COP29, Baku, Azerbaijan, 18 November 2024
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Yours excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentleman, it is my privilege as Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – the IPCC – to address this important session. I recall participating in the same session at COP 27, and I very much appreciate this further opportunity to contribute.
I want to focus most of my remarks on the opportunities – and indeed the benefits – of near-term action. But first, a few words on urgency. We are perilously close to 1.5ºC warming, and indeed it may be that this level is exceeded, albeit temporarily, in 2024. Beyond this point many of the risks associated with climate change escalate from what we have called “moderate” risks – those that are detectable and attributable to climate change – to “high risks”, that is risks that are severe and widespread. And, if carry on as are, we could reach 3 ºC warming during this century which will see severe impacts, significant irreversibility and a limited ability to adapt.
Carbon dioxide accumulates in the atmosphere; every incremental tonne adds to global warming. If we continue with currently implemented policies, we are likely, by 2030, to have placed limiting warming to 1.5ºC with low or no overshoot, even in the long run, beyond reach. Even the most ambitious emission reductions beyond 2030 may not allow us to recover lost ground. The emissions pathway matters, not just targets for individual years.
So that, in short, is the scientific case as to why near-term ambition matters. Now let me turn to opportunities.
The argument proceeds like this. First, it has been demonstrated that options are available in the near-term to reduce emissions. Second, the potential co-benefits of these options far exceed trade-offs with other development goals. Third, we have the policy tools and means to exercise these options.”
On the tangible options, I risk repeating some of my remarks from two years ago, but the IPCC identified many options in all sectors that could halve global GHG emissions in 2030 at costs of less than $100/t CO2eq. More than half of that potential costs less than $20/tCO2eq and some measures would pay for themselves. The largest contributions to the potential lie in energy, and agriculture, forestry and land use (AFOLU).
Within energy, by far the largest potential lies with renewable energy, particularly wind and solar each of which have an emissions reduction potential of around 4 Gt CO2eq per year or 7 per cent of total emissions. The costs of both have fallen dramatically in recent years. A substantial part of that renewable potential can be achieved at a negative cost. Take-up so far has been concentrated in Europe, North America and China. Significant take-up in other parts of the world requires strengthening power grids and lowering the cost of capital.
There is a further significant potential from reducing fugitive methane emissions from fossil fuel systems. Given that methane is a particularly potent greenhouse gas, sign-up to the Global Methane Pledge could bring rapid results in terms of avoided warming in the near-term. Other context-specific opportunities with a smaller potential in the near-term include more longer-established renewable energy technologies, nuclear for those countries which choose to use it, and carbon capture and storage.
AFOLU has a similarly large near-term potential. The biggest opportunities lie in: reduced conversion of forests and other ecosystems; ecosystem restoration, afforestation and reforestation; and carbon sequestration in agriculture, for example through soil management. Within the food system, dietary shifts and the reduction of waste could also pay a role, though the costs cannot be characterised.
There are also opportunities across the demand sectors,buildings, transport and industry. For buildings, and even more so for transport, options are available at a negative cost. Enhanced efficiency, and switching to alternative energy carriers, notably electricity are the key measures. The industrial potential comes at a higher cost and in the near-term is dominated by energy efficiency, materials efficiency through circular economy approaches, and fuel switching.
The pre-2030 period is also a time to prepare for measures required in the longer term as innovations emerge and existing capital stocks of equipment that supply and use energy – power stations, vehicles, space heating and cooling equipment – come to be replaced.
In terms of co-benefits, the IPCC has identified multiple synergies between mitigation actions and the sustainable development goals. They are varied and depend on local circumstances, but let me mention just a few: air quality and consequent health benefits from electrification of transport; more affordable energy by investing in energy efficiency; decent jobs and sustainable growth from the expansion of new industries; more sustainable cities and communities though investment in blue and green infrastructure; and more sustainable agriculture and land use through better management of agricultural activities and soils.
The evidence is that we do actually know how to bring about these outcomes. Policies already implemented have avoided emissions of several Gt CO2eq, have resulted in sustained emissions reductions in some countries, and have “bent the curve” globally. Emissions may continue to rise but, without policies already in place, would have been even higher.
Climate legislation now covers more than half of global emissions; more than 20% of global emissions are covered by some form of carbon pricing. Carbon pricing has a role to play in sectors such as power generation and industry, but there is a wider policy toolset available. In sectors such as buildings and transport, where there are millions if not billions of actors, markets are less efficient and different instruments – regulations, standards, sunset requirements on obsolete technologies, information, advice and education, and interventions addressing skills, training, and supply chains – will be needed. The same considerations apply to agriculture and land use given the predominance of smallholders in many parts of the world.
And, of course, aspirations will not be achieved unless financial flows reflect ambition. Investment gaps for mitigation are larger in developing countries. But we have demonstrated that there is sufficient global capital to close investment gaps, and that there are means to redirect capital to climate action in the context of economic vulnerabilities and indebtedness facing developing countries.
Let me conclude with some wider remarks. Paragraph 1 of the principles governing IPCC’s work require us to concentrate our activities, inter alia, on actions in support of the UNFCCC. With that in mind, I have constantly reminded IPCC authors that the Paris Agreement has three goals – the long-term temperature goal, the goal on adaptation and resilience, and the goal on financial flows. These goals are interlocking – no single goal can be realised unless there is progress on them all. I will continue to press this case as we scope out the content of the Seventh Assessment Cycle report, as we recruit authors, and as the reports are drafted.
We will be emphasising adaptation and resilience in this cycle – there will be revised and updated technical guidelines on impacts and adaptation, emphasising indicators, metrics and methodologies. And our mitigation work must be framed holistically in the context of all three goals of the Paris Agreement, notably, that on financial flows.
Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. Once again it has been a privilege to address you. Let me conclude with an assurance that the IPCC stands ready to support you in your work and to generate actionable findings in support of your work to combat climate change and alleviate the worst effects.
Thank you.