGOs have grown enormously, allowing them to take part in bidding for staff, but with potentially disastrous results when funding levels subside. The Red Cross Movement has highlighted this as an area of concern for the national Red Cross societies in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Some interviewees

from international agencies noted that they have remained operational for longer than they would have preferred in order to avoid pushing their local partners into an unsustainable growth curve.

### **6.4.2 External expertise versus local knowledge**

A major issue for international agencies already operating development programmes in Sri Lanka and Indonesia was the question of whether merely to strengthen existing structures or to send seasoned emergency professionals to lead the tsunami response, that is, whether to link their local development capacities to relief efforts or their international relief capacities to pre-existing development structures. Some agencies have clear policies stating that the overall response should be managed by their local personnel, who are assumed to have the local knowledge and relationships necessary for effective LRRD. Emergency professionals are deployed to support rather than replace local managers. Other agencies applied parallel or 'step-aside' policies to replace country-level managers in Aceh and Sri Lanka with senior personnel from other regions who were seen to have the leadership skills and experience to run large emergency programmes.

Some senior personnel observed that this enabled them to link existing development programmes quickly to relief by bringing in wider humanitarian skills and experience. However, these policies are controversial. In-country personnel (national and international) reported that the managers flown in from Africa or Latin America lacked understanding of and sensitivity to the local context. There were also reports of relatively junior international humanitarian personnel taking over responsibilities from senior national personnel as part of this change of command. 'Step-aside' policies may also have a conservative bias, leading to a 'repetitive emergency response syndrome' in which operational leadership draws on past experience rather than engaging with the specifics of the new operation. Even though most of the emergency specialists have now left for Pakistan and other operations, tensions and bitterness remain, especially among many national personnel who feel that their competence was under-utilised at a time when it was most needed.

# Sectoral performance

## 7.1 Shelter and community planning

Shelter is clearly the sector where LRRD performance has been most problematic. Dissatisfaction has been widely expressed by affected populations, with problems falling into the following eight categories:

- speed
- property rights
- relocation
- community planning and consultation
- quality
- equity and transparency
- environmental impact
- risk reduction and the buffer zones.

### 7.1.1 Speed

The proportion of affected populations still living in tents one year after the tsunami has been almost universally described as unacceptable. It is sometimes referred to as the 'second emergency'. At the end of September 2005, 0.6 per cent of the required houses had been constructed in Sri Lanka, and the houses that had been built were not in the worst affected areas (Perera, 2005a). The reasons for this are many. In addition to problems noted below, there is a lack of skilled masons and carpenters in most of the affected areas. Shortages of building materials have been reported. There is also a scarcity of large construction firms, which has created virtual monopolies in many areas. Agencies have been presented with a choice of paying exorbitant prices or waiting. Official ceilings on what new

houses should cost, instituted to ensure equity, have had to be readjusted and are often ignored. Construction of transitional shelter has nonetheless progressed reasonably well in much of Sri Lanka, permitting time for consideration of other factors before proceeding with permanent housing. The construction of transitional housing has been much slower in Aceh. Those who have moved into government-constructed barracks in Aceh appear to accept that delays are inevitable, while those in tents are increasingly angry and frustrated. In many reconstruction efforts after other disasters, temporary solutions have tended to become permanent (Barakat, 2003). Especially in Aceh, people have been hesitant to accept transitional housing for fear of losing the chance to obtain permanent houses, an attitude that may well be justified, especially since affected populations are unable to hold agencies accountable for making good on their promises.

Although the aid community has been heavily criticised for lack of speed, there are a growing number of observers who question whether speed is possible or desirable if affected populations are to be provided with high quality housing in functional communities. The problem may instead be one of ignorance and arrogance in the claims made by political actors and many aid agencies that permanent housing would be provided rapidly. The factors behind the slow progress in shelter should have come as no surprise to agencies that have engaged in post-disaster shelter programmes elsewhere. The key concern is thus not one of slow response but rather of why unrealistic expectations were actively encouraged. Promises reflected what the donors, the public in Northern countries and the public in Aceh and Sri Lanka wanted to hear. They also were tactically important for agencies wishing to stake out 'turf' by claiming to be fastest in addressing the needs of specific groups of beneficiaries. Agencies report that when they have transparently discussed the challenges of shelter and community planning with affected populations they readily accept that building permanent housing will take time. Problems of impatience stem more from agencies and politicians having made wildly optimistic plans and promises.

### **7.1.2 Property rights**

One of the main factors behind the delays in shelter programming has been that of securing property rights for new locations and for those who lack (or have lost) certified title to their land. Even before the disaster, property rights were contentious due to increasing population pressures and changing investment and land-use patterns. For example, some internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Aceh were resettled in villages that had been abandoned earlier by Javanese transmigrants who had fled the conflict.

Establishment of clear property rights is not a task for the aid community alone. National and local institutions are required. As mentioned above, Indonesia has sent land officers to assist in re-registration with World Bank support. A Manual for Community-Driven Adjudication has been prepared and 25,000 land parcels were registered before Ramadan (MDTFANS, 2005). In Sri Lanka, the tsunami occurred amid an incomplete devolution of responsibilities for land issues. This created significant confusion regarding who bears the legal responsibilities for many key decisions, which was subsequently aggravated with the introduction of

regulations on buffer zones (CPA, 2005). It should be stressed that property rights is a field where IFIs have considerable experience, but that these skills have not always been optimally utilised given the unusually large engagement of NGOs and the Red Cross Movement in shelter. Some of the NGOs and Red Cross societies involved faced similar challenges after Hurricane Mitch in Central America but, presumably due to turnover of staff and the predominance of very inexperienced staff in the tsunami response, the institutional memory of how to address and take into account issues of property rights has been weak.

Several observers have expressed concerns that the many tenants who have lost their homes will not receive houses of their own since they were landless. This constitutes a conundrum. Land reform is a complex and political task that is not likely to be effectively managed by the humanitarian community. The disaster may appear to be an opportunity to carry out land reforms, but engagement in this field without considerable levels of knowledge, experience and time may encourage corruption and social conflict and do little to address broad structural inequalities (Williams, 2005).

### **7.1.3 Relocation**

Both the government and the disaster-affected populations have struggled with choices of whether new homes should be built in a different location, and if so where. Disputes have been inevitable. Regardless of buffer zone regulations, many communities need to move and some even need to be reconstituted due to the loss of the majority of former inhabitants. Particularly in Aceh, some communities have to move because of the subsidence of the land where their houses stood before. The differences involved in these diverse scenarios have significant implications that are not addressed in one-size-fits-all programming. The unavoidably artificial communities being created have little initial social cohesion and social capital. The original inhabitants of some areas where IDPs are staying or being resettled are beginning to retract the generosity that they at first extended to IDPs (Wu, 2005). In Sri Lanka some of the most intense pressures on land are in the multi-ethnic east, which in turn means that entirely new communities are being created in areas with high potential for ethnic tension (Perera, 2005a). Conflict risks are being increased as a consequence of efforts to reduce risks from natural hazards. Agencies have shown a certain awareness of these issues, but have limited capacity to make significant contributions to the long-term and complex dynamics by which new neighbours develop new social, cultural and economic relations.

### **7.1.4 Community planning and consultation**

Initial plans for housing projects in Aceh were based on blueprint models. These were soon abandoned and it has been claimed that they have been replaced by what is commonly called 'Community-Driven Development' (CDD) (BRR, 2005a). In Sri Lanka there has been more of a mix of the two approaches throughout the past year. Whereas many humanitarian agencies and other NGOs have a modicum of skills in managing the contracts required to build houses, few have extensive experience in ensuring that the houses built are destined to be part of functional communities. This is a component of the LRRD process that usually tends to be left to local

authorities and IFIs. Many agencies have attempted to apply standard participatory methods for community planning, but the complexity of these processes where different interests need to be considered, negotiated and reconciled frequently exceed the skills of the agencies involved (Wu, 2005). Of particular note is that the communities being reconstituted from two or more devastated villages are artificial. This inevitably creates needs and conflicts that are unlikely to be addressed through the consensus mechanisms that characterise participatory rural appraisal and other standard participatory methods. There is often disagreement about who should be in the driver's seat for community development.

The extent to which communities have actually driven programming in either country is disputed. One oft-cited example is the inclusion of indoor toilets in many construction plans in Aceh, where the population perceives these to be inherently unsanitary. There are also reports of indoor kitchens being used as an extra room since outdoor cooking facilities are perceived to be more sanitary. In many programmes traditional customary rules regarding placement of walls, doors and windows have been ignored. A number of agencies have attempted to implement schemes whereby people are provided with materials and encouraged to build houses according to their own preferences. Internationally these methods are generally recognised as 'good practice'. Such methods have sometimes been stymied in the tsunami response due to inter-agency competition over recipients. Some affected populations have chosen to wait for more attractive offers when presented with conditions that require a considerable level of personal investment.

In Aceh one of the major obstacles to community consultation is, paradoxically, the community 'leaders'. Interviews in the Indonesia Country Study and other studies (Wu, 2005) reveal many complaints about how these village heads, or keuchiks, filter rather than facilitate the flow of information to their communities and are frequently accused of pursuing their own personal interests. Good local governance is ostensibly recognised as the basis for many aspects of participatory LRRD processes, but there are few examples of where agencies have had the time or skills required to resolve problems stemming from bad local governance. One irony noted in the Sri Lanka Country Study regarding the consultation process is that the buffer zone conundrum, generally seen to be the bane of LRRD, has delayed efforts to the extent that the aid community has actually had time to develop a relationship (albeit strained) with many disaster-affected communities in the east of Sri Lanka. This may ultimately result in plans that avoid the worst aspects of the blueprint townships being constructed in the south (Perera, 2005b).

### **7.1.5 Quality**

Among agencies and among affected populations, perceptions vary about what levels of quality are to be considered appropriate. For some, the issue of quality is related to the 'standard' of materials and design. There are also reports of very shoddy construction. Agencies have built houses and left, providing no accountability to affected populations for the quality of construction. The IFRC is investing an increasing proportion its resources in retrofitting the transitional housing built by other agencies that has deteriorated far more rapidly than expected.



Quality can also relate to the influence that local people have had in ensuring that houses are relevant for their needs and take into account their knowledge of conditions such as ground moisture, wind direction and tide levels. The Sri Lanka Country Study found that the different standards of housing provided to neighbouring communities by different agencies have created tensions and resentment. Variations within communities have also been prevalent where different agencies have been present. On the other hand, affected populations in well-served areas have sometimes been able to manipulate the aid system as they 'shop' for a house among competing NGOs (BRR, 2005a) – adding an unusual dimension to participation.

### **7.1.6 Equity and transparency**

Major inequities have been noted between different regions, especially in Sri Lanka. Commitments have been made to build 4,591 houses in Hambantota District, despite the fact that only 1,057 houses were lost in the tsunami. The Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation reports that it has been unable to steer aid agencies toward areas in greater need or to prevent such blatant political bias (Perera, 2005a). In Sri Lanka inequity is generally perceived to be primarily due to macro-political factors, although logistical issues are also seen to be the reason why some areas have been particularly poorly served. The Sinhalese population has been far better served by the aid community than have the tsunami-affected Muslim and Tamil populations. Those affected by the conflict have received very little assistance despite often far more pressing needs. In Aceh concerns partly relate to local leaders taking advantage of their role in brokering agreements with the aid community. In both countries the lack of information provided to affected populations has provided fertile soil for rumours and innuendo concerning inequitable provision of housing. Whereas inequity in distributions of smaller assets is often more or less accepted, such differences in large and visible assets, such as houses, generate considerably more anger and frustration.

### **7.1.7 Environmental impact**

Disposal of solid waste and debris was the initial priority for environmental efforts related to shelter and was generally seen to be managed well. Now attention is shifting to mitigating the negative impacts of the reconstruction process itself. Particularly in Aceh, concerns have been raised that a shortage of wood for house construction may lead to irreparable impact on remaining forests (WWF and Greenomics Indonesia, 2005).

Regulations for assessing the environmental impacts of reconstruction have been put into place, and there are a number of initiatives under way to promote eco-friendly modalities. It is difficult at this point to assess how widespread these forms of programming are and how well regulations are being followed. Illegal logging was extensive in Sumatra before the tsunami, and the pressures to build quickly and cheaply may be stronger than incentives to ensure that supplies are sourced from legal and sustainably managed holdings. Uncontrolled quarrying is also a cause for concern, as is the damage done to fragile environments where former forests, hillsides and wetlands are rapidly cleared for construction of new

settlements. Pits that have been left after the excavation of sand in Sri Lanka are providing breeding areas for mosquitoes.

Further problems may arise in the future if agriculture and firewood collection degrade landscapes and if fishing populations encounter difficulties in adapting to unfamiliar environments. The experience of ill-conceived transmigration programmes in Indonesia includes numerous examples of the environmental devastation caused by the movement of populations from one agro-ecological region to another. The massive forest fires that have plagued Southeast Asia in recent years are partly the result of ill-founded resettlement schemes and would seem to provide a glaring warning (Stolle et al, 2003; Packel, 2005). Compounding these risks, the capacity of local environmental management authorities in Aceh was shattered in the tsunami (BRR, 2005b), which makes it difficult to monitor and enforce regulations.

### **7.1.8 Risk reduction and the buffer zones**

Many of the aspects above relate to the role that housing plays in reducing or enhancing risks from future natural disasters, public health problems, destitution and even conflict. Buffer zones were introduced early in the response to the tsunami as a meta-solution for ensuring that shelter reconstruction contributes to reducing risks from natural disasters. The massive difficulties of implementing programmes within the buffer zone framework soon turned the issue of buffer zones into a meta-problem that aggravated most of the factors described above – especially speed. Risk reduction became an obstacle to both relief and development, rather than an inherent component of both. Partially due to these factors, the aid community has taken an ambivalent stance in its response to government resettlement plans. It is widely recognised that participating in these plans without consultation with communities and households is not ‘good practice’, but that taking the time required for negotiating about the need for consultation, and indeed the need to reconsider the extent of the buffer zones, would also have negative consequences. In Sri Lanka the buffer zones were relaxed and the extent of the zones became an election issue. During the autumn of 2005 confusion reigned over the extent of the buffer zones (Perera, 2005b). At year-end the government finally reversed all of the post-tsunami regulations and returned to guidelines from 1997 coastal-zone management plans – regulations that were rarely followed in the past.

The issues surrounding the buffer zones should not have caught the aid community by surprise. In a lessons learnt paper issued in January 2005, the World Bank noted:

it is necessary to assess whether the reasons for relocation are technically correct before planning to relocate people or entire villages. Particularly when moving people away from coastal zones, the tendency to return is almost irresistible. When relocating people away from one risk, it is important to keep exposure to new risks in mind. While it may be important to settle people away from flood-prone areas, in situ reconstruction should be promoted after earthquakes to take advantage of existing infrastructure and community facilities, while minimizing resettlement and its attendant social dislocation (World Bank, 2005, p 3).

### 7.1.9 Shelter: the Achilles heel of humanitarian response

The problems noted above are not unique to the tsunami response. Past reviews of humanitarian evaluations by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian (ALNAP) have noted that shelter is an area in which performance has been poor. Probably for this reason, in the first months of 2005 many agencies were hesitant about making large commitments to housing despite the glaring fact that this was destined to be the largest reconstruction need. The IFRC, for example, did not specify housing as a primary focus in its Regional Strategy and Operational Framework presented in March 2005 ([http://www.ifrc.org/docs/pubs/disasters/ars\\_en.pdf](http://www.ifrc.org/docs/pubs/disasters/ars_en.pdf)). Since then, shelter has grown to become the largest component of Red Cross response.

In sum, although the housing sector has been the primary focus of the call to 'build back better', there is limited consensus on what 'betterments' are appropriate, essential, possible or desirable. Even if there was such a consensus, there would be grossly insufficient levels of skills to manage the tasks required among the agencies entrusted with funds for housing. In Sri Lanka, 258 organisations have committed themselves to building houses, but at the end of 2005 most had not completed a single house (THRU, 2006). The confusion associated with the buffer zones is just part of the problem. Few of these 258 organisations, which include a tyre company, a golf club and an eye-donation society, have any past experience in any form of housing or community planning.

This is not just a matter of calling for more 'participation'. Interviews in Aceh have shown a lack of community capacity to make plans that address the eight sets of factors listed above, and that affected populations tend therefore to look for shortcuts to get what they can out of the aid system as fast as they can. This can be seen as either an argument for returning to top-down planning modalities, or a recognition that there are no quick fixes to consultation and ownership.

Despite these challenges, the reasons for the overwhelming focus on shelter are clear. For affected populations, shelter is the crux of their LRRD conundrum. The rebuilding of communities and service institutions is reliant on people knowing where they will live and when they are going to move (if they are to be resettled). Agencies rebuilding schools, clinics, roads and other infrastructure need to know where the students, patients and travellers are going to live. Uncertainties about housing plans have profound knock-on effects for a variety of aspects of recovery programming related to public services and other infrastructure. Respondents in both the TEC evaluations and other studies stress that in order to make genuine re-investment in their livelihoods, shelter has to come first. One report notes:

After removing the tsunami debris, recovering bodies, and helping with burials, when asked 'What next?', people replied 'We need homes; we need our houses again.' We said that's not something that Oxfam has done before, to which the response was, 'If you're not doing houses, you're not doing anything.' (Renton and Palmer, 2005, p 10)

The move beyond emergency shelter does not sit well with humanitarian agencies. It is not fast, when the organisational structures of the humanitarian sector are

built for speed. It is not neutral, since the decisions required regarding property rights, land-use planning and access to natural resources are by nature part of political processes at national and local levels. It is not impartial, since houses are extremely 'lumpy assets' that cannot be effectively distributed in an equitable manner across huge areas with different needs, capacities and risks. One study reports Acehnese people as saying that 'Small aid is better than big aid which is uneven' (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects and ProVention, 2005, p 7). It would be unrealistic to expect humanitarian agencies alone to solve many of the serious deficiencies that have emerged in shelter and community planning. The problem is rather that, for a disaster-affected person, the house is the hub in a wheel of recovery with many broken and missing spokes. Taking on the task of providing housing should not imply a commitment to fixing the entire wheel, but it should mean taking on a responsibility for highlighting, cajoling, advocating, networking and negotiating with the many actors who should be involved in assisting new and reconstructed communities to start off on the right track.

## 7.2 Livelihoods

### 7.2.1 Complex livelihoods need complex support

Any consideration of the relevance and effectiveness of livelihood support must start from an analysis of how well the tsunami-affected regions were integrated with markets, and of the diversity and complexity of the livelihoods of the affected population. On the whole the tsunami-affected areas were neither isolated nor reliant on subsistence production. The vast majority of affected populations derived their livelihoods through a mix of strategies, most of which were dependent on functioning market economies. In an LRRD perspective, so-called livelihoods programming should be judged on whether efforts transcend the provision of mere alternatives to food aid, to looking also at how the diversity and complexity of ways in which people strive for longer term dignity and survival have been encouraged or undermined.

Despite a high level of market integration, there were considerable problems in livelihood development in the pre-tsunami context. Due to the conflict and other factors, an economic reversal was underway in Aceh before the tsunami. Urban employment was declining and people were returning to small-scale agricultural production (BRR, 2005a). In Sri Lanka as well, fears of renewed conflict were discouraging new investment in many areas. In both countries the costs of transport have risen faster than either wages or prices paid for commercial crops both before and after the tsunami. Destruction of infrastructure has contributed to these declining terms of trade, but international oil prices have taken their toll as well.

This suggests that hopes for a linear continuum from relief to development are not likely to be realised. If livelihoods programming is to be part of LRRD it must reflect the economic trends, opportunities and challenges present before the disaster. Experience of livelihoods programming elsewhere has shown that this is rarely part of programming calculations (Longley et al, 2006). Instead there is a tendency to provide standard-package solutions (especially seeds and tools) and to rely on false

assumptions about affected populations being subsistence farmers and fisherfolk. The role of markets for labour and products in ensuring livelihoods viability are ignored. As with other areas of tsunami programming, the international community has enough funds to 'do it right' this time, but does it have the contextual understanding, patience and listening skills in order to avoid these pitfalls from post-emergency programming in other contexts? The fundamental question in assessing the relevance of livelihood support is whether it represents an effort to build upon how people survive, or whether stylised and set-piece programming has created pseudo livelihoods that will disappear when artificial, aid-financed labour markets are dismantled and when natural resource bases are exhausted.

### **7.2.2 Linking relief to early livelihood rehabilitation**

Although the tsunami devastated livelihoods for many, it did not result in mass, entrenched unemployment. A potential livelihoods crisis was clearly diverted. This has been due to three factors: the speed and scale of cash-for-work programmes, the buoyancy of the construction industry and above all the industrious efforts of the affected populations.

Virtually all agencies interviewed in all three TEC LRRD empirical studies stated their intentions to support relief and livelihood-rehabilitation efforts simultaneously. The contiguum was effectively used. Humanitarian programming is commonly criticised for a failure to move as quickly as it should into livelihood support, thereby leading to supposed 'dependency'. The tsunami response has shown no signs of dependency on food aid. Jobs were created fast through cash-for-work and other public works programmes (ODI, 2005). Agricultural land in Aceh has been quickly reclaimed and waste and rubble removed. Large numbers of boats were rapidly distributed to small-scale fisherfolk. In Sri Lanka an International Labour Organisation (ILO) survey reported that, in April 2005, 60 per cent of those who had lost their employment due to the tsunami were already back at work (ILO, 2005).

Cash-for-work and cash distributions in general have been promoted as an improvement over food aid in that they encourage people to use their money as they see fit and strengthen (rather than compete with) agricultural and other markets by supporting demand. Cash is thus seen to be more appropriate than food aid for promoting LRRD. The fact that national food production levels were not significantly affected by the tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka has been used to argue that cash should be used to increase the entitlements of affected populations to access food in the market (Oxfam, 2005a). There are no indications that people receiving cash have less food security than those receiving food. Cash-for-work has also contributed to recovering productive assets. It has been used to pay farmers to reclaim land damaged by the tsunami (though in many areas it will take a long time for rains to remove excess salinity from the soil before it is usable again). While data on use of wages are unavailable, the money paid has presumably supported both food markets and investments in the recipients' own chosen LRRD strategies.

There are some concerns, however, about the potentially negative impact of cash-for-work on traditions of voluntarism and community self-help, especially in Aceh. These customs, called *gotong-royong*, and other self-help traditions have been

reported to be strong in Aceh prior to the tsunami (UNDP, 2005). Many cash-for-work programmes are being proudly labelled as being 'gotong-royong', with one agency targeting '[cash] support... for any activities that were done before the tsunami' (ODI, 2005, p 17). Not surprisingly, dependency is rumoured to be emerging. There are fears in Sri Lanka that people are becoming 'lazy' (Research Consultancy Bureau, 2005). It is too early to draw verifiable conclusions about such negative outcomes. There is some anecdotal evidence that this may be a problem, but in the current atmosphere of competition over aid recipients it is impossible to ascertain whether the signs of weak voluntarism merely reflect a lack of ownership of aid programming or if the lost voluntarism relates to genuine deterioration of sociocultural cohesion. Weak ownership of aid activities may in the long term provide protection for local traditions if aid modalities are not perceived as being related to the real LRRD efforts of the disaster-affected communities themselves. This is a topic that warrants considerable concern, but where there is reason for caution in drawing early conclusions.

Cash grants have also sometimes been provided for re-investment in agricultural and other livelihood activities. It is difficult to ascertain the grounds used for deciding whether or not cash is expected to be a more effective form of support than in-kind grants, such as boats or tools (or vouchers for the purchase of designated assets). Some agencies have strongly argued that cash aid should replace food aid due to the plentiful presence of food in the markets. But they have not consistently applied the same logic to other types of in-kind assistance (Oxfam, 2005a). If cash aid is more empowering and developmental than food aid, why then is it not preferred to seed aid or boat aid as well? This is a debate that has been raised in discussion of use of cash versus vouchers for business-development support in Aceh, but clear conclusions have not emerged (ODI, 2005).

Aid has not been the only, or perhaps even the primary, motor in restarting economic activities. In Aceh the reduction of 'informal taxes' and other forms of extortion have provided perhaps the biggest boost to people's own efforts to re-establish their livelihoods. Especially since many of the affected people were traders and small entrepreneurs, this 'peace dividend' has undoubtedly encouraged renewed trade and investment, a finding confirmed in the Indonesia Country Study. A large number of traders and other small entrepreneurs in Aceh have re-started their businesses despite losses of facilities, stocks and working capital in the tsunami and subsequent looting. Informal credit from former business partners has been a major factor. Agricultural land inundated with debris has also been recovered, largely due to the efforts of the owners. The construction industries in both Sri Lanka and Aceh have boomed, creating jobs for both skilled and unskilled labour. Aid has contributed to this, but judging from experience in other post-disaster contexts, the construction sector in the affected areas would undoubtedly have grown even without any aid inputs (Clay and Benson, 2005).

Behind the proclamations of successes by the aid industry it must therefore be stressed that the basis for livelihood recovery was actually quite positive in many respects even without the injections of capital and other assets provided through aid projects. Interviews in the Sri Lanka and Indonesia Country Studies revealed great pride of affected people in their own creativity and effort in establishing new



livelihoods. It has been suggested that natural disasters may have some significant inherently positive effects on economic processes and livelihoods that should not be underestimated (Clay and Benson, 2005).

### 7.2.3 Danger signs of unsustainable support

Despite the noteworthy success of early rehabilitation and recovery, there are danger signs. It is not clear whether the investments of the aid community in livelihood rehabilitation have reflected and supported a pattern of economic development that will prove sustainable and viable in the future. It is too early to draw firm conclusions regarding what livelihoods will be sustained, but there are seven significant danger signs:

- wage inflation
- failure to pay attention to carrying capacities and productivity
- failure to understand/support diversified livelihoods beyond own-account fishing/farming
- failure to consider the sustainability of livelihood-support institutions
- provision of poor-quality assets for production
- insufficient dialogue on the complex implications for livelihoods of buffer zone plans
- weak gender analysis and understanding of groups with different capacities and needs.

#### *Wage inflation*

One of the goals of aid-financed cash-for-work schemes in the early rehabilitation period is to avoid a crash in wages as large numbers of people who have lost their productive resources enter the labour market. In the tsunami-affected areas, wage levels have remained firm and there are growing concerns that wage inflation may actually become a larger problem than wage deflation. After an initial jump in unemployment in Aceh, male participation in the labour force had again reached pre-tsunami levels, and the participation of women and youths is now actually higher than it was before the disaster (BRR, 2005a, p 58). Agencies interviewed in both countries complained of a shortage of skilled labour for house construction and in some cases even of difficulties in accessing reliable unskilled labour. Wages for unskilled labour in many tsunami-affected areas are higher than in neighbouring regions.<sup>10</sup> In interviews some concerns were expressed that larger scale commercial fishermen will not be able to attract crews since their former employees all have their own boats. Particularly in Aceh, the loss of lives in the working-age population combined with the demands for labour to recover rice fields and aquaculture may affect labour available for other activities. In both countries there are worries that higher wage costs may put the tsunami-affected areas at a comparative disadvantage relative to other regions.

<sup>10</sup> See for example, ICASERD (2005).



This may seem to be a surprising finding but experience elsewhere (for example, Kabul after the fall of the Taliban) has shown that initial assumptions that disasters will create massive unemployment have often been exaggerated. Disasters can create construction booms and provide the impetus for an upgrading of infrastructure and technology (one aspect of 'building back better') that can provide a boost for employment (Clay and Benson, 2005). Skills training to help affected populations to take advantage of new and changing opportunities may therefore be more valuable than cash-for-work. While some agencies are responding to these needs and opportunities, skills training is not a major feature of the livelihoods programming encountered in this evaluation. Agencies appear more concerned by their search for skilled labour for constructing housing, than in adapting livelihoods programming to prevailing and emerging labour markets.

Some agencies have acknowledged that their cash-for-work programmes have in some cases deprived local businesses of access to labour at viable wage levels, and they have restricted the scale of their programmes accordingly (ODI, 2005). Other agencies with less experience in intervening in labour markets may be less sensitive to the potential negative impact of their programmes.

#### *Carrying capacities and productivity*

The attractiveness of being seen to be handing out productive assets such as boats has clearly outweighed concerns about the livelihoods that those boats might contribute to. Fisheries were severely depleted before the tsunami and the distribution of boats has rebuilt the pre-existing overcapacity and aggravated over-fishing. Whereas modest distributions of boats and fishing equipment have been undertaken in other emergencies, these have generally been on too small a scale to impact significantly on overall fish stocks. In Sri Lanka and Aceh the scale of these distributions and the subsequent dangers are very different. A recent review stresses that the greatest needs in the fisheries sector are to increase productivity (whereas more boats merely increase short-term catch capacity), and to promote diversification away from fishing. The report expresses grave worries that the tsunami aid response may devastate fish stocks for years to come (CONSRN, 2005). Regulating fisheries is of course a matter for governments, but the aid industry has clearly contributed to 'bad governance' in that it would be impossible for a political leader to stand in the way of popular boat distributions.

This has led to a paradoxical and unfortunate combination of two 'tragedies of the commons'. Over-fishing has been caused by individual fisherfolk concerned about their individual livelihoods but at the expense of long-term prospects. The same can be said of aid agencies. No single agency or project is responsible for over-fishing, but the uncoordinated nature of their actions and the lack of joint accountability for the long-term impact of their work create a 'tragedy of the commons' as all want to be seen handing out boats, but none take responsibility for the sustainability of livelihoods. It is the fisherfolk rather than the agencies who will bear the consequences of this failure.

#### *Diversified livelihoods beyond own-account fishing/farming*

Livelihoods programming in many countries has tended to become trapped on what has been referred to as the 'seeds and tools treadmill' (Remington et al,

2002) of providing standard packages to supposed subsistence farmers despite seemingly overwhelming evidence of diverse and complex livelihoods. The Indonesia Country Study found that so-called 'women in development' initiatives show a similar tendency toward stereotyped 'jams and jellies' projects that fail to relate household production to real and significant market opportunities. Rural areas in virtually all countries in the South are undergoing a process of deagrarianisation (Bryceson, 2000), with a declining proportion of the population dependent on own-account farming and fishing. Labour markets and the service sector are crucial to the poor and affected population's attempts to sustain their livelihoods. This has generally not been reflected in LRRD livelihoods programming (Christoplos et al, 2004). Three examples of these blind spots are mentioned here: wider perspectives on fisheries, tourism and aquaculture.

Whereas the seeds and tools treadmill has been largely avoided in the tsunami response, there have been tendencies to jump on to an equally questionable treadmill related to own-account fishing. The assumption that all men living on the coast are by nature own-account fishermen has led to many accounts of non-fishermen receiving boats (sometimes more than one) while 'real' fisherfolk have been left empty handed. In Sri Lanka there are many complaints that no assistance has been available for the larger, 'multi-day' boats that exploit different fish resources and provide employment and tax revenues. In addition, there has been little investment made in fisheries infrastructure. Markets have been rapidly reconstructed, but ice factories, cold storage and landing facilities for commercial fisheries have not attracted much investment thus far. International NGOs generally view such production methods as inequitable and exploitative when compared to own-account production, but there appear to be no consolidated analyses of the actual relative benefits of a more diversified support strategy for poor and affected populations.

Aid agencies have encouraged own-account (over-)fishing while portraying the Sri Lankan coastal zone management debate as a choice between beaches for hotels or for fishing, with the former depicted as the environmental villains and exploiters. There is undoubtedly a need to regulate tourism to prevent environmental destruction and promote 'pro-poor' solutions. In recent years an array of guidelines have been produced to support these processes that could be applied on a large scale after the destruction caused by the tsunami (Ashley, 2005; Goodwin, 2005). If appropriately managed, the carrying capacity of the beaches for tourists may be far more elastic than that of capture fisheries. Again, it appears that stylised assumptions about livelihoods have superseded the need to analyse what interventions may have the greatest impact on sustainable livelihoods. It is also important to note that the 'poor fisherfolk versus the hotel industry' narrative has very often been applied to the overall debate on buffer zones, despite the seemingly glaring fact that tourism investments are being considered in only some of the coastal areas.

In Aceh, aquaculture was a very important part of the pre-tsunami economy. Despite drastic losses to both production and infrastructure, aquaculture has not been a significant priority for livelihoods programming. Aquaculture has been seen as more of a threat than an opportunity for sustainable livelihoods. This is because the rehabilitation of aquaculture, particularly shrimp farming, has been

rightfully perceived to be an endeavour that carries with it risks of environmental destruction. Shrimp farms have been established in areas that were previously mangrove forests, and it has been suggested that mangroves may reduce risks of destruction from future tsunamis. This seems probable in Sri Lanka, and less likely in Aceh (Black, 2005). Therefore aquaculture is an area of livelihood support that deserves to be handled with care.

Nonetheless, aquaculture was a very significant part of coastal-zone livelihoods and as such is also worthy of closer analysis to determine whether it can provide for more 'sustainable' livelihoods than those encouraged by boats and other standard packages. Over 80 per cent of aquaculture production in Aceh used low-input methods. It provided income to owner-operators, tenants, contract farmers and labourers. It is estimated that approximately 100,000 people derived their livelihoods directly or indirectly from aquaculture (Budhiman and Phillips, 2005).

Finally, livelihood diversity is not important only for income and economic sustainability. Diversified farming systems also provide an important basis for balanced diets and household food security. Home gardens in Sri Lanka were destroyed or damaged by the tsunami through being uprooted and through salinisation. This has affected access to micronutrients and on women's income through reduced access to coconut husks for coir production (Anputhas et al, 2005).

#### *Sustainability of livelihood-support institutions*

Key institutions must be rehabilitated if the link between simple asset replacement and more developmental approaches through more comprehensive livelihood support is to be effective. Regulatory structures are essential. The need for institutions to regulate fisheries and tourism has been noted above. Advisory institutions are also important if the opportunities for technological change created by the tsunami are to benefit the poor and affected populations.

For example, sustainable rehabilitation of farming affected by salinisation may require strengthened agricultural extension services in order to provide knowledge about new salt-resistant varieties and farming methods. Environmentally sustainable aquaculture may require similar services. If poor farmers are to adapt their production to the specialised demands from profitable tourism markets, they will also need new knowledge. Former fisherfolk (and perhaps ex-combatants in Aceh) are being resettled inland, and may need special training in order to learn to farm in a sustainable manner in fragile environments. All of these actors may need to form their own organisations in order to negotiate prices and to meet the demands of markets for timeliness, quality and quantity. Reliable and effective public, private and local civil-society service providers are needed, not just input handouts. There is an imbalance in current programming between asset replacement and development of the institutions necessary to utilise those assets in an effective and sustainable manner.

A major set of institutions involved in livelihood support is those providing financial services. The tsunami response coincided with the International Year of Microfinance, and there have been significant efforts to mobilise these services to help the tsunami-affected population to regain their livelihoods. In Sri Lanka, the

'microfinance revolution' had arrived long before the tsunami and was already experiencing serious growing pains. Over liquidity was a problem, with too many loan providers chasing too few qualified clients. Repayment rates were generally poor, and the system was not financially sustainable.

The tsunami resulted in calls to soften conditions for repayment and for expanded lending, something which the microfinance institutions resisted. Good practice guidelines based on experience from other disasters were distributed in an effort to raise awareness of how soft credit conditions can ruin the sustainability of the microfinance sector. Attempts were generally made to stem the tide of goodwill that was seen to threaten further a sector that was already weak. The highly respected microfinance consortium the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) emphasised that, after a disaster, relief was more important than financial services and that if microfinance was used, it was essential to return rapidly to non-subsidised services during rehabilitation phases (CGAP, 2005):

MFIs [microfinance institutions] are not relief agencies. While the imperative of the situation may force some MFIs to conduct relief activities immediately in the post-disaster phase, donors should ensure separation between relief and microfinance as soon as possible. Clients should not perceive mixed messages, so that the credit culture is not damaged (CGAP, 2005, p 2).

Coordination meetings attempted to ensure that some discipline was maintained, but the agencies with little experience in the sector were those least likely to attend such meetings. Generous supplies of credit began to flow. In Sri Lanka 85 per cent of the affected people applying for loans had their applications approved (ILO, 2005). Some have seen this as a positive sign demonstrating the usefulness of microfinance in disaster response. It is questionable, however, that a sufficiently large proportion of these destitute people will be able to repay their loans. One interviewee reported that the biggest threat to future financial services was not default due to the destruction of the tsunami, but rather a declining culture of credit due to the tsunami aid. It appears that many NGOs in both countries are confused about how to promote a 'culture of credit'.<sup>11</sup>

In contrast to the free availability of microfinance, there has been a lack of credit facilities for small- and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) (BRR, 2005a; 2005b; FCCISL, 2005). This has been compounded by the impact of buffer zones and resettlement in general which have meant that collateral is often lacking for larger loans in both countries due to uncertainties about land titles and values.

#### *Poor-quality assets for production*

Many of the boats that have been distributed are of very low quality or inappropriate design. An estimated 40 per cent of the small boats distributed in Aceh are expected to be unusable within 12–18 months (BRR, 2005b). Poor quality construction has created dangers for fisherfolk and has led to many boats having been already abandoned in both countries (BRR, 2005a; FAO, 2005). Poor-quality

<sup>11</sup> See also ODI (2005).

assets have also included 'fake' rice seeds (Indonesia-Relief.org, 2005b). In all of these examples it appears that agencies have given priority to the act and images of giving, rather than accountability to the recipients. This tendency has been noted in other TEC evaluations.

#### *Implications for livelihoods of buffer zone plans*

There have been significant concerns raised, particularly in Sri Lanka, about the potentially negative impact of the buffer zones as people have been resettled away from the sources of their former livelihoods. There has been some advocacy by the international community concerning these potential negative effects of buffer zones. As discussed below in Section 8.4, the wider implications of buffer zones and resettlement in general for livelihoods have not been dealt with in a way that reflects the complexity of the choices and options involved. There has been a tendency to simplify the question to being one of whether fishermen will be able to continue fishing if they are resettled away from the coast. This is of course a very major issue, but it is not the only factor affecting how these men (much less the women in the communities) rebuild their post-tsunami livelihoods.

#### *Gender analysis and understanding different groups*

Gender-related livelihood issues have been raised by many agencies as a significant factor that should influence programming. On the whole however, it is difficult to discern what impact ostensibly improved gender awareness has actually had on livelihoods programming. It is self-evident that men and women require different forms of livelihood support, but programme priorities seem to be influenced more by the relative logistical ease of delivery rather than these different needs. Men's livelihoods needs have been seen to relate to boats, nets, seeds and tools that can be addressed with relatively simple asset-replacement projects. Especially in Sri Lanka, women are reliant on links to international markets as many of the products (such as coir and handicrafts) they manufacture at home are destined for export. There has been limited attention to these value chains in aid programming. Handing out a boat is easier than rebuilding a coir industry that is in turn dependent on a functioning value chain stretching well beyond the geographical bounds of the tsunami-affected areas and the perceived mandates of the agencies present.

These and other aspects of women's livelihoods are also related to home industries, such as paddy processing and snack making, which require space in the house, especially during the rainy season. Support to women's livelihoods has therefore been delayed along with the delays in shelter programming. There are also some indications that shelter programming is not paying sufficient attention to the need to provide appropriate space for home-based industries.

Both the Indonesia and Sri Lanka Country Studies note that the reliance on standard packages has carried with it a failure to consider the capacities and needs of those affected populations who have no use for these packages. There is very little programming directed toward the livelihood-related needs and opportunities of the elderly and disabled, for example. Changes in household structure, such as the now larger number of widowers with small children, have

created special needs for childcare but generated limited response from the aid community.

### *Mismatches between livelihoods and livelihoods programming*

To summarise, there are several reasons for the mismatch between livelihood-rehabilitation projects and the socioeconomic development processes in which affected populations are struggling to survive:

- reliance on stylised but false assumptions about livelihoods
- international NGO distrust and ignorance of the private sector, especially tourism and commercial fisheries
- assumptions that own-account farming/fishing are inherently more 'sustainable'
- insufficient attention to enterprises that generate employment
- insufficient attention to the institutional functions that are needed to support livelihoods
- running roughshod over institutions that were weak even before the disaster.

Perhaps the largest gap between livelihood rehabilitation programming and actual livelihood development processes in the affected areas is a failure to acknowledge the limited role of aid. The livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people were devastated by the tsunami. The changes in the economies of Aceh and the Sri Lankan coastal zones have created hundreds of thousand of new livelihood opportunities since the tsunami. Livelihood interventions have been stuck in a narrow conceptual focus on livelihood replacement, rather than on identifying how aid can provide added value in the interface between lost and emerging livelihood opportunities. Aid can effectively contribute in the following ways:

- filling gaps for certain groups that are unlikely to benefit from market forces
- addressing factors that limit entry into markets
- creating incentives that encourage environmentally sustainable processes
- opening up new sectors for disadvantaged groups and introducing new technologies
- providing for public goods that are required if the private sector is to re-enter the arena, particularly by rebuilding infrastructure.

All of these can be significant, but in a wider perspective the aid community does not rule the roost. The focus on handing out assets has overshadowed the need to find out where livelihoods support can have greatest impact. It appears that the concentration of resources with international NGOs (rather than IFIs and bilateral or multilateral agencies) has carried with it a tendency to miss the bigger picture of how livelihoods are part of broader economic development processes.



# Poverty alleviation and risk reduction

## 8.1 Contributions to alleviating transient and chronic poverty

### **8.1.1 LRRD and both chronic and transient poverty**

Disasters can generate both lasting (chronic) and temporary (transient) forms of poverty. Post-disaster aid modalities and changes in the politico-economic context in Sri Lanka and Aceh have affected both chronic and transient poverty. Effective LRRD manifests itself in a judicious balance of efforts to address both kinds of poverty. This requires bringing together the different principles of humanitarian and development response and ensuring that both are respected and acted upon. Given the extent of resources available in the tsunami response it would be unwise to conceptualise this as an either/or question of whether to focus either on humanitarian needs or to explore the opportunities to be developed for those made chronically poor by the disaster. There is enough money to do both. The LRRD question is whether efforts have been designed that can combine humanitarian and developmental interventions in a balanced and appropriate way.

Before the tsunami, chronic poverty was widespread in both Aceh and the affected areas of Sri Lanka. The tsunami naturally resulted in extreme levels of transient poverty as a large group of those who were moderately well off were left destitute. Despite some claims to the contrary, the tsunami did not just affect the poorest of the poor, but it presumably pushed more people into this category. It is important to consider how much of the destitution created by the tsunami can realistically be reversed through short- to medium-term rehabilitation projects replacing assets, and how many people can be said to have entered the ranks of the chronically poor. Evidence from other disasters has shown that poor people's coping strategies in the face of disasters can lead them into 'poverty traps' where their depletion of assets



leads toward long-term destitution. Income shocks, destruction of homes and productive assets, reduced consumption/nutrition and stress sales of productive assets are interlinked (Carter et al, 2004). There is no consensus on how best to avoid this weak resilience through relief and rehabilitation. More developmental interventions may be appropriate, but it is also unclear how such modalities should be designed. Weak resilience is a concern for LRRD efforts, but is primarily a challenge that relates to the poverty alleviation efforts of the affected countries.

A significant proportion of the transient poverty caused by the tsunami has now been alleviated, due either to aid or to the efforts of the affected people themselves. Some has not. The loss of productive agricultural land (particularly in Aceh), of facilities with which to run commercial enterprises, and of the jobs created through commercial enterprise cannot all be remedied with 'livelihood projects'. Those who rely on these enterprises are not generally reached by the tools of relief and rehabilitation. Therefore, these problems should not be seen as a weakness in the links between relief and rehabilitation, but rather as the limited progress made at this early stage in continuing on from rehabilitation to development.

### **8.1.2 Rights and responsibilities for poverty alleviation**

'Rights-based approaches' are conceptual frameworks for aid programming that relate to the fundamental questions of how to combine humanitarian and developmental frameworks for addressing poverty. Humanitarians and development actors tend to have very different perspectives on what is a 'right' in different contexts. For example, some humanitarian agencies speak of a 'right to credit' (ODI, 2005, p 13) among affected populations, a concept that most MFIs would find abhorrent since an effort to uphold such a 'right' would ultimately deprive future potential clients of their 'right to credit' due to an inevitable financial collapse of the microfinance sector.

Differing perspectives on sustainability is not the only source of confusion across the LRRD divide. 'Standards' have become the most common vehicle for efforts to uphold rights. However, different agencies and phases of response raise questions about 'whose standards' are relevant.

- Should one follow the international standards of the humanitarian community (such as the Sphere standards)?
- Should national guidelines for poverty alleviation, for example Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) steer planning?
- Should local people be supported to define their own standards through participatory approaches?

A starting point for defining what a rights-based approach means in the tsunami LRRD response may be to look at if and how efforts are becoming part of a framework of social protection, whereby protection from shocks and reduction of risks and vulnerabilities are seen to be a responsibility for the state, international providers and local communities. In other words, are these issues an integral part of commitments to alleviate poverty, or are shocks considered an aberration, to be

addressed separately from ongoing poverty strategies by discrete humanitarian projects? There is a growing realisation that for poor people shocks are not abnormal. Disasters, large and small, are an ever-present fear that profoundly affects livelihood strategies. In cognisance of this, social protection has become a central issue in the development debate in many countries, even though the term means different things to different people (Barrientos et al, 2005). Social protection is generally seen to encompass social assistance schemes, social security, social funds and other structures that provide either a safety net for those at risk of becoming destitute, or a safety ladder to provide subsidised support for those struggling to deal with shocks. These may be either formal (state-managed) or informal, such as the community self-help mechanisms that were mobilised directly after the tsunami. A 'disaster' can be defined as an event that temporarily overwhelms these structures, thus requiring humanitarian response. A key conceptual challenge to LRRD is to decide how temporary this should be.

Social protection is intended to be the cornerstone of efforts to increase the resilience of the poor who face recurrent shocks to their livelihoods and well-being. A fundamental question in determining where disaster response ends, and where the responsibilities of the state, civil society and local communities for basic social protection begins, is in the situation of those who have less chance of rising from their tsunami-related destitution and who should therefore now be seen to be 'chronically poor'. Chronic poverty can be seen to have increased after the tsunami due to loss of the following assets:

- productive agricultural land
- financial capital (combined with increased debt)
- human resources (eg family labour, skills)
- title to land and housing
- fixed capital (especially for women with home-based enterprises)
- social capital (especially where communities have been devastated and fragmented)
- access to pensions and other social protection measures due to loss of identity papers
- public service institutions.

In addition, the aid response itself may have contributed further to eroding people's capacity to avoid destitution through destruction of the natural resource base upon which they depend. This could include encouraging the decimation of inshore fish stocks through small-boat distribution, and of forests through housing programmes.

### **8.1.3 Is 'relief' still appropriate?**

Strangely enough, social protection is all but unheard-of in the humanitarian sphere. This has negative consequences for making appropriate LRRD linkages (Longley et al, 2006). The current humanitarian-oriented aid discourse in Sri

Lanka and Aceh tends to refer to high levels of destitution as indicating a need to continue relief programmes. One year after the tsunami it is perhaps appropriate also to begin asking whether people who are deemed to be 'in continued need of relief' may in fact be more 'in need of social protection' by their governments and communities. There is a large population of chronically poor who are not likely to be 'lifted out of poverty' by yet another short-term project. They will be effectively supported only if social protection structures are (re-)established. Despite the efforts of some agencies (especially the ILO), such developmental approaches to shocks and destitution have not yet been scaled up to meet the new challenges. One report notes that social protection payments in Sri Lanka have not expanded after the tsunami despite ostensibly massive needs (ILO, 2005). However, some new structures for governmental social protection measures have been established. In Aceh the government is providing Rp 30,000 per day to IDPs, and in Sri Lanka grants of LKR 5,000<sup>12</sup> have been provided. There have been extensive accusations of corruption in these programmes, but these may prove to be problems that can be addressed over time.<sup>13</sup>

This shift to social protection is particularly appropriate since both Sri Lanka and Aceh have economic resources to ensure the survival of their own populations. There is no reason to assume or accept that the chronically poor should be seen to be wards of the international community for an extended period of time after the tsunami. The peace agreement with GAM awards 70 per cent of the profits from Aceh's extensive natural wealth to local re-investment. This may be adequate to provide a significant safety net for those left destitute after the tsunami. Although its system has been frayed in recent years, Sri Lanka was in the past a pioneer in social protection (Amarasinghe et al, 2005) and has a sufficiently strong economy to provide for the basic needs of its citizens. Furthermore, the strong response from community members, local businesses and civil society in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami demonstrated the strength of informal social protection mechanisms. If humanitarian agencies stay on too long, this could result in damage to these mechanisms as people grow accustomed to seeing 'disaster victims' as being the responsibility of the international community. Such a development would indicate that great harm has been done to informal social protection structures and indigenous forms of disaster preparedness and response.

The implications of these issues are particularly notable with regard to defining an appropriate role for the humanitarian sector in addressing the particular needs of the elderly, the disabled and other groups not effectively reached by standard programming modalities. The TEC LRRD reviews found that very few agencies have paid much attention to the rights of these affected populations to assistance that meets their needs and builds on their capacities. Emergency assistance should address the special acute needs resulting from loss of shelter and other assets.

12 In Sri Lanka, US\$1 = 103LKR; in Indonesia, US\$1 = 9310 Indonesian Rupiahs.

13 Reviews of social protection show that social protection systems based on small regular payments (such as pensions) have proven less prone to corruption than more complicated and innovative project interventions (Farrington et al, 2003).

This includes adapting shelter and resettlement plans to needs, targeted health services and ensuring that the growing shift to cash-for-work modalities does not exclude support to those who cannot participate in these programmes. With respect to LRRD, an equally important question is whether aid helps or hinders the rebuilding of the social protection structures on which disadvantaged groups will rely in the future. Anecdotal reports indicate that the re-obtaining of identity papers (essential for access to pensions and social welfare schemes) has gone reasonably well. It is too early, however, to assess whether the ability of elderly and disabled people to rely on the state and their neighbours and communities will be re-established after the withdrawal of humanitarian assistance.

### **8.1.4 Poverty and learning**

Responding to poverty demands an understanding of its multidimensional nature, and of how the affected countries and different groups of poor people are dealing with poverty. This knowledge is limited among many of the agencies involved in the tsunami response. As noted in other TEC evaluations, the aid community has not drawn on the considerable experience existing in the affected countries of dealing with different forms of crisis transitions in the past.

Emergencies are not often seen to be ideal opportunities for learning about the dynamic of poverty. Operational actors tend to give higher priority to 'action' than to critical analysis of the relevance of their work. This deficiency should not, however, be accepted as inevitable. One in-depth study of World Bank operations in Indonesia noted that until the late 1990s poverty analysis was weak, but: 'The [economic] crisis of 1997 made it evident that this was not enough... This manifested itself in a dramatic shift in the country portfolio as the Bank scrambled to find instruments to deal with poverty and crisis' (Bebbington and Barrientos, 2005, pp 5–6). Because of this crisis, Indonesia became one of the countries where World Bank operations underwent a fundamental refocus as efforts shifted to decentralisation and social safety nets.

There have been few attempts to relate current tsunami programming to past experience and policies. There are not many references to the MDGs in tsunami-related programme documents and reporting (only 13 citations in over 28,000 documents collected by the TEC). Mentions of PRSPs are even more rare (one citation found). These poverty alleviation strategies and objectives have insignificant impact on programme design and it is doubtful that the majority of agency personnel are aware of national plans for poverty alleviation.

The issue is not just one of relating LRRD response to pre-existing poverty alleviation strategies, but also of ensuring that these strategies are reconsidered in light of the LRRD processes of the aid community and the affected populations. Organisations may need to reconsider their roles in addressing chronic poverty based on what has been learnt about the vulnerabilities revealed by the tsunami. This evaluation encountered little indication that learning about poverty has been a significant feature of the post-tsunami period. It is too early to gain a clear overview of learning processes, but these are issues that may be crucial to the eventual future linking of rehabilitation to pro-poor development in Aceh and Sri Lanka.

## 8.2 Equity and LRRD?

### 8.2.1 A myriad of definitions

Equity and poverty alleviation are two different things, but they are often conflated in discussions of LRRD. Some of the poverty resulting from the tsunami can be alleviated without addressing structural inequalities, and some cannot. Aid can be provided in an equitable manner without contributing to the alleviation of poverty. Indeed, most humanitarian assistance does not aim to alleviate poverty but strives toward equity in order to ensure the basic survival and dignity of all. The chronically poor may be especially targeted, but they are not the exclusive target group. A significant feature of LRRD in the tsunami response has been assumptions that if assets are distributed in an equitable manner, poverty will thereby be alleviated. The examples noted in Section 7.2 above illustrate these assumptions. Provision of small boats to ‘everyone’ in the name of equity is seen as sufficient. Analysis of how the fishing industry can sustainably contribute to poverty alleviation has not been part of programme design. More detailed analyses of political economy and the biophysical resource bases are necessary if the two objectives of equity and poverty alleviation are to be combined effectively.

It is important to observe that the term ‘equity’ is being applied in a myriad of ways – implicitly and explicitly – in the tsunami response. This can mean:

- giving priority to those most affected by the disaster
- giving priority to those least capable of recovering without external support
- giving priority to people who are disadvantaged due to age or physical capacities
- the poorest
- ensuring equal access to aid between men and women and among different ethnic groups
- impartially allocating assistance to those affected by the tsunami and those affected by the conflict according to relative need
- supporting those enterprises most likely to generate sustainable employment
- equitable distribution of aid resources within recipient communities
- equitable distribution of aid resources among affected communities
- looking beyond the direct impacts of the tsunami, to support those most in need including conflict-affected populations and the chronic poor.

There are overlaps between these priorities, but none of them are congruent. The choices between priorities are not just issues of policy but also a reflection of political struggles, cultural norms and perceptions of how a disaster response should be situated in broader development processes.

Although equity and its operational function of ‘targeting’ concern many organisations, there are few agency policies that disaggregate these objectives and notions of equity in the tsunami context. Decisions are based on a combination of

the above definitions without clearly discerning which type of equity is more or less important. One notable exception to this is a UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) discussion paper that proposes clear principles for addressing the needs of different types of IDPs and other disadvantaged groups (UNHCR, 2005, p 5).

### **8.2.2 Equity versus poverty alleviation?**

Most agencies assume that the poor are those who were most affected by the disaster and that a focus on the poorest will thereby contribute to both poverty alleviation and rehabilitation for those most affected. This is further underpinned by the notion that direct support to own-account production is inherently more equitable than indirect support through re-investment in larger enterprises. In light of the findings behind many current bilateral and multilateral poverty alleviation policies,<sup>14</sup> these assumptions deserve to be questioned. The belief that supporting own-account production in order to promote equity is an inherently superior and more sustainable basis for poverty reduction has been referred to as the 'yeoman farmer fallacy' (Farrington and Bebbington, 1994). It is an assumption that has been questioned for many years in development circles, but is largely undisputed among the international NGOs involved in the tsunami response. The reason for this is that the humanitarian assistance modalities of the NGOs focus almost exclusively on directly assisting those in greatest need. Some agencies have explicitly tied themselves to such a response scenario by stating that they respond only to need, and not to losses (Oxfam, 2005b).

This is a fully justifiable response in a purely humanitarian action but, in rehabilitation and development, issues of sustainability, public finance of basic social services, alignment with national policies and congruence with local norms all enter the equation. Poverty alleviation inevitably becomes an issue with political and ideological dimensions. A comprehensive alignment between poverty alleviation policies and LRRD in Indonesia and Sri Lanka would seem to require a dual strategy that both responds to needs (through social protection) and also supports the expansion of opportunities for employment. Such a broader developmental perspective would require complementing the needs-driven approach with measures to support the replacement of losses by medium-sized and large enterprises, which may in turn indirectly (but more effectively and sustainably) reach those who have lost their productive resources by creating employment opportunities. It is these losses that reduce economic activity, which may have the greatest impact on the poor (Clay and Benson, 2005). Such measures may also re-establish a tax base to finance government services. It should be noted that the three countries/regions that went through the most massive LRRD operations in the last ten years (Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor) are all currently confronted with catastrophic unemployment and public finance crises. These examples suggest that the aid industry has lacked the skills required to address these issues in the past. There is no indication that lessons regarding LRRD impact on poverty alleviation are actively being sought from these countries to apply in the tsunami response.

14 For example, see Sida (2004).



A starting point for mapping alternative perspectives on how to achieve equity could be to consider sectors that tend to be labelled as pariahs. Activities such as tourism create articulated markets that micro-entrepreneurs and small-scale farmers can serve. An example of this is roadside sales of sweetmeats and curds on the south coast of Sri Lanka (Anputhas et al, 2005). Such enterprises are particularly important for women. Another example (albeit macabre) of this form of LRRD efforts by disaster-affected women is the specialised enterprises that sell offers for photos beside sites of tsunami carnage and even stories of loss and destruction to the 'tsunami tourists' from the media and aid agencies (Perera, 2005b). Such opportunities are unlikely to be uncovered in mere needs assessments. They are dependent on more proactive analyses of opportunities.

The tsunami devastated the operations of the relatively wealthy fish traders that had previously dominated markets in Aceh (ICASERD, 2005) and Sri Lanka. It is too early to tell whether the 'equity' that resulted from the effective decimation of these trading networks will have positive or negative impacts on the livelihoods of the poor fisherfolk who supplied their operations, and the employees who worked for them. There is reason to doubt whether this equity will help the poor. Tsunami recovery programming thus far has not included significant efforts to investigate whether support to go-betweens and the private sector more generally can contribute to alleviating the poverty of affected populations. This appears to be primarily due to a pre-existing belief that such support is not 'equitable'.

### 8.2.3 Targeting

Targeting in the tsunami operations is problematic, but the most important factors are not questions of reaching the poor within assisted communities. Interviews with affected populations in the Sri Lanka and Indonesia Country Studies generally indicated that they have not felt that aid has increased gaps between rich and poor. The key factor of targeting for equity is whether aid has reached the most disaster-affected (and poorer and more conflict-ridden) areas or if it has been concentrated in places that are easily accessible, better-off and/or favoured by political powers. Especially in Sri Lanka, this is a major concern: rehabilitation investment has been far greater in the south than the east, and has been very limited in LTTE-controlled areas. Despite professed commitments to impartiality, need has not determined the concentration of aid flows, and the geographical distribution of aid shows disturbing signs of political influence.

In both Sri Lanka and Aceh the issue of equity in access is closely related to that of transparency. Complaints about distributions and beneficiary lists are frequently based on rumours of bribery and political influence. In Sri Lanka, inequity is perceived to be driven by personal political agendas, patronage, greed and corruption in government-held areas, and by loyalty-driven political agendas in LTTE-controlled areas (Sarvanathan, 2005).

It is interesting to note that those agencies that would normally consider themselves to be 'humanitarian' have struggled with the conundrum of having funding only for tsunami-affected populations when they can see that in many respects the conflict-affected communities have greater needs. They are not able to target according to need. The World Bank does not have such limitations since it is not reliant on



donations from the public, and has therefore disbursed more resources on conflict-affected IDPs than on the tsunami-affected population during 2005 (UNHCR, 2005).

Gender-equity issues have not been ignored, but the prevailing methods of livelihoods support for example have limited agencies' ability and readiness to turn gender awareness into more equitable programme modalities. Gender focal points abound, but their influence on programming can be questioned. Targeting related to gender equity demands more than just ensuring that women are not missed in beneficiary lists. It requires an understanding of what has happened within households and the new needs (and opportunities) that have arisen in the post-tsunami context. For example, there were far more female than male fatalities in the tsunami. This has affected household structures in ways that are hard to predict. Special problems have arisen due to widowers caring for children. In many countries land titling is key to addressing gender equity. Depending on the modalities used, inequality can either be reduced or reinforced. Research prior to the tsunami in Indonesia noted that although men participated more actively in meetings to determine land titling, women did not perceive themselves to be discriminated against (Sulaksono, 2005). In these and other factors, the implications of gender for equitable LRRD deserve deeper analysis.

## 8.3 Contributions to reduction of conflict risk

### 8.3.1 Sri Lanka

The tsunami did not help to bring peace to Sri Lanka. It did, however, at first have a modestly positive 'dampening' effect on the conflict, perhaps due both to genuine altruistic urges after the tragedy and also to the military losses caused by the tsunami (Goodhand and Klem, 2005). Interviews with affected populations in the Sri Lanka Country Study indicate that tensions were reduced and that jealousy over distributions was not a major concern during the relief phase. At that point discrimination was not perceived to be a problem. Interviews showed that tsunami survivors tended to demand and expect relief and other handouts while the conflict-affected populations were more passive and marginalised. This is perhaps because people displaced by war have been living in camps and other shelters with very limited assistance for many years, and have low expectations of the aid community.

The political tensions behind the conflict quickly returned after the initial emergency phase. While the tsunami itself had a slight positive impact on the dynamics of the conflict, the patrimonial struggle to control aid resources became a point of contention rather than an incentive for cooperation (Goodhand and Klem, 2005). Even at local level, feelings of jealousy and related tensions have increased as efforts have moved beyond the relief phase. Proposals for structured sharing of resources through the Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure were signed but then declared unconstitutional, thereby removing the main potential vehicle for using tsunami assistance to promote reconciliation. The increase in violence occurring at the time of writing this report (December 2005) cannot be verifiably attributed to the tsunami response, but the competition over

aid flows and subsequent distrust can be assumed to have had some negative impact.

### **8.3.2 Indonesia**

Indonesia has had a very different trajectory. The rapidity with which the conflict in Aceh is being resolved was not expected before the tsunami. Even on the eve of the peace agreement, knowledgeable observers were still pessimistic (Huxley, 2005). Although any inference of attributed causality between the aid response and the peace agreement should be treated with caution, the Indonesia Country Study found that most Acehnese see the opening up to the international community and the aid presence as a significant factor supporting this sudden change. Their fears of central government authorities were reduced, and (surprisingly) the authorities' fears of the population seem to also have been mitigated.

In addition to the tsunami having a positive impact on the dynamics of the conflict, the peace agreement has had a number of other positive knock-on effects that may be even more important than the reduced violence alone. Informal taxes by warring parties have been reduced, access to fields has been improved, rules on public gatherings have been relaxed allowing a resurgence of civil society, and a generally more positive outlook has emerged.

### **8.3.3 Macro and micro conflicts**

As mentioned above in this report, the post-tsunami operations have had an impact on, in addition to macro-political conflicts, micro-political conflicts over land, resources and livelihoods. Although neighbouring communities generally initially showed extraordinary generosity to those displaced by the tsunami, tensions have since grown. Those being resettled in both Sri Lanka and Aceh have reported that they feel themselves to be in a weak position compared to their hosts (Wu, 2005; Research Consultancy Bureau, 2005). Perceived corruption and inequity in provision of aid (particularly housing) has created jealousy and distrust (Sarvananthan, 2005; Research Consultancy Bureau, 2005; Goodhand and Klem, 2005).

In Sri Lanka this has manifested itself in horizontal jealousy regarding who has received aid. In Aceh distrust has been primarily vertical, wherein affected populations are angered by the perceived abuse of power by the informal community leaders who act as brokers between them and the aid agencies. Whereas the international community has focused its attention on the impact (or lack thereof) of aid on the macro-political conflicts, the damage to the social fabric at the micro level may prove equally enduring and have significant impact on the prospects of rebuilding functioning communities. Given the importance of community structures in supporting affected populations, this possible loss of social capital may have a negative knock-on effect of reducing capacity to deal with future natural hazards as well.

## 8.4 Contributions to natural-disaster risk reduction: building back better?

### 8.4.1 Kobe and the chance to reduce disaster risk

There is a common assumption that disasters provide a 'window of opportunity' to reconstruct both institutions and infrastructure so as to reduce the risks of future disasters. This assumption is based on seven factors that are presumed to encourage the inclusion of disaster risk reduction in recovery programmes:

- public awareness and pressure are strong to correct the past mistakes that caused the disaster
- political will is present since leaders want to show their concern for public safety
- technical deficiencies in infrastructure and planning have been made apparent
- the old, poor quality infrastructure has been destroyed
- there is money available for new, better structures
- weaknesses (and corruption) in regulatory and planning institutions have been exposed
- both development and humanitarian organisations have been 'reminded' of the importance of disaster risk reduction.

Indeed, these factors have all been present in the post-tsunami context and have had a certain impact in promoting a role for disaster risk reduction in planning and programming. The arguments supporting window-of-opportunity assumptions were particularly strong directly after the tsunami. In January 2005 grand claims were made that recovery programming would emphasise risk reduction. This drive received special impetus from the World Conference of Disaster Reduction held in Kobe, Japan in February 2005. This UN conference had been planned before the tsunami, and only low-level government representatives were expected to attend. Due to the tsunami, many countries instead sent high-level delegations that made strong sounding commitments to make good on the window of opportunity. Over US\$10 million was raised for early warning systems. In the months that have followed, the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery has emphasised the need to remember disaster risk reduction with the call to 'build back better'.

Despite the seemingly overwhelming 'common sense' behind these window-of-opportunity assumptions, evidence from other major natural disaster recovery operations indicates that a sustained commitment to disaster risk reduction rarely emerges. Opportunities may exist for assuming a radically different perspective on risk reduction, but other factors may negate their impact. A recent set of reviews, commissioned by the ProVention Consortium, of reconstruction after natural disasters showed that despite calls for 'transformation' and other

catch phrases for risk-aware recovery, commitments to disaster risk reduction are ultimately usually weak (Beck, 2005; Wiles et al, 2005; Telford et al, 2004). After a phase of initial post-disaster rhetoric, the topic has usually faded to the sidelines of reconstruction planning (Christoplos, 2006).

There are several reasons why the window of opportunity has not been opened in many past reconstruction contexts, and the same factors have been present in the tsunami response.

- Speed is not conducive to 'building back better' and agencies have felt themselves pressured to give higher priority to speed than to quality (partially due to their own over-optimistic claims). Upholding people's 'rights' to obtain shelter and livelihoods as soon as possible discourages attention to the sustainability of the shelter and livelihoods being supported.
- Disaster risk reduction is one of several competing agendas and has no natural strong political proponents with longer term interests in keeping the topic on the agenda.
- When disaster risk reduction is presented as a topic to be 'mainstreamed' it must compete with several other, more well-established mainstreaming agendas, such as poverty alleviation, gender, environment and HIV/AIDS.
- Reconstruction is primarily about bricks and mortar, while disaster risk reduction demands strong national and local institutions. Institution-building is a slow and unglamorous process. Furthermore, massive relief and recovery operations overload key national institutions that should be working to reduce future disaster risk.
- Disaster risk reduction is not very visible, and the ultimate indicator of success – a disaster not happening – is not an event of interest to the media.
- The affected populations primarily yearn for a return to things as they were. They are more interested in getting back to a normal life than in something that outsiders have described as 'better', which they do not understand or trust.

With the exception of some progress in establishing early warning systems, interest in disaster risk reduction in Aceh and Sri Lanka has not been of the magnitude suggested by calls for mainstreaming made in the first months after the tsunami. In interviews, almost no agencies spontaneously raised the topic of risk reduction and when queried few had any relevant activities. A recent major World Bank and BRR report on future programming in Indonesia devotes one short paragraph to the topic (BRR, 2005b).

The environment is an area in which aid may either contribute to disaster risk reduction or aggravate future risks. Exceptional levels of attention were paid to assessing the environmental impacts of the tsunami itself and a number of environmental initiatives have been taken to protect human health and safety, primarily through waste management (Calvi-Parisetti and Pasche, 2005). However, with the notable exception of concerns about deforestation caused by the search for building materials, there has been relatively little attention to the positive or negative environmental impacts related to disaster risks due to aid response.

### 8.4.2 Buffer zones: from solution to problem

The Sri Lanka Country Study found that the risk of natural disasters is a major worry for affected populations. A large proportion of the affected people support the buffer zones and express strong fears for future tsunamis.<sup>15</sup> One study in Sri Lanka has found that in the east there is a belief that the buffer zone has been imposed in order to protect the population, whereas in the south there are greater suspicions of ulterior motives (Research Consultancy Bureau, 2005).

Land policies must be at the centre of any strategy for reduction of disaster risk (CPA, 2005), and the contention surrounding the buffer zones has severely undermined the will to pursue disaster risk reduction through land-use planning and resettlement. Differences of opinion, lack of clarity regarding the exact implementation procedures, and distrust of the government have created divisions and tensions within and between affected communities, the state and aid providers. Since October 2005, when the regulations were relaxed, this confusion has increased. In Sri Lanka the buffer zones are frequently described by the aid community as being solely designed as a mechanism to snatch land from the poor for tourism development. The buffer zones are not seen as a risk reduction measure, and therefore a proactive discussion of how land-use planning can be applied to reduce risk while also minimising disruptions to communities and livelihoods has not developed. Many agencies see their role as encouraging a return to (perhaps imaginary) livelihoods of the past despite evidence that these livelihoods entail grave risks. Some affected populations want to be given the opportunity to be resettled and receive support to begin a different and better livelihood. They do not want to rebuild their past vulnerabilities (Research Consultancy Bureau, 2005). This is not to say that there may be quite significant commercial interests from the tourism industry involved in promoting the buffer zones. What is important to note is that the risk reduction agenda has suffered from an insufficiently nuanced debate based on the concerns of the affected population.

Another topic where nuance has been lacking is the question of what biophysical measures could reduce the impact of future tsunamis. There is a widespread belief, based on significant anecdotal evidence from Sri Lanka, that mangroves can provide effective protection against tsunamis (IUCN, 2005). This view echoes a widespread faith in the importance of forest cover in disaster risk reduction. This view has been strongly disputed in a recent study that concluded:

In the case of upland/lowland as well as forest and flood relationships, existing 'knowledge' is frequently based more on perceived wisdom, or myths, than on science. In the rush to identify the culprits for the most recent disasters, assumptions are made about processes in one region based on observations from other regions which often have quite different environmental characteristics, or by extrapolating from small to large scales. Oversimplification is common, frequently leading to initiatives such as logging bans or the resettlement of people residing in watershed areas – often with minimal environmental benefits but very definite negative social and economic implications. The unfortunate

15 See also Shanmugaratnam (2005).

outcome is that intended results are rarely achieved, but scarce funds are misallocated and unnecessary hardships are heaped upon those segments of society that become scapegoats for flood-related disasters and damages (CIFOR, 2005, p 2).

These findings refer primarily to inland forestry rather than mangroves, but in conjunction with the release of this report the director of one of the authoring agencies remarked on the danger that similar misrepresentation of facts was underway in discussion of the potential role of mangroves in tsunami risk reduction, especially in Aceh where mangroves would probably provide minimal protection against future tsunamis.<sup>16</sup>

### **8.4.3 Building back better?**

So is reconstruction involving 'building back better'? Among some of those interviewed, this slogan has taken on a variety of meanings, only some of which relate to the disaster risk reduction agenda. Many interpret building back better to be simply a call for upgrading – providing houses and other assets of a higher standard than those lost, or 'building back nicer'. This can be seen a symptomatic of the activity-driven nature of the tsunami response in general. The ultimate outcomes, in terms of risks reduced, institutions enhanced and livelihoods made more sustainable, have been overshadowed by the pressures to have visible activities on the ground.

It may be questioned whether many agencies have the skills and experience to do more than this. In order to 'build back better' in the sense of reducing risk it is essential to analyse risks and vulnerabilities. Such analysis requires an overview of the past risk profiles of the area, geo-technical and engineering skills and socioeconomic and cultural understanding of how people conceptualise and respond to risk, not least with regard to their livelihood strategies. Some risks were seemingly obvious after the tsunami. For example, fatalities among women were greater since they were at home or in small, enclosed workplaces near the beach, lacked swimming skills and had difficulties climbing trees due to their clothing. While the tsunami shattered their sense of security in the home, it also created pressures and opportunities for them to rebuild different lives beyond the homestead. Interviews revealed limited inclusion of analyses of these types of vulnerabilities and capacities in reconstruction programming.

Some programmes of participatory risk mapping are now getting underway, but further time is needed to assess what impact these maps will have on mainstream reconstruction programming. The 'build back better' slogan has had some other apparent impact as well. Governments have used it as a way of expressing their insistence on quality response, and agencies also report seeing the phrase as a component of being held accountable for the quality of their work, thereby discouraging pressures for rapid visible outputs. This may ultimately provide a foundation for returning to a disaster risk reduction agenda in the future.

<sup>16</sup> Black (2005) and Adger et al (2005) state that mangroves did protect the coast in Sri Lanka but not in Indonesia.

# Information, participation and power

## 9.1 Information

Poor information flow is undoubtedly the biggest source of dissatisfaction, anger and frustration among affected people. They are confused, misinformed and ignorant about aid plans and government regulations. They are torn between inflated expectations and disillusionment, and the aid community bears a heavy share of responsibility for this. This deficiency is starting to be acknowledged, with strong calls being made by the UN to improve information flows to affected populations (Najmuddin, 2005), but considerable damage has already been done to the trust between affected populations and those serving them.

Both the Sri Lanka and Indonesia Country Studies found that throughout the tsunami response affected populations have perceived the lack of information about aid plans as constituting the biggest obstacle they face in determining how to get on with their lives.<sup>17</sup> Information is the most basic resource for affected populations in the following respects.

- Knowing the fate of family and friends can provide peace of mind and a sense of closure.
- Decisions about livelihoods and shelter must be based on knowledge about labour markets, trading networks and geophysical disaster risks in areas of resettlement.
- Decisions about whether or not to accept offers of resettlement and whether or not to start self-construction activities is dependent on information about buffer zones and other regulations.

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<sup>17</sup> See also Shanmugaratnam (2005).



- Information can mitigate conflicts, fears and manipulation stemming from rumours about aid, regulatory structures and patterns of risk.
- Information can discourage false rumours about new tsunamis and other hazards that cause great psychological strain.
- Information is essential for rebuilding social networks with potential employers, former customers and suppliers.<sup>18</sup>

In addition, information is a means with which to lobby for more appropriate assistance and to hold aid agencies, village leaders and others accountable for their work. If affected populations know what has been signed in memorandums of understanding and what standards have been set for construction programmes, they have a basis to complain when these agreements are not followed or when there is evidence of corruption in programme implementation. Information is therefore a fundamental element in supporting the re-emergence of governance and empowerment. As such, information is a bridge between the LRRD projects of the disaster-affected population and the LRRD projects of the government and international community in the following respects.

- Knowing what has been committed is a way for people to plan how to combine their own assets and resources with those they can expect to receive from aid providers.
- Knowledge of the 'rules of the game' is the basis for affected populations to hold service providers, aid providers and political leaders (local and national) to account.
- Information is necessary for managing expectations and thereby preserving at least a modicum of trust between aid providers and recipients.

Poor information flow is not always the fault of frontline operational personnel. Centralisation (fuelled by pressures for upward accountability) has been a major reason for poor information flow. The frontline personnel of many agencies are themselves ignorant of their agencies' plans, which makes it impossible for them to inform the recipients of their aid.

A large proportion of the information that reaches (or should reach) the disaster-affected population is via community leaders. Especially in Aceh, there are many complaints that these mechanisms do not function well. Information about aid flows is a major source of power, and those in the power structure recognise and use this resource accordingly. One study in Sri Lanka stressed that communication skills (including proficiency in English) were seen as a central indicator of good community leadership as part of the brokering role that leaders have between villagers and outside authorities (Research Consultancy Bureau, 2005).

<sup>18</sup> Undoubtedly one of the most classic studies of the importance of information in socioeconomic relations is from Indonesia; see Geertz.

## 9.2 Participation

While a lack of information and consultation could possibly be excused during the most acute period of the relief phase, one shocking finding of the Sri Lanka Country Study is that affected people interviewed feel that they have been consulted even less in the latter half of 2005 than they were in the initial relief phase. This indicates that the common excuse used by humanitarian agencies for failure to consult with affected populations – lack of time – is false. Efforts to consult with affected populations have been insufficient. That said, there are several reasons why meaningful participation has been difficult to establish:

- The complexity of concerns of affected populations in rehabilitation means that participation demands more comprehensive planning methods than the widespread approach taken by humanitarian agencies of merely asking for lists of priorities.
- Particularly given their distrust of aid providers, would-be aid recipients use a variety of tactics to get what they want, which may involve efforts to manipulate the 'participatory planning processes' of the aid community.
- Participation rewards those with narrative skills in portraying themselves as victims.
- Many of the settlements being planned do not represent genuine 'communities', which puts into question the use of community-based planning methods.
- It is often not possible to combine essential regulatory functions with participatory processes in a pressured timeframe.

### 9.2.1 Asking for priority lists is insufficient

Many assumptions about the role of participation in humanitarian and recovery programming take the 'rational choice' of disaster-affected populations for granted. Participation is portrayed as a matter of asking people what they want and giving it to them. The complexity of concerns facing a household struggling to rebuild lives means that reality is not so simple (Wu, 2005). Affected people need to juggle a number of competing and incommensurable 'priorities' and deal with a number of unknown factors, especially uncertainties about whether or not NGOs will keep their promises. Priority lists may therefore be very misleading.

### 9.2.2 Tactical and strategic participation

Especially in the Indonesia Country Study, interviews revealed a significant chasm between the strategies of recipients (and would-be recipients) in rebuilding their lives and livelihoods, and their tactics in attempting to maximise their access to aid flows. This is true in almost any humanitarian response, but seems to have been aggravated in the tsunami operations due to pipeline pressures, uneven coverage, competition over recipients, rumours among disaster-affected populations about the massive amount of resources to be invested, exceedingly

weak downward information flows and (particularly in Aceh) the population's lack of trust in and understanding of the aid community. People are getting on with their strategies to find work, start businesses, recover their land, improve their shelter and develop their relationships with their neighbours. Their portrayal of these efforts in interactions with aid agencies may reflect tactical considerations of how best to tap aid flows rather than engagement in a 'participatory process' with their would-be benefactors. Their calculations of, for example, whether to accept an inferior house in an inappropriate location today, or wait for an uncertain but potentially better offer tomorrow reflect a calculation grounded in uncertainty.

### **9.2.3 Being and becoming a victim can be lucrative**

In addition, there are obvious advantages in becoming a victim of the tsunami. Some agencies openly and proudly state that they pay cash to disaster victims for 'participation' in planning and other exercises (ODI, 2005). There are many reports of poor people and those affected by conflict trying to access aid by portraying themselves as being tsunami-affected. Narrative skills in telling a good story about what the tsunami did to one's home and family may be richly rewarded in a dialogue with aid providers (Hastrup, 2005). Paradoxically, those who can effectively portray themselves as victims can in the process gain some control over their lives. This is not to say that the good storytellers are not always those who were also affected by the tsunami or those in most need. The important factor is to acknowledge that skills in communicating with aid agencies and in taking part in participatory procedures can be lucrative and empowering.

### **9.2.4 Community development needs a community**

Many of the 'communities' formed through resettlement from different locations do not function as communities – they are merely people living near each other, often with great tensions and distrust. As noted above, some new communities are being created by resettling people from different devastated areas in a single site. The bias within most conventional participatory methods to base efforts around community consensus is therefore highly problematic.

### **9.2.5 Participation or enforcement?**

Many of the actions being taken to address the mass displacement of populations and to ensure a modicum of attention to risk reduction require zoning and other regulatory measures. Avoidance of over-fishing requires more than asking poor people if they want more boats. One observer writes that this 'pits two cherished ideals of the aid community against one another: community-driven development on the one hand vs. ecologically sustainable development on the other' (Baldauf, 2006). With enough highly skilled field personnel, conundrums such as these could be sorted out through extensive and patient discussions and negotiations at community level. Regrettably, human-resource capacities and patience are both in short supply in many agencies managing humanitarian response, and methods need to be chosen that reflect prevailing time pressures and the skills of the

available field staff. The shortage of personnel in the civil service has meant that many struggling street-level bureaucrats are put in a position of having to combine tasks involving the enforcement of harsh regulations with support for community dialogue and participation. These types of activities do not mix well in a pressured timeframe. In hierarchical societies with traditions of strong government authority it is not realistic to expect that responsibilities for regulation and participation can be assigned to a single individual.

Participation in the form of merely asking people what they want may therefore not be a way to support their real livelihood strategies and search for dignity. The LRRD projects of humanitarian response and the LRRD projects of the affected populations are running in parallel. There may be ways to improve connections between them but, even if agencies have personnel skilled in managing participatory processes, it is unlikely that the two sets of strategies will ever be entirely congruent.

## 9.3 Politics, community leadership and power

As highlighted elsewhere in this report, the importance of good local governance is largely recognised, but the tools and capacity to deal with bad local governance are largely absent in the tsunami response. Small groups of local leaders have been able to gain a considerable level of control over aid flows and they have not always acted in the interests of their communities. Interviews show that affected populations are increasingly outspoken about their anger and frustration with bad local governance. This is a positive sign given the previous climate of fear in conflict-affected areas (especially Aceh). Nonetheless, even if the people have found a degree of voice, it is not evident that anyone is listening. There are few mechanisms of redress when their rights are violated. The needs to prevent corruption and promote transparency have been recognised from the start of tsunami operations (ADB, 2005), but the measures being instituted do not always reach the frontline relationships between villagers and their erstwhile leaders.

The humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence do not provide strong guidance for how to address the tensions, pressures and choices involved in bringing together the communities devastated by the tsunami. These are micro-political processes that require micro-political solutions. Agency safeguards have proven reasonably effective in providing for equitable distribution of relief, but assuring equity and a climate for investment in rehabilitation and development demand different forms of engagement in village-level relations. Many key decisions in the recovery process are and should be political decisions. The interface between aid and these political processes is a grey area in LRRD.

This relates to the fundamental question of how LRRD programming relates to the humanitarian principles. In the relief phase, agencies performed reasonably well in maintaining neutrality, impartiality and independence. As efforts have moved into rehabilitation and development, competing political demands have become

stronger and more complex. It has become less clear how to apply humanitarian principles. Impartiality is a more valid objective than ever in ensuring that the big investments in housing, livelihoods and services reach those populations and areas that were most affected and (due to conflict) are most in need. Pressures from politicians have apparently grossly distorted efforts to act impartially in Sri Lanka. Greater flexibility may be required in applying the principle of independence. Support to livelihoods, services and the strengthening of the local institutional structures required to ensure sustainable natural resource management, transparent land allocation and taxation, for example, all force aid agencies to join the political fray in one way or another. Those agencies that have made long-term commitments to reconstruction are beginning to find their place in these structures, but it is too early to assess the quality of their integration.

At a micro level, interview findings in both the Sri Lanka and Indonesia country studies point to two seemingly contradictory conclusions. First is the great importance of social networks in mobilising emergency response, obtaining basic needs and in rebuilding livelihoods. These networks are the foundation of the LRRD strategies of affected populations. At the same time, affected populations are becoming increasingly distrustful of their new and old neighbours and (above all) their 'community leaders'. This seeming contradiction between reliance on social networks and distrust within these networks is actually a reflection of the dependence and vulnerability that exist within these societies. Aid is not the primary driving force in either causing or addressing the damage appearing in the social fabric in Sri Lanka and Aceh. Effective response should nonetheless be built on a modicum of awareness of the thorny political economy of the affected societies.

The political processes that form LRRD are not necessarily just and equitable at either macro or micro levels. Political reform is needed in both Aceh and Sri Lanka. The fundamental question is whether aid efforts can or should retain their independent character in relation to these political reforms as response moves into more developmental modalities. While the majority of humanitarian actors see structural change as an attractive long-term goal, there are real questions about whether foreign NGOs have a real mandate to push forward such change as part of a relief and recovery operation, and whether their personnel on the ground have the wisdom, experience, and diplomatic skills required to promote such change.

# Conclusions and recommendations

## **LRRD must be more firmly rooted in national and local contexts and processes**

It is important to differentiate clearly between the LRRD issues related to the disaster itself, and the narrower concerns related to the aid response. LRRD is primarily a matter for affected populations, their neighbours and their governments. Good LRRD by the aid community helps them to sort this out. Bad LRRD gets in their way and encourages people to pursue livelihoods and resettlement patterns that are not sustainable and which intensify risks from conflict and future natural disasters. LRRD must be analysed from the perspective of how the aid response has related to the ongoing political, economic and social processes that enable and constrain affected populations as they rebuild their lives.

Most of the weaknesses in LRRD efforts thus far can be traced to insufficient efforts and incentives to anchor interventions in an awareness of in these realities. Generous levels of funding have provided flexibility, but also create obstacles to field-level learning as agencies concentrate on upward accountability to donors and the media, at the expense of upholding their responsibilities to affected populations and the national and local institutions with which they work. These other accountabilities are reliant on considerable managerial, human resource and intellectual capacities among the agencies involved. Accountability also relies on ability to mobilise international and national personnel who understand the policies, trends, successes and failures of past development efforts in the affected areas. Indeed, there are signs that there may be ‘too much money’ in relation to the capacities of the agencies entrusted with the majority of funds and their local partners to understand the real prospective impacts of their operations.

A bridging of the current divide between aid programming and the initiatives of affected populations will require a reconsideration of how agenda-setting is

managed in the affected countries. The most fundamental LRRD gaps are not between relief and development agencies (even if these gaps still exist). Genuine LRRD requires attention to how to align and harmonise programming with national actors, be they governmental, civil society, private sector or the affected populations themselves. The weaknesses in national and local institutions are immense, so alignment may have to be a protracted process, but the overall direction needs to be maintained. There are some indications that this is beginning to happen, but in some areas significant damage has already been done.

### **Links between relief and rehabilitation have been achieved, but greater attention needs to be paid to the implications of programming for longer term development**

The links between relief and rehabilitation have been managed expeditiously with a generally quick and efficient shift from food aid to cash-for-work and livelihood initiatives. Operations contributed to a rapid return to employment for most of those affected by the tsunami and enabled people to get on with their lives. Satisfaction levels among affected populations were high in the early months after the tsunami.

Over time, disillusionment and frustration have set in. Some of this is inevitable, as shelter and livelihoods take time to be established. The governments and the international community alike have been overly optimistic about rehabilitation to development transitions and have failed to consider the real challenges. This is due to lack of analyses of the markets that affect livelihood opportunities and insufficient acknowledgement of how resettlement must link house construction to the development of communities.

Aid has not been the only, or even primary, motor for re-starting economic activities. It is therefore important to be cautious about attributing either the benefits or the failures of economic development to aid interventions. There are, however, some significant danger signs. There are serious failures to pay attention to carrying capacities and productivity of the livelihoods being actively promoted by the aid community. Above all there is a failure to understand and support diversified livelihoods. Stylised and ungrounded assumptions that own-account farming and fishing are inherently more 'sustainable' have discouraged support to enterprises that generate employment. Insufficient attention has been paid to how to strengthen the institutional functions and service organisations that are needed to support livelihoods.

### **For poverty alleviation, interventions need to be better related to ongoing trajectories**

Post-disaster aid modalities and changes in the politico-economic context have affected both chronic and transient poverty. Effective LRRD manifests itself in a judicious balance of efforts to address both kinds of poverty. This requires bringing together the different principles of humanitarian and development



response and ensuring that both are respected and acted upon. Given the extent of resources available in the tsunami response it would be unwise to conceptualise this as an either-or question of whether to focus on humanitarian needs or to invest in employment and other opportunities for those made chronically poor by the disaster. There is enough money to do both. The LRRD question is whether efforts have been designed that can combine humanitarian and developmental interventions in an appropriate manner.

Progress has been rapid in alleviating much of the transient poverty that was created by the tsunami. However, tsunami-related destitution has now effectively placed a significant proportion of people in the ranks of the chronically poor. They are unlikely to be helped by small-asset replacement initiatives, and their needs are best addressed by economic development and/or social protection. Neither approach has thus far been effectively integrated into the tsunami response. This does not require simply returning to the pre-tsunami development agenda. Different methods are required since new forms of vulnerability have been revealed in the wake of the tsunami, and new opportunities have emerged. LRRD involves relating aid to both of these.

### **More consideration needs to be given to reducing risks of natural disasters, and anchoring such strategies within national structures for social protection**

Despite additional international attention and funding for early warning, risk reduction has not been sufficiently mainstreamed in recovery programming. There is inadequate NGO capacity and will to live up to the initial commitments made to pursue these aims. A primary reason for this is that natural-disaster risk reduction has in some respects become a 'problem' rather than a 'solution' due to the controversy over the buffer zones.

The risks of natural disaster remain great, as do the dangers of recovery programming undermining long-term livelihoods through destruction of the natural resource base, especially fish stocks and forests. Such issues have been noted, but incentives and control measures to stop inappropriate programming are lacking. There is a need for deeper and more evidence-based assessment of the impacts of aid programmes on environments and natural resources.

Although the aid effort has had positive and negative impacts on conflict risks, these have primarily been indirect impacts on what is above all a more macro-political process. Continued efforts to 'do no harm' are warranted, but the aid community should neither be broadly blamed nor given credit for the successes in Aceh and the failures in Sri Lanka in resolving political conflicts.

Given prevailing risks, there is a need to consider how national structures can re-shoulder responsibilities for social protection to deal with the various forms of shocks from natural hazards, conflicts and other factors. Aid needs to be

refocused to support governments as they reassume responsibility for ensuring the safety, survival and dignity of their citizens.

### **Links to the LRRD efforts of affected populations should be improved through strengthened information flow**

Information is power, and the people affected by the tsunami do not have much of either. Participation is important, but information about aid and development plans is the starting point for people to decide for themselves how they wish to get on with their lives, build their homes and re-establish their livelihoods. It is also their most basic tool with which to hold aid providers and their governments to account for making links between relief, rehabilitation and development that are relevant to them.

LRRD is inevitably a political process. Politics may be an inconvenience for aid programming and may have many detrimental impacts; it creates a range of dilemmas in relation to maintaining humanitarian principles. But it is also the foundation for moving beyond relief. Rather than bypassing the political struggles over aid resources, it is important to ensure that affected populations have the information and knowledge through which they can influence these processes. The aid community may not have much ability to stop abuse of power by politicians and local leaders, but by providing better information they can make a modest contribution to strengthening the ability of affected populations to influence the LRRD agenda.

### **Links between policies and programming should be made by sector and through support to national and household efforts to bring together relief, rehabilitation and development**

The international community and the individual agencies involved in tsunami response do not have a comprehensive master plan for linking relief, rehabilitation and development. They do not need one, but they do need the vision, modesty and contextual awareness to understand how their efforts can best contribute to national and local recovery processes. Their responsibility is to ensure that their efforts support the efforts of national actors to make the links from relief to development. At the very least, international actors should not obstruct or undermine national initiatives through programmes that ignore markets, natural-resource management and risks.

The national governments, civil society and individual affected populations of Aceh and Sri Lanka do not yet have a master plan. In a post-disaster context these links are inevitably of an emergent nature and their quality will be dependent on people having the time to 'find their feet' in the process. It is too early to assess the ultimate success or failure of this process, but national ownership is growing

(especially in Aceh) and it is likely that the landscape of the tsunami response will be fundamentally changed in the coming year.

The wider LRRD policies of the aid community have had little apparent impact on LRRD operations. Links are instead embodied in the decisions and modalities of sectoral programming, such as shelter and livelihoods. This is not a major constricting factor. The fragmented nature of recovery aid and weak coordination mean that many agencies have no choice but to 'dig where they will sow'. It is within specific sectors where the impact of LRRD reform is most likely to be achieved, just as it is within sectors that pressures for moving from relief to development are clear and results measurable. LRRD policy development will be most effective if it aims for greater depth rather than breadth. Since the primary concerns of the disaster-affected population are shelter and livelihoods, these would be the best places to start.

### **LRRD is best served by greater transparency about who is able to do what, and when**

Many of the problems that have emerged in LRRD relate to operational actors having promised too much, rather than having done too little. Agencies, donors and government authorities have felt pressured to claim to do more than they could possibly accomplish. Criticism should therefore not necessarily be directed at their failures to achieve programming targets, but rather at how these claims have led to unfulfilled promises to affected populations, and to dysfunctional shortcuts in development planning. A tragic combination of arrogance and ignorance has characterised how much of the aid community has misled people into believing that they would receive permanent houses and that a range of other concerns would be resolved in a matter of a few months.

The struggle to stake out agency turf by making such promises has superseded efforts to ensure that resources are channelled through organisations competent to take on the diverse, complex and specialised processes required to link relief, rehabilitation and development. Most agencies active in the tsunami response are certainly competent to make significant contributions to these efforts, but many have shown themselves as unable to achieve the goals to which they have committed themselves. Greater reflection on institutional comparative strengths and weaknesses would provide the basis for a more honest dialogue with affected populations about the challenges facing both aid providers and recipients in rebuilding Aceh and Sri Lanka. The incentives of the aid industry need to change in order to encourage agencies to 'get out of the way' when critical tasks require skills and endurance that exceed what they can actually muster for field-level operations.



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#### The TEC's thematic evaluations

Reference in this report	Full reference
TEC Funding Response Report (2006)	Flint, M and H Goyder (2006) <i>Funding the tsunami response</i> . London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TEC LRRD Report (2006)	Christoplos, I (2006) <i>Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response</i> . London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TEC Capacities Report (2006)	Scheper B, A Parakrama and S Patel (2006) <i>Impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities</i> . London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TEC Coordination Report (2006)	Bennett, J, W Bertrand, C Harkin, S Samarasinghe and H Wickramatillake (2006) <i>Coordination of international humanitarian assistance in tsunami-affected countries</i> . London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TEC Needs Assessment Report (2006)	de Ville de Goyet, C and L Morinière (2006) <i>The role of needs assessment in the tsunami response</i> . London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition



# Annex 1: Terms of reference

## A1.0 Introduction

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This evaluation of the linkage of relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) is part of a larger, international evaluation programme of tsunami disaster support, which is described below. A first, comprehensive report from the overall tsunami disaster evaluation will be published at the end of 2005.

The LRRD evaluation consists of three separate studies, one on policies and plans, one on interventions in Sri Lanka and one on interventions in Indonesia. The evaluation will be carried out by one policy-level team and two separately procured teams in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, respectively. The three studies will be summarised in a consolidated report, written by a separate consultant, who also has an advisory function for the LRRD evaluation.

The LRRD evaluation will have two phases, the first phase during Autumn 2005 and a second phase about one year later. The present terms of reference (ToR) cover only the first phase.

The ToR below have seven main sections:

- Sections A1.1 and A1.2 provide background and outline the general approach for the evaluation
- Sections A1.3, A1.4 and A1.5 describe specific questions for each of the three studies on Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Policies and Plans, respectively
- Section A1.6 summarises the tasks for the LRRD evaluation adviser
- Section A1.7 gives the time plan and requirements regarding reporting that are common to all three studies.

## A1.1 Background

The tsunami disaster along the coasts of the Indian Ocean in December 2004 generated an unprecedented response from the international donor community, individuals and NGOs worldwide and private companies. Massive resources for immediate disaster relief were mobilised very fast and large amounts of money became available for recovery and reconstruction.

The number of organisations involved in the aftermath of the tsunami created problems of overview, coordination, follow-up and reporting to relevant receivers of information. At the initiative of OCHA and ALNAP, a number of organisations formed the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) in order more effectively and on a joint basis to evaluate the tsunami response and the interventions carried out by the various actors.

The TEC evaluation programme will concentrate on five themes.<sup>19</sup> One of these themes is the linkage between immediate relief interventions, rehabilitation or recovery and development efforts, often known as LRRD.

### **A1.1.2 The LRRD concept**

The LRRD concept should in principle be applied in the planning and evaluation of all humanitarian and disaster relief operations. It builds on the assumptions that there is both a severe time constraint in the initial (life-saving) stage, which limits the range of possible activities, and a distinction between this initial and the subsequent stages. At a minimum, what is being done at the initial stage should not harm later efforts for recovery, or at least possible negative effects should be consciously diminished while still retaining the primary, operational objective of saving lives. If possible, humanitarian efforts should make a contribution to recovery and development processes and reduce the risk of future disasters.

The awareness of the importance of this linkage and how it affects the longer term outcome of interventions is widespread but the understanding of the concept of LRRD varies considerably. It is all too easy to see the linkage between immediate relief and rehabilitation or recovery as a simple operational sequence. In practice the different stages often take place in parallel and the linkage can be rather complicated seen from either the intended beneficiaries' point of view or from the perspective of the planner or the implementation agency. The understanding and explicit or implicit use of the LRRD concept may thus become an important factor for the long-term impact of humanitarian relief interventions.

## **A1.2 Purpose and scope of the evaluation**

The objective of the evaluation of LRRD in the context of the tsunami disaster is to find out what ideas and practices regarding LRRD governed operations and roles of the various actors, and to assess what consequences those ideas, practices and subsequent actions have had or may in future have for the affected population. The scope of the evaluation is to investigate a limited number of possible linkages between various types of operations in the countries struck by the disaster, and to assess consequences from those.

The LRRD evaluation will have two parts. The first will be carried out during the latter half of 2005 in parallel with the other four TEC themes. The second will be made one year later as a follow-up to the first study. These ToR cover only the first part. The first part of the evaluation will serve two purposes. One is to provide information on the LRRD theme for the 'one year after' synthesis report planned for the end of 2005 (see Section A1.7 below). The other is to collect basic information and to establish points of reference, particularly regarding the intended beneficiaries' views, to be used in the second LRRD evaluation phase in 2006.

The LRRD evaluation will complement the other themes in the TEC evaluation in order to present a comprehensive assessment of essential elements of the response to the disaster.

<sup>19</sup> The original ToR talked about six themes, the sixth theme constituting an impact assessment evaluation. In the event, this was not undertaken. Please see the TEC's Synthesis Report for more information.

Because of the size of the evaluation task and the number of evaluation issues related to the tsunami disaster response, and because of the problems in organising and financing a large evaluation in a short time, it was decided by the TEC members to split the evaluation into five themes. They will each constitute a separate evaluation of an issue that is important to investigate and at the same time be part of the overall evaluation of responses to the tsunami disaster by the international community and national and local authorities. A synthesis report of all five themes will be produced at the end of 2005 (see Section A1.7 below).

For the LRRD evaluation it is important to stress the learning aspect, which is very much about modes of planning and operation. It is desirable to have conclusions and lessons learned from the tsunami disaster that may be applied to similar situations in the future. Hopefully, studying this theme may also give insights to problems currently emerging in the tsunami countries and operations, and an opportunity to identify remedies if considered necessary.

The possibility of reporting on the results of interventions – the accountability aspect – is particularly important in view of the magnitude of the disaster and the massive response it created. This is a main reason for the TEC evaluation programme and the plan to produce a synthesis report before the end of 2005.

### **A1.2.1 Who is being evaluated?**

Because linkages are the subject of this theme, all possible actors and their operations should in principle be included. Also, the immediately affected people are actors from the evaluation point of view and their roles both as beneficiaries and as actors – with their own ‘LRRD projects’ – should be given special consideration in the study.

The actions of the national and local governments will be analysed in the evaluation, including their domestic, political role. In the context of the tsunami disaster the bilateral and multilateral donors have multiple roles: as conventional development cooperation partners, as humanitarian actors both in the tsunami disaster and previously in connection with the internal conflicts in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, as donors to international and possibly local NGOs, and in varying degrees as responsible representatives for their own citizens hit by the wave or the earthquake. The international NGOs are important actors as well as the local NGOs or community organs, which have mixed roles as implementing agencies, beneficiaries and political lobby groups. Involvement by the national governments and by local evaluators in the planning and execution of the evaluation will be very important for this theme in order to capture this range of perspectives.

The LRRD evaluation will be limited to Sri Lanka and Indonesia, and possibly in the second stage will also include the Maldives. The obvious reason for including the first two countries is both the magnitude of the impact of the disaster and the number and range of actors involved. The reason for later including the Maldives is that the damage incurred there was substantial in relation to the size of the country and its vulnerability to natural disasters.

### **A1.2.2 Approach and methods**

The evaluation will concentrate on five aspects of linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development.

- **Livelihoods:** Were actions taken relevant and effective for preserving and restoring livelihoods in the short and long run? To what extent have local people been consulted and involved in the rebuilding of livelihoods? Beyond the immediate rescue phase, how appropriate have their interventions been in rebuilding and strengthening sustainable livelihoods in the longer term? Were environmental aspects considered?
- **Human rights:** To what extent have agencies adopted a rights-based approach in their interventions? How have they supported different population groups (whether

socioeconomic, according to age and gender, ethnic group or religion) and how have they taken these into account in their design of relief and rehabilitation programmes after the tsunami? How have protection aspects been upheld during the period after the tsunami?

- Linkage to development and poverty reduction: Were actions explicitly planned or implemented in relation to development plans? Were immediate and medium-term actions taken which limit future options? To what extent have agencies explored and understood underlying patterns of vulnerability when designing their relief and rehabilitation programmes? How has the institutional set-up and organisational culture of agencies promoted or hampered their ability to adopt and integrate both short-term and long-term perspectives in their response to the tsunami?
- Risk reduction: To what extent are risk management and vulnerability reduction incorporated into rehabilitation plans and strategies? Are those measures commensurate with perceptions of risks and with changes in livelihood conditions?
- Conflicts: How have the ongoing conflicts in Indonesia and Sri Lanka influenced the design of the immediate and medium-term response? How have agencies dealt with the uncertainties these conflicts pose for development work? Has humanitarian assistance been provided impartially according to need?

The evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact, as well as appropriateness, coverage and coherence, shall be used. The applicability of these criteria may vary between the aspects mentioned above and should be discussed in the inception reports (see Section A1.7 below).

Information shall be collected through interviews and other forms of data gathering from individuals, families and communities belonging to the affected population, from national and local authorities, from local and international NGOs, and from bilateral and international donors. The inception reports shall propose ways to select sources and reasons for such proposals.

The various actors' selection of channels for interventions, including the private sector, for relief and rehabilitation as well as the forms for implementation shall be described and assessed regarding how they affect the linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development. Stakeholders, particularly local communities, shall be involved in the evaluation process when possible. Careful documentation of the fieldwork is needed in order to facilitate follow-up in the second part of the evaluation.

### **A1.2.3 Consultants**

The evaluation shall be carried out by one policy-level team, and two separately procured teams in Sri Lanka and Indonesia respectively. The task for the policy-level team is to analyse documents and, if necessary, interview representatives from a selected number of donor and international NGOs at headquarters on the issues listed above and in Section A1.5. The task for the national teams is particularly to analyse the LRRD issue from the intended beneficiaries' point of view. Specific terms of reference for the three teams are given below. Both the policy-level team and the local teams shall produce reports from their specific studies.

## **A1.3 The Sri Lanka study**

In addition to the aspects mentioned above, special attention in the Sri Lanka study shall be given to the following issues:

- the possible influences of ongoing conflict in the country on immediate relief and on subsequent rehabilitation plans and their implementation



- the emergence of the idea of the coastal protection zone and what effects the zone concept may have on subsequent rehabilitation plans and their implementation
- how the views of the immediately affected population may have been incorporated in the relief and recovery processes
- the interplay between national and local authorities and international aid organisations, and its possible effects.

### **A1.3.1 Consultants for the Sri Lanka study**

The evaluation team in Sri Lanka will consist of three or four persons with experience from evaluation of or research on development projects or programmes. The team members shall have documented ability to collect and analyse qualitative and quantitative data from fieldwork and to present findings in a comprehensive report. The team shall have excellent knowledge of Sri Lanka, extensive experience of working in the country and the majority of the team members must be fluent in local language(s).

The team will have very good knowledge about livelihood, environment and human-rights issues, and be able to apply solid gender and poverty perspectives to the study. At least one of the team members will have good knowledge of humanitarian and disaster relief.

One of the members will be Team Leader and will be responsible for the report and for organising the fieldwork. The team will make all necessary contact with relevant authorities and organisations. The fieldwork will, whenever possible, be coordinated with other TEC evaluations.

## **A1.4 The Indonesia study**

In addition to the aspects mentioned above, special attention in the Indonesia study shall be given to the following issues:

- the possible influences of ongoing conflict in the country on immediate relief and on subsequent rehabilitation plans and their implementation
- the problem of meeting immediate housing needs through a large number of temporary dwellings and the construction of permanent dwellings (the Master Plan says 100,00 new houses are needed)
- the emergence of the idea of the coastal protection zone and what effects the zone concept may have on subsequent rehabilitation plans and their implementation
- the obvious pressure from the affected population on donors and other actors to deliver support and its effect on plans and implementation
- how the views of the immediately affected population may have been incorporated in the relief and recovery processes
- the interplay between national and local authorities and international aid organisations and its possible effects
- the impact on plans of the area being one of the world's major earthquake-prone areas
- the effects on the rehabilitation process of the lack of skilled workers (many perished in the disaster) and the effects on the local economy of the relief and rehabilitation activities.

### **A1.4.1 Consultants for the Indonesia study**

The evaluation team in Indonesia will consist of three or four persons with experience from evaluation of or research on development projects or programmes. The team members shall have documented ability to collect and analyse qualitative and quantitative data from fieldwork and to present findings in a comprehensive report. The team shall have excellent knowledge of Indonesia, extensive experience of working in the country and the majority of the team members must be fluent in local language(s).

The team will have very good knowledge about livelihood, environment and human-rights issues, and be able to apply solid gender and poverty perspectives to the study. At least one of the team members will have good knowledge of humanitarian and disaster relief.

One of the members will be Team Leader and will be responsible for the report and for organising the fieldwork. The team will make all necessary contact with relevant authorities and organisations. The fieldwork will, whenever possible, be coordinated with other TEC evaluations.

## **A1.5 The policy-level study**

In addition to the aspects mentioned above, special attention in the policy-level study shall be given to the following questions.

- Are plans and policies regarding the tsunami disaster related to other plans and policies within the organisation and, in that case, which ones and how?
- Is reference in such policies and plans made to international agreed policies such as the Principles of Humanitarian Good Donorship and/or to documented experiences (eg, evaluations) from LRRD-related interventions?
- What possible effects in the short and long run are discussed in the planning documents and documented decisions on the tsunami interventions in the organisation?
- What conclusions may be drawn about the organisation's ways of handling the link between immediate relief and medium- to long-term development?
- In what way are needs for different kinds of support expressed in the documents?
- In what ways does the organisation normally collect information about needs and requirements from beneficiaries regarding relief interventions or development projects and programmes?

### **A1.5.1 Consultants for the policy-level study**

The policy-level evaluation team will consist of three or four persons with experience from evaluation of or research on development projects or programmes. The team members will have documented ability to collect and analyse qualitative and quantitative data from documents and interviews and to present findings in a comprehensive report. Particularly important is the ability to analyse policies and plans with regard to their possible effects when implemented 'on the ground'.

The team will have very good knowledge of livelihood, environment and human-rights issues, and be able to apply solid gender and poverty perspectives to the study. At least two of the team members will have good knowledge of humanitarian and disaster relief. The Team Leader and preferably one of the other team members will have experience of working in South or Southeast Asia.

One of the members will be Team Leader and will be responsible for the report and for organising the fieldwork. The team will make all necessary contact with relevant authorities and organisations. The fieldwork will, whenever possible, be coordinated with other TEC evaluations.

## A1.6 Adviser

In order to advise Sida's Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit on the LRRD evaluation, as well as to support the work of the three teams and to enhance communication between the teams, an adviser is contracted. The adviser will also summarise the team reports in a comprehensive report from the first stage of the LRRD evaluation.

The adviser will not have the role of overall team leader but will assist the teams when needed during preparations, fieldwork and report writing. The adviser will have extensive experience of both humanitarian relief and development cooperation, and solid knowledge from evaluations, particularly on LRRD. The services of the senior adviser will be procured separately.

## A1.7 Timetable and reporting

The following timetable applies to the first part of the evaluation, which will be carried out during 2005.

- August Procurement of consultants
- September Inception reports, TEC workshops, preparatory work in countries included in the evaluation
- October Fieldwork
- November Draft report(s), dissemination of preliminary results
- December Input to the synthesis report, final report
- January–February 2006 Dissemination, preparations for the second part of the LRRD evaluation. Prior to the start of the fieldwork each team will submit a short inception report. The report will comment on the ToR, propose a detailed plan for the fieldwork and subsequent analysis of data and, if deemed necessary, propose amendments to the original ToR. The date for the respective inception report will be specified in the contract with each team.

The first part of the evaluation will be summarised in a report in English, not longer than 40 pages (excluding annexes), including an executive summary of maximum 1,000 words. Each team will produce a report of its own specific study. A draft of the report must be submitted before 25 November for use in the summary LRRD report and subsequently for the TEC key messages report to be written during December 2005. Further details about form and delivery of the teams' draft reports will be specified in the contract for each team. The teams are also required to propose a brief plan for dissemination of preliminary results, with due consideration to involvement of stakeholders.

The second part of the evaluation will take place in the latter half of 2006. Terms of reference for that part will be formulated during the first quarter of 2006.



# Annex 2: Evaluators and contributors

## **Ian Christoplos**

Ian Christoplos is a researcher at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences and an independent consultant. His research engagements focus on risk, recovery, rural development and agricultural services. He has worked as a researcher and practitioner in both development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. He is the co-author, together with Catherine Longley and Tom Slaymaker, of *Agricultural Rehabilitation: Mapping the Linkages between Humanitarian Relief, Social Protection and Development*, published by the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute (2006) and co-editor, together with John Farrington, of *Poverty, Vulnerability, and Agricultural Extension: Policy Reforms in an Era of Globalization*, published by Oxford University Press in 2004.

The reports on which this synthesis is based contain the biographies of their authors. In summary, these are:

*The LRRD Policy Context*: Contract partner: INTRAC, UK

Hugh Goyder (TL); Cowan Coventry; Jerry Adams; Tania Kaiser; Susanne Williams; Ian Smillie

*The LKA Country Report*: Contract partner: Channel Research, Belgium

Bjorn Ternstrom (TL); Ellen Girard-Barclay; Darini Rajasingham

*The IDN Country Report*: Contract partner: Channel Research, Belgium

Emery Brusset (TL); Anne Davies; Susanne Pedersen

*The LRRD Literature Review*: Contract partner: Margie Buchanan Smith (TL) & Paola Fabbri (Background document that informed conceptual frameworks of the three empirical studies)

# Annex 3: Financial statement (approximate)

<b>Expenses</b>				<b>Rounded off</b>
	<b>SEK</b>	<b>X rate</b>	<b>US\$</b>	<b>US\$</b>
Fees	2,800,000	0.1395	390,600	390,600
Reimbursables	1,100,000	0.1395	153,450	153,500
Total consultants	3,900,000	0.1395	544,050	544,100
Management (estimate)*	320,000	0.1395	44,640	44,600
<b>Disbursed by Sida (ie, total expenses)</b>			<b>588,690</b>	<b>US\$588,700</b>
<b>Donors</b>				
BMZ (€)	40,000	1.261	50,440	50,400
Sida (Swedish Krona)	3,849,040	0.1395	536,941	537,000
<b>Donations Total</b>			<b>587,381</b>	<b>US\$587,400</b>

\*Sida's internal costs for personnel and expenses

**Please note:** the sums for donations and expenses do not match because of differences in exchange rates.



Linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) sounds straight forward; the tsunami experience has shown that it is not. Links must build on development trends underway before the disaster and must reflect the new 'rules of the game' that have appeared since. This evaluation looks at how affected populations in Aceh (Indonesia) and Sri Lanka attempted to move from surviving on handouts from neighbours and aid agencies, to beginning to rebuild their lives. It also looks at the aid industry's efforts to help them in this process.

In the shift toward development the strategies of disaster-affected people and those of the aid agencies have diverged. Most aid actors have demonstrated a limited

understanding of what kinds of interventions may eventually prove sustainable with respect to livelihoods, market relations, community development and natural resource management. There is therefore a risk that many rehabilitation efforts may prove ultimately ineffective and unsustainable.

Programming that genuinely links relief, rehabilitation and development is not a matter of agencies becoming better at 'doing livelihoods' or even building houses. It lies instead in deeper analysis of how 'our' meagre efforts can better contribute to supporting the 'LRRD projects' of disaster-affected populations, who get on with their lives regardless of international aid.

The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) is a multi-agency learning and accountability initiative in the humanitarian sector. It was established in February 2005 in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis of 26 December 2004.

This evaluation on the links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response is one of a series of five thematic evaluations undertaken by the TEC in 2005/06.

The evaluation was managed by the Evaluation and Internal Audit Unit in Sida (Sweden). It was funded by Sida and BMZ (Germany).

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